54 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1967–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Chapman v. Californiared2 sentences2020To be sure, "before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Castagna, 187 N.J. 293, 312 (2006) (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). 2011See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824, 828 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710 (1967), overruled on other grounds by Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 , 113 S.Ct. 1710 , 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) ("before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”); State v. Daniels, 182 N.J. 80 , 861 A.2d 808 (2004); State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 335 , 273 A.2d 1 (1971) ("No matter how a test may be stated, the question whether an error is reason for reversal depends finally upon some degree of possibility | 5 | 10 |
State v. Fritzgreen2 sentences2016See Fritz, supra, 105 N.J. at 58 , 519 A.2d 336 (concluding that “[e]ven if we are not constitutionally compelled to adopt the Stricklandr-Cronic test, the development of the law in this area impels” recognition of “the soundness and efficacy of both the substance and formulation of this federal Constitutional standard in defining our own State Constitutional guarantee of effective assistance of counsel”). 2016See Fritz, supra, 105 N.J. at 58 , 519 A.2d 336 (concluding that “[e]ven if we are not constitutionally compelled to adopt the Stricklandr-Cronic test, the development of the law in this area impels” recognition of “the soundness and efficacy of both the substance and formulation of this federal Constitutional standard in defining our own State Constitutional guarantee of effective assistance of counsel”). | 5 | 7 |
State v. MacOngreen2 sentences2011See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824, 828 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710 (1967), overruled on other grounds by Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 , 113 S.Ct. 1710 , 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) ("before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”); State v. Daniels, 182 N.J. 80 , 861 A.2d 808 (2004); State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 335 , 273 A.2d 1 (1971) ("No matter how a test may be stated, the question whether an error is reason for reversal depends finally upon some degree of possibility 2011See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824, 828 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710 (1967), overruled on other grounds by Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 , 113 S.Ct. 1710 , 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) ("before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”); State v. Daniels, 182 N.J. 80 , 861 A.2d 808 (2004); State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 335 , 273 A.2d 1 (1971) ("No matter how a test may be stated, the question whether an error is reason for reversal depends finally upon some degree of possibility | 5 | 6 |
Bordenkircher v. Hayesgreen2 sentences2001Within the limits set by the legislature's constitutionally valid definition of chargeable offenses, "the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation" so long as "the selection was [not] deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification." [ Bordenkircher, supra, 434 U.S. at 364 , 98 S.Ct. at 668 , 54 L.Ed. 2d at 611 ; Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 82 S.Ct. 501 , 7 L.Ed. 2d 446 (1962); see also State v. Bauman, 298 N.J.Super. 176, 201 , 689 A. 2d 173 (App.Div.), certif. 2001Within the limits set by the legislature's constitutionally valid definition of chargeable offenses, "the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation" so long as "the selection was [not] deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification." [ Bordenkircher, supra, 434 U.S. at 364 , 98 S.Ct. at 668 , 54 L.Ed. 2d at 611 ; Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 82 S.Ct. 501 , 7 L.Ed. 2d 446 (1962); see also State v. Bauman, 298 N.J.Super. 176, 201 , 689 A. 2d 173 (App.Div.), certif. | 2 | 4 |
Strickland v. Washingtongreen2 sentences1997In any event, to establish a federal constitutional claim of ineffectiveness of counsel, a defendant must establish that “counsel’s performance was deficient” and that “the deficient performance prejudiced defendant.” Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 687 , 104 S.Ct. at 2064 , 80 L.Ed.2d at 693 ; see Fritz, supra, 105 N.J. at 58 , 519 A.2d 336 . 1997In any event, to establish a federal constitutional claim of ineffectiveness of counsel, a defendant must establish that “counsel’s performance was deficient” and that “the deficient performance prejudiced defendant.” Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 687 , 104 S.Ct. at 2064 , 80 L.Ed.2d at 693 ; see Fritz, supra, 105 N.J. at 58 , 519 A.2d 336 . | 2 | 3 |
Ferguson v. Skrupagreen2 sentences2025We conclude it does not, at least when the attorney is engaged in the practice of law. 15 We reject defendants' reliance on Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 727 (1963), in which the United States Supreme Court upheld a restriction on the business of debt adjustment when practiced by attorneys, specifically a Kansas debt adjustment statute that limited the practice of debt adjustments to lawyers "as an incident to the lawful practice of law." The Supreme Court's holding in Ferguson was based on a federal constitutional challenge under the Due Process Clause, not principles of separation of pow 2025We conclude it does not, at least when the attorney is engaged in the practice of law. 15 We reject defendants' reliance on Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 727 (1963), in which the United States Supreme Court upheld a restriction on the business of debt adjustment when practiced by attorneys, specifically a Kansas debt adjustment statute that limited the practice of debt adjustments to lawyers "as an incident to the lawful practice of law." The Supreme Court's holding in Ferguson was based on a federal constitutional challenge under the Due Process Clause, not principles of separation of pow | 2 | 2 |
In Re WINSHIPgreen2 sentences2021The federal constitutional standard derives from the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment guarantee “that no person shall be made to suffer the onus of a criminal conviction except upon sufficient proof -- defined as evidence necessary to convince a trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of every element of the offense.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 316 ; see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (“[T]he Due Process Clause protects 31 the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.”) 2021The federal constitutional standard derives from the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment guarantee “that no person shall be made to suffer the onus of a criminal conviction except upon sufficient proof -- defined as evidence necessary to convince a trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of every element of the offense.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 316 ; see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (“[T]he Due Process Clause protects 31 the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.”) | 2 | 2 |
Brecht v. Abrahamsongreen2 sentences2011See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824, 828 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710 (1967), overruled on other grounds by Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 , 113 S.Ct. 1710 , 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) ("before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”); State v. Daniels, 182 N.J. 80 , 861 A.2d 808 (2004); State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 335 , 273 A.2d 1 (1971) ("No matter how a test may be stated, the question whether an error is reason for reversal depends finally upon some degree of possibility 2011See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824, 828 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710 (1967), overruled on other grounds by Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 , 113 S.Ct. 1710 , 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) ("before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”); State v. Daniels, 182 N.J. 80 , 861 A.2d 808 (2004); State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 335 , 273 A.2d 1 (1971) ("No matter how a test may be stated, the question whether an error is reason for reversal depends finally upon some degree of possibility | 2 | 2 |
Howard A. Lambert v. State of Montanagreen2 sentences1990Morgan, 564 A. 2d at 6 , citing and quoting Lambert v. Montana, 545 F. 2d 87, 89 (9th Cir.1976). 1990Morgan, 564 A.2d at 6 , citing and quoting Lambert v. Montana, 545 F.2d 87, 89 (9th Cir.1976). | 2 | 2 |
Oyler v. Bolesgreen2 sentences2001Within the limits set by the legislature's constitutionally valid definition of chargeable offenses, "the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation" so long as "the selection was [not] deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification." [ Bordenkircher, supra, 434 U.S. at 364 , 98 S.Ct. at 668 , 54 L.Ed. 2d at 611 ; Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 82 S.Ct. 501 , 7 L.Ed. 2d 446 (1962); see also State v. Bauman, 298 N.J.Super. 176, 201 , 689 A. 2d 173 (App.Div.), certif. 2001Within the limits set by the legislature's constitutionally valid definition of chargeable offenses, "the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation" so long as "the selection was [not] deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification." [ Bordenkircher, supra, 434 U.S. at 364 , 98 S.Ct. at 668 , 54 L.Ed. 2d at 611 ; Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 82 S.Ct. 501 , 7 L.Ed. 2d 446 (1962); see also State v. Bauman, 298 N.J.Super. 176, 201 , 689 A. 2d 173 (App.Div.), certif. | 1 | 3 |
Gaffney v. Cummingsgreen2 sentences2012Gaffney v. Cummings, supra, 412 U.S. at 752 , 93 S.Ct. at 2331 , 37 L.Ed.2d at 312 , footnote 18. 2012Gaffney v. Cummings, supra, 412 U.S. at 752 , 93 S.Ct. at 2331 , 37 L.Ed.2d at 312 , footnote 18. | 1 | 2 |
Rice v. Collinsgreen1 sentence2020Under the federal constitutional analysis, "'[t]he second step of this process does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible'; so long as the reason is not inherently discriminatory, it suffices." Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 338 (2006) (quoting Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767-68 (1995) (per curiam)). | 1 | 1 |
Purkett v. Elemgreen1 sentence2020Under the federal constitutional analysis, "'[t]he second step of this process does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible'; so long as the reason is not inherently discriminatory, it suffices." Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 338 (2006) (quoting Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767-68 (1995) (per curiam)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Castagnagreen1 sentence2020To be sure, "before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Castagna, 187 N.J. 293, 312 (2006) (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). | 1 | 1 |
Uhlrig v. Hardergreen1 sentence2014See, e.g., Pena v. DePrisco, 432 F.3d 98, 107-10 (2d Cir.2005); Robinson v. Lioi, 536 Fed.Appx. 340, 342 (4th Cir.2013); Jasinski v. Tyler, 729 F.3d 531, 538 (6th Cir.2013); Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122, 1126 (7th Cir.1993); Forrester v. Bass, 397 F.3d 1047, 1058 (8th Cir.2005); Kennedy v. City of Ridgefield, 439 F. 3d 1055, 1061 (9th Cir.2006); Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 572 (10th Cir.1995); Butera v. District of Columbia, 235 F.3d 637, 652 (D.C.Cir.2001). | 1 | 1 |
Butera v. District of Columbiagreen1 sentence2014See, e.g., Pena v. DePrisco, 432 F.3d 98, 107-10 (2d Cir.2005); Robinson v. Lioi, 536 Fed.Appx. 340, 342 (4th Cir.2013); Jasinski v. Tyler, 729 F.3d 531, 538 (6th Cir.2013); Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122, 1126 (7th Cir.1993); Forrester v. Bass, 397 F.3d 1047, 1058 (8th Cir.2005); Kennedy v. City of Ridgefield, 439 F. 3d 1055, 1061 (9th Cir.2006); Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 572 (10th Cir.1995); Butera v. District of Columbia, 235 F.3d 637, 652 (D.C.Cir.2001). | 1 | 1 |
Reed v. Gardnergreen1 sentence2014See, e.g., Pena v. DePrisco, 432 F.3d 98, 107-10 (2d Cir.2005); Robinson v. Lioi, 536 Fed.Appx. 340, 342 (4th Cir.2013); Jasinski v. Tyler, 729 F.3d 531, 538 (6th Cir.2013); Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122, 1126 (7th Cir.1993); Forrester v. Bass, 397 F.3d 1047, 1058 (8th Cir.2005); Kennedy v. City of Ridgefield, 439 F. 3d 1055, 1061 (9th Cir.2006); Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 572 (10th Cir.1995); Butera v. District of Columbia, 235 F.3d 637, 652 (D.C.Cir.2001). | 1 | 1 |
D. Scott Forrester, Conservator of the Estate of Jerry Bass Jerry Bass v. Mary Bass Tony Dixon, Kimberly Rosa Melissa Johnsongreen1 sentence2014See, e.g., Pena v. DePrisco, 432 F.3d 98, 107-10 (2d Cir.2005); Robinson v. Lioi, 536 Fed.Appx. 340, 342 (4th Cir.2013); Jasinski v. Tyler, 729 F.3d 531, 538 (6th Cir.2013); Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122, 1126 (7th Cir.1993); Forrester v. Bass, 397 F.3d 1047, 1058 (8th Cir.2005); Kennedy v. City of Ridgefield, 439 F. 3d 1055, 1061 (9th Cir.2006); Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 572 (10th Cir.1995); Butera v. District of Columbia, 235 F.3d 637, 652 (D.C.Cir.2001). | 1 | 1 |
Kennedy v. City of Ridgefieldgreen1 sentence2014See, e.g., Pena v. DePrisco, 432 F.3d 98, 107-10 (2d Cir.2005); Robinson v. Lioi, 536 Fed.Appx. 340, 342 (4th Cir.2013); Jasinski v. Tyler, 729 F.3d 531, 538 (6th Cir.2013); Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122, 1126 (7th Cir.1993); Forrester v. Bass, 397 F.3d 1047, 1058 (8th Cir.2005); Kennedy v. City of Ridgefield, 439 F. 3d 1055, 1061 (9th Cir.2006); Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 572 (10th Cir.1995); Butera v. District of Columbia, 235 F.3d 637, 652 (D.C.Cir.2001). | 1 | 1 |
Carlin Robinson v. Daniel Lioigreen1 sentence2014See, e.g., Pena v. DePrisco, 432 F.3d 98, 107-10 (2d Cir.2005); Robinson v. Lioi, 536 Fed.Appx. 340, 342 (4th Cir.2013); Jasinski v. Tyler, 729 F.3d 531, 538 (6th Cir.2013); Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122, 1126 (7th Cir.1993); Forrester v. Bass, 397 F.3d 1047, 1058 (8th Cir.2005); Kennedy v. City of Ridgefield, 439 F. 3d 1055, 1061 (9th Cir.2006); Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 572 (10th Cir.1995); Butera v. District of Columbia, 235 F.3d 637, 652 (D.C.Cir.2001). | 1 | 1 |
Rebecca Jasinski v. Sheri Tylergreen1 sentence2014See, e.g., Pena v. DePrisco, 432 F.3d 98, 107-10 (2d Cir.2005); Robinson v. Lioi, 536 Fed.Appx. 340, 342 (4th Cir.2013); Jasinski v. Tyler, 729 F.3d 531, 538 (6th Cir.2013); Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122, 1126 (7th Cir.1993); Forrester v. Bass, 397 F.3d 1047, 1058 (8th Cir.2005); Kennedy v. City of Ridgefield, 439 F. 3d 1055, 1061 (9th Cir.2006); Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 572 (10th Cir.1995); Butera v. District of Columbia, 235 F.3d 637, 652 (D.C.Cir.2001). | 1 | 1 |
Pena v. Depriscogreen1 sentence2014See, e.g., Pena v. DePrisco, 432 F.3d 98, 107-10 (2d Cir.2005); Robinson v. Lioi, 536 Fed.Appx. 340, 342 (4th Cir.2013); Jasinski v. Tyler, 729 F.3d 531, 538 (6th Cir.2013); Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122, 1126 (7th Cir.1993); Forrester v. Bass, 397 F.3d 1047, 1058 (8th Cir.2005); Kennedy v. City of Ridgefield, 439 F. 3d 1055, 1061 (9th Cir.2006); Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 572 (10th Cir.1995); Butera v. District of Columbia, 235 F.3d 637, 652 (D.C.Cir.2001). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Cronicgreen2 sentences2013This second prong was reiterated by the Supreme Court in Cronic, supra, 466 U.S. at 658, 104 S.Ct. at 2046 , 80 L.Ed.2d at 667 , with the caveat that there are “circumstances that are so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified.” 5 With the exception of the unusual setting in which prejudice to the defendant is self-evident, a defendant must make a showing of prejudice to meet the federal constitutional standard. 2013This second prong was reiterated by the Supreme Court in Cronic, supra, 466 U.S. at 658, 104 S.Ct. at 2046 , 80 L.Ed.2d at 667 , with the caveat that there are “circumstances that are so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified.” 5 With the exception of the unusual setting in which prejudice to the defendant is self-evident, a defendant must make a showing of prejudice to meet the federal constitutional standard. | 1 | 1 |
Bell v. Conegreen2 sentences2013Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 695-96 , 122 S.Ct. 1843, 1850-51 , 152 L.Ed.2d 914, 927-28 (2002) (recognizing Cronic’s three presumed prejudice scenarios: complete denial of counsel, failure to subject State’s case to meaningful adversarial testing and inability of any counsel to provide competent assistance under certain circumstances). 2013Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 695-96 , 122 S.Ct. 1843, 1850-51 , 152 L.Ed.2d 914, 927-28 (2002) (recognizing Cronic’s three presumed prejudice scenarios: complete denial of counsel, failure to subject State’s case to meaningful adversarial testing and inability of any counsel to provide competent assistance under certain circumstances). | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Branchgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Colorado v. Connellygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Dickerson v. United Statesred | 1 | 1 |
| Johnson v. Yurickgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Johnson v. Yurickgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Karins v. City of Atlantic Citygreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Baumangreen | 1 | 1 |
| In re the Division of Criminal Justice State Investigatorsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Baumangreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Goodwingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hunter v. City of Pittsburghgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gilmore v. Taylorgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Foucha v. Louisianagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Parham v. J. R.green | 1 | 1 |
| Vitek v. Jonesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Blockburger v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Jackson v. Virginia
red
2 sentences2021The federal constitutional standard derives from the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment guarantee “that no person shall be made to suffer the onus of a criminal conviction except upon sufficient proof -- defined as evidence necessary to convince a trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of every element of the offense.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 316 ; see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (“[T]he Due Process Clause protects 31 the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.”) 2021The federal constitutional standard derives from the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment guarantee “that no person shall be made to suffer the onus of a criminal conviction except upon sufficient proof -- defined as evidence necessary to convince a trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of every element of the offense.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 316 ; see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (“[T]he Due Process Clause protects 31 the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.”) | 2 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Smith
green
2 sentences2015Ed. 2d at 336-37 ; Smith, supra, 134 N.J. at 610-11 .5 In declaring this new federal constitutional principle, the Mimms Court was not clear whether it applied to all occupants of a vehicle. 2015Ed. 2d at 336-37 ; Smith, supra, 134 N.J. at 610-11 .5 In declaring this new federal constitutional principle, the Mimms Court was not clear whether it applied to all occupants of a vehicle. | 2 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Daniels
green
2 sentences2011See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824, 828 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710 (1967), overruled on other grounds by Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 , 113 S.Ct. 1710 , 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) ("before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”); State v. Daniels, 182 N.J. 80 , 861 A.2d 808 (2004); State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 335 , 273 A.2d 1 (1971) ("No matter how a test may be stated, the question whether an error is reason for reversal depends finally upon some degree of possibility 2011See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824, 828 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710 (1967), overruled on other grounds by Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 , 113 S.Ct. 1710 , 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) ("before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”); State v. Daniels, 182 N.J. 80 , 861 A.2d 808 (2004); State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 335 , 273 A.2d 1 (1971) ("No matter how a test may be stated, the question whether an error is reason for reversal depends finally upon some degree of possibility | 2 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Gross
green
2 sentences2011See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824, 828 , 17 L.Ed. 2d 705, 710 (1967), overruled on other grounds by Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 , 113 S.Ct. 1710 , 123 L.Ed. 2d 353 (1993) ("before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt"); State v. Daniels, 182 N.J. 80 , 861 A.2d 808 (2004); State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 335 , 273 A.2d 1 (1971) ("No matter how a test may be stated, the question whether an error is reason for reversal depends finally upon some degree of possibilit 2011See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824, 828 , 17 L.Ed. 2d 705, 710 (1967), overruled on other grounds by Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 , 113 S.Ct. 1710 , 123 L.Ed. 2d 353 (1993) ("before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt"); State v. Daniels, 182 N.J. 80 , 861 A.2d 808 (2004); State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 335 , 273 A.2d 1 (1971) ("No matter how a test may be stated, the question whether an error is reason for reversal depends finally upon some degree of possibilit | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Benton v. Maryland
green
2 sentences1997Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 , 89 S.Ct. 2056 , 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969). 1997Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 , 89 S.Ct. 2056 , 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969). | 2 | 1980–1997 |
Morgan v. Foretich
green
2 sentences1990Morgan, 564 A. 2d at 6 , citing and quoting Lambert v. Montana, 545 F. 2d 87, 89 (9th Cir.1976). 1990Morgan, 564 A.2d at 6 , citing and quoting Lambert v. Montana, 545 F.2d 87, 89 (9th Cir.1976). | 2 | 1990–1990 |
| State v. Muhammad green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| State v. Presha green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| State v. O'NEILL green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Whitburn v. Addis green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Bilzerian v. United States green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Swartz v. Internal Revenue Service green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| cluster 766366 green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Binkowski v. State green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Hamilton Amusement Center v. Verniero green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| State v. Davis green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| United States v. Gaudin green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| State v. Preciose green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Payne v. Tennessee green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| State v. Coyle green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| State v. Sutton green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Yick Wo v. Hopkins green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Cannon v. United States green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| United States v. Dixon green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| State v. Coleman green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| cluster 269278 green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Willie Lawrence Celestine v. Frank Blackburn, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Boyd v. United States red | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Seymour v. United States green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Berger v. New York green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.