federal constitutional error in Georgia

2024Given these particular circumstances, we simply cannot say it was highly probable that the error did not affect the trial result, much less that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.49 Accordingly, we reverse Murphy’s false- 48 Ellington, 292 Ga. at 138 (7) (f); see Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (III) ( 87 SCt 824 , 17 LE2d 705) (1967) (holding that, “before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”). 49 See Ellington, 292 Ga. at 138-39 (7) (f) (holding trial court’s refus

2024Given these particular circumstances, we simply cannot say it was highly probable that the error did not affect the trial result, much less that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.49 Accordingly, we reverse Murphy’s false- 48 Ellington, 292 Ga. at 138 (7) (f); see Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (III) ( 87 SCt 824 , 17 LE2d 705) (1967) (holding that, “before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”). 49 See Ellington, 292 Ga. at 138-39 (7) (f) (holding trial court’s refus

2024Given these particular circumstances, we simply cannot say it was highly probable that the error did not affect the trial result, much less that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.49 Accordingly, we reverse Murphy’s false- 48 Ellington, 292 Ga. at 138 (7) (f); see Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (III) ( 87 SCt 824 , 17 LE2d 705) (1967) (holding that, “before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”). 49 See Ellington, 292 Ga. at 138-39 (7) (f) (holding trial court’s refus

2024Given these particular circumstances, we simply cannot say it was highly probable that the error did not affect the trial result, much less that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.49 Accordingly, we reverse Murphy’s false- 48 Ellington, 292 Ga. at 138 (7) (f); see Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (III) ( 87 SCt 824 , 17 LE2d 705) (1967) (holding that, “before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”). 49 See Ellington, 292 Ga. at 138-39 (7) (f) (holding trial court’s refus

1992There was no pursuit of, nor ruling on, the federal constitutional claim, so the sole preliminary issue is whether this statute governing criminal procedure applies to proceedings pursuant to OCGA § 15-11-28 on petitions alleging delinquency under OCGA § 15-11-25 in juvenile court. *281 Although I surmised in Smith v. State, 173 Ga. App. 728, 732 ( 327 SE2d 839 ) (1985), Beasley, J., concurring specially, that because of the language in OCGA § 16-1-8 and its focus, it did not apply to juvenile delinquency proceedings, I agree with the further analysis and conclusion in this case that it does.

1992There was no pursuit of, nor ruling on, the federal constitutional claim, so the sole preliminary issue is whether this statute governing criminal procedure applies to proceedings pursuant to OCGA § 15-11-28 on petitions alleging delinquency under OCGA § 15-11-25 in juvenile court. *281 Although I surmised in Smith v. State, 173 Ga. App. 728, 732 ( 327 SE2d 839 ) (1985), Beasley, J., concurring specially, that because of the language in OCGA § 16-1-8 and its focus, it did not apply to juvenile delinquency proceedings, I agree with the further analysis and conclusion in this case that it does.

1999J„ concurring specially). 8 Reddish v. State, 23' 8 Ga. 136, 138 (1) ( 231 SE2d 737 ) (1977). 9 Rachel v. State, 247 Ga. 130, 135 (4) ( 274 SE2d 475 ) (1981). 10 Hardy v. State, supra at 601. 11 Id. at 602. 12 Farley v. State, 225 Ga. App. 687, 692 ( 484 SE2d 711 ) (1997). 13 Harrington v. California, 395 U. S. 250, 253 (89 SC 1726, 23 LE2d 284) (1969). 14 Compare Hardy v. State, supra. 15 This is the rigorous standard for a federal constitutional violation.

1996In Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 , 89 S.Ct. 1726 , 23 L.Ed.2d 284 (1969), which preceded Van Arsdall , the confessions of two co-defendants who did not testify were introduced.

1985Wainwright v. Sikes, supra, observed: “The ‘cause’-and-‘prejudice’ exception of the Francis rule will afford an adequate guarantee, we think, that the rule will not prevent a federal habeas court from adjudicating for the first time the federal constitutional claim of a defendant who in the absence of such an adjudication will be the victim of a miscarriage of justice.” 433 U. S. at 90, 91 .

1985Wainwright v. Sikes, supra, observed: "The `cause'-and-`prejudice' exception of the Francis rule will afford an adequate guarantee, we think, that the rule will not prevent a federal habeas court from adjudicating for the first time the federal constitutional claim of a defendant who in the absence of such an adjudication will be the victim of a miscarriage of justice." 433 U. S. at 90, 91 .

2025See Rockdale County, 312 Ga. at 761–62. 22 is unconstitutional under the Georgia Constitution, and why (as they claim) the Georgia constitutional standard deviates from the federal constitutional standard.

2025See Rockdale County, 312 Ga. at 761–62.

2020See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 ( 104 SCt 2052 , 80 LE2d 674) (1984) (explaining that reversal on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds “requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial” (emphasis added)).

2020See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 ( 104 SCt 2052 , 80 LE2d 674) (1984) (explaining that reversal on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds “requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial” (emphasis added)).

2019By allowing the out-of-time remedy to be applied on direct appeal, our post-conviction jurisprudence has, as Justice Fletcher 44 observed 27 years ago, created a “tangle of procedural rules” that is both “confusing” and “incredible.” Maxwell v. State, 262 Ga. 541, 543 ( 422 SE2d 543 ) (1992) (Fletcher, J., concurring specially).

2019By allowing the out-of-time remedy to be applied on direct appeal, our post-conviction jurisprudence has, as Justice Fletcher 44 observed 27 years ago, created a “tangle of procedural rules” that is both “confusing” and “incredible.” Maxwell v. State, 262 Ga. 541, 543 ( 422 SE2d 543 ) (1992) (Fletcher, J., concurring specially).

2016See id. at 294-299 .

2012See Fulminante, 499 U. S. at 306-312 (holding that harmless error review applies to trial court error in admitting an involuntary statement); Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18, 24 (87 SC 824, 17 LE2d 705) (1967) (holding that, “before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”).

2011See Hall v. State, 241 Ga. App. 454, 460 (1) ( 525 SE2d 759 ) (1999) (“[Defendant] could be convicted of conspiracy even if . . . the jury did not believe that [defendant] had committed the one overt act which he independently was alleged to have committed, as long as one act by [any one co-conspirator] was proven to the jury’s satisfaction.”) (citations omitted). 10 OCGA § 24-9-84.1 (a) (1) sets a lower standard as to when a witness can be impeached with prior-conviction evidence in that a trial court must only determine “that the probative value of admitting the evidence outweighs its prejud

2011See Hall v. State, 241 Ga. App. 454, 460 (1) ( 525 SE2d 759 ) (1999) (“[Defendant] could be convicted of conspiracy even if . . . the jury did not believe that [defendant] had committed the one overt act which he independently was alleged to have committed, as long as one act by [any one co-conspirator] was proven to the jury’s satisfaction.”) (citations omitted). 10 OCGA § 24-9-84.1 (a) (1) sets a lower standard as to when a witness can be impeached with prior-conviction evidence in that a trial court must only determine “that the probative value of admitting the evidence outweighs its prejud

2011Before a federal constitutional error is held to be harmless, however, a “court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Little v. State, 230 Ga. App. 803, 806 (2) ( 498 SE2d 284 ) (1998). 8 See Reid, supra, 298 Ga. App. at 892 (2) (“[I]t was for the trial court, not this Court, to resolve any conflicts in the record or questions concerning the credibility of the agent in deciding the motion to suppress.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 9 Additionally, the State concedes that it did not present any evidence subst

2011Before a federal constitutional error is held to be harmless, however, a “court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Little v. State, 230 Ga. App. 803, 806 (2) ( 498 SE2d 284 ) (1998). 8 See Reid, supra, 298 Ga. App. at 892 (2) (“[I]t was for the trial court, not this Court, to resolve any conflicts in the record or questions concerning the credibility of the agent in deciding the motion to suppress.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 9 Additionally, the State concedes that it did not present any evidence subst

2011Before a federal constitutional error is held to be harmless, however, a “court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Little v. State, 230 Ga. App. 803, 806 (2) ( 498 SE2d 284 ) (1998). 8 See Reid, supra, 298 Ga. App. at 892 (2) (“[I]t was for the trial court, not this Court, to resolve any conflicts in the record or questions concerning the credibility of the agent in deciding the motion to suppress.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 9 Additionally, the State concedes that it did not present any evidence subst

2011Before a federal constitutional error is held to be harmless, however, a “court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Little v. State, 230 Ga. App. 803, 806 (2) ( 498 SE2d 284 ) (1998). 8 See Reid, supra, 298 Ga. App. at 892 (2) (“[I]t was for the trial court, not this Court, to resolve any conflicts in the record or questions concerning the credibility of the agent in deciding the motion to suppress.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 9 Additionally, the State concedes that it did not present any evidence subst

2007We find no merit to Johnson’s claim that his guilty pleas were not voluntary and knowing because they were accepted in violation of the requirements set forth in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238, 243 (89 SC 1709, 23 LE2d 274) (1969), that a defendant understand and waive the federal constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination; the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront one’s accusers.

2007Foskey v. Battle, 277 Ga. 480, 481-482 ( 591 SE2d 802 ) (2004).

2007Foskey v. Battle, 277 Ga. 480, 481-482 ( 591 SE2d 802 ) (2004).

2002Further, if the federal constitutional claim is not raised in the court below, such arguments on appeal are “unavailing.” Leatherman, 532 U. S. at 433, n. 7 .

2000See United States v. Crowley, 529 F2d 1066, 1070 (3rd Cir. 1976) (finding harmless error as to the denial of counsel at a plea-withdrawal hearing where innocence was not asserted and record shows no basis for allowing withdrawal of the plea); Randall v. State, 861 P2d 314, 316 (Okl.

2000See United States v. Crowley, 529 F.2d 1066 (3rd Cir. 1976) (finding harmless error as to the denial of counsel at a plea-withdrawal hearing where innocence was not asserted and record shows no basis for allowing withdrawal of the plea); Randall v. State, 861 P.2d 314, 316 (Okl.Cr.

2000See United States v. Crowley, 529 F.2d 1066 (3rd Cir. 1976) (finding harmless error as to the denial of counsel at a plea-withdrawal hearing where innocence was not asserted and record shows no basis for allowing withdrawal of the plea); Randall v. State, 861 P.2d 314, 316 (Okl.Cr.

1999Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U. S. 673, 684 (106 SC 1431, 89 LE2d 674) (1986). 16 See generally Josey v. State, 199 Ga. App. 780, 781 (2) ( 406 SE2d 125 ) (1991).

1999Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U. S. 673, 684 (106 SC 1431, 89 LE2d 674) (1986). 16 See generally Josey v. State, 199 Ga. App. 780, 781 (2) ( 406 SE2d 125 ) (1991).

1999Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U. S. 673, 684 (106 SC 1431, 89 LE2d 674) (1986). 16 See generally Josey v. State, 199 Ga. App. 780, 781 (2) ( 406 SE2d 125 ) (1991).