federal constitutional error in Texas

2025In Chapman v. California, the Supreme Court of the United States held that “before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that [the error] was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967).

2018The test for determining whether a federal constitutional error is harmless is whether it appears "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." Chapman v. California , 386 U.S. 18 , 24, 87 S.Ct. 824 , 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967).

2022Applicable Law “Under both the Federal constitutional standard and the Texas Confession Statute, evidence obtained as a result of a custodial interview is inadmissible unless the State proves the officer gave proper warnings and shows an affirmative waiver of rights by the accused.” Hutchison, 424 S.W.3d at 175 (footnotes omitted) (citing TEX.

2022“Under both the Federal constitutional standard and the Texas Confession Statute, evidence obtained as a result of custodial interrogation is inadmissible unless the State proves the officer gave proper warnings and shows an affirmative waiver of rights by the accused.” Id. at 840 (quoting Hutchison v. State, 424 S.W.3d 164, 175 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, no pet.) (footnotes omitted) (citing TEX.

2012See Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681, 690 (Tex. Crim.

1992Heitman v. State, held the search and seizure provisions of the Texas Constitution warranted an analysis distinct from the federal constitutional analysis. 815 S.W.2d 681, 690 (Tex.Crim.App.1991).

2001The federal constitutional test of due process consists of two parts: (1) whether the non-resident defendant has purposely established “minimum contacts” with the forum state; and (2) if so, whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with “fair play and substantial justice.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475-76 , 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2183-84 , 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985); Nat’l Indus.

2001The federal constitutional test of due process consists of two parts: (1) whether the non-resident defendant has purposely established “minimum contacts” with the forum state; and (2) if so, whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with “fair play and substantial justice.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475-76 , 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2183-84 , 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985); Nat’l Indus.

2025Id. (footnote omitted). “[F]act scenarios that can raise a state-law claim of involuntariness (even though they do not raise a federal constitutional claim) include the following: [] the suspect was ill and on medication,” “the suspect ‘lacked the mental capacity to understand his rights’[, and] [] the suspect was intoxicated, and he ‘did not know what he was signing and thought it was an accident report.’” Id. at 172-73 (quoting Rogers v. State, 549 S.W.2d 726, 729-30 (Tex. Crim.

2025Id. (footnote omitted). “[F]act scenarios that can raise a state-law claim of involuntariness (even though they do not raise a federal constitutional claim) include the following: [] the suspect was ill and on medication,” “the suspect ‘lacked the mental capacity to understand his rights’[, and] [] the suspect was intoxicated, and he ‘did not know what he was signing and thought it was an accident report.’” Id. at 172-73 (quoting Rogers v. State, 549 S.W.2d 726, 729-30 (Tex. Crim.

2022“Under both the Federal constitutional standard and the Texas Confession Statute, evidence obtained as a result of custodial interrogation is inadmissible unless the State proves the officer gave proper warnings and shows an affirmative waiver of rights by the accused.” Id. at 840 (quoting Hutchison v. State, 424 S.W.3d 164, 175 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, no pet.) (footnotes omitted) (citing TEX.

2015Admissibility of Custodial Interrogations As the Supreme Court of the United States articulated in Miranda, “Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does ■ make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444,- 86 S.Ct. 1602 ; see Coffey v. State, 435 S.W.3d 834, 841 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2014, pet. ref d). “ ‘Under both the Federal constitutional standard and the Texas Confession Statute, evidence obtained as a result of a custodial interrogation is inad

2020“Under both the Federal constitutional standard and the Texas Confession Statute, evidence obtained as a result of a custodial interrogation is inadmissible unless the State proves the officer gave proper warnings and shows an affirmative waiver of rights by the accused.” Id. at 840 (quoting Hutchison v. State, 424 S.W.3d 164, 175 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, no pet.) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted)); see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444; Carter v. State, 309 S.W.3d 31 , 35–36 (Tex. Crim.

2018“Under both the Federal constitutional standard and the Texas Confession Statute, evidence obtained as a result of a custodial interrogation is inadmissible unless the State proves the officer gave proper warnings and shows an affirmative waiver of rights by the accused.”7 Id. at 840–41 (quoting Hutchison v. State, 424 S.W.3d 164, 175 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, no pet.) (footnotes omitted)); see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 ; Carter v. State, 309 S.W.3d 31 , 35–36 (Tex. Crim.

2018“Under both the Federal constitutional standard and the Texas Confession Statute, evidence obtained as a result of a custodial interrogation is inadmissible unless the State proves the officer gave proper warnings and shows an affirmative waiver of rights by the accused.”7 Id. at 840–41 (quoting Hutchison v. State, 424 S.W.3d 164, 175 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, no pet.) (footnotes omitted)); see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 ; Carter v. State, 309 S.W.3d 31 , 35–36 (Tex. Crim.

2018“Under both the Federal constitutional standard and the Texas Confession Statute, evidence obtained as a result of a custodial interrogation is inadmissible unless the State proves the officer gave proper warnings and shows an affirmative waiver of rights by the accused.”7 Id. at 840–41 (quoting Hutchison v. State, 424 S.W.3d 164, 175 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, no pet.) (footnotes omitted)); see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 ; Carter v. State, 309 S.W.3d 31 , 35–36 (Tex. Crim.

2001Sand Ass’n v. Gibson, 897 S.W.2d 769, 772 (Tex. 1995); Guardian Royal Exch.

2000Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476-76 , 105 S.Ct. 2174 , 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985); National Industrial Sand Assoc. v. Gibson, 897 S.W.2d 769, 772 (Tex.1995).

2009See Schlobohm , 784 S.W.2d at 358 .

2009See Schlobohm, 784 S.W.2d at 358 .

2003Id. at 476; CSR Ltd. v. Link, 925 S.W.2d 591, 594 (Tex. 1996).

2003Id. at 476; CSR Ltd. v. Link , 925 S.W.2d 591, 594 (Tex. 1996).

2015Admissibility of Custodial Interrogations As the Supreme Court of the United States articulated in Miranda, “Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does ■ make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444,- 86 S.Ct. 1602 ; see Coffey v. State, 435 S.W.3d 834, 841 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2014, pet. ref d). “ ‘Under both the Federal constitutional standard and the Texas Confession Statute, evidence obtained as a result of a custodial interrogation is inad

2015Admissibility of Custodial Interrogations As the Supreme Court of the United States articulated in Miranda, “Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does ■ make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444,- 86 S.Ct. 1602 ; see Coffey v. State, 435 S.W.3d 834, 841 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2014, pet. ref d). “ ‘Under both the Federal constitutional standard and the Texas Confession Statute, evidence obtained as a result of a custodial interrogation is inad

2011See Jackson Court Condominiums, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 874 F.2d 1070, 1079 (5th Cir.1989). “ ‘The con scious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement [or prosecution] is not in itself a federal constitutional violation.’ ” Allred’s Produce v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 178 F.3d 743, 748 (5th Cir.1999) (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 82 S.Ct. 501 , 7 L.Ed.2d 446 (1962)).

2007"The conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation." Allred ' s Produce v. U.S. Dep ' t of Agric. , 178 F.3d 743, 748 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Oyler v. Boles , 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962)).

2003Schlobohm, 784 S.W.2d at 358 (citing O’Brien v. Lanpar Co., 399 S.W.2d 340, 342 (Tex.1966)). -An assertion of general jurisdiction compels a more demanding minimum-contacts analysis than an assertion of specific jurisdiction and requires a showing of substantial activities within the forum state.

2003Schlobohm , 784 S.W.2d at 358 (citing O'Brien v. Lanpar Co. , 399 S.W.2d 340, 342 (Tex. 1966)).

2018Under Chapman , a federal constitutional error "did not contribute to the verdict obtained" if the verdict "would have been the same absent the error[.]" Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 , 15-18, 119 S.Ct. 1827 , 1837-38, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999).

2018Under Chapman , a federal constitutional error "did not contribute to the verdict obtained" if the verdict "would have been the same absent the error[.]" Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 , 15-18, 119 S.Ct. 1827 , 1837-38, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999).

2026See Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569, 575 (Tex. 2007).

2022See Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 575 .

2015“Mere ‘conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation.’” United States v. Ojala, 544 F.2d 940, 943 (8th Cir. 1976) (cited with approval in Gawlik, 608 S.W.2d at 673 ).

1992These two essential elements are sometimes referred to as “intentional and purposeful discrimination.” * * * Mere “conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation.” [Citations omitted.] Gawlik v. State, 608 S.W.2d 671, 673 (Tex.Crim.App.1980), quoting United States v. Ojala, 544 F.2d 940, 943 (8th Cir.1976); see also Armendariz v. State, 529 S.W.2d 525, 527 (Tex.Crim.App.1975); Railroad Comm’n v. Shell Oil Co., 139 Tex. 66 , 161 S.W.2d 1022, 1029 (1942) (agency may not discriminate in the enforcement of its regulations).

2015See Barrera v. State, 982 S.W. 2d 415, 417 (Tex. Crim.

2010See Barrera, 982 S.W.2d at 417 .

2011See Jackson Court Condominiums, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 874 F.2d 1070, 1079 (5th Cir.1989). “ ‘The con scious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement [or prosecution] is not in itself a federal constitutional violation.’ ” Allred’s Produce v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 178 F.3d 743, 748 (5th Cir.1999) (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 82 S.Ct. 501 , 7 L.Ed.2d 446 (1962)).

2011See Jackson Court Condominiums, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 874 F.2d 1070, 1079 (5th Cir.1989). “ ‘The con scious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement [or prosecution] is not in itself a federal constitutional violation.’ ” Allred’s Produce v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 178 F.3d 743, 748 (5th Cir.1999) (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 82 S.Ct. 501 , 7 L.Ed.2d 446 (1962)).

1999In determining harm, the question is not whether the outcome was proper or whether there was overwhelming evidence of guilt, but rather whether the overwhelming evidence “dissipates the error’s effect upon the jury’s function in determining the facts so that it did not contribute to the verdict.” Harris v. State, 790 S.W.2d 568, 587 ( Tex.Crim.App.1989).

1999In determining harm, the question is not whether the outcome was proper or whether there was overwhelming evidence of guilt, but rather whether the overwhelming evidence "dissipates the error's effect upon the jury's function in determining the facts so that it did not contribute to the verdict." Harris v. State, 790 S.W.2d 568, 587 (Tex.Crim.App.1989).

2010Nevertheless, we note that the federal constitutional rule that "a defendant cannot be held to answer a charge not contained in the indictment brought against him" is not based entirely "on the [due-process] right of the defendant to notice of the charge brought against him." See Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 717-18 , 109 S.Ct. 1443 , 103 L.Ed.2d 734 (1989) (this rule "based at least in part on the right of the defendant to notice of the charge brought against him") (emphasis supplied).

2010Nevertheless, we note that the federal constitutional rule that "a defendant cannot be held to answer a charge not contained in the indictment brought against him" is not based entirely "on the [due-process] right of the defendant to notice of the charge brought against him." See Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 717-18 , 109 S.Ct. 1443 , 103 L.Ed.2d 734 (1989) (this rule "based at least in part on the right of the defendant to notice of the charge brought against him") (emphasis supplied).

2010This rule is also based on the Fifth Amendment's grand jury guarantee that no person "shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless *657 on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury." See United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130, 139-40 , 105 S.Ct. 1811 , 85 L.Ed.2d 99 (1985) (convicting a defendant of an offense not charged in the indictment violates Fifth Amendment's grand jury guarantee); Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218-19 , 80 S.Ct. 270 , 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960) (same).

2010This rule is also based on the Fifth Amendment's grand jury guarantee that no person "shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless *657 on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury." See United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130, 139-40 , 105 S.Ct. 1811 , 85 L.Ed.2d 99 (1985) (convicting a defendant of an offense not charged in the indictment violates Fifth Amendment's grand jury guarantee); Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218-19 , 80 S.Ct. 270 , 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960) (same).

2010This rule is also based on the Fifth Amendment's grand jury guarantee that no person "shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless *657 on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury." See United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130, 139-40 , 105 S.Ct. 1811 , 85 L.Ed.2d 99 (1985) (convicting a defendant of an offense not charged in the indictment violates Fifth Amendment's grand jury guarantee); Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218-19 , 80 S.Ct. 270 , 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960) (same).

2010This rule is also based on the Fifth Amendment's grand jury guarantee that no person "shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless *657 on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury." See United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130, 139-40 , 105 S.Ct. 1811 , 85 L.Ed.2d 99 (1985) (convicting a defendant of an offense not charged in the indictment violates Fifth Amendment's grand jury guarantee); Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218-19 , 80 S.Ct. 270 , 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960) (same).