federal constitutional standard in Michigan

2025People v Armstrong, 490 Mich 281, 289-290 ; 806 NW2d 676 (2011); see also, People v. Pickens, 446 Mich 298 , 521 NW2d 797 (1994) (adopting the federal constitutional standard for an ineffective- assistance-of-counsel claim as set forth in Strickland ).

2025People v Armstrong, 490 Mich 281, 289-290 ; 806 NW2d 676 (2011); see also, People v. Pickens, 446 Mich 298 , 521 NW2d 797 (1994) (adopting the federal constitutional standard for an ineffective- assistance-of-counsel claim as set forth in Strickland ).

1971In Chapman v. California (1967), 386 US 18, 24 ( 87 S Ct 824 , 17 L Ed 2d 705 ), reh den 386 US 987 ( 87 S Ct 1283 , 18 L Ed 2d 241 ), the United States Supreme Court ruled that the denial of a Federal constitutional right in a state court trial can be harmless' and declared: “before a Federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” The Court explained that a standard based on reasonable doubt would be a standard familiar to all courts and expressed a belief that its adoption would, therefore, prove

1971In Chapman v. California (1967), 386 US 18 ( 87 S Ct 824 , 17 L Ed 2d 705 ), reh den 386 US 987 ( 87 S Ct 1283 , 18 L Ed 2d 241 ), the United States Supreme Court held that adverse comments by the prosecuting attorney regarding the defendant’s failure to testify would not necessarily require reversal of a conviction following such comments, and laid down the rule, That before a Federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’ We are convinced that the evidence and argument complained of did not contribu

2021But that conclusion ignores the Supreme Court’s contrary invitation to states in Rivera, 556 US at 161 -162: Absent a federal constitutional violation, States retain the prerogative to decide whether such errors deprive a tribunal of its lawful authority and thus require automatic reversal.

2021But that conclusion ignores the Supreme Court’s contrary invitation to states in Rivera, 556 US at 161 -162: Absent a federal constitutional violation, States retain the prerogative to decide whether such errors deprive a tribunal of its lawful authority and thus require automatic reversal.

1971In Chapman v. California (1967), 386 US 18, 24 ( 87 S Ct 824 , 17 L Ed 2d 705 ), reh den 386 US 987 ( 87 S Ct 1283 , 18 L Ed 2d 241 ), the United States Supreme Court ruled that the denial of a Federal constitutional right in a state court trial can be harmless' and declared: “before a Federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” The Court explained that a standard based on reasonable doubt would be a standard familiar to all courts and expressed a belief that its adoption would, therefore, prove

1971In Chapman v. California (1967), 386 US 18 ( 87 S Ct 824 , 17 L Ed 2d 705 ), reh den 386 US 987 ( 87 S Ct 1283 , 18 L Ed 2d 241 ), the United States Supreme Court held that adverse comments by the prosecuting attorney regarding the defendant’s failure to testify would not necessarily require reversal of a conviction following such comments, and laid down the rule, That before a Federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’ We are convinced that the evidence and argument complained of did not contribu

2021States are free to decide, as a matter of state law, that a trial court’s mistaken denial of a peremptory challenge is reversible error per se.[5] See also People v Novotny, 320 P3d 1194, 1206 ; 2014 CO 18 (Colo, 2014) (Hood, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that “even if we were bound by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the federal harmless error standard when interpreting our own, which we are not, its interpretation ‘does not mean that all nonconstitutional errors must be subject to harmless-error analysis’ ”), quoting United States v Lane, 474 US 438, 472 ; 106

2021States are free to decide, as a matter of state law, that a trial court’s mistaken denial of a peremptory challenge is reversible error per se.[5] See also People v Novotny, 320 P3d 1194, 1206 ; 2014 CO 18 (Colo, 2014) (Hood, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that “even if we were bound by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the federal harmless error standard when interpreting our own, which we are not, its interpretation ‘does not mean that all nonconstitutional errors must be subject to harmless-error analysis’ ”), quoting United States v Lane, 474 US 438, 472 ; 106

2021In ascertaining whether there are independent state grounds for finding structural error under the Michigan Constitution, our responsibility is to give meaning to the specific 100 Id. at 52-53 , citing People v Lambert, 395 Mich 296, 304 ; 235 NW2d 338 (1975), and noting People v Newland, 459 Mich 985 , 593 NW2d 557 (1999).

2021In ascertaining whether there are independent state grounds for finding structural error under the Michigan Constitution, our responsibility is to give meaning to the specific 100 Id. at 52-53 , citing People v Lambert, 395 Mich 296, 304 ; 235 NW2d 338 (1975), and noting People v Newland, 459 Mich 985 , 593 NW2d 557 (1999).

2021States are free to decide, as a matter of state law, that a trial court’s mistaken denial of a peremptory challenge is reversible error per se.[5] See also People v Novotny, 320 P3d 1194, 1206 ; 2014 CO 18 (Colo, 2014) (Hood, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that “even if we were bound by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the federal harmless error standard when interpreting our own, which we are not, its interpretation ‘does not mean that all nonconstitutional errors must be subject to harmless-error analysis’ ”), quoting United States v Lane, 474 US 438, 472 ; 106

2021States are free to decide, as a matter of state law, that a trial court’s mistaken denial of a peremptory challenge is reversible error per se.[5] See also People v Novotny, 320 P3d 1194, 1206 ; 2014 CO 18 (Colo, 2014) (Hood, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that “even if we were bound by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the federal harmless error standard when interpreting our own, which we are not, its interpretation ‘does not mean that all nonconstitutional errors must be subject to harmless-error analysis’ ”), quoting United States v Lane, 474 US 438, 472 ; 106

2021In ascertaining whether there are independent state grounds for finding structural error under the Michigan Constitution, our responsibility is to give meaning to the specific 100 Id. at 52-53 , citing People v Lambert, 395 Mich 296, 304 ; 235 NW2d 338 (1975), and noting People v Newland, 459 Mich 985 , 593 NW2d 557 (1999).

2021In ascertaining whether there are independent state grounds for finding structural error under the Michigan Constitution, our responsibility is to give meaning to the specific 100 Id. at 52-53 , citing People v Lambert, 395 Mich 296, 304 ; 235 NW2d 338 (1975), and noting People v Newland, 459 Mich 985 , 593 NW2d 557 (1999).

2018“However, this Court possesses the discretion to review a legal issue not raised by the parties. 2 Brought under 42 USC § 1983 . -4- See Mack v. Detroit, 467 Mich 186, 206-209 ; 649 NW2d 47 (2002) (stating that “[t]he jurisprudence of Michigan cannot be, and is not, dependent upon whether individual parties accurately identify and elucidate controlling legal questions”).” Whether a state’s pre-suit notice requirements apply to a federal constitutional claim is a purely legal question and was considered by the U.S. Supreme Court in Felder v Casey, 487 US 131 ; 108 S Ct 2302 ; 101 L Ed 2d 123 (1

2018“However, this Court possesses the discretion to review a legal issue not raised by the parties. 2 Brought under 42 USC § 1983 . -4- See Mack v. Detroit, 467 Mich 186, 206-209 ; 649 NW2d 47 (2002) (stating that “[t]he jurisprudence of Michigan cannot be, and is not, dependent upon whether individual parties accurately identify and elucidate controlling legal questions”).” Whether a state’s pre-suit notice requirements apply to a federal constitutional claim is a purely legal question and was considered by the U.S. Supreme Court in Felder v Casey, 487 US 131 ; 108 S Ct 2302 ; 101 L Ed 2d 123 (1

2018“However, this Court possesses the discretion to review a legal issue not raised by the parties. 2 Brought under 42 USC § 1983 . -4- See Mack v. Detroit, 467 Mich 186, 206-209 ; 649 NW2d 47 (2002) (stating that “[t]he jurisprudence of Michigan cannot be, and is not, dependent upon whether individual parties accurately identify and elucidate controlling legal questions”).” Whether a state’s pre-suit notice requirements apply to a federal constitutional claim is a purely legal question and was considered by the U.S. Supreme Court in Felder v Casey, 487 US 131 ; 108 S Ct 2302 ; 101 L Ed 2d 123 (1

2018“However, this Court possesses the discretion to review a legal issue not raised by the parties. 2 Brought under 42 USC § 1983 . -4- See Mack v. Detroit, 467 Mich 186, 206-209 ; 649 NW2d 47 (2002) (stating that “[t]he jurisprudence of Michigan cannot be, and is not, dependent upon whether individual parties accurately identify and elucidate controlling legal questions”).” Whether a state’s pre-suit notice requirements apply to a federal constitutional claim is a purely legal question and was considered by the U.S. Supreme Court in Felder v Casey, 487 US 131 ; 108 S Ct 2302 ; 101 L Ed 2d 123 (1

2001In Bricker, supra, pp. 529-531 , 208 N.W.2d 172 , the Court stated: In light of the declared public policy of this state [to proscribe abortion] and the changed circumstances resulting from the Federal constitutional doctrine elucidated in Roe and Doe [ v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 , 93 S.Ct. 739 , 35 L.Ed.2d 201 (1973) ], we construe § 14 of the penal code to mean that the prohibition of this section shall not apply to "miscarriages" authorized by a pregnant woman's attending physician in the exercise of [the physician's] medical judgment; the effectuation of the decision to abort is also left to

2001In Bricker, supra, pp. 529-531 , 208 N.W.2d 172 , the Court stated: In light of the declared public policy of this state [to proscribe abortion] and the changed circumstances resulting from the Federal constitutional doctrine elucidated in Roe and Doe [ v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 , 93 S.Ct. 739 , 35 L.Ed.2d 201 (1973) ], we construe § 14 of the penal code to mean that the prohibition of this section shall not apply to "miscarriages" authorized by a pregnant woman's attending physician in the exercise of [the physician's] medical judgment; the effectuation of the decision to abort is also left to

2024People v Carbin, 463 Mich 599 -600; 623 NW2d 884 (2001).

2021People v 2 On remand, the trial court applied the two-prong Strickland test. -8- Lockett, 295 Mich App 165, 182 ; 814 NW2d 295 (2012).

2019The Supreme Court has said that “the locus delicti must be determined from the nature of the crime alleged and the location of the act or acts constituting it.” United States v Anderson, 328 US 699, 703 ; 66 S Ct 1213 ; 90 L Ed 1529 (1946).

2019The Supreme Court has said that “the locus delicti must be determined from the nature of the crime alleged and the location of the act or acts constituting it.” United States v Anderson, 328 US 699, 703 ; 66 S Ct 1213 ; 90 L Ed 1529 (1946).

2016People v Anderson, 446 Mich 392, 404 ; 521 NW2d 538 (1994).

2016People v Anderson, 446 Mich 392, 404 ; 521 NW2d 538 (1994).

2015Within the limits set by the legislature’s constitutionally valid definition of chargeable offenses, the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation so long as the selection was not deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification. [Bordenkircher v Hayes, 434 US 357, 364 ; 98 S Ct 663 ; 54 L Ed 2d 604 (1978) (quotation marks and citation omitted).] “Thus, the trial court’s authority over the discharge of the prosecutor’s duties is limited to those activities or decisions by

2015Within the limits set by the legislature’s constitutionally valid definition of chargeable offenses, the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation so long as the selection was not deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification. [Bordenkircher v Hayes, 434 US 357, 364 ; 98 S Ct 663 ; 54 L Ed 2d 604 (1978) (quotation marks and citation omitted).] “Thus, the trial court’s authority over the discharge of the prosecutor’s duties is limited to those activities or decisions by

2015“It is a violation of due process to punish a person for asserting a protected statutory or constitutional right.” People v Ryan, 451 Mich 30, 35 ; 545 NW2d 612 (1996); see also Bordenkircher, 434 US at 363 (“To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort[.]”).

2015“It is a violation of due process to punish a person for asserting a protected statutory or constitutional right.” People v Ryan, 451 Mich 30, 35 ; 545 NW2d 612 (1996); see also Bordenkircher, 434 US at 363 (“To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort[.]”).

2008Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 , 110 S.Ct. 1595 , 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990) (quotations omitted).

2008Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 , 110 S.Ct. 1595 , 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990) (quotations omitted).

2001We hold that, except as to those cases defined and exempted under Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton, supra , criminal responsibility attaches. [ Bricker, supra at 529-531 , 208 N.W.2d 172 .] See also Larkin v. Cahalan Prosecutor, 389 Mich. 533, 537 , 208 N.W.2d 176 (1973), in which the Court stated that the constitutionality of M.C.L. § 750.14; MSA 28.204 "is discussed and decided in [ Bricker ], decided this day." IV Defendant argues that M.C.L. § 750.14; MSA 28.204, which by its express terms prohibits all abortions except those necessary to save the mother's life, was impliedly repealed by the

2001We hold that, except as to those cases defined and exempted under Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton, supra , criminal responsibility attaches. [ Bricker, supra at 529-531 , 208 N.W.2d 172 .] See also Larkin v. Cahalan Prosecutor, 389 Mich. 533, 537 , 208 N.W.2d 176 (1973), in which the Court stated that the constitutionality of M.C.L. § 750.14; MSA 28.204 "is discussed and decided in [ Bricker ], decided this day." IV Defendant argues that M.C.L. § 750.14; MSA 28.204, which by its express terms prohibits all abortions except those necessary to save the mother's life, was impliedly repealed by the

2001In Bricker, supra, pp. 529-531 , 208 N.W.2d 172 , the Court stated: In light of the declared public policy of this state [to proscribe abortion] and the changed circumstances resulting from the Federal constitutional doctrine elucidated in Roe and Doe [ v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 , 93 S.Ct. 739 , 35 L.Ed.2d 201 (1973) ], we construe § 14 of the penal code to mean that the prohibition of this section shall not apply to "miscarriages" authorized by a pregnant woman's attending physician in the exercise of [the physician's] medical judgment; the effectuation of the decision to abort is also left to

2001In Bricker, supra, pp 529-531 , the Court stated: In light of the declared public policy of this state [to proscribe abortion] and the changed circumstances resulting from the Federal constitutional doctrine elucidated in Roe and Doe [v Bolton, 410 US 179 ; 93 S Ct 739 ; 35 L Ed 2d 201 (1973)], we construe § 14 of the penal code to mean that the prohibition of this section shall not apply to “miscarriages” authorized by a pregnant woman’s attending physician in the exercise of [the physician’s] medical judgment; the effectuation of the decision to abort is also left to the physician’s judgment