automobile exception in Massachusetts

2015“Under the automobile exception, a warrantless search of an automobile is permitted when police have ‘probable cause to believe that a motor vehicle on a public way contains contraband or evidence of a crime, and exigent circumstances make obtaining a warrant impracticable.’ ” Id. at 473-474 , quoting Commonwealth v. Cast, 407 Mass. 891, 901 (1990). “[W]hen an automobile is stopped in a public place with probable cause, no more exigent circumstances are required . . . beyond the inherent mobility of an automobile itself to justify a warrantless search of the vehicle.” Commonwealth v. Motta, 42

2014The Commonwealth cites Commonwealth v. Motto, 424 Mass. 117, 123-24 (1997), for the proposition that the firearm was legally seized under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.

2015The judge concluded that the search was justified under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement because, quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925), there was enough evidence to “ ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’ . . . that the handgun would be in the vehicle, perhaps in the trunk and out of sight.” The judge reasoned that the six hours that had passed between the robbery and the automobile stop were not fatal where “it was reasonable to think that one or both of the occupants at the time of the stop had probably been using the vehicle at the time

2011Under the automobile exception, a warrantless search of an automobile is permitted when police have "probable cause to believe that a motor vehicle on a public way contains contraband or evidence of a crime, and exigent *474 circumstances make obtaining a warrant impracticable." Commonwealth v. Cast, 407 Mass. 891, 901 (1990), quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925). [27] In contrast, therefore, to the requirement that criminality be suspected to effectuate an exit order under the reasonable suspicion standard, a warrantless search of an automobile may be based on probable c

2015“Under the automobile exception, a warrantless search of an automobile is permitted when police have ‘probable cause to believe that a motor vehicle on a public way contains contraband or evidence of a crime, and exigent circumstances make obtaining a warrant impracticable.’ ” Id. at 473-474 , quoting Commonwealth v. Cast, 407 Mass. 891, 901 (1990). “[W]hen an automobile is stopped in a public place with probable cause, no more exigent circumstances are required . . . beyond the inherent mobility of an automobile itself to justify a warrantless search of the vehicle.” Commonwealth v. Motta, 42

2012As the motion judge concluded, the search of the vehicle was justified by the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. 7 Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable, under both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, subject only to “a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Commonwealth v. Bostock, 450 Mass. 616, 623-624 (2008), quoting Commonwealth v. Cast, 407 Mass. 891, 901 (1990).

2023"Under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, the search of a motor vehicle [wa]s reasonable and permissible." Hernandez, 473 Mass. at 383 , quoting Commonwealth v. Johnson, 461 Mass. 44, 49 (2011). b.

2015“Under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, the search of a motor vehicle is reasonable and permissible where probable cause exists to support the search.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 461 Mass. 44, 49 (2011).

2009In United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 809 (1982), the Court held that a warrantless vehicle search is proper as long as police officers have probable cause to search the vehicle, “even though a warrant has not actually been obtained.” The Court later clarified that the automobile exception does not have a separate exigency requirement, and that it applies as long as the vehicle is “readily mobile” and officers have probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband.

1990While the United States Supreme Court considered in Ross the same suggestion made by the defendant here — that while every part of the vehicle could be searched under the automobile exception, any closed container discovered, since not inherently mobile, could be removed and taken to a magistrate for his *915 or her assessment of probable cause to open it — it rejected the suggestion as an impractical solution that would unduly burden law enforcement efforts while “actually ex-acerba! [ing] the intrusion on privacy interests.” United States v. Ross, supra at 821 n.28.

2015“Under the automobile exception, a warrantless search of an automobile is permitted when police have ‘probable cause to believe that a motor vehicle on a public way contains contraband or evidence of a crime, and exigent circumstances make obtaining a warrant impracticable.’ ” Id. at 473-474 , quoting Commonwealth v. Cast, 407 Mass. 891, 901 (1990). “[W]hen an automobile is stopped in a public place with probable cause, no more exigent circumstances are required . . . beyond the inherent mobility of an automobile itself to justify a warrantless search of the vehicle.” Commonwealth v. Motta, 42

2014The Commonwealth argues that the smell of marijuana supported probable cause to search the back seat of the defendant’s vehicle, rendering the search proper under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. 6 The Commonwealth contends that these circumstances differ from those in *20 Cruz, supra, because that case involved the smell of burnt marijuana, whereas the officers in this case perceived an odor of unburnt marijuana.

2019Authority to search under the automobile exception exists "even when the police had ample opportunity to obtain a search warrant, provided **221 that there has been no unreasonable delay." Commonwealth v. Eggleston , 453 Mass. 554 , 554, 903 N.E.2d 1087 (2009).

2019Authority to search under the automobile exception exists "even when the police had ample opportunity to obtain a search warrant, provided **221 that there has been no unreasonable delay." Commonwealth v. Eggleston , 453 Mass. 554 , 554, 903 N.E.2d 1087 (2009).

2025"Due to the inherent mobility of an automobile, and the owner's reduced expectation of privacy when stopped on a public road, police are permitted to search a vehicle based upon probable cause to believe that it contains evidence of a crime." Commonwealth v. Davis, 481 Mass. 210,220 (2019) (citation omitted).

2025"Due to the inherent mobility of an automobile, and the owner's reduced expectation of privacy when stopped on a public road, police are permitted to search a vehicle based upon probable cause to believe that it contains evidence of a crime." Commonwealth v. Davis, 481 Mass. 210, 220 (2019).

2010Although the troopers did not have a warrant to search the car, under “the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, the search of the [car] was justified as long as the [troopers] had probable cause to believe that there was contraband in the car.” Commonwealth v. Garden, 451 Mass. 43, 47 (2008).

2010Because a trained officer’s detection of the smell of burnt marijuana permits a search of a vehicle’s passenger compartment under the automobile exception, see Commonwealth v. Garden, 451 Mass. 43, 48 (2008), we need not consider the apparent inconsistency as to when the marijuana roaches were actually discovered.

2019See Commonwealth v. Agosto , 428 Mass. 31 , 34-35, 696 N.E.2d 924 (1998), quoting Commonwealth v. Markou , 391 Mass. 27 , 30-31, 459 N.E.2d 1225 (1984) (while safety concerns may permit immediate search after towing vehicle from highway to safe environment, "[n]onetheless, we have not endorsed 'giving the police carte blanche to search without a warrant any time subsequent to a valid stop' ").

2009We emphasized that, while broad, the automobile exception did not “giv[e] the police carte blanche to search without a warrant any time subsequent to a valid stop,” and that an “unreasonable delay . . . will render invalid an otherwise valid search.” Id. at 34 , quoting Commonwealth v. Markou, 391 Mass. 27, 30 (1984), and Commonwealth v. Motta, supra at 125 .

2020Therefore, the automobile exception to the search warrant requirement applied, "[b]ecause the observation g[a]ve[] rise to probable cause to conduct a search, [and] the subsequent entry into the vehicle and seizure of the [contraband was] permissible." Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Bostock, 450 Mass. 616 , 624 - 625 (2008) (search of truck permissible under the automobile exception because there was probable cause to believe that the truck contained evidence of a break-in of a vehicle, including observations by police of potentially stolen items).[8] --------------------------- [7]Unlike the e

2016“One of those exceptions, commonly known as ‘the automobile exception,’ applies to situations where the police have probable cause to believe that a motor vehicle parked in a public place and apparently capable of being moved contains contraband or evidence of a crime.” Commonwealth v. Bostock, 450 Mass. 616, 624 , (2008).

1978As was said in Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970), "for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment there is a constitutional difference between houses and cars.” In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), the Supreme Court first carved out the automobile exception to the general law of search and seizure.

1975There is therefore no basis for automatically extending an automobile rule to cover dwelling searches, see Chambers v. Maroney, supra, at 52 , and the Vale line of cases makes clear that it should not beso extended. 18 See United States v. Rubin, 474 F. 2d at 268 (3d Cir. 1973).

2001See also New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 , 462 & n.6 (1982) (expressly disclaiming reliance on the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment).

1982Because the defendant’s evidence at the suppression hearing, as a result of the Commonwealth’s statement, was pitched toward the automobile exception and not at the concept of a search incident to a lawful arrest, we do not consider New York v. Belton, supra, dispositive of the issue. 2 In United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982), also decided after the decision in this case, the United States Supreme Court held that police officers who have lawfully stopped an automobile and who have probable cause to believe that contraband is concealed somewhere within the vehicle, may conduct a warrantle

2025Sec Commonwealth v. Tyree, 455 Mass. 676, 694 (2010) (under plain view doctrine, '" if police are lawfully in a position from which they view an object, if its incriminating -20- character is immediately apparent, and if the officers have a lawful right of access to the object, they may seize it without a warrant"'). 5. '"Under the automobile exception, a warrantless search of an automobile is permitted when police have "probable cause to believe that a motor vehicle on a public way contains contraband or evidence of a crime, and exigent circumstances make obtaining a warrant impracticable.""'

2020The automobile exception, Sheridan, 470 Mass. at 759 , and the plain view exception, Commonwealth v. Sliech-Brodeur, 457 Mass. 300, 306 (2010) (citations omitted), are two such well-recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.

2017Commonwealth v. Cruz, 459 Mass. 459, 466-467 (2011). "[I]t does not take much for a police officer to establish a reasonable basis to justify an exit order or search based on safety concerns." Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 429 Mass. 658, 664 (1999).

2011See Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 429 Mass. 658, 662-663 (1999). [11] The automobile exception may apply even if the vehicle is not currently mobile.

2016“The existence of probable cause depends on whether the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge at the time of making the search or seizure were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the defendant had committed, or was committing, an offense.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 366 Mass. 387, 391 (1974).

2008See Commonwealth v. Gajka, 425 Mass. 751, 752 (1997); Commonwealth v. Cast, supra. “The existence of probable cause depends on whether the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge at the time of making the search or seizure were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the defendant had committed, or was committing, an offense.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 366 Mass. 387, 391 (1974).

2011See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Moses, 408 Mass. 136, 141 (1990), quoting Commonwealth v. Borges, 395 Mass. 788, 794 (1985) (“The degree of intrusiveness that is permitted is that which is ‘proportional to the degree of suspicion that prompted the intrusion’ ”).

2011See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Moses, 408 Mass. 136, 141 (1990), quoting Commonwealth v. Borges, 395 Mass. 788, 794 (1985) ("The degree of intrusiveness that is permitted is that which is `proportional to the degree of suspicion that prompted the intrusion'").

2010In any event we are “free to affirm a ruling on grounds different from those relied on by the motion judge if the correct or preferred basis for affirmance is supported by the record and the findings.” Commonwealth v. Va Meng Joe, 425 Mass. 99, 102 (1997).

2005Cf. Commonwealth v. Va Meng Joe, 425 Mass. 99, 102 (1997).

1998See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Motta, 424 Mass. 117, 125 (1997) (“within five to ten minutes”); Commonwealth v. Bakoian, 412 Mass. 295, 304 (1992) (“little over one hour”); Commonwealth v. A Juvenile (No. 2), 411 Mass. 157, 166 (1991) (“no delay”); Commonwealth v. Markou, 391 Mass. 27, 32 (1984) (“no more than two hours”); Commonwealth v. Bongarzone, 390 Mass. 326, 351 (1983) (“less than two hours”).

1993Cast still talks in terms of exigent circumstances, and in the later case of Commonwealth v. Bakoian, 412 Mass. 295, 305 (1992), the court said, “We do not suggest that, under Massachusetts law, there is no requirement of exigent circumstances to justify an immediate, warrantless search of an automobile based on probable cause.” Our respected neighbor, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, evidently thinks this no more than a form and holds in these automobile cases, simpliciter, that search is valid if probable cause exists at the time.

2019See Commonwealth v. Agosto , 428 Mass. 31 , 34-35, 696 N.E.2d 924 (1998), quoting Commonwealth v. Markou , 391 Mass. 27 , 30-31, 459 N.E.2d 1225 (1984) (while safety concerns may permit immediate search after towing vehicle from highway to safe environment, "[n]onetheless, we have not endorsed 'giving the police carte blanche to search without a warrant any time subsequent to a valid stop' ").

2009We emphasized that, while broad, the automobile exception did not “giv[e] the police carte blanche to search without a warrant any time subsequent to a valid stop,” and that an “unreasonable delay . . . will render invalid an otherwise valid search.” Id. at 34 , quoting Commonwealth v. Markou, 391 Mass. 27, 30 (1984), and Commonwealth v. Motta, supra at 125 .

2009Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996).

2009See Maryland v. Dyson, supra at 467 ; Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996).

2008Although this search was upheld under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, the court noted, in a footnote, that “[i]n view of the fact that the search of the automobile was neither contemporaneous with the arrest nor for the purpose of protecting the safety of the officers, it is doubtful whether the search could be justified on [the] basis [of a search incident to arrest].” Id. at 120 n.9, citing Alvarado, supra at 554 .

2003There is a possibly negative implication in Commonwealth v. Alvarado, 420 Mass. 542, 552, 554-555 (1995), suggesting the immobilizing of the vehicle may exclude the automobile exception, but the case was decided on failure of a showing of probable cause. 3.

2008See Acevedo, supra at 571 .

1993The author thinks the majority in Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991), while confining its holding to the automobile doctrine, is “on the brink of ‘clarifying’ Fourth Amendment law at the expense of the warrant requirement.” Tomkovicz, supra at 1106 (footnote omitted).

2026See Barreto, 483 Mass. at 722; Commonwealth v. Amado, 474 Mass. 147, 152 (2016).

2025Sec Commonwealth v. Tyree, 455 Mass. 676, 694 (2010) (under plain view doctrine, '" if police are lawfully in a position from which they view an object, if its incriminating -20- character is immediately apparent, and if the officers have a lawful right of access to the object, they may seize it without a warrant"'). 5. '"Under the automobile exception, a warrantless search of an automobile is permitted when police have "probable cause to believe that a motor vehicle on a public way contains contraband or evidence of a crime, and exigent circumstances make obtaining a warrant impracticable.""'

2024See Commonwealth v. Phifer, 463 Mass. 790, 795-796 (2012), citing Commonwealth v. Madera, 402 Mass. 156, 159-161 (1988). 4 There is considerable uncertainty in the case law as to whether Gant's "reasonable to believe" standard equates to probable cause, to reasonable suspicion, or to some other standard that also is less stringent than probable cause.

2024See Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 443 Mass. 707, 708-709 (2005) (issue endorsement.3 The Commonwealth sought leave to pursue an interlocutory appeal from the judge's orders, and a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court granted leave for an appeal to this court.

2024See Commonwealth v. Phifer, 463 Mass. 790, 795-796 (2012), citing Commonwealth v. Madera, 402 Mass. 156, 159-161 (1988). 4 There is considerable uncertainty in the case law as to whether Gant's "reasonable to believe" standard equates to probable cause, to reasonable suspicion, or to some other standard that also is less stringent than probable cause.

2024See Commonwealth v. Starkweather, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 791, 796-797 (2011).4 Under the automobile exception, where 3 It bears noting that had the police chosen to arrest the defendant as he walked to the car, the backpack search would have been a lawful search incident to arrest, as the backpack was then on his person.

2024See Commonwealth v. Starkweather, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 791, 796-797 (2011).4 Under the automobile exception, where 3 It bears noting that had the police chosen to arrest the defendant as he walked to the car, the backpack search would have been a lawful search incident to arrest, as the backpack was then on his person.