automobile exception in New Jersey

2026The court initially noted defendants did A-0099-25 7 not challenge the stop, but remarked had they done so, the "[c]ourt would have had no hesitation in finding there was reasonable, articulable suspicion to affect that motor vehicle stop." Turning to the warrantless search of the car, the motion court chronicled the development of federal and New Jersey law concerning the automobile exception, including our Supreme Court's decisions in State v. Witt, 223 N.J. 409 (2015), and Smart.

2026Whittaker's testimony." After summarizing the applicable legal principles, the judge first found, although defendants did not expressly challenge the investigatory detention of the Ford, the detention nonetheless was "valid, A-0807-23 11 supported by the totality of the circumstances." The judge found "the sight of smoke and the scent of burnt marijuana, judged under the totality of the circumstances in this matter, gave the officers probable cause for the arrest of the defendants." [*] Citing our Supreme Court's decisions in State v. Witt, 223 N.J. 409 (2015), and State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211

2025This test represents "a sharp departure from a more narrow construction of the automobile exception previously adopted . . . ." State v. Rodriguez, 459 N.J.

2024Under the automobile exception, a police officer may conduct a warrantless search of a motor vehicle during a lawful roadside stop "in situations where: (1) the police have probable cause to believe the vehicle contains evidence of a criminal offense; and (2) the circumstances giving rise to probable cause are unforeseeable and spontaneous." State v. Rodriguez, 459 N.J.

2026Whittaker's testimony." After summarizing the applicable legal principles, the judge first found, although defendants did not expressly challenge the investigatory detention of the Ford, the detention nonetheless was "valid, A-0807-23 11 supported by the totality of the circumstances." The judge found "the sight of smoke and the scent of burnt marijuana, judged under the totality of the circumstances in this matter, gave the officers probable cause for the arrest of the defendants." [*] Citing our Supreme Court's decisions in State v. Witt, 223 N.J. 409 (2015), and State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211

2025Because that limitation is A-0738-23 11 Citing our Supreme Court's decisions in State v. Witt, 223 N.J. 409 (2015), and State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211 (1981), the motion judge concluded the warrantless search was justified under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.

2024In Witt, our Supreme Court "announced . . . a sharp departure from a more narrow construction of the automobile exception the Court had previously adopted in State v. Pena-Flores, 198 N.J. 6 (2009), and in State v. Cooke, 163 N.J. 657 (2000)." State v. Rodriguez, 459 N.J.

2021Pursuant to Witt, police officers may conduct "warrantless on-the- scene searches of motor vehicles in situations where: (1) the police have probable cause to believe the vehicle contains evidence of a criminal offense; and (2) the circumstances giving rise to probable cause are unforeseeable and 1 In Witt, 223 N.J. at 447-48 , the Court abandoned the "pure exigent- circumstances requirement" it had added to the constitutional standard in State v. Pena-Flores, 198 N.J. 6 (2009), and State v. Cooke, 163 N.J. 657 (2000), finding that more narrow construction of the automobile exception to be "un

2025Under federal law, the automobile exception permits the warrantless search of a car if it is "'readily mobile' and the officer has 'probable cause' to believe that the vehicle contains contraband." Witt, 223 N.J. at 422 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996)).

2025Automobile Exception The automobile exception to the warrant requirement, "authorizes a police officer to conduct a warrantless search of a motor vehicle if it is 'readily mobile' and the officer has 'probable cause' to believe that the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of an offense." State v. Witt, 223 N.J. 409, 422 (2015) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996)).

2024In Witt, our Supreme Court "announced . . . a sharp departure from a more narrow construction of the automobile exception the Court had previously adopted in State v. Pena-Flores, 198 N.J. 6 (2009), and in State v. Cooke, 163 N.J. 657 (2000)." State v. Rodriguez, 459 N.J.

2021Pursuant to Witt, police officers may conduct "warrantless on-the- scene searches of motor vehicles in situations where: (1) the police have probable cause to believe the vehicle contains evidence of a criminal offense; and (2) the circumstances giving rise to probable cause are unforeseeable and 1 In Witt, 223 N.J. at 447-48 , the Court abandoned the "pure exigent- circumstances requirement" it had added to the constitutional standard in State v. Pena-Flores, 198 N.J. 6 (2009), and State v. Cooke, 163 N.J. 657 (2000), finding that more narrow construction of the automobile exception to be "un

2024A-2246-22 13 Central to the parties' arguments in this case is the precise language of our Supreme Court's decision in Witt, wherein the court identified three rationales for the automobile exception: (1) the inherent mobility of the vehicle, Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925); (2) the lesser expectation of privacy in an automobile compared to a home, California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391-93 (1985); and (3) the recognition that a Fourth Amendment intrusion occasioned by a prompt search based on probable cause is not necessarily greater than a prolonged detention of the vehicl

2019"One of the established exceptions to the warrant requirement is the automobile exception." Ibid. (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925)).

2023The Court concluded that the search was unlawful because, under the automobile exception, not only must an officer have probable cause to believe that contraband is present in the vehicle, “but the search must be reasonable in scope” and must be “strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible.” Id. at 10-11 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 ).

2017In State v. Pena-Flores, 198 N.J. 6, 31 (2009), for example, the Court held that after stopping the defendant for a traffic violation and finding discrepancies between information from a computer lookup of the license plate and the actual car, police were "entitled, separate and apart from the automobile exception, to look into the areas in the vehicle in which evidence of ownership might be expected to be found." In State v. Patino, 83 N.J. 1, 12 (1980), the Court recognized that 5 With respect to both this search and the subsequent August 2012 search, defendant does not challenge the initial

2025For example, in Chambers v. Maroney, the Court refused to limit the automobile exception to on-scene searches, finding no Fourth Amendment violation when police stopped a car and arrested its occupants, drove the car to the police 11 station, and then, without a warrant, thoroughly searched the car at the station. 399 U.S. 42, 44-45, 47-52 (1970).

2025For example, in Chambers v. Maroney, the Court refused to limit the automobile exception to on-scene searches, finding no Fourth Amendment violation when police stopped a car and arrested its occupants, drove the car to the police 11 station, and then, without a warrant, thoroughly searched the car at the station. 399 U.S. 42, 44-45, 47-52 (1970).

2024A-2246-22 13 Central to the parties' arguments in this case is the precise language of our Supreme Court's decision in Witt, wherein the court identified three rationales for the automobile exception: (1) the inherent mobility of the vehicle, Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925); (2) the lesser expectation of privacy in an automobile compared to a home, California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391-93 (1985); and (3) the recognition that a Fourth Amendment intrusion occasioned by a prompt search based on probable cause is not necessarily greater than a prolonged detention of the vehicl

2019The automobile exception is premised on three rationales: (1) the inherent mobility of the vehicle, Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925); (2) the lesser expectation of privacy in an automobile compared to a home, California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391-93 (1985); and (3) the recognition that a Fourth Amendment intrusion occasioned by a prompt search based on probable cause is not necessarily greater than a prolonged detention of the vehicle and its occupants while the police secure a A-5422-17T4 6 The State argues expansion of the search was justified because the service area was

2024As our Supreme Court noted in Witt: Under federal law, probable cause to search a vehicle "alone satisfies the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement." Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467 (1999).

2022By 2 "Under federal law, probable cause to search a vehicle 'alone satisfies the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.'" Witt, 223 N.J. at 422 (quoting Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467 (1999)).

2020See State v. Martin, 87 N.J. 561, 569 (1981) (recognizing an exigency independent of the automobile exception—that at- A-3822-17T1 9 large suspects "might have returned at any moment to move the car or remove the car's contents"—warranted an immediate search of an automobile).

2020Moreover, the automobile exception "applies to situations involving parked and unoccupied vehicles encountered by police in public parking lots or on city streets as well as to moving vehicles stopped on the open highway." State v. Martin, 87 N.J. 561, 567 (1981).

1989The reasons for the vehicle exception, we have said are twofold. `Besides the element of mobility, less rigorous warrant requirements govern because the expectation of privacy with respect to one's automobile is significantly less than that relating to one's home or office.' [Citations omitted.] [ 471 U.S. at 391 , 105 S.Ct. at 2069 , 85 L.Ed. 2d at 413 .] The Court's current view of the automobile exception was summed up in Carney as follows: In short, the pervasive schemes of regulation, which necessarily lead to reduced expectations of privacy, and the exigencies attendant to ready mobility

1989The reasons for the vehicle exception, we have said are twofold. `Besides the element of mobility, less rigorous warrant requirements govern because the expectation of privacy with respect to one's automobile is significantly less than that relating to one's home or office.' [Citations omitted.] [ 471 U.S. at 391 , 105 S.Ct. at 2069 , 85 L.Ed. 2d at 413 .] The Court's current view of the automobile exception was summed up in Carney as follows: In short, the pervasive schemes of regulation, which necessarily lead to reduced expectations of privacy, and the exigencies attendant to ready mobility

2023Our courts have long recognized that the smell of marijuana “constitutes probable cause ‘that a criminal offense ha[s] been committed and that additional contraband might be present.’” State v. Walker, 213 N.J. 281, 290 (2013) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502, 515-16 (2003)).

2021See State v. Walker, 213 N.J. 281, 290 (2013) ("New Jersey courts have [long] recognized that the smell of marijuana itself constitutes probable cause that a criminal offense ha[s] been committed and that additional contraband might be present.") (second alteration in original) (quoting State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502, 515-16 (2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2019Our Supreme Court in Witt announced in 2015 a sharp departure from a more narrow construction of the automobile exception the Court had previously adopted in State v. Pena-Flores , 198 N.J. 6 , 965 A.2d 114 (2009), and in State v. Cooke , 163 N.J. 657 , 751 A.2d 92 (2000).

2018See Keaton , 222 N.J. at 448 -50 , 119 A.3d 906 (stating that when car is stopped for motor vehicle violation and driver is "unable or unwilling" to produce registration or proof of ownership, the officer may search the car for evidence of ownership); Pena-Flores , 198 N.J. at 31 , 965 A.2d 114 (stating that when officer found that driver's license plate and bill of sale did not correspond to vehicle, officer "was entitled, separate and apart from the automobile exception, to look into the areas in the vehicle in which evidence of ownership might be expected to be found" (citing United States

2024Indeed, if defendant's interpretation of Witt was correct, the Court's A-2246-22 20 decision would have overruled cases in which the automobile exception was applied to parked vehicles, see e.g., State v. Colvin, 123 N.J. 428 (1991) and State v. Paturzzio, 292 N.J.

2015The majority diminishes Colvin by characterizing it as a decision "primarily based on pure exigent circumstances,” ante at 430, 126 A.3d at 862, even while acknowledging that the Colvin Court "introduced the issue as one that 'concerns the scope of the automobile exception,' ” ante at 429, 126 A.3d at 861 (quoting Colvin, supra, 123 N.J. at 429 , 587 A.2d 1278 ) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2013These exceptions “include, among others, plain view, consent, community caretaking, search incident to arrest, and the automobile exception.” State v. Pena-Flores, 198 N.J. 6, 18 , 965 A.2d 114 (2009). “ ‘In analyzing the validity of warrantless searches, the strands of constitutional exceptions to the Fourth Amendment must be kept untangled.’ ” Johnson, supra, 171 N.J. at 205 , 793 A.2d 619 (quoting State v. Welsh, 84 N.J. 346, 354 , 419 A.2d 1123 (1980)). “ ‘[T]he touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness,’ ” and the reasonableness of a search or seizure is determined “ ‘by assess

2013These exceptions “include, among others, plain view, consent, community caretaking, search incident to arrest, and the automobile exception.” State v. Pena-Flores, 198 N.J. 6, 18 , 965 A.2d 114 (2009). “ ‘In analyzing the validity of warrantless searches, the strands of constitutional exceptions to the Fourth Amendment must be kept untangled.’ ” Johnson, supra, 171 N.J. at 205 , 793 A.2d 619 (quoting State v. Welsh, 84 N.J. 346, 354 , 419 A.2d 1123 (1980)). “ ‘[T]he touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness,’ ” and the reasonableness of a search or seizure is determined “ ‘by assess

2023At the time defendant's motor vehicle was stopped on January 30, 2021, "New Jersey courts . . . recognized that the smell of marijuana itself constitute[d] probable cause 'that a criminal offense had been committed and that additional contraband might be present.'" State v. Walker, 213 N.J. 281, 290 (2013).

2023Our courts have long recognized that the smell of marijuana “constitutes probable cause ‘that a criminal offense ha[s] been committed and that additional contraband might be present.’” State v. Walker, 213 N.J. 281, 290 (2013) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502, 515-16 (2003)).

2009Indeed, in Dunlap we noted that " [p]olice safety and the preservation of evidence, " which are the policy rationales underlying the search incident to arrest exception, see State v. Pierce, 136 N.J. 184, 197-98 , 642 A. 2d 947 (1994), are also the "preeminent determinants" of exigency for purposes of applying the automobile exception.

2009Indeed, in Dunlap we noted that " [p]olice safety and the preservation of evidence, " which are the policy rationales underlying the search incident to arrest exception, see State v. Pierce, 136 N.J. 184, 197-98 , 642 A. 2d 947 (1994), are also the "preeminent determinants" of exigency for purposes of applying the automobile exception.

2023The motion court found that the search was justified under the automobile exception “because the smell of ‘the marijuana, coupled with the vehicle riding low certainly constituted probable cause to search the trunk.’” Id. at 150 .

2020Citing Kahlon with approval, our Supreme Court upheld the trial court's denial of the defendant's suppression motion, holding that under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, the trooper "had probable cause to search the trunk for evidence of contraband" once he determined that "the small suitcase in the car's interior" could not have been the source of the "strong odor of marijuana." Id. at 150 .

2024Super. 292 , 301-02 (App. Div. 2023) (quoting Gonzales, 227 N.J. at 101 ).] Another exception to the warrant requirement is the automobile exception.

2020The State argues Gonzales applied the automobile exception where the police conducted a warrantless search after a lengthy wiretap investigation led them to suspect the defendant had drugs in his car intended to be sold. 227 N.J. at 82 - 86.

2010However, the judge concluded that the State had failed to establish the "exigency" required to uphold the validity of the search of the van under New Jersey's version of the automobile exception to the warrant requirement as set forth in State v. Cooke, 163 N.J. 657 , 751 A. 2d 92 (2000) and State v. Dunlap, 185 N.J. 543 , 888 A. 2d 1278 (2006).

2010However, the judge concluded that the State had failed to establish the "exigency" required to uphold the validity of the search of the van under New Jersey's version of the automobile exception to the warrant requirement as set forth in State v. Cooke, 163 N.J. 657 , 751 A. 2d 92 (2000) and State v. Dunlap, 185 N.J. 543 , 888 A. 2d 1278 (2006).

2026Citing State v. Cohen, 254 N.J. 308 , 327 (2023), defendant argues, "[a] generalized smell of marijuana does not justify the search of every cavity inside a vehicle by the police." Prior to the enactment of CREAMMA, the permissible scope of a marijuana search was restricted to areas "'strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible." State v. Patino, 83 N.J. 1, 11 (1980) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)).

2023The Court concluded that the search was unlawful because, under the automobile exception, not only must an officer have probable cause to believe that contraband is present in the vehicle, “but the search must be reasonable in scope” and must be “strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible.” Id. at 10-11 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 ).

2024In addition, he asserts the search did not fall within the automobile exception because the circumstances giving rise to probable cause were not unforeseeable and spontaneous. "[A]n appellate court reviewing a motion to suppress must uphold the factual findings underlying the trial court's decision so long as those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record." State v. Ahmad, 246 N.J. 592 , 609 (2021) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 243 (2007)). "[F]actual findings based on a video recording or documentary evidence" are reviewed under t

2019"One of the established exceptions to the warrant requirement is the automobile exception." Ibid. (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925)).

2019Judge Marysol Rosero concluded that the warrantless search of the vehicle could not be sustained on the basis of the document exception set forth in State v. Keaton, 222 N.J. 438 (2015) (allowing the police, under certain circumstances, to conduct a warrantless search of a car for the registration and insurance papers), but that it could be sustained under the automobile exception in State v. Witt, 223 N.J. 409 (2015).

2018See Keaton , 222 N.J. at 448 -50 , 119 A.3d 906 (stating that when car is stopped for motor vehicle violation and driver is "unable or unwilling" to produce registration or proof of ownership, the officer may search the car for evidence of ownership); Pena-Flores , 198 N.J. at 31 , 965 A.2d 114 (stating that when officer found that driver's license plate and bill of sale did not correspond to vehicle, officer "was entitled, separate and apart from the automobile exception, to look into the areas in the vehicle in which evidence of ownership might be expected to be found" (citing United States

2013These exceptions “include, among others, plain view, consent, community caretaking, search incident to arrest, and the automobile exception.” State v. Pena-Flores, 198 N.J. 6, 18 , 965 A.2d 114 (2009). “ ‘In analyzing the validity of warrantless searches, the strands of constitutional exceptions to the Fourth Amendment must be kept untangled.’ ” Johnson, supra, 171 N.J. at 205 , 793 A.2d 619 (quoting State v. Welsh, 84 N.J. 346, 354 , 419 A.2d 1123 (1980)). “ ‘[T]he touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness,’ ” and the reasonableness of a search or seizure is determined “ ‘by assess

2013These exceptions “include, among others, plain view, consent, community caretaking, search incident to arrest, and the automobile exception.” State v. Pena-Flores, 198 N.J. 6, 18 , 965 A.2d 114 (2009). “ ‘In analyzing the validity of warrantless searches, the strands of constitutional exceptions to the Fourth Amendment must be kept untangled.’ ” Johnson, supra, 171 N.J. at 205 , 793 A.2d 619 (quoting State v. Welsh, 84 N.J. 346, 354 , 419 A.2d 1123 (1980)). “ ‘[T]he touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness,’ ” and the reasonableness of a search or seizure is determined “ ‘by assess

2018See Keaton , 222 N.J. at 448 -50 , 119 A.3d 906 (stating that when car is stopped for motor vehicle violation and driver is "unable or unwilling" to produce registration or proof of ownership, the officer may search the car for evidence of ownership); Pena-Flores , 198 N.J. at 31 , 965 A.2d 114 (stating that when officer found that driver's license plate and bill of sale did not correspond to vehicle, officer "was entitled, separate and apart from the automobile exception, to look into the areas in the vehicle in which evidence of ownership might be expected to be found" (citing United States

2018See Keaton , 222 N.J. at 448 -50 , 119 A.3d 906 (stating that when car is stopped for motor vehicle violation and driver is "unable or unwilling" to produce registration or proof of ownership, the officer may search the car for evidence of ownership); Pena-Flores , 198 N.J. at 31 , 965 A.2d 114 (stating that when officer found that driver's license plate and bill of sale did not correspond to vehicle, officer "was entitled, separate and apart from the automobile exception, to look into the areas in the vehicle in which evidence of ownership might be expected to be found" (citing United States

2022These 9 A-3476-20 exceptions include a search that is incident to a lawful arrest, State v. Minitee, 210 N.J. 307, 318 (2012), or the automobile exception, where a warrantless search of a vehicle is permitted where unforeseeable and spontaneous circumstances give rise to probable cause, and there is some degree of exigency, State v. Witt, 223 N.J. 409, 423-25, 427, 450 (2015).

2020Id. at 322-23 . 15 Minitee was decided under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, when that exception had an exigent-circumstances component. 210 N.J. at 319-20 ; see State v. Witt, 223 N.J. 409, 447 (2015) (holding that the exigent-circumstances component is no longer necessary for a probable- cause search of a vehicle when the automobile exception applies). 30 In all of those cases, there was an objectively reasonable basis to believe that lives might be endangered or evidence destroyed by the delay necessary to secure a warrant. 16 In each instance, time was of the essence,

2019"Because the seizure of the firearm . . . was proper under the plain view doctrine, it was not necessary for the State to establish exigent circumstances under the automobile exception." State v. Reininger, 430 N.J.

2018"Because the seizure of the [guns] was proper under the plain view doctrine, it was not necessary for the State to establish exigent circumstances under the automobile exception." Reininger, 16 A-4376-15T4 430 N.J.