federal constitutional error in Idaho

1985Bistline, J., the author of LePage, supra, wrote separately to clarify the Chapman standard: If the Arizona Supreme Court and other state courts are obligated to, and do, apply the Chapman [v. California, 386 U.S. 18 [ 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 ] (1967) ] rule, then this Court, too, “before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” This in turn does not mean that this Court can speculate what a jury might have done absent the constitutional error committed, but rather requires “the beneficiary of a

1985Bistline, J., the author of LePage, supra, wrote separately to clarify the Chapman standard: If the Arizona Supreme Court and other state courts are obligated to, and do, apply the Chapman [v. California, 386 U.S. 18 [ 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 ] (1967) ] rule, then this Court, too, “before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” This in turn does not mean that this Court can speculate what a jury might have done absent the constitutional error committed, but rather requires “the beneficiary of a

1985Our Supreme Court has held that “[t]he standard for determining whether error of constitutional dimension is ‘harmless,’ as set forth in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), is ‘that before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” State v. LePage, 102 Idaho 387, 393 , 630 P.2d 674, 680 (1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1051 , 102 S.Ct. 606 , 70 L.Ed.2d 595 (1981).

1985Our Supreme Court has held that "[t]he standard for determining whether error of constitutional dimension is `harmless,' as set forth in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), is `that before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.'" State v. LePage, 102 Idaho 387, 393 , 630 P.2d 674, 680 (1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1051 , 102 S.Ct. 606 , 70 L.Ed.2d 595 (1981).

1985Our Supreme Court has held that “[t]he standard for determining whether error of constitutional dimension is ‘harmless,’ as set forth in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), is ‘that before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” State v. LePage, 102 Idaho 387, 393 , 630 P.2d 674, 680 (1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1051 , 102 S.Ct. 606 , 70 L.Ed.2d 595 (1981).

1985Our Supreme Court has held that "[t]he standard for determining whether error of constitutional dimension is `harmless,' as set forth in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), is `that before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.'" State v. LePage, 102 Idaho 387, 393 , 630 P.2d 674, 680 (1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1051 , 102 S.Ct. 606 , 70 L.Ed.2d 595 (1981).

1985Our Supreme Court has held that “[t]he standard for determining whether error of constitutional dimension is ‘harmless,’ as set forth in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), is ‘that before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” State v. LePage, 102 Idaho 387, 393 , 630 P.2d 674, 680 (1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1051 , 102 S.Ct. 606 , 70 L.Ed.2d 595 (1981).

1985Our Supreme Court has held that "[t]he standard for determining whether error of constitutional dimension is `harmless,' as set forth in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), is `that before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.'" State v. LePage, 102 Idaho 387, 393 , 630 P.2d 674, 680 (1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1051 , 102 S.Ct. 606 , 70 L.Ed.2d 595 (1981).

2020As we observed in Perry, the U.S. Supreme Court in Chapman reviewed California’s harmless error standard, and rejected California’s “over-reliance on the ‘overwhelming evidence’ standard.” 10 Perry, 150 Idaho at 223, 245 P.3d at 975 (citing Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23 ). 8 The United States Supreme Court held that “before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24 .

2020As we observed in Perry, the U.S. Supreme Court in Chapman reviewed California’s harmless error standard, and rejected California’s “over-reliance on the ‘overwhelming evidence’ standard.” 10 Perry, 150 Idaho at 223, 245 P.3d at 975 (citing Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23).8 The United States Supreme Court held that “before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.

2005In addition, the federal district court relied on Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 , 110 S.Ct. 3047 , 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990) in concluding that there was no constitutional requirement that a jury must impose the death penalty or make findings as a prerequisite.

2005In addition, the federal district court relied on Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 , 110 S.Ct. 3047 , 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990) in concluding that there was no constitutional requirement that a jury must impose the death penalty or make findings as a prerequisite.

2002Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 , 93 S.Ct. 979 , 35 L.Ed.2d 320 (1973).

2002Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 , 93 S.Ct. 979 , 35 L.Ed.2d 320 (1973).

1991Prosecutorial misconduct reaches the level of a federal constitutional violation only if the argument “so infect[s] the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 , 94 S.Ct. 1868 , 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974).

1991Prosecutorial misconduct reaches the level of a federal constitutional violation only if the argument “so infect[s] the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 , 94 S.Ct. 1868 , 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974).

1990Recently, in *16 Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249 , 108 S.Ct. 1792 , 100 L.Ed.2d 284 (1988), the Supreme Court held that admission of a presentencing psychiatric examination conducted in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in a capital case did not constitute harmless error.

1990Recently, in *16 Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249 , 108 S.Ct. 1792 , 100 L.Ed.2d 284 (1988), the Supreme Court held that admission of a presentencing psychiatric examination conducted in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in a capital case did not constitute harmless error.

1989This test parallels the harmless error test applied in federal courts as stated in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824, 828 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) ("before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.") ( Cited in Coy v. Iowa, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 2798, 2803 , 101 L.Ed.2d 857 (1988).) The existence of sexual abuse, the existence of the crime charged, was evidenced by Dr. Jambura's testimony regarding his medical examination of the younger Wright girl.

1989This test parallels the harmless error test applied in federal courts as stated in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824, 828 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) ("before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.") ( Cited in Coy v. Iowa, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 2798, 2803 , 101 L.Ed.2d 857 (1988).) The existence of sexual abuse, the existence of the crime charged, was evidenced by Dr. Jambura's testimony regarding his medical examination of the younger Wright girl.

1985Bistline, J., the author of LePage, supra, wrote separately to clarify the Chapman standard: If the Arizona Supreme Court and other state courts are obligated to, and do, apply the Chapman [v. California, 386 U.S. 18 [ 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 ] (1967) ] rule, then this Court, too, “before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” This in turn does not mean that this Court can speculate what a jury might have done absent the constitutional error committed, but rather requires “the beneficiary of a

1985In determining whether admission of the evidence was prejudicial, we are guided by the case of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), which we have rather consistently fol lowed, most recently in State v. Hoak, 107 Idaho 742 , 692 P.2d 1174 (1984), where the majority held: The standard for determining whether an error of constitutional dimension is harmless is “that before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. LePage, 102 Idaho 387 , 630 P.2d 6

1985In determining whether admission of the evidence was prejudicial, we are guided by the case of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), which we have rather consistently fol lowed, most recently in State v. Hoak, 107 Idaho 742 , 692 P.2d 1174 (1984), where the majority held: The standard for determining whether an error of constitutional dimension is harmless is “that before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. LePage, 102 Idaho 387 , 630 P.2d 6

1983When a federal constitutional error is committed, the “appellate court must determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict.” Id.

1980In Oyler the Supreme Court made clear that "the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation." 368 U.S. at 456 , 82 S.Ct. at 506 .

1980In Oyler the Supreme Court made clear that "the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation." 368 U.S. at 456 , 82 S.Ct. at 506 .

1970The same contention has been made and rejected in the following cases: Moreno-Vallejo v. United States, supra; People v. Jones, supra; People v. Nugara, supra; People v. Brown, supra; State v. Hock, supra; and United States v. Dento, supra. Further, the Court in Cooper based its holding on the federal constitutional rule and could not have based it on the California statute since in fact the California courts have held that the statute does not authorize a search.