automobile exception in Kentucky

2025The elements of the automobile exception were satisfied and there was probable cause to support a search of the entire vehicle, including the trunk. -14- Moreover, we reject Slaughter’s argument that evidence of the marijuana in the trunk should be suppressed based on Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 .

2025As our Supreme Court pointed out in Rose v. Commonwealth, 322 S.W.3d 76 (Ky. 2010), the United States Supreme Court recognized that: “when considering the constitutionality of a vehicle search incident to the arrest of a recent occupant, a court may find the search constitutional even where the arrestee is secured if ‘it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.’” Id. at 80 (quoting Gant, 556 U.S. at 335 ).7 So, in essence, despite the fact Slaughter was secured away from his vehicle when the search of the trunk was conducted, the search w

2025Id.

2014This exception recognizes “a necessary difference between a search of a store, dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a proper official warrant readily may be obtained, and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or automobile ... where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.” California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 569 , 111 S.Ct. 1982 , 114 L.Ed.2d 619 (1991) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925)).

2023Id. at 692 .

2007On appellate review of a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we must apply the two-step process set out in Ornelas v. U.S., 517 U.S. 690 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996), and adopted by Kentucky in Adcock v. Commonwealth, 967 S.W.2d 6 (Ky.1998).

2025It further noted the ready mobility 6 Chavies, 354 S.W.3d 103 , was abrogated on other grounds by Roe v. Commonwealth, 493 S.W.3d 814 (Ky. 2015), as modified on denial of rehearing (May 5, 2016), and as corrected (Nov. 14, 2016). -13- of a motor vehicle was an exigent circumstance, making it unnecessary to make an independent showing of additional exigent circumstances to satisfy the automobile exception.

2024Although the Commonwealth contends that the Gant standard is unclear and confusing, numerous jurisdictions have concluded that it is akin to the reasonable suspicion standard required to justify an investigatory stop under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 , 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884 , 20 L.

2024Although the Commonwealth contends that the Gant standard is unclear and confusing, numerous jurisdictions have concluded that it is akin to the reasonable suspicion standard required to justify an investigatory stop under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 , 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884 , 20 L.

2023The automobile exception to the warrant requirement “is premised upon the ready mobility of automobiles as well as the ‘reduced expectation of privacy [one has] in an automobile, owing to its pervasive regulation.’” Dunn v. Commonwealth, 199 S.W.3d 775, 776 (Ky. App. 2006) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 , 116 S. Ct. 2485, 2487 , 135 L.

2023The automobile exception to the warrant requirement “is premised upon the ready mobility of automobiles as well as the ‘reduced expectation of privacy [one has] in an automobile, owing to its pervasive regulation.’” Dunn v. Commonwealth, 199 S.W.3d 775, 776 (Ky. App. 2006) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 , 116 S. Ct. 2485, 2487 , 135 L.

2023Commonwealth v. Elliott, 322 S.W.3d 106 (Ky. App. 2010); Gray v. Commonwealth, 28 S.W.3d 316 (Ky. App. 2000).

2022Id. at 261-62 , 102 S. Ct. at 3080-81. “[W]hen police officers have probable cause to believe there is contraband inside an automobile that has been stopped on the road, the officers may conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle, even after it has been impounded and is in police custody.” Id. at 261, 102 S. Ct. at 3080 (citing Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 , 90 S. Ct. 1975 , 26 L.

2022Id. at 261-62 , 102 S. Ct. at 3080-81. “[W]hen police officers have probable cause to believe there is contraband inside an automobile that has been stopped on the road, the officers may conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle, even after it has been impounded and is in police custody.” Id. at 261, 102 S. Ct. at 3080 (citing Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 , 90 S. Ct. 1975 , 26 L.

2022Id. at 261-62 , 102 S. Ct. at 3080-81. “[W]hen police officers have probable cause to believe there is contraband inside an automobile that has been stopped on the road, the officers may conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle, even after it has been impounded and is in police custody.” Id. at 261, 102 S. Ct. at 3080 (citing Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 , 90 S. Ct. 1975 , 26 L.

2021“Instead, a custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a -6- search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification.” Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 , 384, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2483 , 189 L.

2021“Instead, a custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a -6- search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification.” Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 , 384, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2483 , 189 L.

2014This exception recognizes “a necessary difference between a search of a store, dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a proper official warrant readily may be obtained, and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or automobile ... where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.” California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 569 , 111 S.Ct. 1982 , 114 L.Ed.2d 619 (1991) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925)).

2014This exception recognizes “a necessary difference between a search of a store, dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a proper official warrant readily may be obtained, and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or automobile ... where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.” California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 569 , 111 S.Ct. 1982 , 114 L.Ed.2d 619 (1991) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925)).

2007Applying Dunn to the facts of this case, when the drug dog detected the odor of drugs inside Morton’s vehicle, particularly at the driver’s side door, Hord was provided with probable cause to search the vehicle pursuant to the automobile exception which extended to a search of Morton under the facts of this case. *570 Although Morton cites State v. Wallace, 372 Md. 137 , 812 A.2d 291 (2002), and People v. Fondia, 317 Ill.App.3d 966 , 251 Ill.Dec. 553 , 740 N.E.2d 839 (2000), for the proposition that our sister jurisdictions that have addressed this exact issue have not permitted searches of a

2007Applying Dunn to the facts of this case, when the drug dog detected the odor of drugs inside Morton’s vehicle, particularly at the driver’s side door, Hord was provided with probable cause to search the vehicle pursuant to the automobile exception which extended to a search of Morton under the facts of this case. *570 Although Morton cites State v. Wallace, 372 Md. 137 , 812 A.2d 291 (2002), and People v. Fondia, 317 Ill.App.3d 966 , 251 Ill.Dec. 553 , 740 N.E.2d 839 (2000), for the proposition that our sister jurisdictions that have addressed this exact issue have not permitted searches of a

2007On appellate review of a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we must apply the two-step process set out in Ornelas v. U.S., 517 U.S. 690 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996), and adopted by Kentucky in Adcock v. Commonwealth, 967 S.W.2d 6 (Ky.1998).

2007Applying Dunn to the facts of this case, when the drug dog detected the odor of drugs inside Morton’s vehicle, particularly at the driver’s side door, Hord was provided with probable cause to search the vehicle pursuant to the automobile exception which extended to a search of Morton under the facts of this case. *570 Although Morton cites State v. Wallace, 372 Md. 137 , 812 A.2d 291 (2002), and People v. Fondia, 317 Ill.App.3d 966 , 251 Ill.Dec. 553 , 740 N.E.2d 839 (2000), for the proposition that our sister jurisdictions that have addressed this exact issue have not permitted searches of a

2007Applying Dunn to the facts of this case, when the drug dog detected the odor of drugs inside Morton’s vehicle, particularly at the driver’s side door, Hord was provided with probable cause to search the vehicle pursuant to the automobile exception which extended to a search of Morton under the facts of this case. *570 Although Morton cites State v. Wallace, 372 Md. 137 , 812 A.2d 291 (2002), and People v. Fondia, 317 Ill.App.3d 966 , 251 Ill.Dec. 553 , 740 N.E.2d 839 (2000), for the proposition that our sister jurisdictions that have addressed this exact issue have not permitted searches of a

2003See, e.g., United States v. Porter, 738 F.2d 622, 627 (4th Cir.1984), cert. denied 469 U.S. 983 , 105 S.Ct. 389 , 83 L.Ed.2d 323 (1984) (warrantless search of a cariy-on bag at an airport); United States v. Litman, 739 F.2d 137, 138-39 (4th Cir.1984) (warrantless search of a shoulder bag in a hotel room); United States v. Silva, 745 F.2d 840, 847 (4th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1031 , 105 S.Ct. 1404 , 84 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985) (warrantless search of a zipper bag in a hotel room); United States v. Fleming, 677 F.2d 602, 607 (7th Cir.1982) (warrantless search of paper bag in the immediate are