federal constitutional claim in Utah

2022In 1954, the Court added that ―the burden rests heavily upon the Government to establish, after notice to and hearing of the defendant, that such contact with the juror was harmless to the defendant.‖ Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954).18 Indeed, the general proposition that a constitutional violation must be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt to survive a challenge is deeply rooted in Supreme Court precedent. ―[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.‖ Chapman v. Calif

2016Under the federal standard, “the State bears the burden of convincing us that the improperly admitted eyewitness identifications were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. ¶ 16; see also Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) (“[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a rea *56 sonable doubt.”).

2010See generally Valdez, 2006 UT 39 , T 19, 140 P.3d 1219 (discussing that the United States Supreme Court has declined to "set forth ... specific guidelines regarding [the] timeliness" of Batson challenges but that it has "held that 'only a firmly established and regularly followed state practice may be interposed by a State to prevent subsequent review ... of a federal constitutional claim' ") (second omission in original) (quoting Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 423-24 , 111 S.Ct. 850 , 112 L.Ed.2d 935 (1991)).

2010See generally Valdez, 2006 UT 39 , T 19, 140 P.3d 1219 (discussing that the United States Supreme Court has declined to "set forth ... specific guidelines regarding [the] timeliness" of Batson challenges but that it has "held that 'only a firmly established and regularly followed state practice may be interposed by a State to prevent subsequent review ... of a federal constitutional claim' ") (second omission in original) (quoting Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 423-24 , 111 S.Ct. 850 , 112 L.Ed.2d 935 (1991)).

1989Under that standard, which is not as strict as the federal constitutional standard, see Bishop, 753 P.2d at 500 (Zimmerman, J., concurring); Hackford, 737 P.2d at 204 , an error requires reversal only if there is "a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result” for the accused had the error not occurred.

1989Under that standard, which is not as strict as the federal constitutional standard, see Bishop, 753 P.2d at 500 (Zimmerman, J., concurring); Hackford, 737 P.2d at 204 , an error requires reversal only if there is "a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result" for the accused had the error not occurred.

2020See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 , 629–30 (1993) (requiring a conviction involving a federal constitutional error to be set aside unless it is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). ¶57 To avoid reversal on account of a Doyle violation, “the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

2020The State bears the burden of proving that an error passes muster under this standard.” Id. at 630 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶58 In State v. Tillman, we held that a violation similar to the one alleged here was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt “[i]n the face of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt, together with the fact that the comments were isolated as opposed to extensive and the fact that the trial judge specifically instructed the jury that no presumption adverse to [the defendant] is to arise from” his silence. 750 P.2d 546, 555 (Utah 1987) (citation

2020The State bears the burden of proving that an error passes muster under this standard.” Id. at 630 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶58 In State v. Tillman, we held that a violation similar to the one alleged here was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt “[i]n the face of overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt, together with the fact that the comments were isolated as opposed to extensive and the fact that the trial judge specifically instructed the jury that no presumption adverse to [the defendant] is to arise from” his silence. 750 P.2d 546, 555 (Utah 1987) (citation

1988See State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498, 500 (Utah 1986), and cases cited therein. [6] 750 P.2d 546, 573-77 (Utah 1987); see also id. at 574 n. 115 ("Constitutional challenges to panels should be brought outside the framework of the Act."); State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 457 (Utah 1988). [7] 748 P.2d 558, 559-60 (Utah 1987). [8] 746 P.2d 762, 762 (Utah 1987); see also State v. Larson, 758 P.2d 901 (Utah 1988). [9] See Larson, 758 P.2d at 904 . [10] State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983) (emphasis added; citations omitted); see also State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591, 593 (Utah 1988). [11] State v.

2016See State v. Bell, 770 P.2d 100 , 106 n.12 (Utah 1988) (noting that “this Court has never squarely decided whether violations of the Utah Constitution must be addressed under the federal constitutional standard of 'harmless beyond a reasonable doubt1 ”). .

2016See State v. Bell, 770 P.2d 100 , 106 n.12 (Utah 1988) (“[T]his Court has never squarely decided whether violations of the Utah Constitution must be addressed under the federal constitutional standard of ‘harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ”).

2016Whether an error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in a particular case depends on a host of factors, including “the importance of the witness’!#] testimony in the prosecution’s case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution’s case.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 , 106 S.Ct. 1431 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986); see also Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, ¶ 17 , 357 P.3d 20 (ci

2015For us to determine that the trial court's error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we must consider "the importance of the witness'[s] testimony in the prosecution's case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence cofrrolborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution's case." State v. Villarreal, 889 P.2d 419, 425-26 (Utah 1995) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

2010See generally Valdez, 2006 UT 39 , T 19, 140 P.3d 1219 (discussing that the United States Supreme Court has declined to "set forth ... specific guidelines regarding [the] timeliness" of Batson challenges but that it has "held that 'only a firmly established and regularly followed state practice may be interposed by a State to prevent subsequent review ... of a federal constitutional claim' ") (second omission in original) (quoting Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 423-24 , 111 S.Ct. 850 , 112 L.Ed.2d 935 (1991)).

2010See generally Valdez, 2006 UT 39 , T 19, 140 P.3d 1219 (discussing that the United States Supreme Court has declined to "set forth ... specific guidelines regarding [the] timeliness" of Batson challenges but that it has "held that 'only a firmly established and regularly followed state practice may be interposed by a State to prevent subsequent review ... of a federal constitutional claim' ") (second omission in original) (quoting Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 423-24 , 111 S.Ct. 850 , 112 L.Ed.2d 935 (1991)).

2010See also Rosa-Re, 2008 UT 53, ¶¶ 13-14 , 190 P.3d 1259 ("clarifyling] that in the future ... trial courts have an obligation to resolve Batson objections before the jury is sworn and the venire dismissed," that "defense counsel also has an absolute obligation to notify the court that resolution is needed before the jury is sworn and the venire dismissed," and that defense counsel's to do so ... will in the future constitute a waiver of the original objection"); Valdez, 2006 UT 39 , 133 n. 19, 140 P.3d 1219 ("We note that this procedure, whereby an objection was made prior to the swearing of th

2010See also Rosa-Re, 2008 UT 53, ¶¶ 13-14 , 190 P.3d 1259 ("clarifyling] that in the future ... trial courts have an obligation to resolve Batson objections before the jury is sworn and the venire dismissed," that "defense counsel also has an absolute obligation to notify the court that resolution is needed before the jury is sworn and the venire dismissed," and that defense counsel's to do so ... will in the future constitute a waiver of the original objection"); Valdez, 2006 UT 39 , 133 n. 19, 140 P.3d 1219 ("We note that this procedure, whereby an objection was made prior to the swearing of th

2016As we have explained, ―cursory references to the state constitution within arguments otherwise dedicated to a federal constitutional claim are inadequate.‖ State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, ¶ 18 , 164 P.3d 397 . ―When parties fail to direct their argument to the state constitutional issue, our ability to formulate an independent body of state constitutional law is compromised.

2016As we have explained, ―cursory references to the state constitution within arguments otherwise dedicated to a federal constitutional claim are inadequate.‖ State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, ¶ 18 , 164 P.3d 397 . ―When parties fail to direct their argument to the state constitutional issue, our ability to formulate an independent body of state constitutional law is compromised.

2016Whether an error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in a particular case depends on a host of factors, including “the importance of the witness’!#] testimony in the prosecution’s case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution’s case.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 , 106 S.Ct. 1431 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986); see also Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, ¶ 17 , 357 P.3d 20 (ci

2016Whether an error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in a particular case depends on a host of factors, including “the importance of the witness’!#] testimony in the prosecution’s case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution’s case.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 , 106 S.Ct. 1431 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986); see also Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, ¶ 17 , 357 P.3d 20 (ci

2022In 1954, the Court added that ―the burden rests heavily upon the Government to establish, after notice to and hearing of the defendant, that such contact with the juror was harmless to the defendant.‖ Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954).18 Indeed, the general proposition that a constitutional violation must be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt to survive a challenge is deeply rooted in Supreme Court precedent. ―[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.‖ Chapman v. Calif

2022In 1954, the Court added that ―the burden rests heavily upon the Government to establish, after notice to and hearing of the defendant, that such contact with the juror was harmless to the defendant.‖ Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954).18 Indeed, the general proposition that a constitutional violation must be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt to survive a challenge is deeply rooted in Supreme Court precedent. ―[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.‖ Chapman v. Calif

2018See State v. Bond , 2015 UT 88 , ¶ 35, 361 P.3d 104 (holding that "the defendant retains the burden to show harm for unpreserved federal constitutional claims under plain error").

2018See State v. Bond , 2015 UT 88 , ¶ 35, 361 P.3d 104 (holding that "the defendant retains the burden to show harm for unpreserved federal constitutional claims under plain error").

2018See City & Cty. of S.F., Cal. v. Sheehan , --- U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 1765 , 1773, 191 L.Ed.2d 856 (2015) (dismissing writ of certiorari as improvidently granted where adverse party abandoned the position it took in the lower court; noting that the question presented "would benefit from briefing and an adversary presentation"). 3 Met v. State , 2016 UT 51 , ¶ 44, 388 P.3d 447 ("As we have explained, cursory references to the state constitution within arguments otherwise dedicated to a federal constitutional claim are inadequate.

2018See City & Cty. of S.F., Cal. v. Sheehan , --- U.S. ----, 135 S.Ct. 1765 , 1773, 191 L.Ed.2d 856 (2015) (dismissing writ of certiorari as improvidently granted where adverse party abandoned the position it took in the lower court; noting that the question presented "would benefit from briefing and an adversary presentation"). 3 Met v. State , 2016 UT 51 , ¶ 44, 388 P.3d 447 ("As we have explained, cursory references to the state constitution within arguments otherwise dedicated to a federal constitutional claim are inadequate.

2016Whether an error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in a particular case depends on a host of factors, including “the importance of the witness’!#] testimony in the prosecution’s case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution’s case.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 , 106 S.Ct. 1431 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986); see also Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, ¶ 17 , 357 P.3d 20 (ci

2016Whether an error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in a particular case depends on a host of factors, including “the importance of the witness’!#] testimony in the prosecution’s case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution’s case.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 , 106 S.Ct. 1431 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986); see also Lujan, 2015 UT App 199, ¶ 17 , 357 P.3d 20 (ci

2013It is true that in Campbell v. Campbell, in examining a federal constitutional challenge to the predecessor of our current Grandparent Visitation Statute, we refused to “apply strict scrutiny to determine the statute’s constitutionality” and instead held “the statute to be constitutional because it is rationally related to furthering a legitimate state interest.” 896 P.2d 635, 644 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).

2013Campbell held that rational basis review was appropriate because the statute in effect at the time did not “substantially infringe upon the parent’s fundamental rights or the autonomy of the nuclear family.” Id. at 642 . ¶23 But Campbell’s holding on this point was effectively overruled by Troxel.