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10 Nevada opinions name it 1 courts 1967–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Nevada courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Chapman v. Californiared2 sentences2013Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 295 (1991) (noting that “ ‘before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt’ ” (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967), overruled on other grounds by Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993))). 2005See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (“[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 16 Of the nonconspiracy crimes charged, only burglary and kidnapping required a showing of specific intent. 17 We also reject Bolden’s contentions that the State failed to prove that the offenses here involved the possession or use of deadly weapons. | 3 | 6 |
Medina v. Stategreen2 sentences2022Finally, "before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Medina, 122 Nev. at 355, 143 P.3d at 477 (internal quotation marks omitted). 2022Finally, "before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Medina, 122 Nev. at 355, 143 P.3d at 477 (internal quotation marks omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Arizona v. Fulminantegreen2 sentences2013Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 295 (1991) (noting that “ ‘before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt’ ” (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967), overruled on other grounds by Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993))). 1999In Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306-12 (1991), Chief Justice Rehnquist, speaking for a majority of the court, distinguished between “trial error” and “structural error” in determining whether a federal constitutional violation could be analyzed under the Chapman test or required automatic reversal. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Craiggreen2 sentences2019Reviewing the district court's decision whether to dismiss based on a statutory speedy trial violation under NRS 178.556 for an abuse of discretion, State v. Craig, 87 Nev. 199, 200 , 484 P.2d 719, 719 (1971), we affirm.2 'Bozeman erroneously relies on NRS 174.511, which pertains to the State's right to trial within 60 days after arraignment. 2Whi1e Bozeman raises a statutory challenge to his speedy trial right, he erroneously relies on Leonard v. State, 117 Nev. 53 , 83, 17 P.3d 397 , 416 (2001), which lays out the test for a federal constitutional challenge to a speedy trial right violation. 2019Reviewing the district court's decision whether to dismiss based on a statutory speedy trial violation under NRS 178.556 for an abuse of discretion, State v. Craig, 87 Nev. 199, 200 , 484 P.2d 719, 719 (1971), we affirm.2 'Bozeman erroneously relies on NRS 174.511, which pertains to the State's right to trial within 60 days after arraignment. 2Whi1e Bozeman raises a statutory challenge to his speedy trial right, he erroneously relies on Leonard v. State, 117 Nev. 53 , 83, 17 P.3d 397 , 416 (2001), which lays out the test for a federal constitutional challenge to a speedy trial right violation. | 1 | 1 |
Brecht v. Abrahamsongreen1 sentence2013Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 295 (1991) (noting that “ ‘before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt’ ” (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967), overruled on other grounds by Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993))). | 1 | 1 |
Witter v. Statered2 sentences2002Although promulgated after Johnson was tried, SCR 254(4) now expressly provides for the random selection of members of three-judge panels from all eligible district judges. 40 391 U.S. 510 (1968). 41 Id. at 514 . 42 Id. at 519 . 43 Id. at 520 . 44 Id. at 519-20 (“[I]n a nation less than half of whose people believe in the death penalty, a jury composed exclusively of such people cannot speak for the community.” (footnote omitted)). 45 See NRS 175.141; see also, e.g., Witter v. State, 112 Nev. 908, 922-23 , 921 P.2d 886, 896 (1996), receded from on other grounds by Byford v. State, 116 Nev. 215 2002Although promulgated after Johnson was tried, SCR 254(4) now expressly provides for the random selection of members of three-judge panels from all eligible district judges. 40 391 U.S. 510 (1968). 41 Id. at 514 . 42 Id. at 519 . 43 Id. at 520 . 44 Id. at 519-20 (“[I]n a nation less than half of whose people believe in the death penalty, a jury composed exclusively of such people cannot speak for the community.” (footnote omitted)). 45 See NRS 175.141; see also, e.g., Witter v. State, 112 Nev. 908, 922-23 , 921 P.2d 886, 896 (1996), receded from on other grounds by Byford v. State, 116 Nev. 215 | 1 | 1 |
Witherspoon v. Illinoisgreen2 sentences2002Although promulgated after Johnson was tried, SCR 254(4) now expressly provides for the random selection of members of three-judge panels from all eligible district judges. 40 391 U.S. 510 (1968). 41 Id. at 514 . 42 Id. at 519 . 43 Id. at 520 . 44 Id. at 519-20 (“[I]n a nation less than half of whose people believe in the death penalty, a jury composed exclusively of such people cannot speak for the community.” (footnote omitted)). 45 See NRS 175.141; see also, e.g., Witter v. State, 112 Nev. 908, 922-23 , 921 P.2d 886, 896 (1996), receded from on other grounds by Byford v. State, 116 Nev. 215 2002Although promulgated after Johnson was tried, SCR 254(4) now expressly provides for the random selection of members of three-judge panels from all eligible district judges. 40 391 U.S. 510 (1968). 41 Id. at 514 . 42 Id. at 519 . 43 Id. at 520 . 44 Id. at 519-20 (“[I]n a nation less than half of whose people believe in the death penalty, a jury composed exclusively of such people cannot speak for the community.” (footnote omitted)). 45 See NRS 175.141; see also, e.g., Witter v. State, 112 Nev. 908, 922-23 , 921 P.2d 886, 896 (1996), receded from on other grounds by Byford v. State, 116 Nev. 215 | 1 | 1 |
Gallego v. Stategreen2 sentences2002Although promulgated after Johnson was tried, SCR 254(4) now expressly provides for the random selection of members of three-judge panels from all eligible district judges. 40 391 U.S. 510 (1968). 41 Id. at 514 . 42 Id. at 519 . 43 Id. at 520 . 44 Id. at 519-20 (“[I]n a nation less than half of whose people believe in the death penalty, a jury composed exclusively of such people cannot speak for the community.” (footnote omitted)). 45 See NRS 175.141; see also, e.g., Witter v. State, 112 Nev. 908, 922-23 , 921 P.2d 886, 896 (1996), receded from on other grounds by Byford v. State, 116 Nev. 215 2002Although promulgated after Johnson was tried, SCR 254(4) now expressly provides for the random selection of members of three-judge panels from all eligible district judges. 40 391 U.S. 510 (1968). 41 Id. at 514 . 42 Id. at 519 . 43 Id. at 520 . 44 Id. at 519-20 (“[I]n a nation less than half of whose people believe in the death penalty, a jury composed exclusively of such people cannot speak for the community.” (footnote omitted)). 45 See NRS 175.141; see also, e.g., Witter v. State, 112 Nev. 908, 922-23 , 921 P.2d 886, 896 (1996), receded from on other grounds by Byford v. State, 116 Nev. 215 | 1 | 1 |
Hollaway v. Stategreen1 sentence2002Therefore, the constitutionality of three-judge panels where a defendant validly waives the right to a jury trial is not at issue here. 34 NRS 175.554(3) (emphasis added); see also Hollaway v. State, 116 Nev. 732 , 745, 6 P.3d 987, 996 (2000) (“Under Nevada’s capital sentencing scheme, two things are necessary before a defendant is eligible for death: the jury must find unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one enumerated aggravating circumstance exists, and each juror must individually consider the mitigating evidence and determine that any mitigating circumstances do not ou | 1 | 1 |
CARDOVA v. Stategreen1 sentence2002Although promulgated after Johnson was tried, SCR 254(4) now expressly provides for the random selection of members of three-judge panels from all eligible district judges. 40 391 U.S. 510 (1968). 41 Id. at 514 . 42 Id. at 519 . 43 Id. at 520 . 44 Id. at 519-20 (“[I]n a nation less than half of whose people believe in the death penalty, a jury composed exclusively of such people cannot speak for the community.” (footnote omitted)). 45 See NRS 175.141; see also, e.g., Witter v. State, 112 Nev. 908, 922-23 , 921 P.2d 886, 896 (1996), receded from on other grounds by Byford v. State, 116 Nev. 215 | 1 | 1 |
Miguel A. Ramirez v. Sherman Hatcher, Wardengreen1 sentence2002Although promulgated after Johnson was tried, SCR 254(4) now expressly provides for the random selection of members of three-judge panels from all eligible district judges. 40 391 U.S. 510 (1968). 41 Id. at 514 . 42 Id. at 519 . 43 Id. at 520 . 44 Id. at 519-20 (“[I]n a nation less than half of whose people believe in the death penalty, a jury composed exclusively of such people cannot speak for the community.” (footnote omitted)). 45 See NRS 175.141; see also, e.g., Witter v. State, 112 Nev. 908, 922-23 , 921 P.2d 886, 896 (1996), receded from on other grounds by Byford v. State, 116 Nev. 215 | 1 | 1 |
Bollinger v. Stategreen2 sentences2002Although promulgated after Johnson was tried, SCR 254(4) now expressly provides for the random selection of members of three-judge panels from all eligible district judges. 40 391 U.S. 510 (1968). 41 Id. at 514 . 42 Id. at 519 . 43 Id. at 520 . 44 Id. at 519-20 (“[I]n a nation less than half of whose people believe in the death penalty, a jury composed exclusively of such people cannot speak for the community.” (footnote omitted)). 45 See NRS 175.141; see also, e.g., Witter v. State, 112 Nev. 908, 922-23 , 921 P.2d 886, 896 (1996), receded from on other grounds by Byford v. State, 116 Nev. 215 2002Although promulgated after Johnson was tried, SCR 254(4) now expressly provides for the random selection of members of three-judge panels from all eligible district judges. 40 391 U.S. 510 (1968). 41 Id. at 514 . 42 Id. at 519 . 43 Id. at 520 . 44 Id. at 519-20 (“[I]n a nation less than half of whose people believe in the death penalty, a jury composed exclusively of such people cannot speak for the community.” (footnote omitted)). 45 See NRS 175.141; see also, e.g., Witter v. State, 112 Nev. 908, 922-23 , 921 P.2d 886, 896 (1996), receded from on other grounds by Byford v. State, 116 Nev. 215 | 1 | 1 |
Byford v. Stategreen1 sentence2002Although promulgated after Johnson was tried, SCR 254(4) now expressly provides for the random selection of members of three-judge panels from all eligible district judges. 40 391 U.S. 510 (1968). 41 Id. at 514 . 42 Id. at 519 . 43 Id. at 520 . 44 Id. at 519-20 (“[I]n a nation less than half of whose people believe in the death penalty, a jury composed exclusively of such people cannot speak for the community.” (footnote omitted)). 45 See NRS 175.141; see also, e.g., Witter v. State, 112 Nev. 908, 922-23 , 921 P.2d 886, 896 (1996), receded from on other grounds by Byford v. State, 116 Nev. 215 | 1 | 1 |
Paine v. Stategreen2 sentences2002Therefore, the constitutionality of three-judge panels where a defendant validly waives the right to a jury trial is not at issue here. 34 NRS 175.554(3) (emphasis added); see also Hollaway v. State, 116 Nev. 732 , 745, 6 P.3d 987, 996 (2000) (“Under Nevada’s capital sentencing scheme, two things are necessary before a defendant is eligible for death: the jury must find unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one enumerated aggravating circumstance exists, and each juror must individually consider the mitigating evidence and determine that any mitigating circumstances do not ou 2002Therefore, the constitutionality of three-judge panels where a defendant validly waives the right to a jury trial is not at issue here. 34 NRS 175.554(3) (emphasis added); see also Hollaway v. State, 116 Nev. 732 , 745, 6 P.3d 987, 996 (2000) (“Under Nevada’s capital sentencing scheme, two things are necessary before a defendant is eligible for death: the jury must find unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one enumerated aggravating circumstance exists, and each juror must individually consider the mitigating evidence and determine that any mitigating circumstances do not ou | 1 | 1 |
Colwell v. Stategreen2 sentences2002Therefore, the constitutionality of three-judge panels where a defendant validly waives the right to a jury trial is not at issue here. 34 NRS 175.554(3) (emphasis added); see also Hollaway v. State, 116 Nev. 732 , 745, 6 P.3d 987, 996 (2000) (“Under Nevada’s capital sentencing scheme, two things are necessary before a defendant is eligible for death: the jury must find unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one enumerated aggravating circumstance exists, and each juror must individually consider the mitigating evidence and determine that any mitigating circumstances do not ou 2002Therefore, the constitutionality of three-judge panels where a defendant validly waives the right to a jury trial is not at issue here. 34 NRS 175.554(3) (emphasis added); see also Hollaway v. State, 116 Nev. 732 , 745, 6 P.3d 987, 996 (2000) (“Under Nevada’s capital sentencing scheme, two things are necessary before a defendant is eligible for death: the jury must find unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one enumerated aggravating circumstance exists, and each juror must individually consider the mitigating evidence and determine that any mitigating circumstances do not ou | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Nevada. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Leonard v. State
green
2 sentences2019Reviewing the district court's decision whether to dismiss based on a statutory speedy trial violation under NRS 178.556 for an abuse of discretion, State v. Craig, 87 Nev. 199, 200 , 484 P.2d 719, 719 (1971), we affirm.2 'Bozeman erroneously relies on NRS 174.511, which pertains to the State's right to trial within 60 days after arraignment. 2Whi1e Bozeman raises a statutory challenge to his speedy trial right, he erroneously relies on Leonard v. State, 117 Nev. 53 , 83, 17 P.3d 397 , 416 (2001), which lays out the test for a federal constitutional challenge to a speedy trial right violation. 2019Reviewing the district court's decision whether to dismiss based on a statutory speedy trial violation under NRS 178.556 for an abuse of discretion, State v. Craig, 87 Nev. 199, 200 , 484 P.2d 719, 719 (1971), we affirm.2 'Bozeman erroneously relies on NRS 174.511, which pertains to the State's right to trial within 60 days after arraignment. 2Whi1e Bozeman raises a statutory challenge to his speedy trial right, he erroneously relies on Leonard v. State, 117 Nev. 53 , 83, 17 P.3d 397 , 416 (2001), which lays out the test for a federal constitutional challenge to a speedy trial right violation. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Ring v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2002Therefore, the constitutionality of three-judge panels where a defendant validly waives the right to a jury trial is not at issue here. 34 NRS 175.554(3) (emphasis added); see also Hollaway v. State, 116 Nev. 732 , 745, 6 P.3d 987, 996 (2000) (“Under Nevada’s capital sentencing scheme, two things are necessary before a defendant is eligible for death: the jury must find unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one enumerated aggravating circumstance exists, and each juror must individually consider the mitigating evidence and determine that any mitigating circumstances do not ou 2002Therefore, the constitutionality of three-judge panels where a defendant validly waives the right to a jury trial is not at issue here. 34 NRS 175.554(3) (emphasis added); see also Hollaway v. State, 116 Nev. 732 , 745, 6 P.3d 987, 996 (2000) (“Under Nevada’s capital sentencing scheme, two things are necessary before a defendant is eligible for death: the jury must find unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one enumerated aggravating circumstance exists, and each juror must individually consider the mitigating evidence and determine that any mitigating circumstances do not ou | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Porter v. State
green
2 sentences1983As stated in Porter v. State, 94 Nev. 142 , 576 P.2d 279 (1978), “[i]t is without question that absent special conditions of admissibility, reference to past criminal history is reversible error.” The federal constitutional rule which we must follow in these matters require us to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that reference to Manning’s past criminal conduct had no affect on the jury before we can affirm the conviction. 1983As stated in Porter v. State, 94 Nev. 142 , 576 P.2d 279 (1978), "[i]t is without question that absent special conditions of admissibility, reference to past criminal history is reversible error." The federal constitutional rule which we must follow in these matters require us to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that reference to Manning's past criminal conduct had no affect on the jury before we can affirm the conviction. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Fahy v. Connecticut
green
1 sentence1967Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963). | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.