federal constitutional error in Arkansas

2003Within the limits set by the legislature's constitutionally valid definition of chargeable offenses, "the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation" so long as "the selection was [not] deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification." Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 , 456 .

2003The Mitchell court relied on the following holding from the Supreme Court’s decision in Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962): Moreover, the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation.

2003Within the limits set by the legislature's constitutionally valid definition of chargeable offenses, `the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation' so long as "the selection was (not) deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification." Id.

2003Within the limits set by the legislature’s constitutionally valid definition of chargeable offenses, ‘the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation’ so long as “the selection was (not) deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.” Id.

2001In Coleman v. Watt, 40 F.3d 255 (8 th Cir. 1994), the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed precisely this issue in the course of rejecting a federal constitutional challenge to a Pulaski County Municipal Judge's standing order directing the impoundment of cars upon citation for certain offenses. 2 The court observed: Coleman asserts that Judge Watt lacked the legal authority to issue such a sweeping order.

1996The Court went on to hold that “[t]o apply [a state procedural ruling] retroactively . . . would . . . apply a rule unannounced at the time of petitioner’s trial and consequently inadequate to serve as an independent state ground .... [Such a state] rule, adopted long after petitioner’s trial, cannot bar federal judicial review . . . .” Id. at 424-25 , 111 S.Ct. at 858 .

1996The rule is that “only a ‘firmly established and regularly followed state practice’ may be interposed by a State to prevent subsequent review ... of a federal constitutional claim.” Id. 498 U.S. at 423-24 , 111 S.Ct. at 857 -58 (citing and quoting from James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341, 348-51 , 104 S.Ct. 1830, 1835-36 , 80 L.Ed.2d 346 (1984)).

1996The rule is that “only a ‘firmly established and regularly followed state practice’ may be interposed by a State to prevent subsequent review ... of a federal constitutional claim.” Id. 498 U.S. at 423-24 , 111 S.Ct. at 857 -58 (citing and quoting from James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341, 348-51 , 104 S.Ct. 1830, 1835-36 , 80 L.Ed.2d 346 (1984)).

1996The rule is that “only a ‘firmly established and regularly followed state practice’ may be interposed by a State to prevent subsequent review ... of a federal constitutional claim.” Id. 498 U.S. at 423-24 , 111 S.Ct. at 857 -58 (citing and quoting from James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341, 348-51 , 104 S.Ct. 1830, 1835-36 , 80 L.Ed.2d 346 (1984)).

1996The rule is that “only a ‘firmly established and regularly followed state practice’ may be interposed by a State to prevent subsequent review ... of a federal constitutional claim.” Id. 498 U.S. at 423-24 , 111 S.Ct. at 857 -58 (citing and quoting from James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341, 348-51 , 104 S.Ct. 1830, 1835-36 , 80 L.Ed.2d 346 (1984)).

1995Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (cited with approval in Pollard v. State, 258 Ark. 512 , 527 S.W.2d 627 (1975)).

1995Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (cited with approval in Pollard v. State, 258 Ark. 512 , 527 S.W.2d 627 (1975)).

1987The Chapman decision stated: “[BJefore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the Court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” We considered both Chapman and Doyle in our recent decision in Numan v. State, 291 Ark. 22 , 722 S.W.2d 276 (1987).

1987The Chapman decision stated: “[BJefore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the Court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” We considered both Chapman and Doyle in our recent decision in Numan v. State, 291 Ark. 22 , 722 S.W.2d 276 (1987).

1979Also, in Adams v. State, 263 Ark. 536 , 566 S.W. 2d 387 (1978), we held that before a federal constitutional error could be held harmless that we must be able to declare it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

1979Also, in Adams v. State, 263 Ark. 536 , 566 S.W. 2d 387 (1978), we held that before a federal constitutional error could be held harmless that we must be able to declare it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

1978In Chapman v. California, supra, the United States Supreme Court said, among other things: "... [B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." See also: Fahy v. State of Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 , 84 S.Ct. 229 , 11 L.Ed.2d 171 .

1978In Chapman v. California, supra, the United States Supreme Court said, among other things: “. . . [BJefore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt.” See also: Fahy v. State of Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 .