federal constitutional analysis in Washington

2016State v. Guloy, 104 Wn.2d 412, 425 , 705 P.2d 1182 (1985). “[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S. Ct. 824 , 17 L.

2016State v. Guloy, 104 Wn.2d 412, 425 , 705 P.2d 1182 (1985). “[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S. Ct. 824 , 17 L.

2020Sutherby, 165 Wn.2d 870, 878 , 204 P.3d 916 (2009)(citing State v. Gocken, 127 Wn.2d 95, 107 , 896 P.2d 1267 (1995)).

2020Sutherby, 165 Wn.2d 870, 878 , 204 P.3d 916 (2009)(citing State v. Gocken, 127 Wn.2d 95, 107 , 896 P.2d 1267 (1995)).

2011State v. Thiefault, 160 Wash.2d 409, 418 , 158 P.3d 580 (2007) (citation omitted); see also State v. Roswell, 165 Wash.2d 186 , 193 n. 5, 196 P.3d 705 (2008) (recognizing the "prior conviction exception" of Almendarez-Torres ).

2011State v. Thiefault, 160 Wn.2d 409, 418 , 158 P.3d 580 (2007) (citation omitted); see also State v. Roswell, 165 Wn.2d 186 , 193 n.5, 196 P.3d 705 (2008) (recognizing the “prior conviction exception” of Almendarez-Torres).

2011State v. Thiefault, 160 Wash.2d 409, 418 , 158 P.3d 580 (2007) (citation omitted); see also State v. Roswell, 165 Wash.2d 186 , 193 n. 5, 196 P.3d 705 (2008) (recognizing the "prior conviction exception" of Almendarez-Torres ).

2011State v. Thiefault, 160 Wn.2d 409, 418 , 158 P.3d 580 (2007) (citation omitted); see also State v. Roswell, 165 Wn.2d 186 , 193 n.5, 196 P.3d 705 (2008) (recognizing the “prior conviction exception” of Almendarez-Torres).

2007Logically, if the state constitution affords broader protection, there can be no need to proceed under the Fourth Amendment, and conversely, if the state constitution is not more protective, the Fourth Amendment’s protections will necessarily be coextensive with our state constitutional protections, making a state constitutional analysis redundant. ¶36 The majority’s mistaken notion that this court must engage in both “an independent state constitutional analysis” and a federal constitutional analysis betrays the majority’s misunderstanding of this court’s important holding in State v. Gunwall

2007Logically, if the state constitution affords broader protection, there can be no need to proceed under the Fourth Amendment, and conversely, if the state constitution is not more protective, the Fourth Amendment’s protections will necessarily be coextensive with our state constitutional protections, making a state constitutional analysis redundant. ¶36 The majority’s mistaken notion that this court must engage in both “an independent state constitutional analysis” and a federal constitutional analysis betrays the majority’s misunderstanding of this court’s important holding in State v. Gunwall

1992NOTES [1] Shortly before Simpson the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 , 65 L.Ed.2d 619 , 100 S.Ct. 2547 (1980) abolished the automatic standing doctrine as a federal constitutional requirement. [2] When the Court developed the automatic standing doctrine in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 , 4 L.Ed.2d 697 , 80 S.Ct. 725 , 78 A.L.R.2d 233 (1960), it did not state clearly whether the defendant's possession at the time of the search was a requirement for automatic standing.

1992NOTES [1] Shortly before Simpson the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 , 65 L.Ed.2d 619 , 100 S.Ct. 2547 (1980) abolished the automatic standing doctrine as a federal constitutional requirement. [2] When the Court developed the automatic standing doctrine in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 , 4 L.Ed.2d 697 , 80 S.Ct. 725 , 78 A.L.R.2d 233 (1960), it did not state clearly whether the defendant's possession at the time of the search was a requirement for automatic standing.

1992Ed. 2d 547 , 105 S. *422 Ct. 1524 (1985); Judge , at 713. "[Selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation." Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 7 L.

1992Ed. 2d 547 , 105 S. *422 Ct. 1524 (1985); Judge , at 713. "[Selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation." Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 7 L.

2020Shortly following the publication of the Jackson decision, our Supreme Court, in State v. Green, 94 Wn.2d 216 , 616 P.2d 628 (1980) (Green II), held that Washington courts must apply the federal constitutional standard for appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence in criminal cases in its reconsideration of State v. Green, 91 Wn.2d 431 , 588 P.2d 1370 (1979) (Green I).

2020Shortly following the publication of the Jackson decision, our Supreme Court, in State v. Green, 94 Wn.2d 216 , 616 P.2d 628 (1980) (Green II), held that Washington courts must apply the federal constitutional standard for appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence in criminal cases in its reconsideration of State v. Green, 91 Wn.2d 431 , 588 P.2d 1370 (1979) (Green I).

2020In the time period between Green II and Homan (and even after Homan), when reviewing whether a conviction is supported by a legally sufficient quantum of evidence, our Supreme Court has applied only the federal constitutional standard set forth in Jackson. ~ ~ State v. Johnson, 188 Wn.2d 742 , 750-51, 399 P.3d 507 (2017); State v. 7 No. 78846-9-1/8 Condon, 182 Wn.2d 307, 314 , 343 P.3d 357 (2015); Engel, 166 Wn.2d at 576 ; State v. Wentz, 149 Wn.2d 342, 347 , 68 P.3d 282 (2003); State v. Bencivenga, 137 Wn.2d 703, 706 , 974 P.2d 832 (1999); State v. Luvene, 127 Wn.2d 690, 712 , 903 P.2d 960 (1

2016See, e.g., State v. Condon, 182 Wn.2d 307, 314 , 343 P.3d 357 (2015); State v. Bencivenga, 137 Wn.2d 703, 706 , 974 P.2d 832 (1999); State v. Luvene, 127 Wn.2d 690, 712 , 903 P.2d 960 (1995). ¶25 Thus, on appellate review of a criminal conviction, Washington’s sole evidentiary sufficiency standard is that which the Fourteenth Amendment requires. *395 B ¶26 Flowing from the principles discussed in Jackson , earlier this year the United States Supreme Court decided Musacchio v. United States, 577 U.S. _ , 136 S. Ct. 709 , 193 L.

2020In the time period between Green II and Homan (and even after Homan), when reviewing whether a conviction is supported by a legally sufficient quantum of evidence, our Supreme Court has applied only the federal constitutional standard set forth in Jackson. ~ ~ State v. Johnson, 188 Wn.2d 742 , 750-51, 399 P.3d 507 (2017); State v. 7 No. 78846-9-1/8 Condon, 182 Wn.2d 307, 314 , 343 P.3d 357 (2015); Engel, 166 Wn.2d at 576 ; State v. Wentz, 149 Wn.2d 342, 347 , 68 P.3d 282 (2003); State v. Bencivenga, 137 Wn.2d 703, 706 , 974 P.2d 832 (1999); State v. Luvene, 127 Wn.2d 690, 712 , 903 P.2d 960 (1

2016See, e.g., State v. Condon, 182 Wn.2d 307, 314 , 343 P.3d 357 (2015); State v. Bencivenga, 137 Wn.2d 703, 706 , 974 P.2d 832 (1999); State v. Luvene, 127 Wn.2d 690, 712 , 903 P.2d 960 (1995). ¶25 Thus, on appellate review of a criminal conviction, Washington’s sole evidentiary sufficiency standard is that which the Fourteenth Amendment requires. *395 B ¶26 Flowing from the principles discussed in Jackson , earlier this year the United States Supreme Court decided Musacchio v. United States, 577 U.S. _ , 136 S. Ct. 709 , 193 L.

2020Shortly following the publication of the Jackson decision, our Supreme Court, in State v. Green, 94 Wn.2d 216 , 616 P.2d 628 (1980) (Green II), held that Washington courts must apply the federal constitutional standard for appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence in criminal cases in its reconsideration of State v. Green, 91 Wn.2d 431 , 588 P.2d 1370 (1979) (Green I).

2020Shortly following the publication of the Jackson decision, our Supreme Court, in State v. Green, 94 Wn.2d 216 , 616 P.2d 628 (1980) (Green II), held that Washington courts must apply the federal constitutional standard for appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence in criminal cases in its reconsideration of State v. Green, 91 Wn.2d 431 , 588 P.2d 1370 (1979) (Green I).

2020In the time period between Green II and Homan (and even after Homan), when reviewing whether a conviction is supported by a legally sufficient quantum of evidence, our Supreme Court has applied only the federal constitutional standard set forth in Jackson. ~ ~ State v. Johnson, 188 Wn.2d 742 , 750-51, 399 P.3d 507 (2017); State v. 7 No. 78846-9-1/8 Condon, 182 Wn.2d 307, 314 , 343 P.3d 357 (2015); Engel, 166 Wn.2d at 576 ; State v. Wentz, 149 Wn.2d 342, 347 , 68 P.3d 282 (2003); State v. Bencivenga, 137 Wn.2d 703, 706 , 974 P.2d 832 (1999); State v. Luvene, 127 Wn.2d 690, 712 , 903 P.2d 960 (1

2016See, e.g., State v. Condon, 182 Wn.2d 307, 314 , 343 P.3d 357 (2015); State v. Bencivenga, 137 Wn.2d 703, 706 , 974 P.2d 832 (1999); State v. Luvene, 127 Wn.2d 690, 712 , 903 P.2d 960 (1995). ¶25 Thus, on appellate review of a criminal conviction, Washington’s sole evidentiary sufficiency standard is that which the Fourteenth Amendment requires. *395 B ¶26 Flowing from the principles discussed in Jackson , earlier this year the United States Supreme Court decided Musacchio v. United States, 577 U.S. _ , 136 S. Ct. 709 , 193 L.

2020In the time period between Green II and Homan (and even after Homan), when reviewing whether a conviction is supported by a legally sufficient quantum of evidence, our Supreme Court has applied only the federal constitutional standard set forth in Jackson. ~ ~ State v. Johnson, 188 Wn.2d 742 , 750-51, 399 P.3d 507 (2017); State v. 7 No. 78846-9-1/8 Condon, 182 Wn.2d 307, 314 , 343 P.3d 357 (2015); Engel, 166 Wn.2d at 576 ; State v. Wentz, 149 Wn.2d 342, 347 , 68 P.3d 282 (2003); State v. Bencivenga, 137 Wn.2d 703, 706 , 974 P.2d 832 (1999); State v. Luvene, 127 Wn.2d 690, 712 , 903 P.2d 960 (1

2016See, e.g., State v. Condon, 182 Wn.2d 307, 314 , 343 P.3d 357 (2015); State v. Bencivenga, 137 Wn.2d 703, 706 , 974 P.2d 832 (1999); State v. Luvene, 127 Wn.2d 690, 712 , 903 P.2d 960 (1995). ¶25 Thus, on appellate review of a criminal conviction, Washington’s sole evidentiary sufficiency standard is that which the Fourteenth Amendment requires. *395 B ¶26 Flowing from the principles discussed in Jackson , earlier this year the United States Supreme Court decided Musacchio v. United States, 577 U.S. _ , 136 S. Ct. 709 , 193 L.

2011See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 239 , 118 S.Ct. 1219 , 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998); see also Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 (" Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.") (emphasis added); U.S. v. O'Brien, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2169 , 2174, 176 L.Ed.2d 979 (2010) (recognizing exception carved out by Almendarez-Torres ). [12] ¶ 45 Our Supreme Court continues to follow this federal constitutional rule: This cour

2011See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 239 , 118 S.Ct. 1219 , 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998); see also Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 (" Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.") (emphasis added); U.S. v. O'Brien, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2169 , 2174, 176 L.Ed.2d 979 (2010) (recognizing exception carved out by Almendarez-Torres ). [12] ¶ 45 Our Supreme Court continues to follow this federal constitutional rule: This cour

2008Neither has been constitutionally required, however, and a violation of either rule does not raise a question cognizable in a habeas corpus hearing. 403 F. Supp. at 985 . ¶21 Thus, case law weighs heavily against the trial court’s conclusion here that corroboration was a federal constitutional requirement. 8 ¶22 We conclude that the independent evidence or corroboration requirement is not constitutionally based and that there is no constitutional impediment to admitting a defendant’s statements found trustworthy under RCW 10.58.035(1).

2008Neither has been constitutionally required, however, and a violation of either rule does not raise a question cognizable in a habeas corpus hearing. 403 F.Supp. at 985 . ¶ 21 Thus, case law weighs heavily against the trial court's conclusion here that corroboration was a federal constitutional requirement. [8] ¶ 22 We conclude that the independent evidence or corroboration requirement is not constitutionally based and that there is no constitutional impediment to admitting a defendant's statements found trustworthy under RCW 10.58.035(1).

2006Plaintiffs maintain they have the fundamental right to marry the person of their choice. ¶43 Under a federal constitutional analysis, for a fundamental right to exist, it must be “objectively, ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’. . . and ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ such that ‘neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.’ ” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 , 117 S. Ct. 2258 , 138 L.

2006Plaintiffs maintain they have the fundamental right to marry the person of their choice. ¶43 Under a federal constitutional analysis, for a fundamental right to exist, it must be “objectively, ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’. . . and ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ such that ‘neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.’ ” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 , 117 S. Ct. 2258 , 138 L.

2000As the Washington Constitution affords no greater protection than the federal constitution in this area, see Ramm v. City of Seattle, 66 Wash.App. 15, 27 , 830 P.2d 395 , review denied, 120 Wash.2d 1018 , 844 P.2d 437 (1992), Washington's similar provisions *38 likewise withstand a constitutional challenge. [3] See also Sightes v. Barker, 684 N.E.2d 224 (Ind.App.) (upholding Indiana's Grandparent Visitation Act against a federal constitutional challenge as a less than substantial encroachment on the parent's rights and a legitimate exercise of the state's parens patriae power where such visita

1998App. 15, 27 , 830 P.2d 395 , review denied, 120 Wn.2d 1018 , 844 P.2d 437 (1992), Washington’s similar provisions likewise withstand a constitutional challenge. 8 See also Sightes v. Barker, 684 N.E.2d 224 (Ind. Ct. App.) (upholding Indiana’s Grandparent Visitation Act against a federal constitutional challenge as a less than substantial encroachment on the parent’s rights and a legitimate exercise of the state’s parens patriae power where such visitation serves the child’s best interests), transfer denied, 690 N.E.2d 1187 (Ind. 1997).