automobile exception in Wisconsin

2013Initially established in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), the automobile exception provides that law enforcement officers may seize a vehicle, its occupants, and personal property inside the vehicle, without a warrant, when officers demonstrate that probable cause exists to justify the intrusion. 11 See Chambers, 399 U.S. at 51-52 ; Whren, 517 U.S. at 809-10 .

2001The Supreme Court first recognized the automobile exception in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149-56 (1925), and concluded that law enforcement officers may search an entire motor vehicle without a warrant if there is probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband.

2023See State v. Tompkins, 144 Wis. 2d 116, 135 , 423 N.W.2d 823 (1988). ¶20 The automobile exception applies when the following two criteria are met: “(1) there is probable cause to search the vehicle; and (2) the vehicle is readily mobile.” Marquardt, 247 Wis. 2d 765, ¶31 (citing Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467 (1999) (per curiam)).

2023See State v. Tompkins, 144 Wis. 2d 116, 135 , 423 N.W.2d 823 (1988). ¶20 The automobile exception applies when the following two criteria are met: “(1) there is probable cause to search the vehicle; and (2) the vehicle is readily mobile.” Marquardt, 247 Wis. 2d 765, ¶31 (citing Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467 (1999) (per curiam)).

2020One such exception is the automobile exception, which permits police to “conduct a warrantless search of a car if they have probable cause to believe that the car contains contraband.” State v. Jackson, 2013 WI App 66, ¶8 , 348 Wis. 2d 103 , 831 N.W.2d 426 (citing U.S. v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 799-800 (1982)). ¶9 Significant here, in addition to this probable-cause-for-contraband rule, under the automobile exception, police may search a vehicle “‘for evidence relevant to offenses other than the offense of arrest’ when ‘there is probable cause to believe a vehicle contains evidence of criminal ac

2020One such exception is the automobile exception, which permits police to “conduct a warrantless search of a car if they have probable cause to believe that the car contains contraband.” State v. Jackson, 2013 WI App 66, ¶8 , 348 Wis. 2d 103 , 831 N.W.2d 426 (citing U.S. v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 799-800 (1982)). ¶9 Significant here, in addition to this probable-cause-for-contraband rule, under the automobile exception, police may search a vehicle “‘for evidence relevant to offenses other than the offense of arrest’ when ‘there is probable cause to believe a vehicle contains evidence of criminal ac

2024State v. Hanson, 2019 WI 63, ¶28 , 387 Wis. 2d 233 , 928 N.W.2d 607 . ¶13 The automobile exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment allows police to search a vehicle if it is “readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband.” State v. Marquardt, 2001 WI App 219, ¶29 , 247 Wis. 2d 765 , 635 N.W.2d 188 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996)).

2024State v. Hanson, 2019 WI 63, ¶28 , 387 Wis. 2d 233 , 928 N.W.2d 607 . ¶13 The automobile exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment allows police to search a vehicle if it is “readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband.” State v. Marquardt, 2001 WI App 219, ¶29 , 247 Wis. 2d 765 , 635 N.W.2d 188 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996)).

2023As the State points out, and as our summary above reflects, the court left open resolution of an alternative theory against suppression argued by the State and the court did not resolve all aspects of the suppression issue by order until March 2022, after which the State timely filed a proper notice of appeal. 8 No. 2022AP350-CR (referencing precedent that includes Carney, 471 U.S. 386 ); State v. Brereton, 2013 WI 17, ¶26 , 345 Wis. 2d 563 , 826 N.W.2d 369 (deeming Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), to be “a hallmark case involving the automobile exception”); see also 3 WAYNE R.

2001The Supreme Court explained the automobile exception in California v. Carney: [T]he pervasive schemes of regulation, which necessarily lead to reduced expectations of privacy [in an automobile], and the exigencies attendant to ready mobility justify searches without prior recourse to the authority of a magistrate so long as the overriding standard of probable cause is met. 471 U.S. at 392 (emphasis added). ¶ 52.

2023As the State points out, and as our summary above reflects, the court left open resolution of an alternative theory against suppression argued by the State and the court did not resolve all aspects of the suppression issue by order until March 2022, after which the State timely filed a proper notice of appeal. 8 No. 2022AP350-CR (referencing precedent that includes Carney, 471 U.S. 386 ); State v. Brereton, 2013 WI 17, ¶26 , 345 Wis. 2d 563 , 826 N.W.2d 369 (deeming Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), to be “a hallmark case involving the automobile exception”); see also 3 WAYNE R.

2013Initially established in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), the automobile exception provides that law enforcement officers may seize a vehicle, its occupants, and personal property inside the vehicle, without a warrant, when officers demonstrate that probable cause exists to justify the intrusion. 11 See Chambers, 399 U.S. at 51-52 ; Whren, 517 U.S. at 809-10 .

2013In Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970), addressing the automobile exception, the Court stated: "Only in exigent circumstances will the judgment of the police as to probable cause serve as a sufficient authorization for a search." In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 461-64 (1971), involving a warrantless seizure of a vehicle, the Court declared that the seizure was unconstitutional when no exigent circumstances existed making it impracticable to secure a warrant.

2001Finally, we address Marquardt's argument that the police should have obtained a warrant because "[t]here was no danger of the car or any evidence of any crime that may have existed in the car being driven away and destroyed." Marquardt cites Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), where the court rejected application of the automobile exception under similar facts.

2024State v. Hanson, 2019 WI 63, ¶28 , 387 Wis. 2d 233 , 928 N.W.2d 607 . ¶13 The automobile exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment allows police to search a vehicle if it is “readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband.” State v. Marquardt, 2001 WI App 219, ¶29 , 247 Wis. 2d 765 , 635 N.W.2d 188 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996)).

2023As we explained in Marquardt, relying on U.S. Supreme Court precedent, there is no longer a requirement in this context that it was impractical for police to obtain a search warrant, with the reasoning being that “the exigency inherent in the ‘ready mobility’ of a vehicle, coupled with the ‘lesser expectation of privacy’ in a readily mobile vehicle, excuses the need to secure a search warrant.” Marquardt, 247 Wis. 2d 765, ¶¶28-29 (citing Carney, 471 U.S. at 390-91 ; Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996) (per curiam)).

2023See State v. Tompkins, 144 Wis. 2d 116, 135 , 423 N.W.2d 823 (1988). ¶20 The automobile exception applies when the following two criteria are met: “(1) there is probable cause to search the vehicle; and (2) the vehicle is readily mobile.” Marquardt, 247 Wis. 2d 765, ¶31 (citing Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467 (1999) (per curiam)).

2023See State v. Tompkins, 144 Wis. 2d 116, 135 , 423 N.W.2d 823 (1988). ¶20 The automobile exception applies when the following two criteria are met: “(1) there is probable cause to search the vehicle; and (2) the vehicle is readily mobile.” Marquardt, 247 Wis. 2d 765, ¶31 (citing Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467 (1999) (per curiam)).

1989"The automobile exception allows a warrantless search and seizure of a car so long as the search is justified by probable cause.” United States v. Rivera, 825 F.2d 152, 158 (7th Cir. 1987); State v. Tompkins, 144 Wis. 2d 116 , 423 N.W.2d 823 (1988).

1988The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently stated: "The automobile exception allows a warrantless search and seizure of a car so long as the search is justified by probable cause." United States v. *130 Rivera, 825 F.2d 152, 158 (7th Cir. 1987), citing California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 ; Chambers v. Moraney, 399 U.S. 42 ; Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 .

2025We conclude that search of the Acura was not an unauthorized “general search,” but fell within “the specific areas and things for which there is probable cause to search[.]” Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987).

2024See State v. Denk, 2008 WI 130, ¶36 , 315 Wis. 2d 5 , 785 N.W.2d 775 . ¶23 Julien concedes that law enforcement had probable cause to search her vehicle after the canine alerted to the presence of drugs inside of her vehicle.

2024See State v. Denk, 2008 WI 130, ¶36 , 315 Wis. 2d 5 , 785 N.W.2d 775 . ¶23 Julien concedes that law enforcement had probable cause to search her vehicle after the canine alerted to the presence of drugs inside of her vehicle.

2023See United States v. Sullivan, 797 F.3d 623, 633 (9th Cir. 2015) (determining whether delay between the seizure of an item and the issuance of a search warrant is constitutionally unreasonable is based on the “totality of the circumstances, not whether the [g]overnment pursued the least intrusive course of action,” and involves a balancing of “‘nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s 23 No. 2022AP350-CR Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion’” (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983))). ¶

2023See Marquardt, 247 Wis. 2d 765, ¶¶27-31 . 5 No. 2022AP350-CR ¶10 In the alternative, the prosecutor contended that, even if the automobile exception does not apply, evidence obtained during the search of the pickup is admissible under the reasoning in State v. Gaines, 197 Wis. 2d 102 , 539 N.W.2d 723 (Ct. App. 1995).

2023See Marquardt, 247 Wis. 2d 765, ¶¶27-31 . 5 No. 2022AP350-CR ¶10 In the alternative, the prosecutor contended that, even if the automobile exception does not apply, evidence obtained during the search of the pickup is admissible under the reasoning in State v. Gaines, 197 Wis. 2d 102 , 539 N.W.2d 723 (Ct. App. 1995).

2023See, e.g., United States v. Howard, 489 F.3d 484, 493 (2d Cir. 2007) (“readily mobile” “has more to do with the inherent mobility of the vehicle than with the potential for the vehicle to be moved from the jurisdiction, thereby precluding a search,” without regard to “the actual ability of a driver or passenger to flee immediately in the car, or the likelihood of hi[s] or her doing so.”); Myers v. State, 839 N.E.2d 1146, 1152 (Ind. 2005) (“[W]e understand the ‘ready mobility’ requirement of the 15 No. 2022AP350-CR automobile exception to mean that all operational, or potentially operational, m

2023See, e.g., United States v. Howard, 489 F.3d 484, 493 (2d Cir. 2007) (“readily mobile” “has more to do with the inherent mobility of the vehicle than with the potential for the vehicle to be moved from the jurisdiction, thereby precluding a search,” without regard to “the actual ability of a driver or passenger to flee immediately in the car, or the likelihood of hi[s] or her doing so.”); Myers v. State, 839 N.E.2d 1146, 1152 (Ind. 2005) (“[W]e understand the ‘ready mobility’ requirement of the 15 No. 2022AP350-CR automobile exception to mean that all operational, or potentially operational, m

2023See United States v. Sullivan, 797 F.3d 623, 633 (9th Cir. 2015) (determining whether delay between the seizure of an item and the issuance of a search warrant is constitutionally unreasonable is based on the “totality of the circumstances, not whether the [g]overnment pursued the least intrusive course of action,” and involves a balancing of “‘nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s 23 No. 2022AP350-CR Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion’” (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983))). ¶

2020See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976); see also United States v. Zahursky, 580 F.3d 515, 523 (7th Cir. 2009) (automobile exception applied because vehicle “was inherently, even if not immediately, mobile”) (citation omitted). 6 No. 2019AP175-CR he contends Nicholas lacked probable cause to search his vehicle.