federal constitutional error in Nebraska

2000Cf. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 457 , 82 S.Ct. 501, 506 , 7 *795 L.Ed.2d 446 (1962) (noting that “the exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation” and holding that where petitioner did not state that “the selection was deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion or other arbitrary classification [,]... grounds supporting a finding of a denial of equal protection were not alleged”).

2000Cf. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 457 , 82 S.Ct. 501, 506 , 7 *795 L.Ed.2d 446 (1962) (noting that “the exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation” and holding that where petitioner did not state that “the selection was deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion or other arbitrary classification [,]... grounds supporting a finding of a denial of equal protection were not alleged”).

2023In Chapman itself, the Court said it was holding that “before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” 386 U.S. at 24 .

1995Moreover, “before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” 386 U.S. at 24 .

2023Courts have understood Chapman to place a burden of persuasion on the prosecution to show that any error was harmless, see, e.g., U.S. v. Crochiere, 129 F.3d 233 (1st Cir. 1997), and to require that doubts about whether the standard has been met be resolved in favor of the defendant, see O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432 , 115 S. Ct. 992 , 130 L.

2023Courts have understood Chapman to place a burden of persuasion on the prosecution to show that any error was harmless, see, e.g., U.S. v. Crochiere, 129 F.3d 233 (1st Cir. 1997), and to require that doubts about whether the standard has been met be resolved in favor of the defendant, see O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432 , 115 S. Ct. 992 , 130 L.

2023Courts have understood Chapman to place a burden of persuasion on the prosecution to show that any error was harmless, see, e.g., U.S. v. Crochiere, 129 F.3d 233 (1st Cir. 1997), and to require that doubts about whether the standard has been met be resolved in favor of the defendant, see O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432 , 115 S. Ct. 992 , 130 L.

2016See, also, State v. Abram, 284 Neb. 55 , 815 N.W.2d 897 (2012) (recognizing and applying Chapman harmless error test); State v. Harper, 208 Neb. 568 , 304 N.W.2d 663 (1981) (applying Chapman harmless error test); State v. Donald, 199 Neb. 70 , 256 N.W.2d 107 (1977) (considering strength of evidence against defendant, comment by prosecutor on defendant’s failure to testify, if error, was harmless beyond reasonable doubt and did not contribute to conviction).

2016See, also, State v. Abram, 284 Neb. 55 , 815 N.W.2d 897 (2012) (recognizing and applying Chapman harmless error test); State v. Harper, 208 Neb. 568 , 304 N.W.2d 663 (1981) (applying Chapman harmless error test); State v. Donald, 199 Neb. 70 , 256 N.W.2d 107 (1977) (considering strength of evidence against defendant, comment by prosecutor on defendant’s failure to testify, if error, was harmless beyond reasonable doubt and did not contribute to conviction).

2016See, also, State v. Abram, 284 Neb. 55 , 815 N.W.2d 897 (2012) (recognizing and applying Chapman harmless error test); State v. Harper, 208 Neb. 568 , 304 N.W.2d 663 (1981) (applying Chapman harmless error test); State v. Donald, 199 Neb. 70 , 256 N.W.2d 107 (1977) (considering strength of evidence against defendant, comment by prosecutor on defendant’s failure to testify, if error, was harmless beyond reasonable doubt and did not contribute to conviction).

2016See, also, State v. Abram, 284 Neb. 55 , 815 N.W.2d 897 (2012) (recognizing and applying Chapman harmless error test); State v. Harper, 208 Neb. 568 , 304 N.W.2d 663 (1981) (applying Chapman harmless error test); State v. Donald, 199 Neb. 70 , 256 N.W.2d 107 (1977) (considering strength of evidence against defendant, comment by prosecutor on defendant’s failure to testify, if error, was harmless beyond reasonable doubt and did not contribute to conviction).

1995In Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 , 110 S. Ct. 1441 , 108 L.

1995In Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 , 110 S. Ct. 1441 , 108 L.

1983Within the limits set by the legislature’s constitutionally valid definition of chargeable offenses, ‘‘the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation” so long as ‘‘the selection was [not] deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.” ’ ” See, also, State v. Karpinski, 92 Wis. 2d 599 , 285 N.W.2d 729 (1979).

1983Within the limits set by the legislature’s constitutionally valid definition of chargeable offenses, ‘‘the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation” so long as ‘‘the selection was [not] deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.” ’ ” See, also, State v. Karpinski, 92 Wis. 2d 599 , 285 N.W.2d 729 (1979).

1982Within the limits set by the legislature’s constitutionally valid definition of chargeable offenses, “the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation” so long as “the selection was [not] deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.’” There is no evidence in the record to indicate that the discretion in this case was based upon any such unjustifiable standard.” In Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 , 98 S. Ct. 663 , 54 L.

1982Within the limits set by the legislature’s constitutionally valid definition of chargeable offenses, “the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation” so long as “the selection was [not] deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.’” There is no evidence in the record to indicate that the discretion in this case was based upon any such unjustifiable standard.” In Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 , 98 S. Ct. 663 , 54 L.