federal constitutional error in California

2026(See Rose v. Clark (1986) 478 U.S. 570 , 570–581.) Under the Chapman standard, a federal constitutional error requires reversal unless the People show the error was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24 .) In the case of In re Lopez (2023) 14 Cal.5th 562 (Lopez), the California Supreme Court further clarified the standard for evaluating harmless error arising from an instruction based on an invalid theory or with omitted required elements.

2026(People v. Dowdell (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1388, 1408 .) We evaluate a federal constitutional error for prejudice using the standard in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 , which requires reversal unless we determine that the misconduct did not affect the jury’s verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.

2026(People v. Watson 9. (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [reversal for state law error is not warranted unless it is “reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error”]; Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24 [before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the reviewing court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt].) The trial court only prohibited defense counsel from displaying his game that had side-by-side pictures of purportedly similar-looking celebrities.

2026Any assumed error was harmless Even assuming the trial court erred in admitting the statements through Rigoberto’s or Campbell’s testimony, any error was harmless under any standard.37 (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [reversal required under federal standard if the prosecution cannot show beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict]; Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836 [requiring reversal only if the defendant can show it is reasonably probable the jury would have reached a different result but for the error].) 37 “[G]enerally, violations of state ev

2026Any assumed error was harmless Even assuming the trial court erred in admitting the statements through Rigoberto’s or Campbell’s testimony, any error was harmless under any standard.37 (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [reversal required under federal standard if the prosecution cannot show beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict]; Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836 [requiring reversal only if the defendant can show it is reasonably probable the jury would have reached a different result but for the error].) 37 “[G]enerally, violations of state ev

2026As a general rule, “ ‘violations of state evidentiary rules do not rise to the level of federal constitutional error.’ (People v. Benavides (2005) 35 Cal.4th 69, 91 .)” (People v. DeHoyos, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 120 .) Sanchez’s testimony did not purport to conclusively establish any fact or even that he had concluded the bruising on Doe’s neck was the result of being strangled or Flores’s facial injuries were inflicted by Doe struggling against Flores strangling her.

2025(Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1 , 9–10.) Under the Chapman standard, a federal constitutional error requires reversal unless the People show the error was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 ; see also Flood, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 475 .) 3.

2025(Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1 , 9–10.) Under the Chapman standard, a federal constitutional error requires reversal unless the People show the error was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman); Flood, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 475 .) 3.

2019Discussion “ The federal constitutional standard for dismissing a prospective juror for cause based on his or her views of capital punishment is ‘ “[w]hether the juror’s views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of h[er] duties as a juror in accordance with h[er] instructions and h[er] oath.” ’ ” (People v. Friend (2009) 47 Cal.4th 1, 56 , quoting Uttecht v. Brown (2007) 551 U.S. 1, 7 .) “ ‘ “There is no requirement that a prospective juror’s bias against the death penalty be proven with unmistakable clarity.” ’ ” (People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 497 .) As the high co

2014“The federal constitutional standard for dismissing a prospective juror for cause based on his or her views of capital punishment is ‘ “[w]hether the juror’s views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.” ’ (Uttecht v. Brown (2007) 551 U.S. 1, 7 , citing [ Witt, supra,] 469 U.S. [at p.] 424.)” (People v. Friend (2009) 47 Cal.4th 1, 56 .) “When the prospective juror’s answers on voir dire are conflicting or equivocal, the trial court’s findings as to the prospective juror’s state of mind are binding on appe

1987That test provides that "before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." ( Id. at p. 24 [17 L.Ed.2d at pp. 710-711].) The Chapman court reiterated the approach it had adopted in Fahy v. Connecticut (1963) 375 U.S. 85 [ 11 L.Ed.2d 171 , 84 S.Ct. 229 ]: "The question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction." ( Id. at pp. 86-87 [ 11 L.Ed.2d at p. 173 ].) When a fundamental constitutional right is at issue, under this

1987That test provides that "before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." ( Id. at p. 24 [17 L.Ed.2d at pp. 710-711].) The Chapman court reiterated the approach it had adopted in Fahy v. Connecticut (1963) 375 U.S. 85 [ 11 L.Ed.2d 171 , 84 S.Ct. 229 ]: "The question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction." ( Id. at pp. 86-87 [ 11 L.Ed.2d at p. 173 ].) When a fundamental constitutional right is at issue, under this

2017A prosecutor’s misconduct constitutes a federal constitutional violation “ ‘ “ ‘when it comprises a pattern of conduct ‘“so egregious that it infects the trial with such unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due process.” ”” ” (People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 819 [ 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656 , 952 P.2d 673 ] (Hill); see People v. Thomas, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 937 .) Conduct by a prosecutor is misconduct under state law “ ‘ ‘“only if it involves the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade either the trial court or the jury.” ’ ” (People v. Linton, supra, 56 C

2017A prosecutor’s misconduct constitutes a federal constitutional violation “ ‘ “ ‘when it comprises a pattern of conduct ‘“so egregious that it infects the trial with such unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due process.” ”” ” (People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 819 [ 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656 , 952 P.2d 673 ] (Hill); see People v. Thomas, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 937 .) Conduct by a prosecutor is misconduct under state law “ ‘ ‘“only if it involves the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade either the trial court or the jury.” ’ ” (People v. Linton, supra, 56 C

2013(People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1060 [ 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 5 P.3d 68 ]; People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 448 [ 250 Cal.Rptr. 604 , 758 P.2d 1135 ] [“when faced with penalty phase error not amounting to a federal constitutional violation, we will affirm the judgment unless we conclude there is a reasonable (i.e., realistic) possibility that the jury would have rendered a different verdict had the error or errors not occurred”].) Liu, 1, concurred.

2013(People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1060 ; People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 448 [“when faced with penalty phase error not amounting to a federal constitutional violation, we will affirm the judgment unless we conclude there is a reasonable (i.e., realistic) possibility that the jury would have rendered a different verdict had the error or errors not occurred”].) WERDEGAR, J.

2023(People v. Sandoval (2015) 62 Cal.4th 394, 422 .) Error under state law is reviewed under the standard set forth in Watson, which requires a determination “whether there is a ‘reasonable probability’ that a result more favorable to the defendant would have occurred absent the error.” (People v. Aranda (2012) 55 Cal.4th 342, 354 , quoting Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 837 .) Error rising to the level of a federal constitutional violation is reviewed under the standard articulated in Chapman, which requires a determination “whether it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury woul

2021(Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 (Chapman).) “Under Chapman, a federal constitutional error is harmless when the reviewing court determines ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’ [Citation.] When there is ‘ “a reasonable possibility” ’ that the error might have contributed to the verdict, reversal is required. [Citation.]” (People v. Aranda (2012) 55 Cal.4th 342, 367 .) B.

2025(Gonzalez, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 196 ; see id. at p. 198 [“neither we nor the United States Supreme Court recognizes a similar duty to instruct on lesser included offenses under federal constitutional law—at least in noncapital cases”]; accord, People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 172 [“federal law has no effect on the appropriate standard of California appellate review when, in a noncapital case, the defendant [argues] . . . the trial court failed in its sua sponte duty under California law to provide instructions . . . on all lesser included offenses”], disapproved by Schuller, supra,

2019In People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142 , 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870 , 960 P.2d 1094 , our Supreme Court held that, in a noncapital case, an erroneous failure to instruct on heat of passion is a violation of state law only, and not a violation of the federal constitution; hence, it is subject to the state-law standard of review. ( Id. at pp. 164-178, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870 , 960 P.2d 1094 ; accord, People v. Beltran , supra , 56 Cal.4th at p. 955 , 157 Cal.Rptr.3d 503 , 301 P.3d 1120 .) Justice Kennard, dissenting in Breverman , argued that such a failure is a federal constitutional violation, becaus

2026It also allows the proponent of the evidence to lay additional foundation, modify the offer of proof, or take other steps designed to minimize the prospect of reversal.’ ” (People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 434 .) 5 R.R. asks us to excuse her failure to object in the trial court because her counsel performed ineffectively by failing to object. “[A] proposed conservatee has a statutory right to effective assistance of counsel.” (Conservatorship of David L. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 701, 710 ; see § 5365; Conservatorship of John L. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 131, 151-152 .) The parties suggest that t

2025Given that, “generally, violations of state evidentiary rules do not rise to the level of federal constitutional error” (People v. Benavides (2005) 35 Cal.4th 69, 91 ), we treat the erroneous admission of hearsay evidence as “state law error . . . subject to the traditional Watson test: The reviewing court must ask whether it is reasonably probable the verdict would have been more favorable to the defendant absent the error” (People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 439 ).

2024In our view, the instant case is extremely 21. close, and under the circumstances, we have no doubt that the admission of Sanchez’s statements and apology letters would have been prejudicial under the heightened standard of review articulated in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [“before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”].) Although the People argue there is strong evidence supporting Sanchez’s guilt notwithstanding his confession, “[t]he inquiry[] … is not whether, in a tri

2023(See Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. 275 , 278–279 (Sullivan); Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman).) Even assuming there was an instructional error of such sufficient magnitude to conclude a violation of federal due process occurred, reversal is generally not automatic.5 (Sullivan, supra, 508 U.S. at p. 279 [noting “most constitutional errors have been held amenable to harmless-error analysis”].) Under Chapman, “before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Chapma

2025(Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1 , 9–10.) Under the Chapman standard, a federal constitutional error requires reversal unless the People show the error was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 ; see also Flood, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 475 .) 3.

2025(Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1 , 9–10.) Under the Chapman standard, a federal constitutional error requires reversal unless the People show the error was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman); Flood, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 475 .) 3.

2016The federal constitutional standard for excusing a prospective juror for cause based on his or her views of capital punishment is whether “the juror’s views would ‘prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.’ ” (Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 424 , fn. omitted.) Applying Witt , we have stated that a prospective juror “is properly excluded if he or she is unable to conscientiously consider all of the sentencing alternatives, including the death penalty where appropriate.” (People v. Rodrigues, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 114

2014“The federal constitutional standard for dismissing a prospective juror for cause based on his or her views of capital punishment is ‘ “[w]hether the juror’s views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.” ’ (Uttecht v. Brown (2007) 551 U.S. 1, 7 , citing [ Witt, supra,] 469 U.S. [at p.] 424.)” (People v. Friend (2009) 47 Cal.4th 1, 56 .) “When the prospective juror’s answers on voir dire are conflicting or equivocal, the trial court’s findings as to the prospective juror’s state of mind are binding on appe

2022Ambiguous Jury Instructions An ambiguous jury instruction amounts to a federal constitutional violation only if there is “ ‘a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way’ that violates the Constitution.” (Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72 , quoting Boyde v. California (1990) 494 U.S. 370, 380 .) These cases articulate a standard that applies to “claims that allegedly ambiguous instructions caused jury confusion.” (Jones v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 373, 390 .) Instructional errors that violate defendant’s rights under both the United States a

2018Generally speaking, violations of state evidentiary rules do not rise to the level of federal constitutional error. ( People v. Benavides (2005) 35 Cal.4th 69 , 91, 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 507 , 105 P.3d 1099 ; cf. Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62 , 72, 75, 112 S.Ct. 475 , 116 L.Ed.2d 385 [question on federal habeas review is whether state law error " 'so infused the trial with unfairness as to deny due process of law' "].) In Luce v. United States (1984) 469 U.S. 38 , 105 S.Ct. 460 , 83 L.Ed.2d 443 ( Luce ), the United States Supreme Court indicated in passing that as a matter of federal practice

2022(People v. Panah, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 462 .) “Misconduct that does not constitute a federal constitutional violation warrants reversal only if it is reasonably probable the trial outcome was affected.” (People v. Shazier (2014) 60 Cal.4th 109, 127 .) Appellants argue that standard was met, because misconduct “eroded every possible chance [they] had at defending against this case by unlawfully shoring up problems with the prosecution’s case.” As they acknowledge, however, the wiretap evidence in this case was “compelling.” Moreover, we presume the jurors followed the court’s instructions to

2022Prosecutorial misconduct that falls short of rendering the trial fundamentally unfair may still constitute misconduct under state law if it involves the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to persuade the trial court or the jury.” (People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 462 .) “Misconduct that does not constitute a federal constitutional violation warrants reversal only if it is reasonably probable the trial outcome was affected.” (People v. Shazier (2014) 60 Cal.4th 109, 127 .) “As a prerequisite for advancing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, the defendant is required to have object

2025“Where a jury is instructed on alternate theories of liability, one legally valid and one legally invalid, a federal constitutional error has occurred.” (In re Lopez (2023) 14 Cal.5th 562 , 580 (Lopez).) Accordingly, we “must reverse the conviction unless, after examining the entire cause, including the evidence, and considering all relevant circumstances, [we] determine[] the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Aledamat (2019) 8 Cal.5th 1, 3 .) A reviewing court may hold such an error harmless “where it would be impossible, based on the evidence, for a jury to make the f

2025“Where a jury is instructed on alternate theories of liability, one legally valid and one legally invalid, a federal constitutional error has occurred.” (In re Lopez (2023) 14 Cal.5th 562 , 580 (Lopez).) In this circumstance, we “must reverse the conviction unless, after examining the entire cause, including the evidence, and considering all relevant circumstances, [we] determine[ ] the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Aledamat (2019) 8 Cal.5th 1, 3 .) We may hold such an error harmless “where it would be impossible, based on the evidence, for a jury to make the findin

2026(See Rose v. Clark (1986) 478 U.S. 570 , 570–581, overruled on other grounds in Brecht v. Abrahamson (1993) 507 U.S. 619, 637 .) Under the Chapman standard, a federal constitutional error requires reversal unless the People show the error was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 .) In the case of In re Lopez (2023) 14 Cal.5th 562 (In re Lopez), the California Supreme Court further clarified the standard for evaluating harmless error arising from an instruction with omitted required elements.

2026(See Rose v. Clark (1986) 478 U.S. 570 , 570–581.) Under the Chapman standard, a federal constitutional error requires reversal unless the People show the error was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24 .) In the case of In re Lopez (2023) 14 Cal.5th 562 (Lopez), the California Supreme Court further clarified the standard for evaluating harmless error arising from an instruction based on an invalid theory or with omitted required elements.

2026Our conclusion precludes finding prejudice, whether under the federal constitutional standard (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 []; Yates v. Evatt (1991) 500 U.S. 391 []) or that for state law error (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 []).

2020(People v. Livingston (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1145, 1159 , citing Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710-711 ].) The Chapman court stated “before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Chapman, at p. 24 [17 L.Ed.2d at pp. 710- 711].) Under this standard, “[t]o say that an error did not contribute to the verdict is, rather, to find that error unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question, as revealed in the record.” (Yates v.

2026(See People v. Riggs, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 292 [“To the extent defendant on appeal raises a federal constitutional claim distinct from his claim that the trial court 19 While defense counsel reserved an objection for late discovery, he never followed up with a further objection nor did he object on the specific grounds now raised on appeal.

2021(See People v. Riggs (2008) 44 Cal.4th 248, 292 [to the extent defendant raises a federal constitutional claim distinct from his claim that the trial court abused its discretion under the Evidence Code, he forfeited that claim by failing to identify that ground in his objections to the trial court].) Even so, on this record we conclude there was no due process violation.

2021(People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 894 .) When it relates to the admission or exclusion of evidence, the “ ‘[a]pplication of the ordinary rules of evidence . . . does not impermissibly infringe on a defendant’s right to present a defense.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1102-1103 .) The California Supreme Court has explained “that only evidentiary error amounting to a complete preclusion of a defense violates a defendant’s federal constitutional right to present a defense.” (People v. Bacon (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1082, 1104, fn. 4 .) The standard for assessing prejudice

2013Assuming it was error for the trial court to admit evidence of the food stamp application, defendant did not suffer any prejudice. ―[G]enerally, violations of state evidentiary rules do not rise to the level of federal constitutional error.‖ (People v. Benavides (2005) 35 Cal.4th 69, 91 .) ―Accordingly, the proper standard of review is that announced in People v. Watson[, supra,] 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 , and not the stricter beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard reserved for errors of constitutional dimension (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 19 . 18, 24).‖ (People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075

2016Prosecutorial misconduct can violate either federal or state law. “ ‘ “When a prosecutor’s intemperate behavior is sufficiently egregious that it infects the trial with such a degree of unfairness as to render the subsequent conviction a denial of due process, the federal Constitution is violated.” ’ [Citations.] ‘ “Prosecutorial misconduct that falls short of rendering the trial fundamentally unfair may still constitute misconduct under state law if it involves the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to persuade the trial court or the jury.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] Misconduct that does

2009(Mickens, at p. 176.) In effect, Lollar, supra, 376 F.2d at page 247 , had “ ‘adopted] the standard of “reasonable doubt," a standard the Supreme Court recently said must govern whenever the prosecution contends the denial of a constitutional right is merely harmless error.’ ” (Chacon, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 776, fn. 3 .) Under that standard, “before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , 87 S.Ct. 824 ] (Chapman).) We therefo

2026As a general rule, “ ‘violations of state evidentiary rules do not rise to the level of federal constitutional error.’ (People v. Benavides (2005) 35 Cal.4th 69, 91 .)” (People v. DeHoyos, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 120 .) Sanchez’s testimony did not purport to conclusively establish any fact or even that he had concluded the bruising on Doe’s neck was the result of being strangled or Flores’s facial injuries were inflicted by Doe struggling against Flores strangling her.

2024(People v. DeHoyos (2013) 57 Cal.4th 79, 120 [violations of state evidentiary rules generally do not rise to the level of federal constitutional error]; Herrera, at p. 478.) Even if the trial court erred in sustaining the objections, any error was harmless.

2019In People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142 , 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870 , 960 P.2d 1094 , our Supreme Court held that, in a noncapital case, an erroneous failure to instruct on heat of passion is a violation of state law only, and not a violation of the federal constitution; hence, it is subject to the state-law standard of review. ( Id. at pp. 164-178, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870 , 960 P.2d 1094 ; accord, People v. Beltran , supra , 56 Cal.4th at p. 955 , 157 Cal.Rptr.3d 503 , 301 P.3d 1120 .) Justice Kennard, dissenting in Breverman , argued that such a failure is a federal constitutional violation, becaus

2019In People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142 , 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870 , 960 P.2d 1094 , our Supreme Court held that, in a noncapital case, an erroneous failure to instruct on heat of passion is a violation of state law only, and not a violation of the federal constitution; hence, it is subject to the state-law standard of review. ( Id. at pp. 164-178, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870 , 960 P.2d 1094 ; accord, People v. Beltran , supra , 56 Cal.4th at p. 955 , 157 Cal.Rptr.3d 503 , 301 P.3d 1120 .) Justice Kennard, dissenting in Breverman , argued that such a failure is a federal constitutional violation, becaus

2023When the defense requests the instruction, the refusal to instruct on a lesser included offense may also violate the federal constitutional requirement that the courts afford every criminal defendant “ ‘a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’ ” (Crane v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 683, 690 ; Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 868, fn. 16 .) This standard is premised on the defendant’s right to a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. ( Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 871–872.) Here, defense cou

1991(See Crane v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 683, 691 [ 90 L.Ed.2d 636, 645-646 , 106 S.Ct. 2142 ] [harmless error test applied to erroneous exclusion of defense evidence].) Under Chapman, a federal constitutional error is not reversible if after reviev/ing the record and assessing the impact of the deprivation the court is convinced the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (.People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1128 [ 240 Cal.Rptr. 585 , 742 P.2d 1306 ].) Here, we are convinced that even assuming Hayes’s exclusion from the courtroom “prevented” him from testifying, his testimonial sil