automobile exception in Kansas

2021This is because "[u]nder the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, which is a subclass of the probable-cause-plus-exigent-circumstances exception, the mobility of the vehicle provides the exigent circumstances without the necessity of proving anything more." 294 Kan. 50 , Syl. ¶ 4.

2019The automobile exception provides that a warrant is not required to search a vehicle as long as "probable cause exists to believe the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime" and the vehicle is "readily mobile." Sanchez-Loredo , 294 Kan. 50 , Syl. ¶ 4, 272 P.3d 34 .

2024The United States Supreme Court has extended the automobile exception to motor homes in California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 393 , 105 S. Ct. 2066 , 85 L.

2024The United States Supreme Court has extended the automobile exception to motor homes in California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 393 , 105 S. Ct. 2066 , 85 L.

2012The automobile exception originated with the case of Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 , 45 S. Ct. 280 , 69 L.

2012The automobile exception originated with the case of Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 , 45 S. Ct. 280 , 69 L.

2012Ed. 2d 442 (1999), the Supreme Court reviewed a Maryland Court of Special Appeals holding that “in order for the automobile exception to the warrant requirement to apply, there must not only be probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime is contained in die automobile, but also a separate finding of exigency precluding the police from obtaining a warrant.” 527 U.S. at 466 .

2012Again the high court disagreed, holding that the automobile exception has no separate exigency requirement beyond a showing of mobility of the vehicle. 527 U.S. at 466-67 .

2012The Supreme Court further clarified the scope of the automobile exception in Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 , 90 S. Ct. 1975 , 26 L.

2012The Supreme Court further clarified the scope of the automobile exception in Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 , 90 S. Ct. 1975 , 26 L.

2022But the United States Supreme Court disagreed, holding: "[T]he automobile exception does not permit an officer without a warrant to enter a home or its curtilage in order to search a vehicle therein." 138 S. Ct. at 1675 .

2022But the United States Supreme Court disagreed, holding: "[T]he automobile exception does not permit an officer without a warrant to enter a home or its curtilage in order to search a vehicle therein." 138 S. Ct. at 1675 .

2022App. at 593 12 (citing State v. Brown, 301 Or. 268 , 721 P.2d 1357 [1986]).

2022App. at 593 12 (citing State v. Brown, 301 Or. 268 , 721 P.2d 1357 [1986]).

2022State v. Cash, 313 Kan. 121 , 125-26, 483 P.3d 1047 (2021).

2022State v. Cash, 313 Kan. 121 , 125-26, 483 P.3d 1047 (2021).

2022In United States v. Hill, 855 F.2d 664 (10th Cir. 1988), a defendant challenged the warrantless search of his houseboat, claiming it was more like a home than a vehicle, so the automobile exception did not apply.

2022In United States v. Hill, 855 F.2d 664 (10th Cir. 1988), a defendant challenged the warrantless search of his houseboat, claiming it was more like a home than a vehicle, so the automobile exception did not apply.

2022That court applied the automobile exception to the camper after finding it was readily mobile and so situated that an objective observer would conclude it was not being used as a residence while parked at a motel parking lot and not a place regularly used for residential purposes. 907 F.2d at 1537-39 .

2022That court applied the automobile exception to the camper after finding it was readily mobile and so situated that an objective observer would conclude it was not being used as a residence while parked at a motel parking lot and not a place regularly used for residential purposes. 907 F.2d at 1537-39 .

2022The Finlay court "fail[ed] to see a significant distinction between searching containers inside a vehicle, which is permitted under the automobile exception . . . and searching containers attached to the outside of a vehicle." 257 Or.

2022The Finlay court "fail[ed] to see a significant distinction between searching containers inside a vehicle, which is permitted under the automobile exception . . . and searching containers attached to the outside of a vehicle." 257 Or.

2009In State v. Hays, 221 Kan. 126, 130 , 557 P.2d 1275 (1976), the Kansas Supreme Court noted that ‘automobiles can be searched without a warrant under circumstances which would not justify the search without a warrant of a house or office, provided there is probable cause to believe that the automobile contains articles which the officers are entitled to seize.’ Specifically, the Kansas Supreme Court has held that ‘[ajutomobile searches may be upheld if there is probable cause to believe there *1027 is evidence of crime in the automobile.’ State ex rel.

2009In State v. Hays, 221 Kan. 126, 130 , 557 P.2d 1275 (1976), the Kansas Supreme Court noted that ‘automobiles can be searched without a warrant under circumstances which would not justify the search without a warrant of a house or office, provided there is probable cause to believe that the automobile contains articles which the officers are entitled to seize.’ Specifically, the Kansas Supreme Court has held that ‘[ajutomobile searches may be upheld if there is probable cause to believe there *1027 is evidence of crime in the automobile.’ State ex rel.

2022In granting the State's motion to reconsider its initial decision to suppress the results of the search of the backpack, the district court simply relied on United States v. Ross and [State v. ]Eubanks[, 355 N.W. 2d 57 (Iowa 1984),] to hold that 'Rincon had no expectation of privacy that would have precluded law enforcement from searching the 12 containers within the detained vehicle, which included her backpack.' Regardless, on our de novo review, the front pocket of the backpack (where the bag of marijuana was protruding) was large enough to hold at least a single-shot bottle of liquor.

2020The automobile exception generally says that "police may search an automobile and the containers within it where they have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained." California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 , 111 S. Ct. 1982 , 114 L.

2020The automobile exception generally says that "police may search an automobile and the containers within it where they have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained." California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 , 111 S. Ct. 1982 , 114 L.

2018Second, the Gant majority, as we have discussed, specifically recognized other doctrines, such as the automobile exception, still applied. 556 U.S. at 347 , 129 S.Ct. 1710 .

2018Second, the Gant majority, as we have discussed, specifically recognized other doctrines, such as the automobile exception, still applied. 556 U.S. at 347 , 129 S.Ct. 1710 .

2018And, for obvious reasons, it is important to keep them straight." United States v. Polanco , 634 F.3d 39 , 43 (1st Cir. 2011).

2018As suggested by our discussion of Polanco , 634 F.3d at 43 , this distinction has led many courts to conclude the reasonable-belief standard requires something less than probable cause-at least on the point of whether the evidence may be in the car (as opposed to the justification for the arrest that triggers the Gant vehicle exception).

2018Parker also claimed his incriminating statements were made without his "full, knowing, and intelligent waiver" under Miranda because of his "physical, mental, educational and emotional state." The State argued the vehicle search and evidence seizure were lawful because (1) Summerer had a reasonable suspicion after seeing Parker lean towards the console area; (2) "a dog sniff of an exterior of a car parked in a public place is not a search" under State v. Skelton , 247 Kan. 34 , 46, 795 P.2d 349 (1990) ; (3) the dog's alert provided probable cause and "the inherent movability of a vehicle" allo

2018Parker also claimed his incriminating statements were made without his "full, knowing, and intelligent waiver" under Miranda because of his "physical, mental, educational and emotional state." The State argued the vehicle search and evidence seizure were lawful because (1) Summerer had a reasonable suspicion after seeing Parker lean towards the console area; (2) "a dog sniff of an exterior of a car parked in a public place is not a search" under State v. Skelton , 247 Kan. 34 , 46, 795 P.2d 349 (1990) ; (3) the dog's alert provided probable cause and "the inherent movability of a vehicle" allo

2014But it upheld the automobile search under the automobile exception, not the emergency aid exception. 178 Cal. App. 4th at 904 .

2012The state court also opined that the automobile exception is limited to situations where “unforeseen circumstances involving the search of an automobile [are] coupled with the presence of probable cause.” Labron, 543 Pa. at 100 .

2012See, e.g., State v. Elison, 302 Mont. 228, 244 , 14 P.3d 456 (2000) (requiring police officers to show exigent circumstances under the automobile exception); State v. Harnisch, 114 Nev. 225, 228-29 , 954 P.2d 1180 (1998) (“[T]he Nevada Constitution requires both probable cause and exigent circumstances in order to justify a war-rantless search of a parked, immobile, unoccupied vehicle.”); State *59 v. Sterndale, 139 N.H. 445, 449-50 , 656 A.2d 409 (1995) (declining to adopt the automobile exception because the New Hampshire Constitution provides greater privacy protections than the Fourth Amen

2012See, e.g., State v. Elison, 302 Mont. 228, 244 , 14 P.3d 456 (2000) (requiring police officers to show exigent circumstances under the automobile exception); State v. Harnisch, 114 Nev. 225, 228-29 , 954 P.2d 1180 (1998) (“[T]he Nevada Constitution requires both probable cause and exigent circumstances in order to justify a war-rantless search of a parked, immobile, unoccupied vehicle.”); State *59 v. Sterndale, 139 N.H. 445, 449-50 , 656 A.2d 409 (1995) (declining to adopt the automobile exception because the New Hampshire Constitution provides greater privacy protections than the Fourth Amen