45 Louisiana opinions name it 2 courts 1969–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Louisiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Parkview Oak Subdivision Corp. v. Tridicogreen2 sentences2009See Parkview Oak Subdivision Corporation v. Tridico, 95-0604 (La.App. 1st Cir.11/9/95), 667 So.2d 1101, 1104 , writ denied, 96-0622 (La.5/19/96), 672 So.2d 921 . 2009See Parkview Oak Subdivision Corporation v. Tridico, 95-0604 (La.App. 1st Cir.11/9/95), 667 So.2d 1101, 1104 , writ denied, 96-0622 (La.5/19/96), 672 So.2d 921 . | 2 | 2 |
Parkview Oak Subdivision Corp. v. Tridicogreen2 sentences2009See Parkview Oak Subdivision Corporation v. Tridico, 95-0604 (La.App. 1st Cir.11/9/95), 667 So.2d 1101, 1104 , writ denied, 96-0622 (La.5/19/96), 672 So.2d 921 . 2009See Parkview Oak Subdivision Corporation v. Tridico, 95-0604 (La.App. 1st Cir.11/9/95), 667 So.2d 1101, 1104 , writ denied, 96-0622 (La.5/19/96), 672 So.2d 921 . | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Batcheldergreen2 sentences1990See also United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114 , 99 S.Ct. 2198 , 60 L.Ed.2d 755 (1979); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 , 98 S.Ct. 663 , 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978)." In the present case there was no showing of arbitrary, capricious, or malicious prosecution. 1990See also United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114 , 99 S.Ct. 2198 , 60 L.Ed.2d 755 (1979); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 , 98 S.Ct. 663 , 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978)." In the present case there was no showing of arbitrary, capricious, or malicious prosecution. | 2 | 2 |
Connick v. Lucky Pierre'sgreen2 sentences1978The underlying principle is that no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed." See also, Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 , 97 S.Ct. 990 , 51 L.Ed.2d 260 (1977); Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48 , 96 S.Ct. 243 , 46 L.Ed.2d 185 (1975); Connick v. Lucky Pierre's, 331 So.2d 431, 434 (La.1976). 1978The underlying principle is that no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed." See also, Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 , 97 S.Ct. 990 , 51 L.Ed.2d 260 (1977); Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48 , 96 S.Ct. 243 , 46 L.Ed.2d 185 (1975). *284 In Connick v. Lucky Pierre's, 331 So.2d 431, 434 (La.1976), we discussed the characteristics of a statute which is void for vagueness: "The fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution, as well as Article I, Section 2 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, command that words and ph | 2 | 2 |
Chapman v. Californiared2 sentences2013From these sources, the Chapman court announced and held: “before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the [reviewing] court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (emphasis added). 2000In Chapman v. State of California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824, 828 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), the court held that before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. | 1 | 12 |
Oyler v. Bolesgreen2 sentences2014See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 , 98 S.Ct. 663 , 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978), quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 82 S.Ct. 501 , 7 L.Ed.2d 446 (1962) (“Within the limits set by the legislature’s constitutionally valid definition of chargeable offenses, ‘the conscious exercise of some selectivity is not in itself a federal constitutional violation....’”); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 , 92 S.Ct. 495 , 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971) (“The disposition of criminal charges by agreement between the prosecutor and the accused ... is an essential component of the administration of j 2014See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 , 98 S.Ct. 663 , 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978), quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 82 S.Ct. 501 , 7 L.Ed.2d 446 (1962) (“Within the limits set by the legislature’s constitutionally valid definition of chargeable offenses, ‘the conscious exercise of some selectivity is not in itself a federal constitutional violation....’”); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 , 92 S.Ct. 495 , 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971) (“The disposition of criminal charges by agreement between the prosecutor and the accused ... is an essential component of the administration of j | 1 | 4 |
Bordenkircher v. Hayesgreen2 sentences2014See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 , 98 S.Ct. 663 , 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978), quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 82 S.Ct. 501 , 7 L.Ed.2d 446 (1962) (“Within the limits set by the legislature’s constitutionally valid definition of chargeable offenses, ‘the conscious exercise of some selectivity is not in itself a federal constitutional violation....’”); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 , 92 S.Ct. 495 , 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971) (“The disposition of criminal charges by agreement between the prosecutor and the accused ... is an essential component of the administration of j 2014See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 , 98 S.Ct. 663 , 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978), quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 82 S.Ct. 501 , 7 L.Ed.2d 446 (1962) (“Within the limits set by the legislature’s constitutionally valid definition of chargeable offenses, ‘the conscious exercise of some selectivity is not in itself a federal constitutional violation....’”); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 , 92 S.Ct. 495 , 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971) (“The disposition of criminal charges by agreement between the prosecutor and the accused ... is an essential component of the administration of j | 1 | 3 |
State v. Perrygreen2 sentences1995Although the current Louisiana definition of "specific intent" appears to be broader than the common law formulation in that it embraces an active desire to achieve any criminal consequences, either in the present or at some future time, the rationale underlying both the common law and Louisiana approaches revolves around subjective criminal intent, that is an actual intention by the offender that his activity lead to a criminal result. [13] "[T]he appropriate procedure in deciding a case such as this is to analyze state law, including the constitutional provisions, before reaching a federal c 1995See State v. Hattaway, 621 So.2d 796 (La.1993) and State v. Perry, 610 So.2d 746, 750 (La.1992). | 1 | 3 |
State v. Hattawaygreen2 sentences1995Although the current Louisiana definition of "specific intent" appears to be broader than the common law formulation in that it embraces an active desire to achieve any criminal consequences, either in the present or at some future time, the rationale underlying both the common law and Louisiana approaches revolves around subjective criminal intent, that is an actual intention by the offender that his activity lead to a criminal result. [13] "[T]he appropriate procedure in deciding a case such as this is to analyze state law, including the constitutional provisions, before reaching a federal c 1995See State v. Hattaway, 621 So.2d 796 (La.1993) and State v. Perry, 610 So.2d 746, 750 (La.1992). | 1 | 2 |
Bracy v. Gramleygreen2 sentences2018The federal constitutional standard for judicial disqualification is implicated only in "rare instances." See Caperton , 556 U.S. at 890 , 129 S.Ct. 2252 ; see also Bracy , 520 U.S. at 904 , 117 S.Ct. 1793 . 2018The federal constitutional standard for judicial disqualification is implicated only in "rare instances." See Caperton , 556 U.S. at 890 , 129 S.Ct. 2252 ; see also Bracy , 520 U.S. at 904 , 117 S.Ct. 1793 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Lawsongreen1 sentence2014See Lawson, 338 So.2d at 630 (“... while the Louisiana and federal criteria are generally congruent, nevertheless the federal constitutional test justifying a mistrial (and thus not barring re-trial) is more general and in some respects broader, than is the more specific and somewhat more limited conditions provided by Louisiana’s constitution and statutory law by which Louisiana trial courts may justifiably declare mistrials without the consent of the defendant.”). | 1 | 1 |
JEB v. Alabama Ex Rel. TBgreen1 sentence2014See Id. 3 The question of the trial judge’s authority to render the acquittal, while immaterial under a federal constitutional analysis, is conceivably germane to an analysis of whether Louisiana’s protections against double jeopardy might also apply. | 1 | 1 |
Monica Stroik v. Wilbur Ponseti and Warren G. Woodfork, Wilbur Ponsetigreen1 sentence2003Stroik v. Ponseti, 35 F.3d 155, 157 (5th Cir.1994), cert denied, 514 U.S. 1064 , 115 S.Ct. 1692 , 131 L.Ed.2d 556 (1995). | 1 | 1 |
| In re Coopergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Benson & Gold Chev. v. La. Motor Veh. Com'ngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Smith v. Robinsonred | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Jonesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Malloy v. Hogangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Louisiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Jackson v. Virginia
red
2 sentences2014In reviewing for the sufficiency of evidence under the specific claim that mis-identification had not been negated by the prosecution, we apply the general rules for sufficiency review set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, which announced a federal constitutional rule or standard of review, to guarantee that a fact-finder had applied the correct standard of proof. 443 U.S. 307, 316-18 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). 2014In reviewing for the sufficiency of evidence under the specific claim that mis-identification had not been negated by the prosecution, we apply the general rules for sufficiency review set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, which announced a federal constitutional rule or standard of review, to guarantee that a fact-finder had applied the correct standard of proof. 443 U.S. 307, 316-18 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). | 4 | 1982–2014 |
U. S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton
green
2 sentences2014Id. 2008Id. at 781 , 115 S.Ct. at 1845 . | 2 | 2008–2014 |
State v. Mitchell
green
2 sentences1978The statute provides: "All persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether present or absent, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, aid and abet in its commission, or directly or indirectly counsel or procure another to commit the crime, are principals." Article I, Section 13 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 provides that an accused in a criminal prosecution "shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him." This Court, in State v. Mitchell, 319 So.2d 357 (La.1975), held that the Louisiana constitutional guarantee of due process 1978La.R.S. 32:705, in pertinent part, provides that ". . . no person shall sell a vehicle without delivery to the purchaser thereof . . . a certificate of title . . ." Article I, Section 13 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 provides that an accused in a criminal prosecution "shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him." This Court, in State v. Mitchell, 319 So.2d 357 (La.1975), held that the Louisiana constitutional guarantee of due process of law is synonymous with the federal constitutional requirement of statutory definiteness set forth by the Supreme Court in U | 2 | 1978–1978 |
United States v. Harriss
green
2 sentences1978The statute provides: "All persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether present or absent, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, aid and abet in its commission, or directly or indirectly counsel or procure another to commit the crime, are principals." Article I, Section 13 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 provides that an accused in a criminal prosecution "shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him." This Court, in State v. Mitchell, 319 So.2d 357 (La.1975), held that the Louisiana constitutional guarantee of due process 1978The statute provides: "All persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether present or absent, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, aid and abet in its commission, or directly or indirectly counsel or procure another to commit the crime, are principals." Article I, Section 13 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 provides that an accused in a criminal prosecution "shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him." This Court, in State v. Mitchell, 319 So.2d 357 (La.1975), held that the Louisiana constitutional guarantee of due process | 2 | 1978–1978 |
Rose v. Locke
green
2 sentences1978The underlying principle is that no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed." See also, Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 , 97 S.Ct. 990 , 51 L.Ed.2d 260 (1977); Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48 , 96 S.Ct. 243 , 46 L.Ed.2d 185 (1975); Connick v. Lucky Pierre's, 331 So.2d 431, 434 (La.1976). 1978The underlying principle is that no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed." See also, Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 , 97 S.Ct. 990 , 51 L.Ed.2d 260 (1977); Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48 , 96 S.Ct. 243 , 46 L.Ed.2d 185 (1975); Connick v. Lucky Pierre's, 331 So.2d 431, 434 (La.1976). | 2 | 1978–1978 |
Marks v. United States
green
2 sentences1978The underlying principle is that no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed." See also, Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 , 97 S.Ct. 990 , 51 L.Ed.2d 260 (1977); Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48 , 96 S.Ct. 243 , 46 L.Ed.2d 185 (1975); Connick v. Lucky Pierre's, 331 So.2d 431, 434 (La.1976). 1978The underlying principle is that no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed." See also, Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 , 97 S.Ct. 990 , 51 L.Ed.2d 260 (1977); Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48 , 96 S.Ct. 243 , 46 L.Ed.2d 185 (1975); Connick v. Lucky Pierre's, 331 So.2d 431, 434 (La.1976). | 2 | 1978–1978 |
Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., Inc.
green
2 sentences2018The federal constitutional standard for judicial disqualification is implicated only in "rare instances." See Caperton , 556 U.S. at 890 , 129 S.Ct. 2252 ; see also Bracy , 520 U.S. at 904 , 117 S.Ct. 1793 . 2018The federal constitutional standard for judicial disqualification is implicated only in "rare instances." See Caperton , 556 U.S. at 890 , 129 S.Ct. 2252 ; see also Bracy , 520 U.S. at 904 , 117 S.Ct. 1793 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Stewart
green
1 sentence2014And we also apply the particular criteria for evaluating the reliability of 1 identification evidence set out in Manson v. Brathwaite. 2 See State v. Paul, 11-0252, pp. 3-4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/18/12), 90 So.3d 1191, 1194 ; State v. Stewart, 04-2219, p. 6 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/29/05), 909 So.2d 636, 639 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Santobello v. New York
green
2 sentences2014See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 , 98 S.Ct. 663 , 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978), quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 82 S.Ct. 501 , 7 L.Ed.2d 446 (1962) (“Within the limits set by the legislature’s constitutionally valid definition of chargeable offenses, ‘the conscious exercise of some selectivity is not in itself a federal constitutional violation....’”); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 , 92 S.Ct. 495 , 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971) (“The disposition of criminal charges by agreement between the prosecutor and the accused ... is an essential component of the administration of j 2014See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 , 98 S.Ct. 663 , 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978), quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 82 S.Ct. 501 , 7 L.Ed.2d 446 (1962) (“Within the limits set by the legislature’s constitutionally valid definition of chargeable offenses, ‘the conscious exercise of some selectivity is not in itself a federal constitutional violation....’”); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 , 92 S.Ct. 495 , 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971) (“The disposition of criminal charges by agreement between the prosecutor and the accused ... is an essential component of the administration of j | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Paul
green
1 sentence2014And we also apply the particular criteria for evaluating the reliability of 1 identification evidence set out in Manson v. Brathwaite. 2 See State v. Paul, 11-0252, pp. 3-4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/18/12), 90 So.3d 1191, 1194 ; State v. Stewart, 04-2219, p. 6 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/29/05), 909 So.2d 636, 639 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Sullivan v. Louisiana
green
2 sentences2013“Consistent with the jury-trial guarantee, the question [Chapman] instructs the reviewing court to consider is not what effect the constitutional error might generally be expected to have upon a reasonable jury, but rather what effect it had upon the guilty verdict in the case at hand.” Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 , 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993). 2013“Consistent with the jury-trial guarantee, the question [Chapman] instructs the reviewing court to consider is not what effect the constitutional error might generally be expected to have upon a reasonable jury, but rather what effect it had upon the guilty verdict in the case at hand.” Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 , 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida
green
2 sentences2010The federal constitutional immunity does not apply to municipal governments. [citing Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 , 119 S.Ct. 2240 , 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999).] In the relevant line of Supreme Court cases, the Court has held that states are immune from private suits in federal courts under either federal or state law [citing Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 , 120 S.Ct. 631 , 145 L.Ed.2d 522 (2000)] and cannot be sued by private parties under federal law even in their own courts. [citing Alden, 527 U.S. 706 , 119 S.Ct. 2240 .] Congress has no power to authorize such suits except pursuant 2010The federal constitutional immunity does not apply to municipal governments. [citing Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 , 119 S.Ct. 2240 , 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999).] In the relevant line of Supreme Court cases, the Court has held that states are immune from private suits in federal courts under either federal or state law [citing Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 , 120 S.Ct. 631 , 145 L.Ed.2d 522 (2000)] and cannot be sued by private parties under federal law even in their own courts. [citing Alden, 527 U.S. 706 , 119 S.Ct. 2240 .] Congress has no power to authorize such suits except pursuant | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents
green
2 sentences2010The federal constitutional immunity does not apply to municipal governments. [citing Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 , 119 S.Ct. 2240 , 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999).] In the relevant line of Supreme Court cases, the Court has held that states are immune from private suits in federal courts under either federal or state law [citing Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 , 120 S.Ct. 631 , 145 L.Ed.2d 522 (2000)] and cannot be sued by private parties under federal law even in their own courts. [citing Alden, 527 U.S. 706 , 119 S.Ct. 2240 .] Congress has no power to authorize such suits except pursuant 2010The federal constitutional immunity does not apply to municipal governments. [citing Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 , 119 S.Ct. 2240 , 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999).] In the relevant line of Supreme Court cases, the Court has held that states are immune from private suits in federal courts under either federal or state law [citing Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 , 120 S.Ct. 631 , 145 L.Ed.2d 522 (2000)] and cannot be sued by private parties under federal law even in their own courts. [citing Alden, 527 U.S. 706 , 119 S.Ct. 2240 .] Congress has no power to authorize such suits except pursuant | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Alden v. Maine
green
2 sentences2010The federal constitutional immunity does not apply to municipal governments. [citing Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 , 119 S.Ct. 2240 , 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999).] In the relevant line of Supreme Court cases, the Court has held that states are immune from private suits in federal courts under either federal or state law [citing Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 , 120 S.Ct. 631 , 145 L.Ed.2d 522 (2000)] and cannot be sued by private parties under federal law even in their own courts. [citing Alden, 527 U.S. 706 , 119 S.Ct. 2240 .] Congress has no power to authorize such suits except pursuant 2010The federal constitutional immunity does not apply to municipal governments. [citing Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 , 119 S.Ct. 2240 , 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999).] In the relevant line of Supreme Court cases, the Court has held that states are immune from private suits in federal courts under either federal or state law [citing Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 , 120 S.Ct. 631 , 145 L.Ed.2d 522 (2000)] and cannot be sued by private parties under federal law even in their own courts. [citing Alden, 527 U.S. 706 , 119 S.Ct. 2240 .] Congress has no power to authorize such suits except pursuant | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Hufnagel v. Medical Board
green
1 sentence2003Stroik v. Ponseti, 35 F.3d 155, 157 (5th Cir.1994), cert denied, 514 U.S. 1064 , 115 S.Ct. 1692 , 131 L.Ed.2d 556 (1995). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
F. Schumacher & Co. v. Alvord-Polk, Inc.
green
1 sentence2003Stroik v. Ponseti, 35 F.3d 155, 157 (5th Cir.1994), cert denied, 514 U.S. 1064 , 115 S.Ct. 1692 , 131 L.Ed.2d 556 (1995). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Stonum v. CCH Computax Inc.
green
1 sentence2003Stroik v. Ponseti, 35 F.3d 155, 157 (5th Cir.1994), cert denied, 514 U.S. 1064 , 115 S.Ct. 1692 , 131 L.Ed.2d 556 (1995). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc. green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Louisiana Independent Auto Dealers Ass'n v. State green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| State v. Schirmer green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| State v. Jefferson green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| State v. Bellamy green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| State v. Scott green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| State v. Romero green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Maher v. Gagne green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| State v. Mussall green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| State v. Byrd green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Fahy v. Connecticut green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| State v. Gibson green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Gregg v. Georgia green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| State v. Lowenfield green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| State v. Shoemaker green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Pulley v. Harris green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Railroad Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co. green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| United States v. Perez green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Spinelli v. United States red | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Aguilar v. Texas red | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| United States v. Harris green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.