federal constitutional error in Texas

2025In Chapman v. California, the Supreme Court of the United States held that “before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that [the error] was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967).

2018The test for determining whether a federal constitutional error is harmless is whether it appears "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." Chapman v. California , 386 U.S. 18 , 24, 87 S.Ct. 824 , 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967).

2022“Under both the Federal constitutional standard and the Texas Confession Statute, evidence obtained as a result of custodial interrogation is inadmissible unless the State proves the officer gave proper warnings and shows an affirmative waiver of rights by the accused.” Id. at 840 (quoting Hutchison v. State, 424 S.W.3d 164, 175 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, no pet.) (footnotes omitted) (citing TEX.

2022Applicable Law “Under both the Federal constitutional standard and the Texas Confession Statute, evidence obtained as a result of a custodial interview is inadmissible unless the State proves the officer gave proper warnings and shows an affirmative waiver of rights by the accused.” Hutchison, 424 S.W.3d at 175 (footnotes omitted) (citing TEX.

2012See Heitman v. State , 815 S.W.2d 681, 690 (Tex. Crim.

1992Heitman v. State, held the search and seizure provisions of the Texas Constitution warranted an analysis distinct from the federal constitutional analysis. 815 S.W.2d 681, 690 (Tex.Crim.App.1991).

2001The federal constitutional test of due process consists of two parts: (1) whether the non-resident defendant has purposely established “minimum contacts” with the forum state; and (2) if so, whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with “fair play and substantial justice.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475-76 , 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2183-84 , 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985); Nat’l Indus.

2001The federal constitutional test of due process consists of two parts: (1) whether the non-resident defendant has purposely established “minimum contacts” with the forum state; and (2) if so, whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with “fair play and substantial justice.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475-76 , 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2183-84 , 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985); Nat’l Indus.

2025Id. (footnote omitted). “[F]act scenarios that can raise a state-law claim of involuntariness (even though they do not raise a federal constitutional claim) include the following: [] the suspect was ill and on medication,” “the suspect ‘lacked the mental capacity to understand his rights’[, and] [] the suspect was intoxicated, and he ‘did not know what he was signing and thought it was an accident report.’” Id. at 172-73 (quoting Rogers v. State, 549 S.W.2d 726, 729-30 (Tex. Crim.

2025Id. (footnote omitted). “[F]act scenarios that can raise a state-law claim of involuntariness (even though they do not raise a federal constitutional claim) include the following: [] the suspect was ill and on medication,” “the suspect ‘lacked the mental capacity to understand his rights’[, and] [] the suspect was intoxicated, and he ‘did not know what he was signing and thought it was an accident report.’” Id. at 172-73 (quoting Rogers v. State, 549 S.W.2d 726, 729-30 (Tex. Crim.

2022“Under both the Federal constitutional standard and the Texas Confession Statute, evidence obtained as a result of custodial interrogation is inadmissible unless the State proves the officer gave proper warnings and shows an affirmative waiver of rights by the accused.” Id. at 840 (quoting Hutchison v. State, 424 S.W.3d 164, 175 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, no pet.) (footnotes omitted) (citing TEX.

2015Admissibility of Custodial Interrogations As the Supreme Court of the United States articulated in Miranda, “Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does ■ make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444,- 86 S.Ct. 1602 ; see Coffey v. State, 435 S.W.3d 834, 841 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2014, pet. ref d). “ ‘Under both the Federal constitutional standard and the Texas Confession Statute, evidence obtained as a result of a custodial interrogation is inad

2020“Under both the Federal constitutional standard and the Texas Confession Statute, evidence obtained as a result of a custodial interrogation is inadmissible unless the State proves the officer gave proper warnings and shows an affirmative waiver of rights by the accused.” Id. at 840 (quoting Hutchison v. State, 424 S.W.3d 164, 175 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, no pet.) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted)); see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444; Carter v. State, 309 S.W.3d 31 , 35–36 (Tex. Crim.

2018“Under both the Federal constitutional standard and the Texas Confession Statute, evidence obtained as a result of a custodial interrogation is inadmissible unless the State proves the officer gave proper warnings and shows an affirmative waiver of rights by the accused.”3 Id. at 840 (quoting Hutchison v. State, 424 S.W.3d 164, 175 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, no pet.)); see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 ; Carter v. State, 309 S.W.3d 31 , 35–36 (Tex. Crim.

2018“Under both the Federal constitutional standard and the Texas Confession Statute, evidence obtained as a result of a custodial interrogation is inadmissible unless the State proves the officer gave proper warnings and shows an affirmative waiver of rights by the accused.”7 Id. at 840–41 (quoting Hutchison v. State, 424 S.W.3d 164, 175 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, no pet.) (footnotes omitted)); see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 ; Carter v. State, 309 S.W.3d 31 , 35–36 (Tex. Crim.

2018“Under both the Federal constitutional standard and the Texas Confession Statute, evidence obtained as a result of a custodial interrogation is inadmissible unless the State proves the officer gave proper warnings and shows an affirmative waiver of rights by the accused.”7 Id. at 840–41 (quoting Hutchison v. State, 424 S.W.3d 164, 175 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, no pet.) (footnotes omitted)); see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 ; Carter v. State, 309 S.W.3d 31 , 35–36 (Tex. Crim.

2015See Barrera v. State, 982 S.W. 2d 415, 417 (Tex. Crim.

2004The failure to apply the law of a case to its facts does not amount to a federal constitutional error, but is merely “a technical violation of [a] state-law rule.” Barrera v. State , 982 S.W.2d 415, 417 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (quoting Brown v. Collins , 937 F.2d 175, 182 (5th Cir. 1991)).

2001Sand Ass’n v. Gibson, 897 S.W.2d 769, 772 (Tex. 1995); Guardian Royal Exch.

2000Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476-76 , 105 S.Ct. 2174 , 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985); National Industrial Sand Assoc. v. Gibson, 897 S.W.2d 769, 772 (Tex.1995).

2009See Schlobohm , 784 S.W.2d at 358 .

2009See Schlobohm, 784 S.W.2d at 358 .

2003Id. at 476; CSR Ltd. v. Link, 925 S.W.2d 591, 594 (Tex. 1996).

2003Id. at 476; CSR Ltd. v. Link , 925 S.W.2d 591, 594 (Tex. 1996).

2015Admissibility of Custodial Interrogations As the Supreme Court of the United States articulated in Miranda, “Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does ■ make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444,- 86 S.Ct. 1602 ; see Coffey v. State, 435 S.W.3d 834, 841 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2014, pet. ref d). “ ‘Under both the Federal constitutional standard and the Texas Confession Statute, evidence obtained as a result of a custodial interrogation is inad

2015Admissibility of Custodial Interrogations As the Supreme Court of the United States articulated in Miranda, “Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does ■ make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444,- 86 S.Ct. 1602 ; see Coffey v. State, 435 S.W.3d 834, 841 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2014, pet. ref d). “ ‘Under both the Federal constitutional standard and the Texas Confession Statute, evidence obtained as a result of a custodial interrogation is inad

1998See Hernandez v. State , 726 S.W.2d 53, 56-57 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).

1996This test was adopted by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Hernandez v. State, 726 S.W.2d 53, 57 (Tex.Crim.App.1986).

2011See Jackson Court Condominiums, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 874 F.2d 1070, 1079 (5th Cir.1989). “ ‘The con scious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement [or prosecution] is not in itself a federal constitutional violation.’ ” Allred’s Produce v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 178 F.3d 743, 748 (5th Cir.1999) (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 82 S.Ct. 501 , 7 L.Ed.2d 446 (1962)).

2007"The conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation." Allred ' s Produce v. U.S. Dep ' t of Agric. , 178 F.3d 743, 748 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Oyler v. Boles , 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962)).

2006See Jackson v. State , 992 S.W.2d 469 , 475 n.8 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Johnson v. State , 853 S.W.2d 527, 533 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).

2006See Jackson v. State , 992 S.W.2d 469 , 475 n.8 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Johnson v. State , 853 S.W.2d 527, 533 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).

2006See Jackson v. State , 992 S.W.2d 469 , 475 n.8 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Johnson v. State , 853 S.W.2d 527, 533 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).

2006See Jackson v. State , 992 S.W.2d 469 , 475 n.8 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Johnson v. State , 853 S.W.2d 527, 533 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).

2004The failure to apply the law of a case to its facts does not amount to a federal constitutional error, but is merely “a technical violation of [a] state-law rule.” Barrera v. State , 982 S.W.2d 415, 417 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (quoting Brown v. Collins , 937 F.2d 175, 182 (5th Cir. 1991)).

2000After holding that the charge was erroneous, the court of criminal appeals stated: the failure to apply the law of a case to its facts does not amount to a federal constitutional error, but is merely a “technical violation of [a] state-law rule.” Brown v. Collins, 937 F.2d 175, 182 (5th Cir.), rehearing en banc denied, 945 F.2d 403 (1991).

2003Schlobohm , 784 S.W.2d at 358 (citing O'Brien v. Lanpar Co. , 399 S.W.2d 340, 342 (Tex. 1966)).

2003Schlobohm, 784 S.W.2d at 358 (citing O’Brien v. Lanpar Co., 399 S.W.2d 340, 342 (Tex.1966)). -An assertion of general jurisdiction compels a more demanding minimum-contacts analysis than an assertion of specific jurisdiction and requires a showing of substantial activities within the forum state.

2018Under Chapman , a federal constitutional error "did not contribute to the verdict obtained" if the verdict "would have been the same absent the error[.]" Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 , 15-18, 119 S.Ct. 1827 , 1837-38, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999).

2018Under Chapman , a federal constitutional error "did not contribute to the verdict obtained" if the verdict "would have been the same absent the error[.]" Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 , 15-18, 119 S.Ct. 1827 , 1837-38, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999).

2026See Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569, 575 (Tex. 2007).

2022See Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 575 .

2015Law Texas has adopted the federal constitutional standard set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and does not apply a higher standard.

2015In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Supreme Court addressed the federal constitutional standard to determine whether counsel rendered reasonably effective assistance.

2011See Jackson Court Condominiums, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 874 F.2d 1070, 1079 (5th Cir.1989). “ ‘The con scious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement [or prosecution] is not in itself a federal constitutional violation.’ ” Allred’s Produce v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 178 F.3d 743, 748 (5th Cir.1999) (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 82 S.Ct. 501 , 7 L.Ed.2d 446 (1962)).

2011See Jackson Court Condominiums, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 874 F.2d 1070, 1079 (5th Cir.1989). “ ‘The con scious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement [or prosecution] is not in itself a federal constitutional violation.’ ” Allred’s Produce v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 178 F.3d 743, 748 (5th Cir.1999) (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 82 S.Ct. 501 , 7 L.Ed.2d 446 (1962)).

1999In determining harm, the question is not whether the outcome was proper or whether there was overwhelming evidence of guilt, but rather whether the overwhelming evidence "dissipates the error's effect upon the jury's function in determining the facts so that it did not contribute to the verdict." Harris v. State, 790 S.W.2d 568, 587 (Tex.Crim.App.1989).

1999In determining harm, the question is not whether the outcome was proper or whether there was overwhelming evidence of guilt, but rather whether the overwhelming evidence “dissipates the error’s effect upon the jury’s function in determining the facts so that it did not contribute to the verdict.” Harris v. State, 790 S.W.2d 568, 587 ( Tex.Crim.App.1989).