federal constitutional error in Illinois

2026XIV; Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (holding that, “before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”).

2026I would submit that, when racial bias is injected into a criminal trial, that fact alone taints the fairness of the proceeding such that we should not presume that the verdict of guilt is worth relying on, and the onus should be on the State to show beyond a reasonable doubt that racial bias was not responsible in any way for the verdict. - 26 - No. 1-24-0533 See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (“Certainly error, constitutional error, in illegally admitting highly prejudicial evidence or comments, casts on someone other than the person prejudiced by it a burden to show that it wa

1990Although our supreme court has stated, in another context involving the admission of nontestifying codefendants’ statements, that “Illinois courts have *** approached the admissibility of *** [the] statements *** quite independently of the Federal constitutional doctrine underlying *** Bruton” and that the Illinois rule regarding the admissibility of such statements “has sufficient basis in the inherent authority of our courts to announce the law of evidence for the assurance of fair trials” (Duncan, 124 Ill. 2d at 413, 415 , 530 N.E.2d at 429 ), it has not addressed whether an “interlocking”

1990Although our supreme court has stated, in another context involving the admission of nontestifying codefendants’ statements, that “Illinois courts have *** approached the admissibility of *** [the] statements *** quite independently of the Federal constitutional doctrine underlying *** Bruton” and that the Illinois rule regarding the admissibility of such statements “has sufficient basis in the inherent authority of our courts to announce the law of evidence for the assurance of fair trials” (Duncan, 124 Ill. 2d at 413, 415 , 530 N.E.2d at 429 ), it has not addressed whether an “interlocking”

2006While I would hold that defendant’s custodial statements should have been suppressed, I would also hold, as did the appellate court, that the admission of these statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. “ ‘[Before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 251 , 23 L.

2006While I would hold that defendant’s custodial statements should have been suppressed, I would also hold, as did the appellate court, that the admission of these statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. “ ‘[Before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 251 , 23 L.

2004Defendant asserts this alleged discrimination was based on gender, because gender is “the only legal difference between the two suspects.” “[Principles of equal protection are violated when the selective enforcement of a statute is ‘deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.’ [Citation.] However, so long as a statute is rationally based, ‘the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation.’ ” Brown’s Furniture, Inc. v. Wagner, 171 Ill. 2d 410, 430 , 665 N.E.2d 795, 805 (

2004Defendant asserts this alleged discrimination was based on gender, because gender is “the only legal difference between the two suspects.” “[Principles of equal protection are violated when the selective enforcement of a statute is ‘deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.’ [Citation.] However, so long as a statute is rationally based, ‘the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation.’ ” Brown’s Furniture, Inc. v. Wagner, 171 Ill. 2d 410, 430 , 665 N.E.2d 795, 805 (

2022However, “ ‘before a federal constitutional error can be held 27 harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Id. (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24 ).

2006Compare, e.g., People v. Nevitt, 135 Ill.2d 423, 447 , 142 Ill.Dec. 854 , 553 N.E.2d 368 (1990) (evidentiary error is harmless "where there is no reasonable probability that the jury would have acquitted the defendant absent the" error (emphasis added)), with Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824, 828 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710-11 (1967) ("before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" (emphasis added)).

2016Instead, primary responsibility for redrawing legislative and representative districts would lie with a new “Independent Redistricting Commission,” whose members are selected through a process in which legislative leaders have only limited input and which, among other things, eliminates the drawing of lots to break deadlocks. ¶ 73 The new system is not unlike the one adopted through a citizen initiative in Arizona with the hope of “ending the practice of gerrymandering and improving voter and candidate participation in elections” (internal quotation marks omitted) (Arizona State Legislature v.

2016Instead, primary responsibility for redrawing legislative and representative districts would lie with a new “Independent Redistricting Commission,” whose members are selected through a process in which legislative leaders have only limited input and which, among other things, eliminates the drawing of lots to break deadlocks. ¶ 73 The new system is not unlike the one adopted through a citizen initiative in Arizona with the hope of “ending the practice of gerrymandering and improving voter and candidate participation in elections” (internal quotation marks omitted) (Arizona State Legislature v.

2014“A defendant may not be put to trial unless he ‘ “has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of -6- rational understanding ... [and] a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” ’ ” Cooper, 517 U.S. at 354 (quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam)). ¶ 25 The primary issue in this case is whether, under article 104 of the Code, defendant’s amnesia as to the events surrounding the crime alone renders him per se unfit to stand trial, as the appellate court held.

2014“A defendant may not be put to trial unless he ‘ “has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding ... [and] a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” ’ ” Cooper, 517 U.S. at 354 (quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam)). ¶ 25 The primary issue in this case is whether, under article 104 of the Code, defendant’s amnesia as to the events surrounding the crime alone renders him per se unfit to stand trial, as the appellate court held.

2007See Rice v. Nova Biomedical Corp., 38 F.3d 909, 910-12 (7th Cir. 1994) (predicting that the Illinois Supreme Court would reject the tort of compelled self-defamation in a case where plaintiff filed suit against his employer alleging that he was discharged in retaliation for filing a workers’ compensation claim and that defamation occurred when “honesty required him to divulge” to prospective employers the ostensible grounds for his discharge); Olivieri v. Rodriguez, 122 F.3d 406, 408 (7th Cir. 1997) (rejecting “the largely discredited doctrine of ‘compelled republication’ or *** ‘self-defamati

2007See Rice v. Nova Biomedical Corp., 38 F.3d 909, 910-12 (7th Cir.1994) (predicting that the Illinois supreme court would reject the tort of compelled self-defamation in a case where plaintiff filed suit against his employer alleging that he was discharged in retaliation for filing a workers compensation claim and that defamation occurred when "honesty required him to divulge" to prospective employers the ostensible grounds for his discharge); Olivieri v. Rodriguez, 122 F.3d 406, 408 (7th Cir.1997) (rejecting "the largely discredited doctrine of `compelled republication' or * * * `self-defamatio

2007See Rice v. Nova Biomedical Corp., 38 F.3d 909, 910-12 (7th Cir. 1994) (predicting that the Illinois Supreme Court would reject the tort of compelled self-defamation in a case where plaintiff filed suit against his employer alleging that he was discharged in retaliation for filing a workers’ compensation claim and that defamation occurred when “honesty required him to divulge” to prospective employers the ostensible grounds for his discharge); Olivieri v. Rodriguez, 122 F.3d 406, 408 (7th Cir. 1997) (rejecting “the largely discredited doctrine of ‘compelled republication’ or *** ‘self-defamati

2007See Rice v. Nova Biomedical Corp., 38 F.3d 909, 910-12 (7th Cir.1994) (predicting that the Illinois supreme court would reject the tort of compelled self-defamation in a case where plaintiff filed suit against his employer alleging that he was discharged in retaliation for filing a workers compensation claim and that defamation occurred when "honesty required him to divulge" to prospective employers the ostensible grounds for his discharge); Olivieri v. Rodriguez, 122 F.3d 406, 408 (7th Cir.1997) (rejecting "the largely discredited doctrine of `compelled republication' or * * * `self-defamatio

2004Defendant asserts this alleged discrimination was based on gender, because gender is “the only legal difference between the two suspects.” “[Principles of equal protection are violated when the selective enforcement of a statute is ‘deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.’ [Citation.] However, so long as a statute is rationally based, ‘the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation.’ ” Brown’s Furniture, Inc. v. Wagner, 171 Ill. 2d 410, 430 , 665 N.E.2d 795, 805 (

2004Defendant asserts this alleged discrimination was based on gender, because gender is “the only legal difference between the two suspects.” “[Principles of equal protection are violated when the selective enforcement of a statute is ‘deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.’ [Citation.] However, so long as a statute is rationally based, ‘the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation.’ ” Brown’s Furniture, Inc. v. Wagner, 171 Ill. 2d 410, 430 , 665 N.E.2d 795, 805 (

2002In Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1206-08 (9th Cir. 1999), the court was presented with facts nearly identical to the case at bar: the plaintiff, who had already obtained a social security number, refused to submit it on a driver’s license renewal form, claiming a conflict with his religious beliefs.

2002In Miller v. Reed , 176 F.3d 1202, 1206-08 (9th Cir. 1999), the court was presented with facts nearly identical to the case at bar: the plaintiff, who had already obtained a social security number, refused to submit it on a driver's license renewal form, claiming a conflict with his religious beliefs.

1988See Pointer v. Texas (1965), 380 U.S. 400 , 13 L.Ed.2d 923 , 85 S.Ct. 1065 . *415 In any event, and regardless of any degree to which the Illinois Constitution's right of confrontation may be incongruent with the Federal Constitution's, we need not find our long-established Illinois rule to be based expressly on the Illinois Constitution in order for the rule to serve in the case at bar as an adequate ground of decision, independent of the Federal constitutional doctrine recognized in Bruton and Richardson .

1988See Pointer v. Texas (1965), 380 U.S. 400 , 13 L.Ed.2d 923 , 85 S.Ct. 1065 . *415 In any event, and regardless of any degree to which the Illinois Constitution's right of confrontation may be incongruent with the Federal Constitution's, we need not find our long-established Illinois rule to be based expressly on the Illinois Constitution in order for the rule to serve in the case at bar as an adequate ground of decision, independent of the Federal constitutional doctrine recognized in Bruton and Richardson .

1979In People v. Knippenberg (1977), 66 Ill.2d 276, 287 , the court said: "Before a Federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute *452 to the defendant's conviction. ( Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 251 , 23 L.Ed.2d 284, 286 , 89 S.Ct. 1726, 1727 ; Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710-11 , 87 S.Ct. 824, 828 .) `"The question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction."' Chapman v. California, 386 U.S

1979In People v. Knippenberg (1977), 66 Ill.2d 276, 287 , the court said: "Before a Federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute *452 to the defendant's conviction. ( Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 251 , 23 L.Ed.2d 284, 286 , 89 S.Ct. 1726, 1727 ; Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710-11 , 87 S.Ct. 824, 828 .) `"The question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction."' Chapman v. California, 386 U.S

2025The standard for review of trial court errors stated in Quintero derives (through People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167 (2005), and People v. Thurow, 203 Ill. 2d 352, 363 (2003)) from Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967), where the United States Supreme Court said that, “before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” ¶ 90 In In re E.H., 224 Ill. 2d at 180 , this court explained that the reasonable doubt standard applied to constitutional errors but that “evidentiary error is harmless w

2014Harmless Error ¶ 103 Second, even if the trial court had admitted E.S.’s statements in error–that is, assuming the statements had been admitted merely to bolster E.S.’s credibility–such an evidentiary error would not warrant reversal in this case. ¶ 104 Defendant confuses the standard of review applicable to such evidentiary errors with the standard of review applicable to constitutional errors. “ ‘[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) In re E.H., 224 Il

2026See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 8 (1995) (reasoning that states are permitted to interpret their own laws to provide greater protections than federal law requires). ¶ 44 F. Issue Preclusion Bars Relitigation of Collins’s Gun Possession ¶ 45 In the case at bar, the UPWF charge required the State to show that Collins (1) knowingly possessed a firearm and (2) had been convicted of a felony. 720 ILCS 5/24-1.1 (West 2020).

2025See People v. Heineman, 2023 IL 127854, ¶ 95 (“evidentiary error is harmless where there is no reasonable probability that the jury would have acquitted the defendant absent the error” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

2025The standard for review of trial court errors stated in Quintero derives (through People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167 (2005), and People v. Thurow, 203 Ill. 2d 352, 363 (2003)) from Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967), where the United States Supreme Court said that, “before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” ¶ 90 In In re E.H., 224 Ill. 2d at 180 , this court explained that the reasonable doubt standard applied to constitutional errors but that “evidentiary error is harmless w

2009Ed. 2d at 329 , 129 S. Ct. at 1454 (stating that peremptory challenges are “state-provided” rights, and that errors of state law do not automatically equate to a federal constitutional violation).

2009See also Rivera, 556 U.S. at ___ , 129 S.Ct. at 1454 , 173 L.Ed.2d at 329 (stating that peremptory challenges are "state-provided" rights, and that errors of state law do not automatically equate to a federal constitutional violation).

2003Neder, 527 U.S. at 8 , 119 S.Ct. at 1833 , 144 L.Ed.2d at 46 ; Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306, 309-10 , 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1263, 1265 , 113 L.Ed.2d 302, 329, 331 (1991) (opinion of Rehnquist, C.J., for the Court); see also Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21-22 , 87 S.Ct. 824, 827 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 709 (1967) (rejecting the view that a federal constitutional error in a criminal trial can never be harmless).

2003Neder, 527 U.S. at 8 , 119 S.Ct. at 1833 , 144 L.Ed.2d at 46 ; Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306, 309-10 , 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1263, 1265 , 113 L.Ed.2d 302, 329, 331 (1991) (opinion of Rehnquist, C.J., for the Court); see also Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21-22 , 87 S.Ct. 824, 827 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 709 (1967) (rejecting the view that a federal constitutional error in a criminal trial can never be harmless).