Free, and it takes a minute. A syfert.com account skips the bot checks on search and case pages, keeps your details and plan under the account icon, and comes with an MCP token for Claude, ChatGPT or any MCP-capable assistant, emailed to you with a link to the setup page and always available from the account icon.
Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
25 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1968–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Chapman v. Californiared2 sentences2015Cf. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) (holding that before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless the reviewing court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). 2015Cf. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) (holding that before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless the reviewing court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). | 3 | 14 |
Orix Capital Markets, LLC v. American Realty Trust, Inc.green2 sentences2014Compare, e.g., Rivera v. Illinois, 556 U.S. 148, 161-62 , 129 S.Ct. 1446 , 173 L.Ed.2d 320 (2009) (noting line of cases “in which federal judges or tribunals lacked statutory authority to adjudicate the controversy” and Supreme Court “held the resulting judgment ... invalid as a matter of federal law”; “Absent a federal constitutional violation, States retain the prerogative to decide whether such errors deprive a tribunal of its lawful authority and thus require automatic reversal.”), with, e.g., Orix Capital Mkts., LLC v. American Realty Trust, Inc., 356 S.W.3d 748, 750-55 (Tex.App. 2011) (d 2014Compare, e.g., Rivera v. Illinois, 556 U.S. 148, 161-62 (2009) (noting line of cases “in which federal judges or tribunals lacked statutory authority to adjudicate the controversy” and Supreme Court “held the resulting judgment . . . invalid as a matter of federal law”; “Absent a federal constitutional violation, States retain the prerogative to decide whether such errors deprive a tribunal of its lawful authority and thus require automatic reversal.”), with, e.g., Orix Capital Mkts., LLC v. American Realty Trust, Inc., 356 S.W.3d 748, 750-55 (Tex. App. 2011) (denying relief to litigant collat | 2 | 2 |
Rivera v. Illinoisgreen2 sentences2014Compare, e.g., Rivera v. Illinois, 556 U.S. 148, 161-62 , 129 S.Ct. 1446 , 173 L.Ed.2d 320 (2009) (noting line of cases “in which federal judges or tribunals lacked statutory authority to adjudicate the controversy” and Supreme Court “held the resulting judgment ... invalid as a matter of federal law”; “Absent a federal constitutional violation, States retain the prerogative to decide whether such errors deprive a tribunal of its lawful authority and thus require automatic reversal.”), with, e.g., Orix Capital Mkts., LLC v. American Realty Trust, Inc., 356 S.W.3d 748, 750-55 (Tex.App. 2011) (d 2014Compare, e.g., Rivera v. Illinois, 556 U.S. 148, 161-62 , 129 S.Ct. 1446 , 173 L.Ed.2d 320 (2009) (noting line of cases “in which federal judges or tribunals lacked statutory authority to adjudicate the controversy” and Supreme Court “held the resulting judgment ... invalid as a matter of federal law”; “Absent a federal constitutional violation, States retain the prerogative to decide whether such errors deprive a tribunal of its lawful authority and thus require automatic reversal.”), with, e.g., Orix Capital Mkts., LLC v. American Realty Trust, Inc., 356 S.W.3d 748, 750-55 (Tex.App. 2011) (d | 2 | 2 |
Meza v. Massanarigreen2 sentences2014Compare, e.g., Rivera v. Illinois, 556 U.S. 148, 161-62 , 129 S.Ct. 1446 , 173 L.Ed.2d 320 (2009) (noting line of cases “in which federal judges or tribunals lacked statutory authority to adjudicate the controversy” and Supreme Court “held the resulting judgment ... invalid as a matter of federal law”; “Absent a federal constitutional violation, States retain the prerogative to decide whether such errors deprive a tribunal of its lawful authority and thus require automatic reversal.”), with, e.g., Orix Capital Mkts., LLC v. American Realty Trust, Inc., 356 S.W.3d 748, 750-55 (Tex.App. 2011) (d 2014Compare, e.g., Rivera v. Illinois, 556 U.S. 148, 161-62 (2009) (noting line of cases “in which federal judges or tribunals lacked statutory authority to adjudicate the controversy” and Supreme Court “held the resulting judgment . . . invalid as a matter of federal law”; “Absent a federal constitutional violation, States retain the prerogative to decide whether such errors deprive a tribunal of its lawful authority and thus require automatic reversal.”), with, e.g., Orix Capital Mkts., LLC v. American Realty Trust, Inc., 356 S.W.3d 748, 750-55 (Tex. App. 2011) (denying relief to litigant collat | 2 | 2 |
McCoy v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2010Indeed, the defendant's own confession is probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted against him." McCoy v. United States, 890 A.2d 204, 211 (D.C.2006) (quoting Fulminante, supra, 499 U.S. at 296 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 ). [24] "[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Chapman, supra note 3, 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. 824 (1967). 2010Indeed, the defendant’s own confession is probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted against him.” McCoy v. United States, 890 A.2d 204, 211 (D.C.2006) (quoting Fulminante, supra, 499 U.S. at 296 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 ). 24 “[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Chapman, supra note 3, 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. 824 (1967). | 2 | 2 |
Etheredge v. District of Columbiagreen1 sentence2022See Etheredge, 635 A.2d at 916 n.10 (acknowledging that “there are differences between a federal constitutional claim [for excessive force] and a tort suit brought under District of Columbia law”); Kotsch, 924 A.2d at 1047 n.7 (noting the “theoretically different . . . underpinnings between the defense of qualified privilege against common law tort claims and qualified immunity from constitutional claims”). | 1 | 1 |
Crane v. Kentuckygreen2 sentences2011We have said that in order to find a non-constitutional error harmless, "we must find it ` highly probable that [that] error did not contribute to the verdict.'" Ellis v. United States, 941 A.2d 1042, 1048 (D.C.2008) (emphasis and brackets in the original; citation omitted). [19] Appellant invokes the standard of harmlessness set forth in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967): "[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Equivalently, the Supreme 2011We have said that in order to find a non-constitutional error harmless, "we must find it ` highly probable that [that] error did not contribute to the verdict.'" Ellis v. United States, 941 A.2d 1042, 1048 (D.C.2008) (emphasis and brackets in the original; citation omitted). [19] Appellant invokes the standard of harmlessness set forth in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967): "[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Equivalently, the Supreme | 1 | 1 |
Alaska Steamship Co. v. Pettersongreen1 sentence2011We have said that in order to find a non-constitutional error harmless, "we must find it ` highly probable that [that] error did not contribute to the verdict.'" Ellis v. United States, 941 A.2d 1042, 1048 (D.C.2008) (emphasis and brackets in the original; citation omitted). [19] Appellant invokes the standard of harmlessness set forth in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967): "[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Equivalently, the Supreme | 1 | 1 |
Washington v. Texasgreen2 sentences2011We have said that in order to find a non-constitutional error harmless, "we must find it ` highly probable that [that] error did not contribute to the verdict.'" Ellis v. United States, 941 A.2d 1042, 1048 (D.C.2008) (emphasis and brackets in the original; citation omitted). [19] Appellant invokes the standard of harmlessness set forth in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967): "[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Equivalently, the Supreme 2011We have said that in order to find a non-constitutional error harmless, "we must find it ` highly probable that [that] error did not contribute to the verdict.'" Ellis v. United States, 941 A.2d 1042, 1048 (D.C.2008) (emphasis and brackets in the original; citation omitted). [19] Appellant invokes the standard of harmlessness set forth in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967): "[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Equivalently, the Supreme | 1 | 1 |
Chambers v. Mississippigreen2 sentences2011We have said that in order to find a non-constitutional error harmless, "we must find it ` highly probable that [that] error did not contribute to the verdict.'" Ellis v. United States, 941 A.2d 1042, 1048 (D.C.2008) (emphasis and brackets in the original; citation omitted). [19] Appellant invokes the standard of harmlessness set forth in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967): "[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Equivalently, the Supreme 2011We have said that in order to find a non-constitutional error harmless, "we must find it ` highly probable that [that] error did not contribute to the verdict.'" Ellis v. United States, 941 A.2d 1042, 1048 (D.C.2008) (emphasis and brackets in the original; citation omitted). [19] Appellant invokes the standard of harmlessness set forth in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967): "[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Equivalently, the Supreme | 1 | 1 |
Ellis v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2011We have said that in order to find a non-constitutional error harmless, "we must find it ` highly probable that [that] error did not contribute to the verdict.'" Ellis v. United States, 941 A.2d 1042, 1048 (D.C.2008) (emphasis and brackets in the original; citation omitted). [19] Appellant invokes the standard of harmlessness set forth in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967): "[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Equivalently, the Supreme 2011We have said that in order to find a non-constitutional error harmless, "we must find it ‘highly probable that [that] error did not contribute to the verdict.’ ” Ellis v. United States, 941 A.2d 1042, 1048 (D.C.2008) (emphasis and brackets in the original: citation omitted). .Appellant invokes the standard of harmlessness set forth in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967): "[Bjefore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Equivalently, the Supreme Cou | 1 | 1 |
Taylor v. Illinoisgreen2 sentences2011We have said that in order to find a non-constitutional error harmless, "we must find it ` highly probable that [that] error did not contribute to the verdict.'" Ellis v. United States, 941 A.2d 1042, 1048 (D.C.2008) (emphasis and brackets in the original; citation omitted). [19] Appellant invokes the standard of harmlessness set forth in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967): "[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Equivalently, the Supreme 2011We have said that in order to find a non-constitutional error harmless, "we must find it ` highly probable that [that] error did not contribute to the verdict.'" Ellis v. United States, 941 A.2d 1042, 1048 (D.C.2008) (emphasis and brackets in the original; citation omitted). [19] Appellant invokes the standard of harmlessness set forth in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967): "[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Equivalently, the Supreme | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Smithgreen2 sentences1991Rather, the defendant must make a prima facie showing that: “(1) others similarly situated were not prosecuted, and (2) the selective prosecution being complained of was improperly motivated, i.e., it was based on an impermissible consideration such as race or a on a desire to prevent the exercise of constitutional rights.” (Elizabeth) Smith, 460 A.2d at 578 ; see Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608, 610 , 105 S.Ct. at 1531, 1532 (“discriminatory purpose”); United States v. (James) Smith, 354 A.2d 510, 513 (D.C.1976) (“invidious or otherwise impermissible form of discrimination”). 8 To support a claim of s 1991Rather, the defendant must make a prima facie showing that: "(1) others similarly situated were not prosecuted, and (2) the selective prosecution being complained of was improperly motivated, i.e., it was based on an impermissible consideration such as race or a on a desire to prevent the exercise of constitutional rights." ( Elizabeth) Smith, 460 A.2d at 578 ; see Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608, 610 , 105 S.Ct. at 1531, 1532 ("discriminatory purpose"); United States v. (James) Smith, 354 A.2d 510, 513 (D.C.1976) ("invidious or otherwise impermissible form of discrimination"). [8] To support a claim o | 1 | 1 |
Wayte v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1991Rather, the defendant must make a prima facie showing that: “(1) others similarly situated were not prosecuted, and (2) the selective prosecution being complained of was improperly motivated, i.e., it was based on an impermissible consideration such as race or a on a desire to prevent the exercise of constitutional rights.” (Elizabeth) Smith, 460 A.2d at 578 ; see Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608, 610 , 105 S.Ct. at 1531, 1532 (“discriminatory purpose”); United States v. (James) Smith, 354 A.2d 510, 513 (D.C.1976) (“invidious or otherwise impermissible form of discrimination”). 8 To support a claim of s 1991Rather, the defendant must make a prima facie showing that: “(1) others similarly situated were not prosecuted, and (2) the selective prosecution being complained of was improperly motivated, i.e., it was based on an impermissible consideration such as race or a on a desire to prevent the exercise of constitutional rights.” (Elizabeth) Smith, 460 A.2d at 578 ; see Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608, 610 , 105 S.Ct. at 1531, 1532 (“discriminatory purpose”); United States v. (James) Smith, 354 A.2d 510, 513 (D.C.1976) (“invidious or otherwise impermissible form of discrimination”). 8 To support a claim of s | 1 | 1 |
Powell v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1986See, e.g., Powell v. United States, 455 A.2d 405, 411 (D.C.1982); Miller v. United States, 444 A.2d 13, 16 (D.C.1982). .“[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id., 386 U.S. at 24 , 87 S.Ct. at 828. . 1986See, e.g., Powell v. United States, 455 A.2d 405, 411 (D.C.1982); Miller v. United States, 444 A.2d 13, 16 (D.C.1982). [4] "[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Id., 386 U.S. at 24 , 87 S.Ct. at 828. [5] The Court thus effectively overruled so much of this court's holding in Springer v. United States, supra , as applied a per se reversible standard to in limine limitations on certain cross-examination. [1] In fact, the Advisory Committee's 1969 preliminary draft of FED.R.EVID. 6 | 1 | 1 |
Miller v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1986See, e.g., Powell v. United States, 455 A.2d 405, 411 (D.C.1982); Miller v. United States, 444 A.2d 13, 16 (D.C.1982). .“[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id., 386 U.S. at 24 , 87 S.Ct. at 828. . 1986See, e.g., Powell v. United States, 455 A.2d 405, 411 (D.C.1982); Miller v. United States, 444 A.2d 13, 16 (D.C.1982). .“[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id., 386 U.S. at 24 , 87 S.Ct. at 828. . | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Edward Hursegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hurse v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
Wheeler v. Barreragreen2 sentences1974See also United States v. Hurse, 477 F.2d 31, 33 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908 , 94 S.Ct. 245 , 38 L.Ed.2d 146 (1973), where the appellate court entertained the contention of error due to absence from a supplemental suppression hearing raised for the first time on appeal. .Henry v. Mississippi, supra, deals with the preservation of a federal constitutional claim, that of an illegal search, in a state court where it was subject to a state requirement that an objection be raised at the time of the introduction of the evidence. 1974United States v. McPherson, 137 U.S.App.D.C. 192 , 194-195 n. 6, 421 F.2d 1127 , 1129-1130 n. 6 (1969). [8] See also United States v. Hurse, 477 F.2d 31, 33 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908 , 94 S.Ct. 245 , 38 L.Ed.2d 146 (1973), where the appellate court entertained the contention of error due to absence from a supplemental suppression hearing raised for the first time on appeal. [9] Henry v. Mississippi, supra , deals with the preservation of a federal constitutional claim, that of an illegal search, in a state court where it was subject to a state requirement that an objection be rais | 1 | 1 |
| Lord v. District of Columbiagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hall v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Oyler v. Boles
green
2 sentences1991A party who charges discriminatory application of prose-cutorial discretion to pretrial diversion "carries a heavy burden of proof,” id., for “[t]he conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation.” Oyler, 368 U.S. at 456 , 82 S.Ct. at 506 . 1991A party who charges discriminatory application of prose-cutorial discretion to pretrial diversion "carries a heavy burden of proof,” id., for “[t]he conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation.” Oyler, 368 U.S. at 456 , 82 S.Ct. at 506 . | 3 | 1975–1991 |
Manns v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2018CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 16:3 (Dec. 2017) (citing Manns v. Virginia, 191 S.E.2d 810 (Va. 1972)). ―This is not a violation of the federal constitutional standard because Virginia authorizes an appeal of right and a trial de novo in the circuit court. 2018CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 16:3 (Dec. 2017) (citing Manns v. Com., 191 S.E.2d 810 (Va. 1972)). ―This is not a violation of the federal constitutional standard because Virginia authorizes an appeal of right and a trial de novo in the circuit court. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Arizona v. Fulminante
green
2 sentences2010Indeed, the defendant’s own confession is probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted against him.” McCoy v. United States, 890 A.2d 204, 211 (D.C.2006) (quoting Fulminante, supra, 499 U.S. at 296 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 ). 24 “[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Chapman, supra note 3, 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. 824 (1967). 2010Indeed, the defendant’s own confession is probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted against him.” McCoy v. United States, 890 A.2d 204, 211 (D.C.2006) (quoting Fulminante, supra, 499 U.S. at 296 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 ). 24 “[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Chapman, supra note 3, 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. 824 (1967). | 2 | 2010–2010 |
Kotsch v. District of Columbia
green
1 sentence2022See Etheredge, 635 A.2d at 916 n.10 (acknowledging that “there are differences between a federal constitutional claim [for excessive force] and a tort suit brought under District of Columbia law”); Kotsch, 924 A.2d at 1047 n.7 (noting the “theoretically different . . . underpinnings between the defense of qualified privilege against common law tort claims and qualified immunity from constitutional claims”). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Williams v. Martinez
green
1 sentence2019Cir. 2011) (acknowledging that subsection (g) provides a "safety valve" when the District's courts bar review under § 23-110 of a federal constitutional claim); Williams v. Martinez , 586 F.3d 995 , 999-1000 (D.C. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Ludwig v. Massachusetts
green
2 sentences2018The Virginia procedure thus extends beyond the federal standard because it guarantees an eventual right to a jury trial regardless of the length of the possible sentence." Id. (citing Va. Code Ann. §§ 16.1-132 , 16.1-136, and Ludwig v. Massachusetts , 427 U.S. 618 , 96 S.Ct. 2781 , 49 L.Ed.2d 732 (1976) ). 2018The Virginia procedure thus extends beyond the federal standard because it guarantees an eventual right to a jury trial regardless of the length of the possible sentence." Id. (citing Va. Code Ann. §§ 16.1-132 , 16.1-136, and Ludwig v. Massachusetts , 427 U.S. 618 , 96 S.Ct. 2781 , 49 L.Ed.2d 732 (1976) ). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Fahy v. Connecticut
green
2 sentences2011We have said that in order to find a non-constitutional error harmless, "we must find it ` highly probable that [that] error did not contribute to the verdict.'" Ellis v. United States, 941 A.2d 1042, 1048 (D.C.2008) (emphasis and brackets in the original; citation omitted). [19] Appellant invokes the standard of harmlessness set forth in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967): "[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Equivalently, the Supreme 2011We have said that in order to find a non-constitutional error harmless, "we must find it ` highly probable that [that] error did not contribute to the verdict.'" Ellis v. United States, 941 A.2d 1042, 1048 (D.C.2008) (emphasis and brackets in the original; citation omitted). [19] Appellant invokes the standard of harmlessness set forth in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967): "[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Equivalently, the Supreme | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Rose v. Clark
green
2 sentences2006Appellant, relying upon Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 501-04 , 107 S.Ct. 1918 , 95 L.Ed.2d 439 (1987), and Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579 , 106 S.Ct. 3101 , 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986), maintains that the "Chapman harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard applies” because the "court’s instruction was error of constitutional dimension.” See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) (”[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 2006Appellant, relying upon Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 501-04 , 107 S.Ct. 1918 , 95 L.Ed.2d 439 (1987), and Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579 , 106 S.Ct. 3101 , 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986), maintains that the "Chapman harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard applies” because the "court’s instruction was error of constitutional dimension.” See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) (”[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Pope v. Illinois
green
2 sentences2006Appellant, relying upon Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 501-04 , 107 S.Ct. 1918 , 95 L.Ed.2d 439 (1987), and Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579 , 106 S.Ct. 3101 , 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986), maintains that the "Chapman harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard applies” because the "court’s instruction was error of constitutional dimension.” See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) (”[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 2006Appellant, relying upon Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 501-04 , 107 S.Ct. 1918 , 95 L.Ed.2d 439 (1987), and Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579 , 106 S.Ct. 3101 , 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986), maintains that the "Chapman harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard applies” because the "court’s instruction was error of constitutional dimension.” See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) (”[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Smith v. United States
green
2 sentences1991A party who charges discriminatory application of prose-cutorial discretion to pretrial diversion "carries a heavy burden of proof,” id., for “[t]he conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation.” Oyler, 368 U.S. at 456 , 82 S.Ct. at 506 . 1991A party who charges discriminatory application of prosecutorial discretion to pretrial diversion "carries a heavy burden of proof," id., for "[t]he conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation." Oyler, 368 U.S. at 456 , 82 S.Ct. at 506 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution
green
2 sentences1989We agree with the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit: “Where it is alleged that the duration of an individual’s confinement no longer bears a reasonable relationship to the purpose for which he [or she] is committed a substantial federal constitutional claim relating to denial of due process is present.” Lambert, 545 F.2d at 89 (citing Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 , 92 S.Ct. 1845 , 32 L.Ed.2d 435 (1972); McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Inst., 407 U.S. 245 , 92 S.Ct. 2083 , 32 L.Ed.2d 719 (1972)). 1989We agree with the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit: “Where it is alleged that the duration of an individual’s confinement no longer bears a reasonable relationship to the purpose for which he [or she] is committed a substantial federal constitutional claim relating to denial of due process is present.” Lambert, 545 F.2d at 89 (citing Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 , 92 S.Ct. 1845 , 32 L.Ed.2d 435 (1972); McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Inst., 407 U.S. 245 , 92 S.Ct. 2083 , 32 L.Ed.2d 719 (1972)). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Howard A. Lambert v. State of Montana
green
2 sentences1989We agree with the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit: “Where it is alleged that the duration of an individual’s confinement no longer bears a reasonable relationship to the purpose for which he [or she] is committed a substantial federal constitutional claim relating to denial of due process is present.” Lambert, 545 F.2d at 89 (citing Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 , 92 S.Ct. 1845 , 32 L.Ed.2d 435 (1972); McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Inst., 407 U.S. 245 , 92 S.Ct. 2083 , 32 L.Ed.2d 719 (1972)). 1989We agree with the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit: "Where it is alleged that the duration of an individual's confinement no longer bears a reasonable relationship to the purpose for which he [or she] is committed a substantial federal constitutional claim relating to denial of due process is present." Lambert, 545 F.2d at 89 (citing Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 , 92 S.Ct. 1845 , 32 L.Ed.2d 435 (1972); McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Inst., 407 U.S. 245 , 92 S.Ct. 2083 , 32 L.Ed.2d 719 (1972)). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Jackson v. Indiana
green
2 sentences1989We agree with the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit: “Where it is alleged that the duration of an individual’s confinement no longer bears a reasonable relationship to the purpose for which he [or she] is committed a substantial federal constitutional claim relating to denial of due process is present.” Lambert, 545 F.2d at 89 (citing Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 , 92 S.Ct. 1845 , 32 L.Ed.2d 435 (1972); McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Inst., 407 U.S. 245 , 92 S.Ct. 2083 , 32 L.Ed.2d 719 (1972)). 1989We agree with the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit: “Where it is alleged that the duration of an individual’s confinement no longer bears a reasonable relationship to the purpose for which he [or she] is committed a substantial federal constitutional claim relating to denial of due process is present.” Lambert, 545 F.2d at 89 (citing Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 , 92 S.Ct. 1845 , 32 L.Ed.2d 435 (1972); McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Inst., 407 U.S. 245 , 92 S.Ct. 2083 , 32 L.Ed.2d 719 (1972)). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| United States v. William B. McPherson green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Fred J. Ford v. United States green | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.