federal constitutional claim in Iowa

2014Iowa v. Fitzgerald, 675 N.W.2d 1 , 6–7 (Iowa 2004) (“[T]his court’s independent application of the rational basis test might result in a dissimilar outcome from that reached by the Supreme Court in considering the federal constitutional claim.”).

2014Iowa v. Fitzgerald, 675 N.W.2d 1 , 6–7 (Iowa 2004) (“[T]his court’s independent application of the rational basis test might result in a dissimilar outcome from that reached by the Supreme Court in considering the federal constitutional claim.”).

2015“Before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).

1983See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824, 828 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 711 (1967); State v. Blackwell, 238 N.W.2d 131, 136-37 (Iowa 1976) (a federal constitutional error may be held harmless if the court is able to declare that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).

2019See State v. Coleman, 890 N.W.2d 284, 286 (Iowa 2017); State v. Prusha, 874 N.W.2d 627, 630 (Iowa 2016).

2019See State v. Coleman , 890 N.W.2d 284 , 286 (Iowa 2017) ; State v. Prusha , 874 N.W.2d 627 , 630 (Iowa 2016).

2019See State v. Coleman, 890 N.W.2d 284, 286 (Iowa 2017); State v. Prusha, 874 N.W.2d 627, 630 (Iowa 2016).

2019See State v. Coleman , 890 N.W.2d 284 , 286 (Iowa 2017) ; State v. Prusha , 874 N.W.2d 627 , 630 (Iowa 2016).

2015See, e.g., State v. Breuer, 808 N.W.2d 195, 200 (Iowa 2012); State v. Pals, 805 N.W.2d 767 , 771–72 (Iowa 2011); King, 797 N.W.2d at 571 ; State v. Bruegger, 50 773 N.W.2d 862, 883 (Iowa 2009).

2015See, e.g., State v. Breuer, 808 N.W.2d 195, 200 (Iowa 2012); State v. Pals, 805 N.W.2d 767, 771-72 (Iowa 2011); King, 797 N.W.2d at 571 ; State v. Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d 862, 883 (Iowa 2009).

2015See, e.g., State v. Breuer, 808 N.W.2d 195, 200 (Iowa 2012); State v. Pals, 805 N.W.2d 767 , 771–72 (Iowa 2011); King, 797 N.W.2d at 571 ; State v. Bruegger, 50 773 N.W.2d 862, 883 (Iowa 2009).

2015See, e.g., State v. Breuer, 808 N.W.2d 195, 200 (Iowa 2012); State v. Pals, 805 N.W.2d 767, 771-72 (Iowa 2011); King, 797 N.W.2d at 571 ; State v. Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d 862, 883 (Iowa 2009).

2007Callender v. Skiles, 591 N.W.2d 182, 187 (Iowa 1999). “[T]his court’s independent application of the rational basis test might result in a dissimilar outcome from that reached by the Supreme Court in considering the federal constitutional claim.” Racing Ass’n of Cent.

2007Callender v. Skiles, 591 N.W.2d 182, 187 (Iowa 1999). “[T]his court’s independent application of the rational basis test might result in a dissimilar outcome from that reached by the Supreme Court in considering the federal constitutional claim.” Racing Ass’n of Cent.

2004This result is particularly possible in view of the "the ill-defined parameters of the equal protection clause." Id. (quoting Miller v. Boone County Hosp., 394 N.W.2d 776, 781 (Iowa 1986)).

2004This result is particularly possible in view of the “the ill-defined parameters of the equal protection clause.” Id. (quoting Miller v. Boone County Hosp., 394 N.W.2d 776, 781 (Iowa 1986)).

1981Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 82 S.Ct. 501, 506 , 7 L.Ed.2d 446, 453 (“Moreover, the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation.

1981Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 82 S.Ct. 501, 506 , 7 L.Ed.2d 446, 453 (“Moreover, the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation.

1981Therefore grounds sup *136 porting a finding of a denial of equal protection were not alleged.”); United States v. Bell, 165 U.S.App.D.C. 146 , 506 F.2d 207, 222 (“Prosecutorial discretion in law enforcement, we have recognized, ‘is by its very nature exceedingly broad.’ And ‘the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation,’ but only so when ‘the selection [is] deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.’ ” Footnotes omitted.).

1981Therefore grounds sup *136 porting a finding of a denial of equal protection were not alleged.”); United States v. Bell, 165 U.S.App.D.C. 146 , 506 F.2d 207, 222 (“Prosecutorial discretion in law enforcement, we have recognized, ‘is by its very nature exceedingly broad.’ And ‘the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation,’ but only so when ‘the selection [is] deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.’ ” Footnotes omitted.).

2015See, e.g., State v. Breuer, 808 N.W.2d 195, 200 (Iowa 2012); State v. Pals, 805 N.W.2d 767 , 771–72 (Iowa 2011); King, 797 N.W.2d at 571 ; State v. Bruegger, 50 773 N.W.2d 862, 883 (Iowa 2009).

2015See, e.g., State v. Breuer, 808 N.W.2d 195, 200 (Iowa 2012); State v. Pals, 805 N.W.2d 767, 771-72 (Iowa 2011); King, 797 N.W.2d at 571 ; State v. Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d 862, 883 (Iowa 2009).

2020Greene v. Friend of Ct., 406 N.W.2d 433, 436 (Iowa 1987).

2019See id. 18 We acknowledge that in State v. Brown, 39 N.E.3d 496, 502 (Ohio 2015), the Ohio Supreme Court held that “a traffic stop for a minor misdemeanor offense made by a township police officer without statutory authority to do so violates Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution.” The court reasoned, The government’s interests in permitting an officer without statutory jurisdiction or authority to make a traffic stop for a minor misdemeanor offense in these circumstances is minimal and is outweighed by the intrusion upon the individual’s liberty and privacy that necessarily arises ou

2019See id.

2019See id. 18 We acknowledge that in State v. Brown, 39 N.E.3d 496, 502 (Ohio 2015), the Ohio Supreme Court held that “a traffic stop for a minor misdemeanor offense made by a township police officer without statutory authority to do so violates Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution.” The court reasoned, The government’s interests in permitting an officer without statutory jurisdiction or authority to make a traffic stop for a minor misdemeanor offense in these circumstances is minimal and is outweighed by the intrusion upon the individual’s liberty and privacy that necessarily arises ou

2016State v. Edouard, 854 N.W.2d 421, 443 (Iowa 2014).

2015Compare Iowa Code § 804.7 (3) (requiring that an officer have reasonable ground to believe an indictable offense has been committed), with Veatch II, 627 F.3d at 1257 (noting the Fourth Amendment standard allows warrantless arrests if the officer has probable cause to believe any offense has been committed).

2015In making this determination, the question “‘is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.’” State v. Hensley, 534 N.W.2d 379, 383 (Iowa 1995) (quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993)).

2015State v. Dewitt, 811 N.W.2d 460, 467 (Iowa 2012).

2015In making this determination, the question “‘is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.’” State v. Hensley, 534 N.W.2d 379, 383 (Iowa 1995) (quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993)).

2013And in Home Builders Ass’n of Greater Des Moines v. City of West Des Moines, we rejected a federal constitutional challenge to a parks fee imposed on residential but not commercial developers, and based on the geographic size of the parcel, without regard to the anticipated density of the proposed subdivision. 644 N.W.2d 339 , 352–53 (Iowa 2002).

2013And in Home Builders Ass’n of Greater Des Moines v. City of West Des Moines, we rejected a federal constitutional challenge to a parks fee imposed on residential but not commercial developers, and based on the geographic size of the parcel, without regard to the anticipated density of the proposed subdivision. 644 N.W.2d 339, 352-53 (Iowa 2002).

2012There, the Court indicated that “[u]nless they fall within an exception to the general rule, new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become final before the new rules are announced.” Id. at 310 , 109 S.Ct. at 1075 , 103 L.Ed.2d at 356 (emphasis added). 2 Teague defined a new rule as one that “breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government” or, to put it another way, “was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.” Id. at 301 , 109 S.Ct. at 1070 , 103 L.Ed.

2012There, the Court indicated that “[u]nless they fall within an exception to the general rule, new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become final before the new rules are announced.” Id. at 310 , 109 S.Ct. at 1075 , 103 L.Ed.2d at 356 (emphasis added). 2 Teague defined a new rule as one that “breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government” or, to put it another way, “was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.” Id. at 301 , 109 S.Ct. at 1070 , 103 L.Ed.

2010Justice O’Connor suggested in her concurring opinion that “[a] period of retroactivity longer than the year preceding the legislative session in which the law was enacted would raise, in [her] view, serious constitutional questions.” Carlton, 512 U.S. at 38 , 114 S.Ct. at 2026 , 129 L.Ed.2d at 33 (O’Connor, J., concurring).

2010Justice O’Connor suggested in her concurring opinion that “[a] period of retroactivity longer than the year preceding the legislative session in which the law was enacted would raise, in [her] view, serious constitutional questions.” Carlton, 512 U.S. at 38 , 114 S.Ct. at 2026 , 129 L.Ed.2d at 33 (O’Connor, J., concurring).

2010See State v. Kasel, 488 N.W.2d 706, 709 (Iowa 1992) (recognizing Mosley as the appropriate analysis under the Federal Constitution when a suspect invokes his or her right to *847 silence and later talks to the authorities); State v. Snethen, 245 N.W.2d 308, 314 (Iowa 1976) (same). 2 2.

2010See State v. Kasel, 488 N.W.2d 706, 709 (Iowa 1992) (recognizing Mosley as the appropriate analysis under the Federal Constitution when a suspect invokes his or her right to *847 silence and later talks to the authorities); State v. Snethen, 245 N.W.2d 308, 314 (Iowa 1976) (same). 2 2.

1984The United States Supreme Court has held that a valid waiver of federal constitutional rights on the record in a guilty plea proceeding is a federal constitutional requirement: "We cannot presume a waiver of these three important federal rights from a silent record." Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 , 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1712 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274, 279-80 (1969).

1984The United States Supreme Court has held that a valid waiver of federal constitutional rights on the record in a guilty plea proceeding is a federal constitutional requirement: "We cannot presume a waiver of these three important federal rights from a silent record." Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 , 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1712 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274, 279-80 (1969).