automobile exception (Missouri) · Go Syfert
← Missouri issues

automobile exception in Missouri

33 Missouri opinions name it 2 courts 1914–2025 4 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (30)

CaseFollowedCited
State v. Middletongreen
mo · 1999 · cited in 6 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 2003–2023
2 sentences

2023The State relies on California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991), to argue that "[t]he police may search an automobile and the containers within it where they have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained." "Under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, police may search a vehicle and seize contraband found if there is probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband and exigent circumstances necessitate the search." State v. Middleton, 995 S.W.2d 443, 458 (Mo. banc 1999).

2019“The automobile exception is such an exception.” Id.5 “[T]he automobile exception to the warrant requirement allows an officer to search a vehicle and seize contraband when probable cause exists.” Id. (quoting State v. Middleton, 995 S.W.2d 443, 458 (Mo. banc 1999)).

46
State v. Burkhardtgreen
mo · 1990 · cited in 6 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 1992–2025
2 sentences

2025“Under this exception, police may search anywhere in a vehicle ‘pursuant to probable cause to believe that contraband, weapons or evidence of a crime are within the automobile.’” Id. (quoting State v. Burkhardt, 795 S.W.2d 399, 404 (Mo. banc 1990)). “[P]robable cause to search ... exist[s] where the known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.” Id. (quoting State v. Hampton, 959 S.W.2d 444, 451 (Mo. banc 1997)). 7 Here, Appellant argues the automobile exception does not apply because his

2025“Under this exception, police may search anywhere in a vehicle ‘pursuant to probable cause to believe that contraband, weapons or evidence of a crime are within the automobile.’” Id. (quoting State v. Burkhardt, 795 S.W.2d 399, 404 (Mo. banc 1990)). “[P]robable cause to search ... exist[s] where the known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.” Id. (quoting State v. Hampton, 959 S.W.2d 444, 451 (Mo. banc 1997)). 7 Here, Appellant argues the automobile exception does not apply because his

26
State of Missouri v. Kraig J. Walkergreen
moctapp · 2015 · cited in 4 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 2015–2025
2 sentences

2025“Under this exception, police may search anywhere in a vehicle ‘pursuant to probable cause to believe that contraband, weapons or evidence of a crime are within the automobile.’” Id. (quoting State v. Burkhardt, 795 S.W.2d 399, 404 (Mo. banc 1990)). “[P]robable cause to search ... exist[s] where the known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.” Id. (quoting State v. Hampton, 959 S.W.2d 444, 451 (Mo. banc 1997)). 7 Here, Appellant argues the automobile exception does not apply because his

2018The trial court's order granting the Motion to Suppress did not address the automobile exception. 12 "Under the automobile exception, 'police may search a vehicle and seize contraband found if there is probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband and exigent circumstances necessitate the search.' " Humble , 474 S.W.3d at 216 (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Walker , 460 S.W.3d 81 , 85 (Mo. App. W.D. 2015) ). " 'As a practical matter, exigent circumstances exist whenever an automobile is involved [because] the mere possibility that the vehicle can be moved is generally suffi

24
California v. Acevedogreen
scotus · 1991 · cited in 2 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 2016–2023
2 sentences

2023The State relies on California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991), to argue that "[t]he police may search an automobile and the containers within it where they have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained." "Under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, police may search a vehicle and seize contraband found if there is probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband and exigent circumstances necessitate the search." State v. Middleton, 995 S.W.2d 443, 458 (Mo. banc 1999).

2016Acevedo , in response to courts’ confusion concerning containers found within vehicles searched under the automobile exception, essentially added an exception" that may apply to a container, holding that "police may search an automobile and the containers within it where they have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained.” 500 U.S. at 580 , 111 S.Ct. 1982 .

22
State v. Lanegreen
mo · 1997 · cited in 2 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 1999–2006
2 sentences

2006State v. Lane, 937 S.W.2d 721, 722 (Mo. banc 1997).

1999State v. Lane, 937 S.W.2d 721, 722 (Mo. banc 1997); State v. Milliorn, 794 S.W.2d 181, 183 (Mo. banc 1990).

22
State v. Breesegreen
moctapp · 2008 · cited in 3 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 2013–2023
2 sentences

2023Id.

2023In Breese, by contrast, the Court emphasized that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement validated the search of the contents of the automobile. 250 S.W.3d at 419 .

13
United States v. Rossgreen
scotus · 1982 · cited in 3 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 1984–2010
2 sentences

1984The Court held that the scope of a lawful warrantless search under the automobile exception encompasses as extensive a search as could be authorized under a warrant “particularly describing the place to be searched.” Ross, 456 U.S. at 800 , 102 S.Ct. at 2159 (quoting U.S. Const. 4th Amend.) The scope of the war-rantless search of a vehicle “is defined by the object of the search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be found,” rather than the nature of the container where the object is hidden.

1984The Court held that the scope of a lawful warrantless search under the automobile exception encompasses as extensive a search as could be authorized under a warrant “particularly describing the place to be searched.” Ross, 456 U.S. at 800 , 102 S.Ct. at 2159 (quoting U.S. Const. 4th Amend.) The scope of the war-rantless search of a vehicle “is defined by the object of the search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be found,” rather than the nature of the container where the object is hidden.

13
California v. Carneygreen
scotus · 1985 · cited in 2 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 1986–2025
2 sentences

2025As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held, “even where an automobile is not immediately mobile at the time of the search, ‘the lesser expectation of privacy resulting from its use as a readily mobile vehicle justifie[s] application of the vehicular exception.’” Fields, 456 F.3d at 524 (quoting California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391 (1985)) (alteration in original). 3 The “reduced expectations of privacy [in a vehicle] derive ... from the pervasive regulation of vehicles capable of traveling on the public highways.” Id. (quoting Carney, 471 U.S. at 392 ) (alteration

2025As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held, “even where an automobile is not immediately mobile at the time of the search, ‘the lesser expectation of privacy resulting from its use as a readily mobile vehicle justifie[s] application of the vehicular exception.’” Fields, 456 F.3d at 524 (quoting California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391 (1985)) (alteration in original). 3 The “reduced expectations of privacy [in a vehicle] derive ... from the pervasive regulation of vehicles capable of traveling on the public highways.” Id. (quoting Carney, 471 U.S. at 392 ) (alteration

12
State v. Irvingreen
moctapp · 2006 · cited in 2 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 2012–2018
2 sentences

2018Id. " 'Probable cause to search an automobile exists when objective facts, under the totality of the circumstances at the time of the search, would lead a reasonably prudent individual to believe that contraband was located in the automobile.' " Id. (quoting State v. Irvin , 210 S.W.3d 360 , 362 (Mo. App. W.D. 2006) ).

2012Specifically, the State argues, “[u]nder the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, officers who have probable cause that contraband is located within a vehicle can search anywhere in the vehicle where such contraband can be found.” State v. Irvin, 210 S.W.3d 360, 362 (Mo.App.2006) (citation omitted).

12
New York v. Beltonred
scotus · 1981 · cited in 2 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 1983–1999
2 sentences

1983In this case, as in Belton, 453 U.S. at 462 n. 6, 101 S.Ct. at 2865 n. 6, it is unnecessary to consider whether the search and seizure were permissible under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.

1983In this case, as in Belton, 453 U.S. at 462 n. 6, 101 S.Ct. at 2865 n. 6, it is unnecessary to consider whether the search and seizure were permissible under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. [1] 26 U.S.C. § 5861 (c) and § 571.115 RSMo 1978, now § 571.030 RSMo 1981.

12
United States v. Bryce Vittetoegreen
ca8 · 2023 · cited in 1 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
2 sentences

2025There are two rationales for the automobile exception: first, exigent circumstances from the inherent mobility of automobiles, see id., and second, a reduced expectation of privacy in an automobile due to “pervasive regulation by official authorities.” State v. Donohoe, 770 S.W.2d 252, 255 (Mo. App. W.D. 1989); see also United States v. Vittetoe, 86 F.4th 1200, 1203 (8th Cir. 2023); United States v. Fields, 456 F.3d 519, 524 (5th Cir. 2006).

2025There are two rationales for the automobile exception: first, exigent circumstances from the inherent mobility of automobiles, see id., and second, a reduced expectation of privacy in an automobile due to “pervasive regulation by official authorities.” State v. Donohoe, 770 S.W.2d 252, 255 (Mo. App. W.D. 1989); see also United States v. Vittetoe, 86 F.4th 1200, 1203 (8th Cir. 2023); United States v. Fields, 456 F.3d 519, 524 (5th Cir. 2006).

11
State v. Hamptongreen
mo · 1997 · cited in 1 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
1 sentence

2025“Under this exception, police may search anywhere in a vehicle ‘pursuant to probable cause to believe that contraband, weapons or evidence of a crime are within the automobile.’” Id. (quoting State v. Burkhardt, 795 S.W.2d 399, 404 (Mo. banc 1990)). “[P]robable cause to search ... exist[s] where the known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.” Id. (quoting State v. Hampton, 959 S.W.2d 444, 451 (Mo. banc 1997)). 7 Here, Appellant argues the automobile exception does not apply because his

11
United States v. Fieldsgreen
ca5 · 2006 · cited in 1 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
2 sentences

2025There are two rationales for the automobile exception: first, exigent circumstances from the inherent mobility of automobiles, see id., and second, a reduced expectation of privacy in an automobile due to “pervasive regulation by official authorities.” State v. Donohoe, 770 S.W.2d 252, 255 (Mo. App. W.D. 1989); see also United States v. Vittetoe, 86 F.4th 1200, 1203 (8th Cir. 2023); United States v. Fields, 456 F.3d 519, 524 (5th Cir. 2006).

2025As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held, “even where an automobile is not immediately mobile at the time of the search, ‘the lesser expectation of privacy resulting from its use as a readily mobile vehicle justifie[s] application of the vehicular exception.’” Fields, 456 F.3d at 524 (quoting California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391 (1985)) (alteration in original). 3 The “reduced expectations of privacy [in a vehicle] derive ... from the pervasive regulation of vehicles capable of traveling on the public highways.” Id. (quoting Carney, 471 U.S. at 392 ) (alteration

11
State v. Donohoegreen
moctapp · 1989 · cited in 1 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
2 sentences

2025There are two rationales for the automobile exception: first, exigent circumstances from the inherent mobility of automobiles, see id., and second, a reduced expectation of privacy in an automobile due to “pervasive regulation by official authorities.” State v. Donohoe, 770 S.W.2d 252, 255 (Mo. App. W.D. 1989); see also United States v. Vittetoe, 86 F.4th 1200, 1203 (8th Cir. 2023); United States v. Fields, 456 F.3d 519, 524 (5th Cir. 2006).

2025There are two rationales for the automobile exception: first, exigent circumstances from the inherent mobility of automobiles, see id., and second, a reduced expectation of privacy in an automobile due to “pervasive regulation by official authorities.” State v. Donohoe, 770 S.W.2d 252, 255 (Mo. App. W.D. 1989); see also United States v. Vittetoe, 86 F.4th 1200, 1203 (8th Cir. 2023); United States v. Fields, 456 F.3d 519, 524 (5th Cir. 2006).

11
State v. Keygreen
moctapp · 2014 · cited in 1 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024
1 sentence

2024Defendant contends that “[e]ven though police did not do an inventory search on [Defendant’s] car, nothing excused the illegal seizure of [Defendant’s] car and, therefore … the ‘initial intrusion’ was unlawful.” “This Court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress in the light most 3 Barraza’s judicial interpretation of section 571.030.1(9) was reaffirmed in State v. Key, 437 S.W.3d 264, 269 (Mo. App. 2014).

11
State v. Bowengreen
moctapp · 1996 · cited in 1 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
1 sentence

2019And, though an informant’s “veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge are all relevant considerations, . . . [they] are only factors to be considered in the totality of the circumstances; a deficiency in one can be compensated for by a strong showing of some other ‘indicia of reliability.’” State v. Turner, 471 S.W.3d 405, 417 (Mo. App. E.D. 2015) (quoting State v. Bowen, 927 S.W.2d 463, 466 (Mo. App. W.D. 1996)).

11
State v. Lawsgreen
mo · 1990 · cited in 1 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
1 sentence

2019“Moreover, while it is not necessary to establish the past reliability of the informant, ‘factual statements of past reliability are [also] a sufficient basis for the magistrate to gauge independently the reliability of an informer.’” State v. Robinson, 454 S.W.3d 428, 439 (Mo. App. W.D. 2015) (emphasis added) 5 Delapp does not challenge the trial court’s application of the automobile exception. 4 (quoting State v. Laws, 801 S.W.2d 68, 69-70 (Mo. banc 1990)).

11
State v. Fulkgreen
moctapp · 2015 · cited in 1 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
1 sentence

2019And, though an informant’s “veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge are all relevant considerations, . . . [they] are only factors to be considered in the totality of the circumstances; a deficiency in one can be compensated for by a strong showing of some other ‘indicia of reliability.’” State v. Turner, 471 S.W.3d 405, 417 (Mo. App. E.D. 2015) (quoting State v. Bowen, 927 S.W.2d 463, 466 (Mo. App. W.D. 1996)).

11
State of Missouri v. Gregory Robinson, Sr.green
moctapp · 2015 · cited in 1 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
1 sentence

2019“Moreover, while it is not necessary to establish the past reliability of the informant, ‘factual statements of past reliability are [also] a sufficient basis for the magistrate to gauge independently the reliability of an informer.’” State v. Robinson, 454 S.W.3d 428, 439 (Mo. App. W.D. 2015) (emphasis added) 5 Delapp does not challenge the trial court’s application of the automobile exception. 4 (quoting State v. Laws, 801 S.W.2d 68, 69-70 (Mo. banc 1990)).

11
State of Missouri v. Christopher P. Humblegreen
moctapp · 2015 · cited in 1 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 2018–2018
2 sentences

2018The trial court's order granting the Motion to Suppress did not address the automobile exception. 12 "Under the automobile exception, 'police may search a vehicle and seize contraband found if there is probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband and exigent circumstances necessitate the search.' " Humble , 474 S.W.3d at 216 (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Walker , 460 S.W.3d 81 , 85 (Mo. App. W.D. 2015) ). " 'As a practical matter, exigent circumstances exist whenever an automobile is involved [because] the mere possibility that the vehicle can be moved is generally suffi

2018As discussed infra , the automobile exception recognized in Missouri allows police to search a vehicle and seize contraband found " 'if there is probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband and exigent circumstances necessitate the search.' " State v. Humble , 474 S.W.3d 210 , 216 (Mo. App. W.D. 2015) (quoting State v. Walker , 460 S.W.3d 81 , 85 (Mo. App. W.D. 2015) ).

11
United States v. Edwardsgreen
scotus · 1974 · cited in 1 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
1 sentence

2016Acevedo, in response to courts' confusion concerning containers found within vehicles searched under the automobile exception, essentially added an exception that may apply to a container, holding that "police may search an 8 A major source of the court of appeals' misunderstanding regarding this well- established rule appears to be based on language taken out of context from United States v. Edwards, in which the Supreme Court stated, "It is also plain that searches and seizures that could be made on the spot at the time of arrest may legally be conducted later when the accused arrives at the

11
State v. Richardsongreen
moctapp · 2010 · cited in 1 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
1 sentence

2015“Probable cause may arise when the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the seizing officer are sufficient in themselves to produce in a man of reasonable caution a belief that the contents of the automobile offend the law.” State v. Richardson, 313 S.W.3d 696, 700 (Mo.App.S.D.2010) (quoting State v. Burkhardt, 7 95 S.W.2d 399, 404 (Mo. banc 1990)).

11
State of Missouri v. Kathryn Aventgreen
moctapp · 2014 · cited in 1 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
1 sentence

2015At a hearing on a motion to suppress, “[t]he State has the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence ■that the motion to suppress should be denied.” State v. Avent, 432 S.W.3d 249, 252 (Mo.App.2014) (citation omitted).

11
Sam Holland v. Stategreen
texcrimapp · 1936 · cited in 1 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
1 sentence

2015“Probable cause may arise when the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the seizing officer are sufficient in themselves to produce in a man of reasonable caution a belief that the contents of the automobile offend the law.” State v. Richardson, 313 S.W.3d 696, 700 (Mo.App.S.D.2010) (quoting State v. Burkhardt, 7 95 S.W.2d 399, 404 (Mo. banc 1990)).

11
Arizona v. Gantgreen
scotus · 2009 · cited in 1 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010
11
State v. Milliorngreen
mo · 1990 · cited in 1 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 1999–1999
11
State v. Petronegreen
moctapp · 1992 · cited in 1 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 1996–1996
11
State v. Johnsongreen
moctapp · 1977 · cited in 1 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 1990–1990
11
United States v. Ruben Rodriguez-Pandogreen
ca10 · 1988 · cited in 1 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 1989–1989
11
Robbins v. Californiared
scotus · 1981 · cited in 1 Missouri opinions naming this issue, 1983–1983
11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (14)

CaseCitedYears
State v. Deaton green
moctapp · 2013
2 sentences

2019“The automobile exception is such an exception.” Id.5 “[T]he automobile exception to the warrant requirement allows an officer to search a vehicle and seize contraband when probable cause exists.” Id. (quoting State v. Middleton, 995 S.W.2d 443, 458 (Mo. banc 1999)).

2015“The automobile exception is such an exception.” Id. “[T]he automobile exception to the warrant requirement allows an officer to search a vehicle and seize contraband when probable cause exists.” State v. Middleton, 995 S.W.2d 443, 458 (Mo. banc 1999).

32015–2019
State v. Villa-Perez green
mo · 1992
2 sentences

2018There are older Missouri Supreme Court cases which observe that " '[a] search of an automobile on the highways pursuant to probable cause to believe that contraband, weapons or evidence of a crime are within the automobile exception is a well established exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.' " State v. Villa-Perez , 835 S.W.2d 897 , 902 (Mo. banc 1992) (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Burkhardt , 795 S.W.2d 399 , 404 (Mo. banc 1990) ).

1993(Emphasis in original.) In the case at bar, the trial court found that the defendant gave consent to “a look” but did not give consent “to a search.” The court stated, “The moving of the boxes is clearly beyond looking,” and “the discovery of the suitcase and the smell of the marijuana by Officer Crowe came while conducting a search that was in violation of the Fourth Amendment.” As stated in Villa-Perez, supra, a search of an automobile on the highway pursuant to probable cause to believe that contraband is within the automobile is an exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.

21993–2018
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Johnson green
moctapp · 1979
2 sentences

1993To bring an automobile under this clause it must be shown that the vehicle covered “is incapable of being driven in any normal use and the substitute vehicle is in use for the purpose for which the insured *285 vehicle would be used were it in operable conditions.” Johnson, 586 S.W.2d at 51 .

1991To bring an automobile under this clause it must be shown that the vehicle covered by the policy “is incapable of being driven in any normal use....” Id.

21991–1993
Carroll v. United States green
scotus · 1925
2 sentences

1990A similar fact was deemed relevant in Carroll v. U.S., 267 U.S. 132 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), which first enunciated the automobile exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.

1990A similar fact was deemed relevant in Carroll v. U.S., 267 U.S. 132 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), which first enunciated the automobile exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.

21989–1990
State v. Donovan green
moctapp · 2017
1 sentence

2025This Court has previously expressed that “automobiles present an ‘exigent circumstance,’ where ‘the mere possibility that the vehicle can be moved” provides sufficient justification for a warrantless search.’” Donovan, 539 S.W.3d at 65 (quoting Walker, 460 S.W.3d at 85 ).

12025–2025
Alabama v. White green
scotus · 1990
2 sentences

2013Defendant, citing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 825 , 330, 110 S.Ct. 2412 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990), for the proposition that additional information is required when a tip “has a low degree of reliability!,]” argues there was no probable cause because Smith had not provided reliable information in the past and her information in this instance was vague, unverified hearsay.

2013Defendant, citing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 825 , 330, 110 S.Ct. 2412 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990), for the proposition that additional information is required when a tip “has a low degree of reliability!,]” argues there was no probable cause because Smith had not provided reliable information in the past and her information in this instance was vague, unverified hearsay.

12013–2013
United States v. Di Re green
scotus · 1948
12010–2010
State v. White green
moctapp · 1992
11999–1999
State v. Hyland green
mo · 1992
11993–1993
Coolidge v. New Hampshire green
scotus · 1971
11990–1990
State v. Speed green
mo · 1970
11974–1974
Evans v. Dyke Automobile Co. neutral
moctapp · 1906
11914–1914
Long v. Nute green
· 1907
11914–1914
Daily v. Maxwell green
moctapp · 1911
11914–1914

Statutes the citing opinions construe

MO § Mo. Rev. Stat. § 542.296 (4) MO § Mo. Rev. Stat. § 571.030 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

OH 258 (1929–2026) NY 250 (1920–2026) TX 239 (1936–2026) NJ 137 (1966–2026) PA 130 (1932–2026) CA 125 (1919–2026) OR 100 (1930–2026) ID 82 (1976–2026) LA 81 (1960–2025) IL 80 (1974–2026) MA 71 (1934–2026) IN 66 (1929–2025) MI 66 (1940–2026) IA 59 (1979–2026) VA 55 (1939–2025) MD 54 (1968–2026) GA 49 (1927–2022) CO 38 (1971–2026) FL 36 (1971–2025) MO 33 (1914–2025) KS 33 (1982–2024) TN 33 (1926–2026) WI 33 (1925–2025) ND 31 (1981–2026) MN 31 (1979–2025) SC 28 (1986–2026) NE 26 (1944–2026) CT 26 (1968–2025) UT 26 (1980–2022) NC 24 (1938–2026) MS 24 (1968–2025) AL 24 (1957–2010) KY 23 (1969–2026) AZ 17 (1979–2022) DE 15 (1934–2024) DC 15 (1979–2026) WA 14 (1934–2016) NM 14 (1965–2022) ME 13 (1979–2021) WY 11 (1979–2019) AR 11 (1931–2015) OK 11 (1923–2024) WV 10 (1978–2015) NV 9 (1997–2021) RI 8 (1989–2023) VT 8 (1933–2019) HI 7 (1978–2020) MT 6 (1978–2025) NH 5 (1990–2018) SD 5 (2000–2016) VI 4 (2012–2026) AK 3 (1978–1983)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

← Caselaw search · G Cite Topics · Brief Check