federal constitutional error in Ohio

1996In Chapman v. California (1967), 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , the United States Supreme Court held that “before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Although the court, in Harrington v. California (1969), 395 U.S. 250 , 89 S.Ct. 1726 , 23 L.Ed.2d 284 , claimed to reaffirm the Chapman standard, it focused on the probable impact the tainted evidence had on the jury.

1996In Chapman v. California (1967), 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , the United States Supreme Court held that “before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Although the court, in Harrington v. California (1969), 395 U.S. 250 , 89 S.Ct. 1726 , 23 L.Ed.2d 284 , claimed to reaffirm the Chapman standard, it focused on the probable impact the tainted evidence had on the jury.

2024Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 674 , 106 S.Ct. 1431 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986) (“While we agree that the trial court’s ruling was contrary to the mandate of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, we conclude that the Supreme Court of Delaware was wrong when it declined to consider whether that ruling was harmless in the context of the trial as a whole”); Coy, 487 U.S. at 1021-1022 , 108 S.Ct. 2798 , 101 L.Ed.2d 857 (denial of face-to- face confrontation is subject to harmless-error review). {¶ 47} The United States Supreme Court has explained that “before a federal constitutiona

2024Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 674 , 106 S.Ct. 1431 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986) (“While we agree that the trial court’s ruling was contrary to the mandate of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, we conclude that the Supreme Court of Delaware was wrong when it declined to consider whether that ruling was harmless in the context of the trial as a whole”); Coy, 487 U.S. at 1021-1022 , 108 S.Ct. 2798 , 101 L.Ed.2d 857 (denial of face-to- face confrontation is subject to harmless-error review). {¶ 47} The United States Supreme Court has explained that “before a federal constitutiona

2024We have deemed Confrontation Clause violations harmless when “ ‘the remaining evidence, standing alone, constitutes overwhelming proof of [the] defendant’s guilt.’ ” (Brackets added in Hood.) State v. Hood, 135 Ohio St.3d 137 , 2012-Ohio-6208 , 984 N.E.2d 1057 , ¶ 43, quoting State v. Williams, 6 Ohio St.3d 281 , 452 N.E.2d 1323 (1983), paragraph six of the syllabus.

2024We have deemed Confrontation Clause violations harmless when “ ‘the remaining evidence, standing alone, constitutes overwhelming proof of [the] defendant’s guilt.’ ” (Brackets added in Hood.) State v. Hood, 135 Ohio St.3d 137 , 2012-Ohio-6208 , 984 N.E.2d 1057 , ¶ 43, quoting State v. Williams, 6 Ohio St.3d 281 , 452 N.E.2d 1323 (1983), paragraph six of the syllabus.

2024We have deemed Confrontation Clause violations harmless when “ ‘the remaining evidence, standing alone, constitutes overwhelming proof of [the] defendant’s guilt.’ ” (Brackets added in Hood.) State v. Hood, 135 Ohio St.3d 137 , 2012-Ohio-6208 , 984 N.E.2d 1057 , ¶ 43, quoting State v. Williams, 6 Ohio St.3d 281 , 452 N.E.2d 1323 (1983), paragraph six of the syllabus.

2024We have deemed Confrontation Clause violations harmless when “ ‘the remaining evidence, standing alone, constitutes overwhelming proof of [the] defendant’s guilt.’ ” (Brackets added in Hood.) State v. Hood, 135 Ohio St.3d 137 , 2012-Ohio-6208 , 984 N.E.2d 1057 , ¶ 43, quoting State v. Williams, 6 Ohio St.3d 281 , 452 N.E.2d 1323 (1983), paragraph six of the syllabus.

2024We have deemed Confrontation Clause violations harmless when “ ‘the remaining evidence, standing alone, constitutes overwhelming proof of [the] defendant’s guilt.’ ” (Brackets added in Hood.) State v. Hood, 135 Ohio St.3d 137 , 2012-Ohio-6208 , 984 N.E.2d 1057 , ¶ 43, quoting State v. Williams, 6 Ohio St.3d 281 , 452 N.E.2d 1323 (1983), paragraph six of the syllabus.

2024We have deemed Confrontation Clause violations harmless when “ ‘the remaining evidence, standing alone, constitutes overwhelming proof of [the] defendant’s guilt.’ ” (Brackets added in Hood.) State v. Hood, 135 Ohio St.3d 137 , 2012-Ohio-6208 , 984 N.E.2d 1057 , ¶ 43, quoting State v. Williams, 6 Ohio St.3d 281 , 452 N.E.2d 1323 (1983), paragraph six of the syllabus.

2000As this court has previously stated, “[tjhere is no reason to conclude that the Religion Clauses of the Ohio Constitution are coextensive with those in the United States Constitution, though they have at times been discussed in tandem. * * * The language in the Ohio provisions is quite different from the federal language. * * * We reserve the right to adopt a different constitutional standard pursuant to the Ohio Constitution, whether because the federal constitutional standard changes or for any other relevant reason.” Simmons-Harris v. Goff (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 1, 10 , 711 N.E.2d 203, 211-2

2000As this court has previously stated, “[tjhere is no reason to conclude that the Religion Clauses of the Ohio Constitution are coextensive with those in the United States Constitution, though they have at times been discussed in tandem. * * * The language in the Ohio provisions is quite different from the federal language. * * * We reserve the right to adopt a different constitutional standard pursuant to the Ohio Constitution, whether because the federal constitutional standard changes or for any other relevant reason.” Simmons-Harris v. Goff (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 1, 10 , 711 N.E.2d 203, 211-2

1999Id. at 346 , citing Harrington v. California (1969), 395 U.S. 250 , 89 S.Ct. 1726 , and Chapman v. California (1967), 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 .

1999Id. at 346 , citing Harrington v. California (1969), 395 U.S. 250 , 89 S.Ct. 1726 , and Chapman v. California (1967), 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 .

1998Citing United States v. Hazel (C.A.6, 1983), 696 F.2d 473, 475 , appellant contends that due process entitled him to a hearing because he presented sufficient facts to raise a reasonable doubt as to the prosecutor’s purpose.

1998Again, he raises both a federal constitutional claim and a state-law claim. {¶ 42} Citing United States v. Hazel (C.A.6, 1983), 696 F.2d 473, 475 , appellant contends that due process entitled him to a hearing because he presented sufficient facts to raise a reasonable doubt as to the prosecutor’s purpose.

2023Id. at 451-452 . {¶ 37} One can question whether Riley controls the federal constitutional analysis for aerial drones because there are obvious differences in the technologies.

2019Although he raised a federal constitutional claim under a United States Supreme Court case from 2010 that had been held not to be retroactive to sentences imposed before that decision issued, compare Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), with Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. 342 (2013), he also asserted an independent state statutory right under R.C. 2943.031. {¶ 5} On its face, that statute might appear to provide bright-line instruction that under certain circumstances, a court before accepting a plea from someone who does not certify that he is a U.S. citizen must "address the defenda

2019As a general matter, “[a]n arrest pursuant to a facially valid warrant is normally a complete defense to a federal constitutional claim for false arrest or false imprisonment made pursuant to [Section 1983].” Voyticky, 412 F.3d at 677 , citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 143-144 , 99 S.Ct. 2689 , 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979); Henderson, 2015-Ohio-15 , at ¶ 53 However, this defense is not available if an officer, in requesting the arrest warrant, (1) ‘“knowingly and deliberately, or with reckless disregard for the truth, made false statements or omissions that create[d] a falsehood’” and (2) ‘“su

2019As a general matter, “[a]n arrest pursuant to a facially valid warrant is normally a complete defense to a federal constitutional claim for false arrest or false imprisonment made pursuant to [Section 1983].” Voyticky, 412 F.3d at 677 , citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 143-144 , 99 S.Ct. 2689 , 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979); Henderson, 2015-Ohio-15 , at ¶ 53 However, this defense is not available if an officer, in requesting the arrest warrant, (1) ‘“knowingly and deliberately, or with reckless disregard for the truth, made false statements or omissions that create[d] a falsehood’” and (2) ‘“su

2019As a general matter, “[a]n arrest pursuant to a facially valid warrant is normally a complete defense to a federal constitutional claim for false arrest or false imprisonment made pursuant to [Section 1983].” Voyticky, 412 F.3d at 677 , citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 143-144 , 99 S.Ct. 2689 , 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979); Henderson, 2015-Ohio-15 , at ¶ 53 However, this defense is not available if an officer, in requesting the arrest warrant, (1) ‘“knowingly and deliberately, or with reckless disregard for the truth, made false statements or omissions that create[d] a falsehood’” and (2) ‘“su

2019As a general matter, “[a]n arrest pursuant to a facially valid warrant is normally a complete defense to a federal constitutional claim for false arrest or false imprisonment made pursuant to [Section 1983].” Voyticky, 412 F.3d at 677 , citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 143-144 , 99 S.Ct. 2689 , 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979); Henderson, 2015-Ohio-15 , at ¶ 53 However, this defense is not available if an officer, in requesting the arrest warrant, (1) ‘“knowingly and deliberately, or with reckless disregard for the truth, made false statements or omissions that create[d] a falsehood’” and (2) ‘“su

2019As a general matter, “[a]n arrest pursuant to a facially valid warrant is normally a complete defense to a federal constitutional claim for false arrest or false imprisonment made pursuant to [Section 1983].” Voyticky, 412 F.3d at 677 , citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 143-144 , 99 S.Ct. 2689 , 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979); Henderson, 2015-Ohio-15 , at ¶ 53 However, this defense is not available if an officer, in requesting the arrest warrant, (1) ‘“knowingly and deliberately, or with reckless disregard for the truth, made false statements or omissions that create[d] a falsehood’” and (2) ‘“su

2018Huffman v. Newburgh Hts. , 120 F.Supp.3d 691 (N.D.Ohio 2015).

2012Justice Alito wrote that, “[u]nder our 13 precedents, if a Bill of Rights guarantee is fundamental from an American perspective, then, unless stare decisis counsels otherwise, that guarantee is fully binding on the States and thus limits (but by no means eliminates) their ability to devise solutions to social problems that suit local needs and values.” Id. {¶24} In this case, the trial court relied on Ohio Supreme Court precedent involving challenges to statutes as violating Ohio’s Constitution to evaluate this federal constitutional challenge.

2007We disagree. {¶ 14} "The separation-of-powers doctrine implicitly arises from our tripartite democratic form of government and recognizes that the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of our government have their own unique powers and duties that are separate and apart from the others." State v. Thompson , 92 Ohio St.3d 584 , 586 , 752 N.E.2d 276 , 2001-Ohio-1288 , citing Zanesville v. Zanesville Tel.

2007We disagree. {¶ 14} "The separation-of-powers doctrine implicitly arises from our tripartite democratic form of government and recognizes that the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of our government have their own unique powers and duties that are separate and apart from the others." State v. Thompson , 92 Ohio St.3d 584 , 586 , 752 N.E.2d 276 , 2001-Ohio-1288 , citing Zanesville v. Zanesville Tel.

2007We disagree. {¶ 14} "The separation-of-powers doctrine implicitly arises from our tripartite democratic form of government and recognizes that the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of our government have their own unique powers and duties that are separate and apart from the others." State v. Thompson , 92 Ohio St.3d 584 , 586 , 752 N.E.2d 276 , 2001-Ohio-1288 , citing Zanesville v. Zanesville Tel.

2001Dickerson v. United States (2000), 147 L.Ed.2d 405 , 419-420 .

1999See Pater v. Pater (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 393 , 588 N.E.2d 794 ; In re Milton (1987), 29 Ohio St.3d 20 , 29 OBR 373, 505 N.E.2d 255 .

1999See Pater v. Pater (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 393 , 588 N.E.2d 794 ; In re Milton (1987), 29 Ohio St.3d 20 , 29 OBR 373, 505 N.E.2d 255 .