federal constitutional error in Kansas

1993That rule was expressed in State v. Washington, 206 Kan. 336 , 479 P.2d 833 , as follows:... - . ’ ‘Under the federal constitutional standard as applied to the states, the test of unavailability, for the purposes of the exception to the confrontation requirement, is whether the prosecutorial authorities have made a “good faith effort” to obtain the witness’s presence at trial (Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 , 20 L.

1993That rule was expressed in State v. Washington, 206 Kan. 336 , 479 P.2d 833 , as follows:... - . ’ ‘Under the federal constitutional standard as applied to the states, the test of unavailability, for the purposes of the exception to the confrontation requirement, is whether the prosecutorial authorities have made a “good faith effort” to obtain the witness’s presence at trial (Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 , 20 L.

2014Although the prosecutor here obtained Thompson’s presence at trial, Gleason relies on a line of cases concerning “absent witnesses,” including State v. Washington, 206 Kan. 336, 338 , 479 P.2d 833 (1971), where this court held: “Under the federal constitutional standard as applied to the states, the test of unavailability, for the purposes of the exception to the confrontation requirement, is whether the prosecutorial authorities have made a ‘good faith effort’ to obtain the witness’s presence at trial [citation omitted].

2014Although the prosecutor here obtained Thompson’s presence at trial, Gleason relies on a line of cases concerning “absent witnesses,” including State v. Washington, 206 Kan. 336, 338 , 479 P.2d 833 (1971), where this court held: “Under the federal constitutional standard as applied to the states, the test of unavailability, for the purposes of the exception to the confrontation requirement, is whether the prosecutorial authorities have made a ‘good faith effort’ to obtain the witness’s presence at trial [citation omitted].

1997In order for a federal constitutional error to be considered harmless, this court must ‘be able to declare the error had little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of the trial and ... be able to declare such a belief beyond a reasonable doubt.’ Hamilton, 222 Kan. at 345 .

1994In order for a federal constitutional error to be considered harmless, this court must “be able to declare the error had little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of the trial and ... be able to declare such a belief beyond a reasonable doubt.” Hamilton, 222 Kan. at 345 .

2016Ed. 2d 604 (1978) ("Within the limits set by the legislature's constitutionally valid definition of chargeable offenses, 'the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation' so long as 'the selection was [not] deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.'") (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 82 S. Ct. 501 , 7 L.

2016Ed. 2d 604 (1978) ("Within the limits set by the legislature's constitutionally valid definition of chargeable offenses, 'the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation' so long as 'the selection was [not] deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.'") (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 82 S. Ct. 501 , 7 L.

1997A good discussion of the question of harmless error in criminal cases is set forth in State v. Sanders, 258 Kan. 409, 418 , 904 P.2d 951 (1995), where we stated: “The admission or exclusion of relevant evidence in a criminal case is governed by two rules, the harmless error rule and the federal constitutional error rule.

1997A good discussion of the question of harmless error in criminal cases is set forth in State v. Sanders, 258 Kan. 409, 418 , 904 P.2d 951 (1995), where we stated: “The admission or exclusion of relevant evidence in a criminal case is governed by two rules, the harmless error rule and the federal constitutional error rule.

1985In State v. Knapp, 234 Kan. 170 , 671 P.2d 520 (1983), Justice Holmes concisely stated in Syllabus ¶ 7: “In determining that a federal constitutional error constitutes harmless error, a court must be able to declare the error had little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of the trial and the court must be able to declare such a belief beyond a reasonable doubt.” And see Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , reh. denied 386 U.S. 987 (1967), where the court said: “[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to

1979In Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , reh. denied 386 U.S. 987 , 18 L.Ed.2d 241 , 87 S.Ct. 1283 (1967), the court formulated the standard by which the error is to be judged: “[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ” (p. 24, emphasis added.) The court implied that in applying this standard to Griffin-type errors, a court should be able to answer in the negative the following questions: (1) Is there a possibility that the error contributed to the con

2009State *174 v. Leitner, 272 Kan. 398 , Syl. ¶ 6, 34 P.3d 42 (2001).

2009State *174 v. Leitner, 272 Kan. 398 , Syl. ¶ 6, 34 P.3d 42 (2001).

2004State v. Lyons, 266 Kan. 591, 598 , 973 P.2d 794 (1999).

2004State v. Lyons, 266 Kan. 591, 598 , 973 P.2d 794 (1999).

1997Accord State v. Beebe, 244 Kan. at 53; State v. Bell, 239 Kan. 229 , Syl. ¶ 3, 718 P.2d 628 (1986).” 255 Kan. at 361-62 .

1997Accord State v. Beebe, 244 Kan. at 53; State v. Bell, 239 Kan. 229 , Syl. ¶ 3, 718 P.2d 628 (1986).” 255 Kan. at 361-62 .

1986In State v. Knapp, 234 Kan. 170 , Syl. ¶ 7, 671 P.2d 520 (1983), we set forth the rule as follows: “In determining that a federal constitutional error constitutes harmless error, a court must be able to declare the error had little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of the trial and the court must be able to declare such a belief beyond a reasonable doubt.” Estrada’s testimony, when carefully examined, indicates that the defendant admitted the 1981 murder of Cheryle Underwood.

1986In State v. Knapp, 234 Kan. 170 , Syl. ¶ 7, 671 P.2d 520 (1983), we set forth the rule as follows: “In determining that a federal constitutional error constitutes harmless error, a court must be able to declare the error had little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of the trial and the court must be able to declare such a belief beyond a reasonable doubt.” Estrada’s testimony, when carefully examined, indicates that the defendant admitted the 1981 murder of Cheryle Underwood.

1978Consistent with the federal mandate is our long-standing rule that before the state may use the testimony of an absent witness given at a former trial or preliminary hearing, it must be made to appear the witness cannot, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, be produced at trial (State v. Lesco, 194 Kan. 555 , 400 P.2d 695 ; State v. Guthrie, 192 Kan. 659 , 391 P.2d 95 ; State v. Brown, 181 Kan. 375 , 312 P.2d 832 ; State v. Bonskowski, 180 Kan. 726 , 308 P.2d 168 ; State v. Streeter, 173 Kan. 240 , 245 P.2d 1177 .

1978Consistent with the federal mandate is our long-standing rule that before the state may use the testimony of an absent witness given at a former trial or preliminary hearing, it must be made to appear the witness cannot, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, be produced at trial (State v. Lesco, 194 Kan. 555 , 400 P.2d 695 ; State v. Guthrie, 192 Kan. 659 , 391 P.2d 95 ; State v. Brown, 181 Kan. 375 , 312 P.2d 832 ; State v. Bonskowski, 180 Kan. 726 , 308 P.2d 168 ; State v. Streeter, 173 Kan. 240 , 245 P.2d 1177 .

1978Consistent with the federal mandate is our long-standing rule that before the state may use the testimony of an absent witness given at a former trial or preliminary hearing, it must be made to appear the witness cannot, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, be produced at trial (State v. Lesco, 194 Kan. 555 , 400 P.2d 695 ; State v. Guthrie, 192 Kan. 659 , 391 P.2d 95 ; State v. Brown, 181 Kan. 375 , 312 P.2d 832 ; State v. Bonskowski, 180 Kan. 726 , 308 P.2d 168 ; State v. Streeter, 173 Kan. 240 , 245 P.2d 1177 .

1978Consistent with the federal mandate is our long-standing rule that before the state may use the testimony of an absent witness given at a former trial or preliminary hearing, it must be made to appear the witness cannot, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, be produced at trial (State v. Lesco, 194 Kan. 555 , 400 P.2d 695 ; State v. Guthrie, 192 Kan. 659 , 391 P.2d 95 ; State v. Brown, 181 Kan. 375 , 312 P.2d 832 ; State v. Bonskowski, 180 Kan. 726 , 308 P.2d 168 ; State v. Streeter, 173 Kan. 240 , 245 P.2d 1177 .

1978Consistent with the federal mandate is our long-standing rule that before the state may use the testimony of an absent witness given at a former trial or preliminary hearing, it must be made to appear the witness cannot, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, be produced at trial (State v. Lesco, 194 Kan. 555 , 400 P.2d 695 ; State v. Guthrie, 192 Kan. 659 , 391 P.2d 95 ; State v. Brown, 181 Kan. 375 , 312 P.2d 832 ; State v. Bonskowski, 180 Kan. 726 , 308 P.2d 168 ; State v. Streeter, 173 Kan. 240 , 245 P.2d 1177 .

1978Consistent with the federal mandate is our long-standing rule that before the state may use the testimony of an absent witness given at a former trial or preliminary hearing, it must be made to appear the witness cannot, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, be produced at trial (State v. Lesco, 194 Kan. 555 , 400 P.2d 695 ; State v. Guthrie, 192 Kan. 659 , 391 P.2d 95 ; State v. Brown, 181 Kan. 375 , 312 P.2d 832 ; State v. Bonskowski, 180 Kan. 726 , 308 P.2d 168 ; State v. Streeter, 173 Kan. 240 , 245 P.2d 1177 .

1978Consistent with the federal mandate is our long-standing rule that before the state may use the testimony of an absent witness given at a former trial or preliminary hearing, it must be made to appear the witness cannot, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, be produced at trial (State v. Lesco, 194 Kan. 555 , 400 P.2d 695 ; State v. Guthrie, 192 Kan. 659 , 391 P.2d 95 ; State v. Brown, 181 Kan. 375 , 312 P.2d 832 ; State v. Bonskowski, 180 Kan. 726 , 308 P.2d 168 ; State v. Streeter, 173 Kan. 240 , 245 P.2d 1177 .

1978Consistent with the federal mandate is our long-standing rule that before the state may use the testimony of an absent witness given at a former trial or preliminary hearing, it must be made to appear the witness cannot, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, be produced at trial (State v. Lesco, 194 Kan. 555 , 400 P.2d 695 ; State v. Guthrie, 192 Kan. 659 , 391 P.2d 95 ; State v. Brown, 181 Kan. 375 , 312 P.2d 832 ; State v. Bonskowski, 180 Kan. 726 , 308 P.2d 168 ; State v. Streeter, 173 Kan. 240 , 245 P.2d 1177 .

1978Consistent with the federal mandate is our long-standing rule that before the state may use the testimony of an absent witness given at a former trial or preliminary hearing, it must be made to appear the witness cannot, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, be produced at trial (State v. Lesco, 194 Kan. 555 , 400 P.2d 695 ; State v. Guthrie, 192 Kan. 659 , 391 P.2d 95 ; State v. Brown, 181 Kan. 375 , 312 P.2d 832 ; State v. Bonskowski, 180 Kan. 726 , 308 P.2d 168 ; State v. Streeter, 173 Kan. 240 , 245 P.2d 1177 .

1978Consistent with the federal mandate is our long-standing rule that before the state may use the testimony of an absent witness given at a former trial or preliminary hearing, it must be made to appear the witness cannot, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, be produced at trial (State v. Lesco, 194 Kan. 555 , 400 P.2d 695 ; State v. Guthrie, 192 Kan. 659 , 391 P.2d 95 ; State v. Brown, 181 Kan. 375 , 312 P.2d 832 ; State v. Bonskowski, 180 Kan. 726 , 308 P.2d 168 ; State v. Streeter, 173 Kan. 240 , 245 P.2d 1177 .

2020The Court explained that this means that the 'beneficiary of [the] constitutional error . . . [must] prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.' Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24." State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 556 , 256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. denied 565 U.S. 1221 (2012). 5 Because the intent to distribute was so clearly and obviously proven to the jury, any possible error would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

2017Under the federal constitutional standard, an "'error may be declared harmless where the party benefitting from the error proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of will not or did not affect the outcome of the trial in light of the entire record, i.e., proves there is no reasonable possibility that the error affected the verdict.'" State v. Dupree, 304 Kan. 377, 402-03 , 373 P.3d 811 (2016) (quoting State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 569 , 256 P.3d 801 [2011], cert. denied 565 U.S. 1221 [2012]).

2016It then defined the federal constitutional standard as "requiring the beneficiary of a constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict," a standard it equated with determining "'whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.'" 386 U.S. at 24 (quoting Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 , 84 S. Ct. 229 , 11 L.

2016It then defined the federal constitutional standard as "requiring the beneficiary of a constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict," a standard it equated with determining "'whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.'" 386 U.S. at 24 (quoting Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 , 84 S. Ct. 229 , 11 L.

2011In Fleury , the court first noted the Chapman holding that "`before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.' [Citation omitted]." Fleury, 203 Kan. at 893 , 457 P.2d 44 (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 ).

2011In Fleury , the court first noted the Chapman holding that "`before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.' [Citation omitted]." Fleury, 203 Kan. at 893 , 457 P.2d 44 (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 ).

2009State v. Hebert, 277 Kan. 61, 96 , 82 P.3d 470 (2004). *172 "`Where the evidence of guilt is of such direct and overwhelming nature that it can be said that evidence erroneously admitted or excluded in violation of a constitutional or statutory right could not have affected the result of the trial, such admission or exclusion is harmless.' State v. Sanders, 258 Kan. 409, 418-19 , 904 P.2d 951 (1995)." 277 Kan. at 96 , 82 P.3d 470 .

2009State v. Hebert, 277 Kan. 61, 96 , 82 P.3d 470 (2004). *172 "`Where the evidence of guilt is of such direct and overwhelming nature that it can be said that evidence erroneously admitted or excluded in violation of a constitutional or statutory right could not have affected the result of the trial, such admission or exclusion is harmless.' State v. Sanders, 258 Kan. 409, 418-19 , 904 P.2d 951 (1995)." 277 Kan. at 96 , 82 P.3d 470 .

2009Among other things, this court specifically considers whether the error is of such a nature as to affect the outcome of the trial.); Walters, 284 Kan. 1 , Syl. ¶ 6, 159 P.3d 174 ("Before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the appellate court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; stated another way, that the error had little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of the trial.").

2009Among other things, this court specifically considers whether the error is of such a nature as to affect the outcome of the trial.); Walters, 284 Kan. 1 , Syl. ¶ 6, 159 P.3d 174 ("Before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the appellate court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; stated another way, that the error had little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of the trial.").

2006Under the federal constitutional rule, “an error may not be held to be harmless unless the appellate court is willing to declare beyond a reasonable doubt that the error had little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of the trial. [Citation omitted.]” 276 Kan. at 925 .

2005State v. Atkinson, 276 Kan. 920, 925 , 80 P.3d 1143 (2003).

2004“Under that rule, an error may not be held to be harmless unless the appellate court is willing to declare beyond *1010 a reasonable doubt that the error had little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of the trial. [Citation omitted.]” State v. Groschang, 272 Kan. 652, 671 , 36 P.3d 231 (2001).

2004“Under that rule, an error may not be held to be harmless unless the appellate court is willing to declare beyond *1010 a reasonable doubt that the error had little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of the trial. [Citation omitted.]” State v. Groschang, 272 Kan. 652, 671 , 36 P.3d 231 (2001).

2001Then, if tire evidence was improperly admitted, it must determine whether to apply tire harmless error rule of review or the federal constitutional error rule to the erroneous admission of that evidence.” State v. Smallwood, 264 Kan. 69, 80-81 , 955 P.2d 1209 (1998).

2001Then, if tire evidence was improperly admitted, it must determine whether to apply tire harmless error rule of review or the federal constitutional error rule to the erroneous admission of that evidence.” State v. Smallwood, 264 Kan. 69, 80-81 , 955 P.2d 1209 (1998).

1979Thus, assuming that state remedies have been exhausted, see 28 USC § 2254 (b) [28 USCS § 2254(b)], and that no independent and adequate state ground stands as a bar, see Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 , 48 L.Ed.2d 126 , 96 S.Ct. 1691 ; Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 , 48 L.Ed.2d 149 , 96 S.Ct. 1708 ; Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 , 53 L.Ed.2d 594 , 97 S.Ct. 2497 ; Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 , 9 L.Ed. 2d 837 , 83 S.Ct. 822 , 24 Ohio Ops. 2d 12, it follows that such a claim is cognizable in a federal habeas corpus proceeding.” 61 L.Ed.2d at 574-575 .

1979Thus, assuming that state remedies have been exhausted, see 28 USC § 2254 (b) [28 USCS § 2254(b)], and that no independent and adequate state ground stands as a bar, see Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 , 48 L.Ed.2d 126 , 96 S.Ct. 1691 ; Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 , 48 L.Ed.2d 149 , 96 S.Ct. 1708 ; Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 , 53 L.Ed.2d 594 , 97 S.Ct. 2497 ; Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 , 9 L.Ed. 2d 837 , 83 S.Ct. 822 , 24 Ohio Ops. 2d 12, it follows that such a claim is cognizable in a federal habeas corpus proceeding.” 61 L.Ed.2d at 574-575 .

1978“In applying the Kansas harmless error rule (K.S.A. 60-2105) to a federal constitutional error a court must be able to declare the error had little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of the trial and the court must be able to declare such a belief beyond a reasonable doubt.” (State v. Hamilton, 222 Kan. 341 , Syl. 4, 564 P.2d 536 ; State v. Thompson, 221 Kan. 176 , Syl. 5, 558 P.2d 93 .) Two girls positively identified Hayes, and Holt gave testimony at trial that incriminated Hayes.

1978“In applying the Kansas harmless error rule (K.S.A. 60-2105) to a federal constitutional error a court must be able to declare the error had little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of the trial and the court must be able to declare such a belief beyond a reasonable doubt.” (State v. Hamilton, 222 Kan. 341 , Syl. 4, 564 P.2d 536 ; State v. Thompson, 221 Kan. 176 , Syl. 5, 558 P.2d 93 .) Two girls positively identified Hayes, and Holt gave testimony at trial that incriminated Hayes.

2024But the United States Supreme Court has recognized a limited category of errors which violate constitutional rights "so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error." Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23-24 , n.8 (citing Payne v. State of Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 , 78 S. Ct. 844 , 2 L.

2024But the United States Supreme Court has recognized a limited category of errors which violate constitutional rights "so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error." Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23-24 , n.8 (citing Payne v. State of Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 , 78 S. Ct. 844 , 2 L.