24 Mississippi opinions name it 2 courts 1968–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Mississippi courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Barry v. Stategreen2 sentences2024The Mississippi Supreme Court has held that “there has long been an automobile exception to the warrant requirement where probable cause exists.” Smith v. State, 724 So. 2d 280, 312 (¶123) (Miss. 1998) (citing McNeal v. State, 617 So. 2d 999 (Miss. 1993); Barry v. State, 406 So. 2d 45, 47 (Miss. 1981); Hall v. State, 288 So. 2d 850, 851 (Miss. 1974)). 2024The Mississippi Supreme Court has held that “there has long been an automobile exception to the warrant requirement where probable cause exists.” Smith v. State, 724 So. 2d 280, 312 (¶123) (Miss. 1998) (citing McNeal v. State, 617 So. 2d 999 (Miss. 1993); Barry v. State, 406 So. 2d 45, 47 (Miss. 1981); Hall v. State, 288 So. 2d 850, 851 (Miss. 1974)). | 7 | 7 |
Hall v. Stategreen2 sentences2024The Mississippi Supreme Court has held that “there has long been an automobile exception to the warrant requirement where probable cause exists.” Smith v. State, 724 So. 2d 280, 312 (¶123) (Miss. 1998) (citing McNeal v. State, 617 So. 2d 999 (Miss. 1993); Barry v. State, 406 So. 2d 45, 47 (Miss. 1981); Hall v. State, 288 So. 2d 850, 851 (Miss. 1974)). 2024The Mississippi Supreme Court has held that “there has long been an automobile exception to the warrant requirement where probable cause exists.” Smith v. State, 724 So. 2d 280, 312 (¶123) (Miss. 1998) (citing McNeal v. State, 617 So. 2d 999 (Miss. 1993); Barry v. State, 406 So. 2d 45, 47 (Miss. 1981); Hall v. State, 288 So. 2d 850, 851 (Miss. 1974)). | 5 | 5 |
McNeal v. Stategreen2 sentences2024The Mississippi Supreme Court has held that “there has long been an automobile exception to the warrant requirement where probable cause exists.” Smith v. State, 724 So. 2d 280, 312 (¶123) (Miss. 1998) (citing McNeal v. State, 617 So. 2d 999 (Miss. 1993); Barry v. State, 406 So. 2d 45, 47 (Miss. 1981); Hall v. State, 288 So. 2d 850, 851 (Miss. 1974)). 2024The Mississippi Supreme Court has held that “there has long been an automobile exception to the warrant requirement where probable cause exists.” Smith v. State, 724 So. 2d 280, 312 (¶123) (Miss. 1998) (citing McNeal v. State, 617 So. 2d 999 (Miss. 1993); Barry v. State, 406 So. 2d 45, 47 (Miss. 1981); Hall v. State, 288 So. 2d 850, 851 (Miss. 1974)). | 4 | 5 |
Roche v. Stategreen2 sentences2024Ct. App. 2015) (quoting Roche v. State, 913 So. 2d 306, 313 (¶23) (Miss. 2005)), for the premise that “under the automobile exception, ‘if a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth 9 Amendment permits police to search the vehicle without more.’” The order also provided the following: In the instant case, the Lawrence County Sheriff arrived at Turnage’s home for a “knock and talk.” When he arrived, the Sheriff saw Turnage and another person sitting in the cab of a pickup truck parked on the property. 2024Under the automobile exception, “[i]f a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment permits police to search the vehicle without more.” Roche, 913 So. 2d at 313 (¶23) (quoting Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467 (1999)). | 4 | 4 |
Wyoming v. Houghtongreen2 sentences2004California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 576 , 111 S.Ct. 1982 , 114 L.Ed.2d 619 (1991); see also Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 301 , 119 S.Ct. 1297 , 143 L.Ed.2d 408 (1999); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 809 , 102 S.Ct. 2157 , 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982). 2004California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 576 , 111 S.Ct. 1982 , 114 L.Ed.2d 619 (1991); see also Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 301 , 119 S.Ct. 1297 , 143 L.Ed.2d 408 (1999); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 809 , 102 S.Ct. 2157 , 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982). | 3 | 3 |
Maryland v. Dysongreen2 sentences2024Under the automobile exception, “[i]f a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment permits police to search the vehicle without more.” Roche, 913 So. 2d at 313 (¶23) (quoting Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467 (1999)). 2015Under the automobile exception, “[i]f a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment permits police to search the vehicle without more.” Roche v. State, 913 So.2d 306, 313 (¶ 23) (Miss.2005) (quoting Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467 , 119 S.Ct. 2013 , 144 L.Ed.2d 442 (1999)) (quotations omitted). ¶ 13. | 2 | 5 |
Robbins v. Californiared2 sentences2008See, e.g., Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 , 101 S.Ct. 2841 , 69 L.Ed.2d 744 (1981); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 , 101 S.Ct. 2860 , 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981). ¶ 38. 2008See, e.g., Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 , 101 S.Ct. 2841 , 69 L.Ed.2d 744 (1981); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 , 101 S.Ct. 2860 , 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981). ¶ 38. | 2 | 2 |
Rooks v. Stategreen2 sentences1996See Rooks, 529 So.2d at 551 (stating that this Court is not bound by Federal courts' interpretation of Fourth Amendment); Penick v. State, 440 So.2d 547, 552 (Miss. 1983) ("The words of our Mississippi Constitution are not balloons to be blown up or deflated every time, and precisely in accord with the interpretation of the U.S. Supreme Court"). 1991See Rooks, 529 So. 2d at 551 (stating that this Court is not bound by Federal courts' interpretation of Fourth Amendment); Penick v. State, 440 So. 2d 547, 552 (Miss. 1983) ("The words of our Mississippi Constitution are not balloons to be blown up or deflated every time, and precisely in accord with the interpretation of the U.S. Supreme Court"). | 2 | 2 |
Penick v. Stategreen2 sentences1996See Rooks, 529 So.2d at 551 (stating that this Court is not bound by Federal courts' interpretation of Fourth Amendment); Penick v. State, 440 So.2d 547, 552 (Miss. 1983) ("The words of our Mississippi Constitution are not balloons to be blown up or deflated every time, and precisely in accord with the interpretation of the U.S. Supreme Court"). 1991See Rooks, 529 So. 2d at 551 (stating that this Court is not bound by Federal courts' interpretation of Fourth Amendment); Penick v. State, 440 So. 2d 547, 552 (Miss. 1983) ("The words of our Mississippi Constitution are not balloons to be blown up or deflated every time, and precisely in accord with the interpretation of the U.S. Supreme Court"). | 2 | 2 |
Spencer v. Stategreen1 sentence2025In addition, “[u]nder the automobile exception [to the warrant requirement] police may conduct a warrantless search of an automobile and any containers therein if they have probable cause to believe that it contains contraband or evidence of a crime.” Spencer v. State, 908 So. 2d 783, 787 (¶11) (Miss. | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Stategreen2 sentences2024The Mississippi Supreme Court has held that “there has long been an automobile exception to the warrant requirement where probable cause exists.” Smith v. State, 724 So. 2d 280, 312 (¶123) (Miss. 1998) (citing McNeal v. State, 617 So. 2d 999 (Miss. 1993); Barry v. State, 406 So. 2d 45, 47 (Miss. 1981); Hall v. State, 288 So. 2d 850, 851 (Miss. 1974)). 2024The Mississippi Supreme Court has held that “there has long been an automobile exception to the warrant requirement where probable cause exists.” Smith v. State, 724 So. 2d 280, 312 (¶123) (Miss. 1998) (citing McNeal v. State, 617 So. 2d 999 (Miss. 1993); Barry v. State, 406 So. 2d 45, 47 (Miss. 1981); Hall v. State, 288 So. 2d 850, 851 (Miss. 1974)). | 1 | 1 |
Jim v. Stategreen2 sentences2024Turnage claims that Roche did not abrogate the exigency requirement and cites Jim v. State, 911 So. 2d 658, 661 (¶¶13-14) (Miss. 2024Id. at (¶10). | 1 | 1 |
Trevor Hoskins v. State of Mississippigreen1 sentence2024He further claims the automobile exception to the warrant requirement did not apply because his truck was “not readily mobile,” and there were no “exigent circumstances.” After a hearing, the trial court denied Turnage’s motion to suppress and found that “although law enforcement did not have a search warrant, the search fell within the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s requirement to have a warrant.” The court cited Hoskins v. State, 172 So. 3d 1242, 1248 (¶12) (Miss. | 1 | 1 |
Townsend v. Stategreen1 sentence2016See Townsend, 681 So.2d at 502 . ¶ 11. | 1 | 1 |
Wolf v. Stategreen1 sentence2007The court in Wolf v. State 260 So.2d 425, 432 (Miss.1972) noted: the defendant's testimony, and all of the circumstances relied upon by appellant to show that other people could have placed the marijuana in the automobile were factors to be considered by the jury, and the jury could have accepted defendant's testimony that he did not know marijuana was in his automobile. | 1 | 1 |
Sanders v. Stategreen1 sentence2005"The practical effect of this exception is that evidence seized without a warrant from an automobile is admissible if there is probable cause and an exigency." Sanders v. State 678 So.2d 663, 667 (Miss.1996). | 1 | 1 |
Millsap v. Stategreen2 sentences2005"Under the automobile exception[,] police may conduct a warrantless search of an automobile and any containers therein if they have probable cause to believe that it contains contraband or evidence of a crime." Millsap v. State, 767 So.2d 286, 292 (¶ 19) (Miss.Ct.App.2000) (citing California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 576 , 111 S.Ct. 1982 , 114 L.Ed.2d 619 (1991)). 2005"Under the automobile exception[,] police may conduct a warrantless search of an automobile and any containers therein if they have probable cause to believe that it contains contraband or evidence of a crime." Millsap v. State, 767 So.2d 286, 292 (¶ 19) (Miss.Ct.App.2000) (citing California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 576 , 111 S.Ct. 1982 , 114 L.Ed.2d 619 (1991)). | 1 | 1 |
Jackson v. Stategreen1 sentence1998Jackson v. State, 689 So.2d 760, 764-66 (Miss.1997). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Mississippi. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Ross
green
2 sentences2011The automobile exception provides that “[w]hen probable cause justifies the search of [a] vehicle which [the] police have lawfully stopped, ‘it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.’ ” Roche v. State, 913 So.2d 306, 313 (¶ 22) (Miss.2005) (citing Ross, 456 U.S. at 825 , 102 S.Ct. 2157 ). 2011The automobile exception provides that “[w]hen probable cause justifies the search of [a] vehicle which [the] police have lawfully stopped, ‘it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.’ ” Roche v. State, 913 So.2d 306, 313 (¶ 22) (Miss.2005) (citing Ross, 456 U.S. at 825 , 102 S.Ct. 2157 ). | 6 | 2000–2011 |
California v. Acevedo
green
2 sentences2005"Under the automobile exception[,] police may conduct a warrantless search of an automobile and any containers therein if they have probable cause to believe that it contains contraband or evidence of a crime." Millsap v. State, 767 So.2d 286, 292 (¶ 19) (Miss.Ct.App.2000) (citing California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 576 , 111 S.Ct. 1982 , 114 L.Ed.2d 619 (1991)). 2005"Under the automobile exception[,] police may conduct a warrantless search of an automobile and any containers therein if they have probable cause to believe that it contains contraband or evidence of a crime." Millsap v. State, 767 So.2d 286, 292 (¶ 19) (Miss.Ct.App.2000) (citing California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 576 , 111 S.Ct. 1982 , 114 L.Ed.2d 619 (1991)). | 4 | 2000–2005 |
Pennsylvania v. Labron
green
2 sentences2024Ed.2d 1031 (1996) (per curiam), we repeated that the automobile exception does not have a separate exigency requirement: ‘If a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment permits police to search the vehicle without more.’ Id. at 940 . 2005The United States Supreme Court has also stated, We made this clear in United States v. Ross, [ 456 U.S. at 809 , 102 S.Ct. 2157 ], when we said that in cases where there was probable cause to search a vehicle `a search is not unreasonable if based on facts that would justify the issuance of a warrant, even though a warrant has not been actually obtained.' In a case with virtually identical facts to this one (even down to the bag of cocaine in the trunk of the car), Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938 , 116 S.Ct. 2485 , 135 L.Ed.2d 1031 (1996) (per curiam), we repeated that the automobile exc | 3 | 2004–2024 |
Coolidge v. New Hampshire
green
2 sentences1996Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 462-64 , 91 S.Ct. at 2035 ; see Barry v. State, 406 So.2d 45, 47 (Miss. 1981) (warrantless search of automobiles allowed only when exigent circumstances exist). 1996Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 462-64 , 91 S.Ct. at 2035 ; see Barry v. State, 406 So.2d 45, 47 (Miss. 1981) (warrantless search of automobiles allowed only when exigent circumstances exist). | 2 | 1991–1996 |
Henry v. Williams
green
2 sentences1996The exigency prong is addressed in the Mississippi Federal case of Henry v. Williams, 299 F. Supp. 36 (N.D.Miss. 1969): [T]he exceptional circumstances excusing the issuance of a warrant are: 1) when the vehicle searched is in motion; 2) when the officers have probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband subject to search; and 3) when it is impracticable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can and may be removed from the jurisdiction. 1991The exigency prong is addressed in the Mississippi Federal case of Henry v. Williams, 299 F.Supp. 36 (N.D. | 2 | 1991–1996 |
Walker v. State
green
1 sentence2025Id. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
New York v. Belton
red
2 sentences2008See, e.g., Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 , 101 S.Ct. 2841 , 69 L.Ed.2d 744 (1981); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 , 101 S.Ct. 2860 , 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981). ¶ 38. 2008See, e.g., Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 , 101 S.Ct. 2841 , 69 L.Ed.2d 744 (1981); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 , 101 S.Ct. 2860 , 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981). ¶ 38. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Curry v. State
green
1 sentence1972In Curry v. State, 249 So.2d 414 (Miss. 1971), also cited and relied upon by defendant, the Court stated the rule concerning possession as follows: What constitutes a sufficient external relationship between the defendant and the narcotic property to complete the concept of "possession" is a question which is not susceptible of a specific rule. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Rogillio v. Cazedessus
green
2 sentences1968Appellees cite Rogillio v. Cazedessus, 241 La. 186 , 127 So.2d 734 (1961), as authority for the proposition that an insured owner's grant of a party to an original permittee to allow an unlicensed driver to use the automobile in violation of law will not be implied. 1968Appellees cite Rogillio v. Cazedessus, 241 La. 186 , 127 So.2d 734 (1961), as authority for the proposition that an insured owner's grant of a party to an original permittee to allow an unlicensed driver to use the automobile in violation of law will not be implied. | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Odden v. Union Indemnity Co.
green
2 sentences1968It states: "The fact that the driver is unlicensed, or has had his license suspended, and consequently cannot lawfully drive upon the highway, does not prevent an automobile owner from giving such a person permission or consent to use his automobile with such effect as to make the liability insurer liable; it not being fatal to the giving of permission that such person's operation of the automobile is in violation of law or essential to a valid permission, as contemplated by the policy, that the driving be legal." In the case of Odden v. Union Indemnity Company, 156 Wash. 10 , 286 P. 59 , 72 A 1968It states: "The fact that the driver is unlicensed, or has had his license suspended, and consequently cannot lawfully drive upon the highway, does not prevent an automobile owner from giving such a person permission or consent to use his automobile with such effect as to make the liability insurer liable; it not being fatal to the giving of permission that such person's operation of the automobile is in violation of law or essential to a valid permission, as contemplated by the policy, that the driving be legal." In the case of Odden v. Union Indemnity Company, 156 Wash. 10 , 286 P. 59 , 72 A | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.