federal constitutional test in Maryland

1995Although the “conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation,” the selection process cannot be deliberately “based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.” Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 457 , 82 S.Ct. 501, 506 , 7 L.Ed.2d 446 (1962).

1995Although the “conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation,” the selection process cannot be deliberately “based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.” Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 457 , 82 S.Ct. 501, 506 , 7 L.Ed.2d 446 (1962).

1987"The federal constitutional test with respect to the judge’s preliminary decision is that of a preponderance of the evidence, Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 [ 92 S.Ct. 619 , 30 L.Ed.2d 618 ] (1972), and the test with respect to a final determination by the trier of fact is beyond a reasonable doubt, Linkins v. State, 202 Md. 212, 223 , 96 A.2d 246 (1953).” Kidd, 281 Md. at 38 , 375 A.2d at 1109 .

1987"The federal constitutional test with respect to the judge’s preliminary decision is that of a preponderance of the evidence, Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 [ 92 S.Ct. 619 , 30 L.Ed.2d 618 ] (1972), and the test with respect to a final determination by the trier of fact is beyond a reasonable doubt, Linkins v. State, 202 Md. 212, 223 , 96 A.2d 246 (1953).” Kidd, 281 Md. at 38 , 375 A.2d at 1109 .

1987"The federal constitutional test with respect to the judge’s preliminary decision is that of a preponderance of the evidence, Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 [ 92 S.Ct. 619 , 30 L.Ed.2d 618 ] (1972), and the test with respect to a final determination by the trier of fact is beyond a reasonable doubt, Linkins v. State, 202 Md. 212, 223 , 96 A.2d 246 (1953).” Kidd, 281 Md. at 38 , 375 A.2d at 1109 .

1987"The federal constitutional test with respect to the judge’s preliminary decision is that of a preponderance of the evidence, Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 [ 92 S.Ct. 619 , 30 L.Ed.2d 618 ] (1972), and the test with respect to a final determination by the trier of fact is beyond a reasonable doubt, Linkins v. State, 202 Md. 212, 223 , 96 A.2d 246 (1953).” Kidd, 281 Md. at 38 , 375 A.2d at 1109 .

2022Benisek v. Lamone, 241 F. Supp. 3d 566 (D.

2022Benisek v. Lamone, 241 F. Supp. 3d 566 (D.

2026“The primary difference between the federal constitutional test and the Maryland common law test is ‘that constitutional voluntariness does not require that all promises, threats, or inducements render a confession involuntary; instead, the federal constitution requires only that courts consider promises, threats, or inducements as part of the totality of the circumstances that courts must look at to determine voluntariness.’” Covel v. State, 258 Md. App. 308 , 326 (2023) (first quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 , 285-86 (1991); then citing Lee, 418 Md. at 159-60).

2026“Courts that are asked to determine at a suppression hearing whether a confession was made voluntarily must examine the totality of the circumstances affecting the interrogation and the confession.” Hill, 418 Md. at 75 (citing Knight, 381 Md. at 532 ).

2026“Courts that are asked to determine at a suppression hearing whether a confession was made voluntarily must examine the totality of the circumstances affecting the interrogation and the confession.” Hill, 418 Md. at 75 (citing Knight, 381 Md. at 532 ).

2018Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp. , 532 U.S. 424 , 431, 121 S.Ct. 1678 , 149 L.Ed.2d 674 (2001).

2018Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp. , 532 U.S. 424 , 431, 121 S.Ct. 1678 , 149 L.Ed.2d 674 (2001).

2016Legal Proceedings In its memorandum order dismissing the federal claims and remanding the remaining state law claims, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland ruled that Morales failed to state a federal constitutional claim against the County because he did not allege facts showing “that Richardson’s actions ... were taken ‘under color of state law.’ ” 841 F.Supp.2d at 913 .

2013United States v. Henry is to be contrasted with Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 , 106 S.Ct. 2616 , 91 L.Ed.2d 364 (1986), a case wherein the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not violated because the undercover fellow prisoner, instead of inducing conversation, acted only as a "passive listening post.” .

2013United States v. Henry is to be contrasted with Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 , 106 S.Ct. 2616 , 91 L.Ed.2d 364 (1986), a case wherein the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not violated because the undercover fellow prisoner, instead of inducing conversation, acted only as a "passive listening post.” .

2012As earlier pointed out, several years after the Stevenson and Montgomery cases, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Jenkins v. Hutchinson, supra, 221 F.3d 679 , held that a state trial judge’s jury instructions, which, inter alia, allowed the jury to reject the reasonable doubt instruction required by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

2012As earlier pointed out, several years after the Stevenson and Montgomery cases, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Jenkins v. Hutchinson, supra, 221 F.3d 679 , held that a state trial judge’s jury instructions, which, inter alia, allowed the jury to reject the reasonable doubt instruction required by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

2006These standards are consistent with the federal constitutional principle that the stop of a motorist on the basis of probable cause, or reasonable suspicion that the motorist was engaged in conduct in violation of the criminal law, are constitutionally reasonable when measured against an “objective standard.” See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654 , 99 S.Ct. at 1396 , 59 L.Ed.2d at 668 .

2006These standards are consistent with the federal constitutional principle that the stop of a motorist on the basis of probable cause, or reasonable suspicion that the motorist was engaged in conduct in violation of the criminal law, are constitutionally reasonable when measured against an “objective standard.” See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654 , 99 S.Ct. at 1396 , 59 L.Ed.2d at 668 .

2005Appellant argues that in Prince v. State, 131 Md.App. 296 , 748 A.2d 1078 (2000), precedent at the time of appellant’s trial, we held that the “tender years” statute’s incorporation of a multi-factor test to guarantee the trustworthiness of the child victim’s statement satisfied constitutional requirements, and therefore, admission of out-of-court statements pursuant to the statute did not violate the Confrontation Clause.

2005Appellant argues that in Prince v. State, 131 Md.App. 296 , 748 A.2d 1078 (2000), precedent at the time of appellant’s trial, we held that the “tender years” statute’s incorporation of a multi-factor test to guarantee the trustworthiness of the child victim’s statement satisfied constitutional requirements, and therefore, admission of out-of-court statements pursuant to the statute did not violate the Confrontation Clause.

2005The justification for permitting an award of attorney’s fees in section 1988 cases when the plaintiff prevails on a state claim and a federal constitutional claim remains undecided, is “to avoid penalizing a litigant for the fact that courts are properly reluctant to resolve constitutional questions if a nonconstitutional claim is dispositive.” Doe, supra, 300 Md. at 457 , 479 A.2d 352 (quoting Smith, supra, 468 U.S. at 1007 , 104 S.Ct. 3457 ).

2005The justification for permitting an award of attorney’s fees in section 1988 cases when the plaintiff prevails on a state claim and a federal constitutional claim remains undecided, is “to avoid penalizing a litigant for the fact that courts are properly reluctant to resolve constitutional questions if a nonconstitutional claim is dispositive.” Doe, supra, 300 Md. at 457 , 479 A.2d 352 (quoting Smith, supra, 468 U.S. at 1007 , 104 S.Ct. 3457 ).

2005In determining whether the federal constitutional claim was substantial, the Court noted that federal courts cannot hear cases otherwise within their jurisdiction if they are “ ‘so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit....”’ Id. at 536-37 , 94 S.Ct. 1372 (quoting Newburyport Water Co. v. Newburyport, 193 U.S. 561, 579 , 24 S.Ct. 553 , 48 L.Ed. 795 (1904)).

2005In determining whether the federal constitutional claim was substantial, the Court noted that federal courts cannot hear cases otherwise within their jurisdiction if they are “ ‘so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit....”’ Id. at 536-37 , 94 S.Ct. 1372 (quoting Newburyport Water Co. v. Newburyport, 193 U.S. 561, 579 , 24 S.Ct. 553 , 48 L.Ed. 795 (1904)).

2005The Court further cited to Ex Parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30 , 54 S.Ct. 3 , 78 L.Ed. 152 (1933), for the proposition that a claim may be insubstantial if “it is ‘obviously without merit’ or because ‘its unsoundness so clearly results from the previous decisions of this court as to foreclose the subject and leave no room for the inference that the question sought to be raised can be the subject of controversy.’” Hagans, supra, 415 U.S. at 537 , 94 S.Ct. 1372 (quoting Poresky, supra,, 290 U.S. at 32 , 54 S.Ct. 3 ).

2005The Court further cited to Ex Parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30 , 54 S.Ct. 3 , 78 L.Ed. 152 (1933), for the proposition that a claim may be insubstantial if “it is ‘obviously without merit’ or because ‘its unsoundness so clearly results from the previous decisions of this court as to foreclose the subject and leave no room for the inference that the question sought to be raised can be the subject of controversy.’” Hagans, supra, 415 U.S. at 537 , 94 S.Ct. 1372 (quoting Poresky, supra,, 290 U.S. at 32 , 54 S.Ct. 3 ).

2005The justification for permitting an award of attorney’s fees in section 1988 cases when the plaintiff prevails on a state claim and a federal constitutional claim remains undecided, is “to avoid penalizing a litigant for the fact that courts are properly reluctant to resolve constitutional questions if a nonconstitutional claim is dispositive.” Doe, supra, 300 Md. at 457 , 479 A.2d 352 (quoting Smith, supra, 468 U.S. at 1007 , 104 S.Ct. 3457 ).

2005The justification for permitting an award of attorney’s fees in section 1988 cases when the plaintiff prevails on a state claim and a federal constitutional claim remains undecided, is “to avoid penalizing a litigant for the fact that courts are properly reluctant to resolve constitutional questions if a nonconstitutional claim is dispositive.” Doe, supra, 300 Md. at 457 , 479 A.2d 352 (quoting Smith, supra, 468 U.S. at 1007 , 104 S.Ct. 3457 ).

2005The Court further cited to Ex Parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30 , 54 S.Ct. 3 , 78 L.Ed. 152 (1933), for the proposition that a claim may be insubstantial if “it is ‘obviously without merit’ or because ‘its unsoundness so clearly results from the previous decisions of this court as to foreclose the subject and leave no room for the inference that the question sought to be raised can be the subject of controversy.’” Hagans, supra, 415 U.S. at 537 , 94 S.Ct. 1372 (quoting Poresky, supra,, 290 U.S. at 32 , 54 S.Ct. 3 ).

2005In determining whether the federal constitutional claim was substantial, the Court noted that federal courts cannot hear cases otherwise within their jurisdiction if they are “ ‘so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit....”’ Id. at 536-37 , 94 S.Ct. 1372 (quoting Newburyport Water Co. v. Newburyport, 193 U.S. 561, 579 , 24 S.Ct. 553 , 48 L.Ed. 795 (1904)).

2004Allen v. State, 318 Md. 166, 179-80 , 567 A.2d 118 (1989).

2004Allen v. State, 318 Md. 166, 179-80 , 567 A.2d 118 (1989).

2002We have only found three Supreme Court opinions, in something other than a death penalty case, involving an Eighth Amendment analysis of the length of a prison sentence: Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 , 100 S.Ct. 1133 , 63 L.Ed.2d 382 (1980); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 , 103 S.Ct. 3001 , 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 , 111 S.Ct. 2680 , 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991).

2002We have only found three Supreme Court opinions, in something other than a death penalty case, involving an Eighth Amendment analysis of the length of a prison sentence: Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 , 100 S.Ct. 1133 , 63 L.Ed.2d 382 (1980); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 , 103 S.Ct. 3001 , 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 , 111 S.Ct. 2680 , 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991).

2002We have only found three Supreme Court opinions, in something other than a death penalty case, involving an Eighth Amendment analysis of the length of a prison sentence: Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 , 100 S.Ct. 1133 , 63 L.Ed.2d 382 (1980); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 , 103 S.Ct. 3001 , 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 , 111 S.Ct. 2680 , 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991).

2002We have only found three Supreme Court opinions, in something other than a death penalty case, involving an Eighth Amendment analysis of the length of a prison sentence: Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 , 100 S.Ct. 1133 , 63 L.Ed.2d 382 (1980); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 , 103 S.Ct. 3001 , 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 , 111 S.Ct. 2680 , 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991).

2002We have only found three Supreme Court opinions, in something other than a death penalty case, involving an Eighth Amendment analysis of the length of a prison sentence: Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 , 100 S.Ct. 1133 , 63 L.Ed.2d 382 (1980); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 , 103 S.Ct. 3001 , 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 , 111 S.Ct. 2680 , 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991).

2002We have only found three Supreme Court opinions, in something other than a death penalty case, involving an Eighth Amendment analysis of the length of a prison sentence: Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 , 100 S.Ct. 1133 , 63 L.Ed.2d 382 (1980); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 , 103 S.Ct. 3001 , 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 , 111 S.Ct. 2680 , 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991).