federal constitutional standard in New York

2017Since “ ‘our state standard . . . offers greater protection than the federal test,’ ” we necessarily reject the defendant’s federal constitutional challenge by determining that he was not denied meaningful representation under the State Constitution (People v Wragg, 26 NY3d 403, 412 [2015], quoting People v Caban, 5 NY3d 143, 156 [2005]).

2013The defendant received the effective assistance of counsel under both the state constitutional standard (see People v Williams, 8 NY3d 854, 855-856 [2007]; People v Caban, 5 NY3d 143, 152 [2005]; People v Benevento, 91 NY2d 708, 712 [1998]; People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137, 147 [1981]; People v West, 105 AD3d 781 [2013]) and the federal constitutional standard (see Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668 [1984]).

2025The "proper measure of attorney performance" under the federal constitutional standard "remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms" ( Strickland v Washington , 466 US 668, 688 [1984]).

2025The "proper measure of attorney performance" under the federal constitutional standard "remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms" ( Strickland v Washington , 466 US 668, 688 [1984]).

2013The defendant received the effective assistance of counsel under both the state constitutional standard (see People v Williams, 8 NY3d 854, 855-856 [2007]; People v Caban, 5 NY3d 143, 152 [2005]; People v Benevento, 91 NY2d 708, 712 [1998]; People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137, 147 [1981]; People v West, 105 AD3d 781 [2013]) and the federal constitutional standard (see Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668 [1984]).

2013The defendant received the effective assistance of counsel under both the state constitutional standard (see People v Williams, 8 NY3d 854, 855-856 [2007]; People v Caban, 5 NY3d 143, 152 [2005]; People v Benevento, 91 NY2d 708, 712 [1998]; People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137, 147 [1981]; People v West, 105 AD3d 781 [2013]) and the federal constitutional standard (see Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668 [1984]).

2013The defendant received the effective assistance of counsel under both the state constitutional standard (see People v Williams, 8 NY3d 854, 855-856 [2007]; People v Caban, 5 NY3d 143, 152 [2005]; People v Benevento, 91 NY2d 708, 712 [1998]; People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137, 147 [1981]; People v West, 105 AD3d 781 [2013]) and the federal constitutional standard (see Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668 [1984]).

2013The defendant received the effective assistance of counsel under both the state constitutional standard (see People v Williams, 8 NY3d 854, 855-856 [2007]; People v Caban, 5 NY3d 143, 152 [2005]; People v Benevento, 91 NY2d 708, 712 [1998]; People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137, 147 [1981]; People v West, 105 AD3d 781 [2013]) and the federal constitutional standard (see Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668 [1984]).

2001Where, as here, a State claim is joined with a Federal constitutional claim that would permit an award of an attorney’s fee pursuant to 42 USC § 1988 , and the matter is resolved on the State claim without reaching the Federal constitutional claim, an award of an attorney’s fee pursuant to 42 USC § 1988 may still be made if the Federal claim, although unresolved, is sufficient to meet the “Gibbs test” (United Mine Workers v Gibbs, 383 US 715, 725 ; see, Matter of Johnson v Blum, 58 NY2d 454 ).

1989Where relief is sought on State and Federal constitutional claims but granted only on the State claim, which is deemed dispositive, attorney’s fees may be awarded if the Federal constitutional claim meets the so-called "Gibbs test” (see, Mine Workers v Gibbs, 383 US 715, 725 ), which "permits an award of attorney’s fees if (1) the Federal claim has substance sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction and (2) the Federal and non-Federal claims 'derive from a common nucleus of operative fact’ ” (see, Matter of Johnson v Blum, 58 NY2d 454, 458, n 2 ).

2013The defendant received the effective assistance of counsel under both the state constitutional standard (see People v Williams, 8 NY3d 854, 855-856 [2007]; People v Caban, 5 NY3d 143, 152 [2005]; People v Benevento, 91 NY2d 708, 712 [1998]; People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137, 147 [1981]; People v West, 105 AD3d 781 [2013]) and the federal constitutional standard (see Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668 [1984]).

2013The defendant received the effective assistance of counsel under both the state constitutional standard (see People v Williams, 8 NY3d 854, 855-856 [2007]; People v Caban, 5 NY3d 143, 152 [2005]; People v Benevento, 91 NY2d 708, 712 [1998]; People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137, 147 [1981]; People v West, 105 AD3d 781 [2013]) and the federal constitutional standard (see Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668 [1984]).

2000Under article III, a petitioner or plaintiff “ ‘must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.’ ” (Raines v Byrd, 521 US 811, 818 [1997].) That standing requirement in Federal court, which is “grounded in the Federal constitutional requirement of a case or controversy * * * [is] a requirement that has no analogue in the State Constitution.” (Society of Plastics Indus. v County of Suffolk, 77 NY2d 761, 772 [1991].) The terms of New York City Charter § 1109, a legislative enactment which has the force

1999In Society of Plastics Indus. v County of Suffolk ( 77 NY2d 761, 772 , supra), it was noted that the “standing requirement in Federal actions has been grounded in the Federal constitutional requirement of a case or controversy * * * a requirement that has no analogue in the State Constitution”.

2018In addition to demonstrating that defense counsel's performance was deficient, a defendant making a federal constitutional claim must also show, in order to satisfy the second prong of the Strickland standard, that there was " a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial'" ( People v McDonald , 1 NY3d at 114 , quoting Hill v Lockhart , 474 US 52, 59 ; see People v Hernandez , 22 NY3d 972, 976 ; People v Roberts , 143 AD3d at 845 ; People v Pinto , 133 AD3d at 792 ).

2015Under the federal constitutional standard, which defendant solely invokes, a defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must meet a two-pronged test by *403 showing that “counsel’s performance was deficient” and “that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense” (Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 687 [1984]; see also People v McDonald, 1 NY3d 109, 113 [2003]).

2016(People v Baret, 23 NY3d at 795 .) The first is where a new rule “places certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe.” (Teague v Lane, 489 US at 311 [internal quotation marks omitted]; People v Eastman, 85 NY2d 265, 275 [1995].) The second is where “the new rule alters a bedrock procedural element of criminal procedure which implicates the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the trial.” (Id., citing Teague v Lane, 489 US at 311-312 .) Teague held that this second exception should be limited to “those new procedures wi

2010A federal constitutional rule of criminal procedure is applicable to those cases which have become final before it was announced, unless it creates a new rule of law (see Teague v Lane, 489 US 288, 311 [1989]; People v Eastman, 85 NY2d 265 [1995]).

2013The defendant’s contention that his right to confrontation was violated (see Crawford v Washington, 541 US 36 [2004]) is not preserved for appellate review (see People v Fleming, 70 NY2d 947 [1988]; People v Marino, 21 AD3d 430, 431 [2005]; see also People v Galloway, 54 NY2d 396, 400 [1981]) and, in any event, is without merit (see Davis v Washington, 547 US 813, 821 [2006]; Crawford v Washington, 541 US at 53-54 ).

2013The defendant’s contention that his right to confrontation was violated (see Crawford v Washington, 541 US 36 [2004]) is not preserved for appellate review (see People v Fleming, 70 NY2d 947 [1988]; People v Marino, 21 AD3d 430, 431 [2005]; see also People v Galloway, 54 NY2d 396, 400 [1981]) and, in any event, is without merit (see Davis v Washington, 547 US 813, 821 [2006]; Crawford v Washington, 541 US at 53-54 ).

2013The defendant’s contention that his right to confrontation was violated (see Crawford v Washington, 541 US 36 [2004]) is not preserved for appellate review (see People v Fleming, 70 NY2d 947 [1988]; People v Marino, 21 AD3d 430, 431 [2005]; see also People v Galloway, 54 NY2d 396, 400 [1981]) and, in any event, is without merit (see Davis v Washington, 547 US 813, 821 [2006]; Crawford v Washington, 541 US at 53-54 ).

2013The defendant’s contention that his right to confrontation was violated (see Crawford v Washington, 541 US 36 [2004]) is not preserved for appellate review (see People v Fleming, 70 NY2d 947 [1988]; People v Marino, 21 AD3d 430, 431 [2005]; see also People v Galloway, 54 NY2d 396, 400 [1981]) and, in any event, is without merit (see Davis v Washington, 547 US 813, 821 [2006]; Crawford v Washington, 541 US at 53-54 ).

2013The defendant’s contention that his right to confrontation was violated (see Crawford v Washington, 541 US 36 [2004]) is not preserved for appellate review (see People v Fleming, 70 NY2d 947 [1988]; People v Marino, 21 AD3d 430, 431 [2005]; see also People v Galloway, 54 NY2d 396, 400 [1981]) and, in any event, is without merit (see Davis v Washington, 547 US 813, 821 [2006]; Crawford v Washington, 541 US at 53-54 ).

2013The defendant’s contention that his right to confrontation was violated (see Crawford v Washington, 541 US 36 [2004]) is not preserved for appellate review (see People v Fleming, 70 NY2d 947 [1988]; People v Marino, 21 AD3d 430, 431 [2005]; see also People v Galloway, 54 NY2d 396, 400 [1981]) and, in any event, is without merit (see Davis v Washington, 547 US 813, 821 [2006]; Crawford v Washington, 541 US at 53-54 ).

1997In the case before us, it is clear that the failure to enforce the collection of sales and excise taxes on cigarettes and motor fuel sold by on-reservation retailers to non-Indian consumers has resulted in the unequal application of the taxing statutes and regulations to petitioners, who by statute (see, Tax Law arts 12-A, 20, 28), regulation (see, 20 NYCRR 336.6, 336.7, 414.6, 414.7) and case law (see, Department of Taxation & Fin. v Milhelm Attea & Bros., 512 US 61 , supra) are entitled to be treated alike (see, Matter of Di Maggio v Brown, 19 NY2d 283, 290 ). 3 Although " '[t]he conscious e

1994(Matter of DiMaggio v Brown, 19 NY2d 283 [1967].) There must be a " 'clear and intentional discrimination’ ” ( 19 NY2d, at 290 , supra), and the "conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation.” (Supra, at 290, quoting Oyler v Boles, 368 US 448, 456 [1962].) In the case at bar the defendant has offered no evidence that he is the victim of selective enforcement of the local law.

2000(Chapman v California, supra, at 23; Fahy v Connecticut, 375 US 85, 86-87 [1963]; People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230 [1975].) Hence, before a Federal constitutional error may be held harmless, the reviewing court must be able to declare a belief that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

1977As with the requirement of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, "before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” (Chapman v California, 386 US 18, 24 ).

2018In addition to demonstrating that defense counsel's performance was deficient, a defendant making a federal constitutional claim must also show, in order to satisfy the second prong of the Strickland standard, that there was " a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial'" ( People v McDonald , 1 NY3d at 114 , quoting Hill v Lockhart , 474 US 52, 59 ; see People v Hernandez , 22 NY3d 972, 976 ; People v Roberts , 143 AD3d at 845 ; People v Pinto , 133 AD3d at 792 ).

2015Under Hill v Lockhart ( 474 US 52 [1985], which defendant cites, the second prong “focuses on whether counsel’s constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea process” (id. at 59).

2000(Chapman v California, supra, at 23; Fahy v Connecticut, 375 US 85, 86-87 [1963]; People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230 [1975].) Hence, before a Federal constitutional error may be held harmless, the reviewing court must be able to declare a belief that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

1988There the United States Supreme Court held (at 24) that "before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless, beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Also see, Fahy v Connecticut, 375 US 85 .) Similarly, in People v Crimmins ( 36 NY2d 230 [1975]), the New York Court of Appeals utilized a two-pronged test in deciding whether a motion to vacate a conviction should be granted based on an alleged violation of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

2018Here, claimant filed numerous grievances with respect to his claim that prison staff interfered with his free exercise of religion, and he had [*2]multiple alternative legal remedies that he could have pursued, including filing his free exercise claim as a federal constitutional claim in federal court ( see 42 USC § 1983 ) or as an action pursuant to Correction Law § 610 in state Supreme Court ( see Oppenheimer v State of New York , 152 AD3d at 1009 ; Flemming v State of New York , 120 AD3d 848, 849 [2014]) [FN2] .

2017Because claimant could assert his free exercise claim as a federal constitutional claim in federal court under 42 USC § 1983 or in state Supreme Court under Correction Law § 610, the Court of Claims properly dismissed the state constitutional cause of action (see Flemming v State of New York, 120 AD3d at 849 ; Shelton v New York State Liq.

2018Video , 68 NY2d 296, 302-303 [1986]).

1998Video, 68 NY2d 296, 302 ) nor, in arguing that the State provision should ‘be given a unique reading,’ advances any significant ‘noninterpretive’ consideration, such as the ‘distinctive attitudes’ of New York residents toward the right at issue (People v Alvarez, supra, at 378-379 ).” (People v Enrique, 165 AD2d 13, 21 , affd for reasons stated by Sullivan, J. , 80 NY2d 869 .) The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that in all criminal cases, the accused shall have the assistance of counsel for his defense.

2016(People v Baret, 23 NY3d at 795 .) The first is where a new rule “places certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe.” (Teague v Lane, 489 US at 311 [internal quotation marks omitted]; People v Eastman, 85 NY2d 265, 275 [1995].) The second is where “the new rule alters a bedrock procedural element of criminal procedure which implicates the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the trial.” (Id., citing Teague v Lane, 489 US at 311-312 .) Teague held that this second exception should be limited to “those new procedures wi

2010A federal constitutional rule of criminal procedure is applicable to those cases which have become final before it was announced, unless it creates a new rule of law (see Teague v Lane, 489 US 288, 311 [1989]; People v Eastman, 85 NY2d 265 [1995]).

2015In support of this position, the People assert that a Catu error is not a federal constitutional violation under CPL 400.15 (7) (b), *603 and they also assert that such an error does not affect the predicate status of the conviction in light of the retroactivity principle set forth in People v Catalonotte, 72 NY2d 641, 644-645 [1988]).

2015In People v Catalanotte ( 72 NY2d 641 [1988]), the Court of Appeals established a two-pronged standard for determining the viability of a challenge, in a predicate sentencing proceeding, of a defendant’s prior felony conviction as retrospectively violative of a federal constitutional rule.

2009This is fully consistent with the federal constitutional standard (see Mine Workers v Bagwell, 512 US 821 [1994]).

2006It is the substance of the proceeding and the character of the relief that is critical and controlling (id.; see Mine Workers v Bagwell, supra at 828; Matter of Department of Hous.

2001Co., 348 U.S. 483 [1955].) “And one need prove more than mere nonenforcement as against other violators: “ ‘[T]he conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation.

1967Co., 348 U. S. 483, 489 [1955].) And one need prove more than mere nonenforcement as against other violators: “ [T]he conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation.

2000(Chapman v California, supra, at 23; Fahy v Connecticut, 375 US 85, 86-87 [1963]; People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230 [1975].) Hence, before a Federal constitutional error may be held harmless, the reviewing court must be able to declare a belief that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

1988There the United States Supreme Court held (at 24) that "before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless, beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Also see, Fahy v Connecticut, 375 US 85 .) Similarly, in People v Crimmins ( 36 NY2d 230 [1975]), the New York Court of Appeals utilized a two-pronged test in deciding whether a motion to vacate a conviction should be granted based on an alleged violation of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel.