federal constitutional analysis in New Hampshire

2002State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231-33 (1983). ‘We need not conduct a separate federal constitutional analysis because our State Constitution affords the defendant greater protection than does the Federal Constitution in this area.” State v. Aubuchont, 147 N.H. 142, 146 (2001).

1988Finally, in view of our disposition of CSC’s due process claim, we need not consider the company’s federal constitutional claim, see State v. Ball, 124 N.H. at 231-32 , 471 A.2d at 351 , or the merits of the disputed findings.

2002We agree with the State that the respondent has not preserved a due process claim under our State Constitution, see State v. Dellorfano, 128 N.H. 628, 632 (1986), but we find that she has sufficiently preserved a federal constitutional claim that she was deprived of her “fundamental right to be a parent.” We do not, however, need to examine whether the respondent’s rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the Federal Constitution or Part I, Article 15 of the State Constitution were violated here.' The Sixth Amendment is expressly limited to criminal defendants.

1989State v. Dellorfano, 128 N.H. 628, 632 , 517 A.2d 1163, 1166 (1986); State v. Westover, 127 N.H. 130, 131 , 497 A.2d 1218, 1219 (1985).

2002“Whether a confession is voluntary is initially a question of fact for the trial court, whose decision will not be overturned unless it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, as viewed in the light most favorable to the State.” Id. (quotation omitted).

2002State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231-33 (1983). ‘We need not conduct a separate federal constitutional analysis because our State Constitution affords the defendant greater protection than does the Federal Constitution in this area.” State v. Aubuchont, 147 N.H. 142, 146 (2001).

1989State v. Dellorfano, 128 N.H. 628, 632 , 517 A.2d 1163, 1166 (1986); State v. Westover, 127 N.H. 130, 131 , 497 A.2d 1218, 1219 (1985).

1989State v. Dellorfano, 128 N.H. 628, 632 , 517 A.2d 1163, 1166 (1986); State v. Westover, 127 N.H. 130, 131 , 497 A.2d 1218, 1219 (1985).

2017Cf. State v. Rodney Portigue, 125 N.H. 352, 361 (1984) (finding “no reviewable State constitutional claim presented” where “the defendant in his appeal relating to [a certain] issue wholly failed to raise anything but a federal constitutional claim and propositions in State case law relying entirely on federal law”). “[O]ur review of the defendant’s double jeopardy claim under the United States Constitution requires us to consider the legislature’s articulated intent.” State v. Stratton, 182 N.H. 451 , 455 (1989); see Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. at 499 (noting that “[b]ecause the substantive pow

2017Cf. State v. Rodney Portigue, 125 N.H. 352, 361 (1984) (finding “no reviewable State constitutional claim presented” where “the defendant in his appeal relating to [a certain] issue wholly failed to raise anything but a federal constitutional claim and propositions in State case law relying entirely on federal law”). “[O]ur review of the defendant’s double jeopardy claim under the United States Constitution requires us to consider the legislature’s articulated intent.” State v. Stratton, 182 N.H. 451 , 455 (1989); see Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. at 499 (noting that “[b]ecause the substantive pow

2017See State v. Kelly, 159 N.H. 390, 394 (2009).

2017Specifically, “we must determine the unit of prosecution intended by the legislature.” Jennings, 155 N.H. at 777 (addressing federal constitutional challenge).

2017Cf. State v. Rodney Portigue, 125 N.H. 352, 361 (1984) (finding “no reviewable State constitutional claim presented” where “the defendant in his appeal relating to [a certain] issue wholly failed to raise anything but a federal constitutional claim and propositions in State case law relying entirely on federal law”). “[O]ur review of the defendant’s double jeopardy claim under the United States Constitution requires us to consider the legislature’s articulated intent.” State v. Stratton, 182 N.H. 451 , 455 (1989); see Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. at 499 (noting that “[b]ecause the substantive pow

2017Cf. State v. Rodney Portigue, 125 N.H. 352, 361 (1984) (finding “no reviewable State constitutional claim presented” where “the defendant in his appeal relating to [a certain] issue wholly failed to raise anything but a federal constitutional claim and propositions in State case law relying entirely on federal law”). “[O]ur review of the defendant’s double jeopardy claim under the United States Constitution requires us to consider the legislature’s articulated intent.” State v. Stratton, 182 N.H. 451 , 455 (1989); see Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. at 499 (noting that “[b]ecause the substantive pow

2017Cf. State v. Rodney Portigue, 125 N.H. 352, 361 (1984) (finding “no reviewable State constitutional claim presented” where “the defendant in his appeal relating to [a certain] issue wholly failed to raise anything but a federal constitutional claim and propositions in State case law relying entirely on federal law”). “[O]ur review of the defendant’s double jeopardy claim under the United States Constitution requires us to consider the legislature’s articulated intent.” State v. Stratton, 182 N.H. 451 , 455 (1989); see Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. at 499 (noting that “[b]ecause the substantive pow

2017Cf. State v. Rodney Portigue, 125 N.H. 352, 361 (1984) (finding “no reviewable State constitutional claim presented” where “the defendant in his appeal relating to [a certain] issue wholly failed to raise anything but a federal constitutional claim and propositions in State case law relying entirely on federal law”). “[O]ur review of the defendant’s double jeopardy claim under the United States Constitution requires us to consider the legislature’s articulated intent.” State v. Stratton, 182 N.H. 451 , 455 (1989); see Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. at 499 (noting that “[b]ecause the substantive pow

2015We review a federal constitutional challenge to a condition of a sentence that limits a fundamental right — including the right to travel — to determine whether it is “reasonably related to the goals of deterrence, protection of the public, or rehabilitation of the offender, taking into account the offender’s history and personal characteristics, and involve[s] no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary for the purposes of supervised release.” United States v. Watson, 582 F.3d 974, 982 (9th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted); see, e.g., State v. Perfetto, 160 N.H. 675, 678 (201

2015See id.

2015Here, the trial court found that the defendant had engaged in a “serious and disturbing” course of criminal conduct for many years, had “a long history of disregard for the law,” and was “in need of significant supervision.” The trial court explained that it imposed the condition because “[p]revious rehabilitation and deterrent efforts have had dubious results, at best,” and “a course of incentive[s to] conduct himself as a law abiding citizen upon his release is essential to encourage his commitment to rehabilitation going forward and to protecting the community.” We conclude that the conditi

2015We review a federal constitutional challenge to a condition of a sentence that limits a fundamental right — including the right to travel — to determine whether it is “reasonably related to the goals of deterrence, protection of the public, or rehabilitation of the offender, taking into account the offender’s history and personal characteristics, and involve[s] no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary for the purposes of supervised release.” United States v. Watson, 582 F.3d 974, 982 (9th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted); see, e.g., State v. Perfetto, 160 N.H. 675, 678 (201

2013See, e.g., State v. Veale, 158 N.H. 632, 638-39 (2009) (holding that reputation alone is a sufficient interest to require state due process protection and rejecting the federal “stigma-plus” approach); State v. Laurie, 139 N.H. 325, 330 (1995) (requiring State to demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that undisclosed exculpatory evidence would not have affected the verdict); State v. Phinney, 117 N.H. 145, 147 (1977) (adopting beyond a reasonable doubt standard in determining the voluntariness of confessions).

2013See, e.g., State v. Veale, 158 N.H. 632, 638-39 (2009) (holding that reputation alone is a sufficient interest to require state due process protection and rejecting the federal “stigma-plus” approach); State v. Laurie, 139 N.H. 325, 330 (1995) (requiring State to demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that undisclosed exculpatory evidence would not have affected the verdict); State v. Phinney, 117 N.H. 145, 147 (1977) (adopting beyond a reasonable doubt standard in determining the voluntariness of confessions).

2013See, e.g., State v. Veale, 158 N.H. 632, 638-39 (2009) (holding that reputation alone is a sufficient interest to require state due process protection and rejecting the federal “stigma-plus” approach); State v. Laurie, 139 N.H. 325, 330 (1995) (requiring State to demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that undisclosed exculpatory evidence would not have affected the verdict); State v. Phinney, 117 N.H. 145, 147 (1977) (adopting beyond a reasonable doubt standard in determining the voluntariness of confessions).

2012Burling, 148 N.H. at 149 .

2012See Burling, 148 N.H. at 146 .

2009See State v. Gaffney, 147 N.H. 550, 554 (2002).

2008See, e.g., State v. Barkus, 152 N.H. 701, 706 (2005).

2007See State v. Panzera, 139 N.H. 235, 239 (1994).

2007See State v. Ayer, 150 N.H. 14, 34 (2003).

2007State v. Stern, 150 N.H. 705, 708 (2004).

2006Like the federal constitutional inquiry, the focus in the state ex post facto analysis is not upon whether a law imposes disadvantages or additional burdens, but rather upon whether it “increases the punishment for or alters the elements of an offense, or changes the ultimate facts required to prove guilt.” Comean, 142 N.H. at 88 (quotation and brackets omitted).

2004Because the State Constitution provides at least as much protection as the Federal Constitution, see Stewart v. Cunningham, Warden, 131 N.H. 68, 70 (1988), we find no federal constitutional violation.

2001State v. Gotsch, 143 N.H. 88, 90 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1164 (1999).