federal constitutional violation in Pennsylvania

2024However, in order for a federal constitutional violation to be classified as harmless, the government must “show ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’” Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S.Ct. 1899, 1907 (2017) (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24 ). [J-83-2022] - 8 Further, with respect to the proper remedy for the juvenile court’s violation of Taylor’s Fifth Amendment right, Justice Baer noted that Taylor had, by the time of our decision, reached the age of 21.

1991Rather, we have held that “Chapman mandates consideration of the entire record prior to reversing a conviction for constitutional errors that may be harmless.” The question is whether, “on the whole record ... the error ... [is] harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” See also Chapman [v. State of California] 386 U.S. [18] at 24, 87 S.Ct. [824] at 828 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705 ] (“[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”); Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. [73] at 97, n. 5, 103 S.Ct. [969] at 983

2016Id. at 297 . “[T]he imposition of a minimum sentence taking such factors into account is the most appropriate remedy for the federal constitutional violation that occurred when a life-without-parole sentence was mandatorily applied to [the a]ppellant.” Id.; see also Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736 (stating that “[a]llowing those offenders to be considered for parole ensures that juveniles whose crimes reflected only transient immaturity— and who have since matured—will not be forced to serve a disproportionate sentence in violation of the Eighth Amendment.”) (emphasis added). -4- J-S11043-15 Jud

2016Thus, “the imposition of a minimum, sentence taking such factors into account is the most appropriate remedy for the federal constitutional violation that occurred when a [LWOP] .sentence was mandatorily applied to [a]ppellant.” Batts, supra. Furthermore, “[allowing those offenders to be considered for parole, ensures that juveniles whose crimes reflected only transient immaturity — and who . have since .matured — will not be forced to serve a disproportionate sentence in violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Montgomery, supra at —, 136 S.Ct. at 736 .

2024Commonwealth v. Story, 383 A.2d 155, 162 (Pa. 1978) (“Where a trial error violates the federal constitution, this Court, at a minimum, must employ the federal harmless error rule.” (emphasis added)); cf. Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73 , 81 n.9 (1983) (plurality) (“This Court held in Chapman that whether a federal constitutional error can be harmless is a federal question . . . .

2020As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently noted in Commonwealth v. Fulton, 179 A.3d 475 (Pa. 2018), “[s]tate rules often implicate constitutional values, and the violation of a state rule may rise to the level of a federal constitutional violation,” and “a more relaxed harmless error standard for errors perceived as violations of state rules, but which might also be violations of the federal Constitution, would leave constitutional values inadequately protected.” Id. at 493 (quoting Commonwealth v. Story, 383 A.2d 155, 163 (Pa. 1978)). -7- J-S43017-19 Relevant to this appeal, Pa.R.Crim.P. 205

2019In Bussey, a three-Justice plurality of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the more lenient Federal constitutional rule that a defendant can implicitly waive his Miranda rights, instead holding that “an explicit waiver is a mandatory requirement.” Bussey, 404 A.2d at 1314 .

2016In that plurality opinion, our Supreme Court rejected the more lenient Federal constitutional rule that a defendant can implicitly waive his Miranda rights, instead holding that “an explicit waiver is a mandatory requirement.” Id. at 1314 (emphasis added); See also North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 , 99 S. Ct. 1755 , 60 L.

2016In that plurality opinion, our Supreme Court rejected the more lenient Federal constitutional rule that a defendant can implicitly waive his Miranda rights, instead holding that “an explicit waiver is a mandatory requirement.” Id. at 1314 (emphasis added); See also North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 , 99 S. Ct. 1755 , 60 L.

2016In that plurality opinion, our Supreme Court rejected the more lenient Federal constitutional rule that a defendant can implicitly waive his Miranda rights, instead holding that “an explicit waiver is a mandatory requirement.” Id. at 1314 (emphasis added); See also North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 , 99 S. Ct. 1755 , 60 L.

2014In re Opening a Private Road (O’Reilly), 22 A.3d 291, 296-97 (Pa. Cmwlth.2011) [O’Reilly III l We noted that while Section 204(b)(9) shows sufficient public purpose necessary to satisfy the federal constitutional standard established in Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 , 125 S.Ct. 2655 , 162 L.Ed.2d 439 (2005), it “does nothing to show compliance with the more stringent standard” of primary and paramount public benefit. 22 A.3d at 296 . 5 Because the trial court correctly applied the standards set forth by our Supreme Court in O'Reilly II, we affirm.

2014In re Opening a Private Road (O’Reilly), 22 A.3d 291, 296-97 (Pa. Cmwlth.2011) [O’Reilly III l We noted that while Section 204(b)(9) shows sufficient public purpose necessary to satisfy the federal constitutional standard established in Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 , 125 S.Ct. 2655 , 162 L.Ed.2d 439 (2005), it “does nothing to show compliance with the more stringent standard” of primary and paramount public benefit. 22 A.3d at 296 . 5 Because the trial court correctly applied the standards set forth by our Supreme Court in O'Reilly II, we affirm.

2022I, § 1. 5 requirement with respect to both prospective and retroactive aspects of legislation is “a legitimate legislative purpose furthered by rational means.” Bible v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 696 A.2d 1149, 1155 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997) (stating that Pennsylvania has adopted the federal constitutional standard for due process analysis of economic legislation).

2022I, § 1. 5 “a legitimate legislative purpose furthered by rational means.” Bible v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 696 A.2d 1149, 1155 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997) (stating that Pennsylvania has adopted the federal constitutional standard for due process analysis of economic legislation).

2022With regard to retroactive application of statutes, “retrospective laws which have been deemed reasonable are those which impair no contract and disturb no vested right, but only vary remedies, cure defects in proceedings otherwise fair, and do not vary existing obligations contrary to their situation when entered into and when prosecuted.” Id. at 1156 (quoting Krenzelak v. Krenzelak, 469 A.2d 987, 991 (Pa. 1983)).

2022With regard to retroactive application of statutes, “retrospective laws which have been deemed reasonable are those which impair no contract and disturb no vested right, but only vary remedies, cure defects in proceedings otherwise fair, and do not vary existing obligations contrary to their situation when entered into and when prosecuted.” Id. at 1156 (quoting Krenzelak v. Krenzelak, 469 A.2d 987, 991 (Pa. 1983)).

2017Batts II, supra at 297 (first brackets in original).

2016Batts II, supra at 297 (first brackets in original).

2019Additionally, this Court recognized "the imposition of a minimum sentence taking [the Miller ] factors into account is the most appropriate remedy for the federal constitutional violation that occurred when a life-without-parole sentence was mandatorily applied." Id.

2016Id. at 297 . “[T]he imposition of a minimum sentence taking such factors into account is the most appropriate remedy for the federal constitutional violation that occurred when a life-without-parole sentence was mandatorily applied to [the a]ppellant.” Id.; see also Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736 (stating that “[a]llowing those offenders to be considered for parole ensures that juveniles whose crimes reflected only transient immaturity— and who have since matured—will not be forced to serve a disproportionate sentence in violation of the Eighth Amendment.”) (emphasis added). -4- J-S11043-15 Jud

1990The “conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation.” Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 82 S.Ct. 501, 506 , 7 L.Ed.2d 446, 453 (1962). 5 Absent a prima facie showing that the selection was deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification, this discretion may not be successfully challenged.

1990The “conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation.” Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 82 S.Ct. 501, 506 , 7 L.Ed.2d 446, 453 (1962). 5 Absent a prima facie showing that the selection was deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification, this discretion may not be successfully challenged.

2024Commonwealth v. Story, 383 A.2d 155, 162 (Pa. 1978) (“Where a trial error violates the federal constitution, this Court, at a minimum, must employ the federal harmless error rule.” (emphasis added)); cf. Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73 , 81 n.9 (1983) (plurality) (“This Court held in Chapman that whether a federal constitutional error can be harmless is a federal question . . . .

1991Rather, we have held that “Chapman mandates consideration of the entire record prior to reversing a conviction for constitutional errors that may be harmless.” The question is whether, “on the whole record ... the error ... [is] harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” See also Chapman [v. State of California] 386 U.S. [18] at 24, 87 S.Ct. [824] at 828 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705 ] (“[B]efore a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”); Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. [73] at 97, n. 5, 103 S.Ct. [969] at 983

1973See Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 251 , 89 S. Ct. 1726, 1727 (1969); Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 , 92 S. Ct. 1056 (1972).

1970Rev. 553 (1968-69), this Court held in Commonwealth v. Padgett, 428 Pa. 229 , 237 A. 2d 209 (1968) that Miranda violations do not call for automatic reversal but are subject to Chapman’s harmless error rule. 1 That rule, which was recently reaffirmed in Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969), is that, “before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” 386 U.S. at 24.

2024However, in order for a federal constitutional violation to be classified as harmless, the government must “show ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’” Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S.Ct. 1899, 1907 (2017) (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24 ). [J-83-2022] - 8 Further, with respect to the proper remedy for the juvenile court’s violation of Taylor’s Fifth Amendment right, Justice Baer noted that Taylor had, by the time of our decision, reached the age of 21.

2024Subsequently, in Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309 (1991), the Court addressed whether the improper admission of a coerced confession at a criminal trial court is, consistent with Chapman, subject to harmless error analysis.

2019See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 268 (2005) (new rule announced in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), can be waived for failure to raise the claim below); Shea v. Louisiana, 470 U.S. 51 , 59 n.4 (1985) (same, as to the new rule announced in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981)).

2019See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 268 (2005) (new rule announced in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), can be waived for failure to raise the claim below); Shea v. Louisiana, 470 U.S. 51 , 59 n.4 (1985) (same, as to the new rule announced in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981)).

2018See Commonwealth v. Brooker, 103 A.3d 325, 338 (Pa. Super. 2014) (quotations omitted).