automobile exception in Ohio

2026The State asks us to follow Moore, which held that “the smell of marijuana, alone, by a person qualified to recognize the odor, is sufficient to establish probable cause to search a motor vehicle, pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.” Moore, 90 Ohio St.3d at 48 .

2026Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 248 (2013). {¶106} “Once a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that a vehicle contains contraband, he or she may search a validly stopped motor vehicle based upon the well-established automobile exception to the warrant requirement.” State v. Moore, 90 Ohio St.3d 47, 51 (2000), citing Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466 (1999) (the automobile exception does not have a separate exigency requirement). {¶107} Upon this law, we address Appellant’s argument about the court’s January 21, 2015 denial of his motion to suppress the evidence recovered

2026Pursuant to the automobile exception, where “probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.” State v. Vega, 2018-Ohio-4002, ¶ 13 , quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982).

2026Pursuant to the automobile exception, where “probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.” State v. Vega, 2018-Ohio-4002, ¶ 13 , quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982).

2026“And still more fundamentally, we do not evaluate probable cause in hindsight, based on what a search does or does not turn up.” Id. (noting the subject’s regular touching of meth would transfer the odor to his vehicle, upon which a trained drug dog is expected to alert, regardless of whether the type of drugs for which the dog was certified were then recovered from the vehicle). {¶45} “Once a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that a vehicle contains contraband, he or she may search a validly stopped motor vehicle based upon the well-established automobile exception to the

2026Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 248 (2013). {¶106} “Once a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that a vehicle contains contraband, he or she may search a validly stopped motor vehicle based upon the well-established automobile exception to the warrant requirement.” State v. Moore, 90 Ohio St.3d 47, 51 (2000), citing Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466 (1999) (the automobile exception does not have a separate exigency requirement). {¶107} Upon this law, we address Appellant’s argument about the court’s January 21, 2015 denial of his motion to suppress the evidence recovered

2024As such, the exception recognized in Michigan v. Long, supra, was not applicable. {¶ 28} The state argues that even if the exception in Long did not support the search, the search was nonetheless valid under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement as "the officers had probable cause to believe evidence of a crime would be found in the vehicle." Relying on the information provided by appellant's wife indicating that appellant had a loaded firearm in the vehicle, the state argues the deputies had probable cause to believe the vehicle contained evidence (i.e., a loaded gun) that appel

2023“Once a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that a vehicle contains contraband, he or she may search a validly stopped motor vehicle based upon the well-established automobile exception to the warrant requirement.” State v. Moore, 90 Ohio St.3d 47, 51 , 734 N.E.2d 804 (2000); State v. Welch, 18 Ohio St.3d 88, 91 , 480 N.E.2d 384 (1985), citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 155-156 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925) (“a warrantless search of an automobile stopped by police officers who had probable cause to believe the vehicle contained contraband was not unreasona

2022Generally, "[f]or a search or seizure to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, it must be based upon probable cause and executed pursuant to a warrant." State v. Moore, 90 Ohio St.3d 47 , 49 734 N.E.2d 804 (2000). {¶ 43} An exception to the warrant requirement is the automobile exception, which "allows police to conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle if there is probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband and exigent circumstances necessitate a search or seizure." State v. Mills, 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 367 , 582 N.E.2d 972 (1992), citing Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42,

2022Generally, "[f]or a search or seizure to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, it must be based upon probable cause and executed pursuant to a warrant." State v. Moore, 90 Ohio St.3d 47 , 49 734 N.E.2d 804 (2000). {¶ 43} An exception to the warrant requirement is the automobile exception, which "allows police to conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle if there is probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband and exigent circumstances necessitate a search or seizure." State v. Mills, 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 367 , 582 N.E.2d 972 (1992), citing Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42,

2023Licking No. 2004 CA 68, 2005-Ohio-4714, ¶ 68 . {¶22} In terms of the permissible scope of a search pursuant to the automobile exception, the Ohio Supreme Court has held that "[w]here police officers have probable cause to search an entire vehicle, they may conduct a warrantless search of every part of the vehicle and its contents, including all movable containers and packages, that may logically conceal the object of the search." (Emphasis added.) State v. Welch, 18 Ohio St.3d 88, 92 (1985); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 , 102 S.Ct. 2157 (1982), paragraph (c) of the syllabus.

2023“Once a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that a vehicle contains contraband, he or she may search a validly stopped motor vehicle based upon the well-established automobile exception to the warrant requirement.” State v. Moore, 90 Ohio St.3d 47, 51 , 734 N.E.2d 804 (2000); State v. Welch, 18 Ohio St.3d 88, 91 , 480 N.E.2d 384 (1985), citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 155-156 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925) (“a warrantless search of an automobile stopped by police officers who had probable cause to believe the vehicle contained contraband was not unreasona

2026Id. at 52 ; see also State v. Green, 2023-Ohio-4503 , ¶ 18, 22-23 (7th Dist.), citing Moore, Dyson, and California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391-392 (1985) (the well-established automobile exception to the warrant requirement was created based on the ready mobility of automobiles, the lesser expectations of privacy surrounding an automobile, and also the pervasive regulation of vehicles capable of travel on public roads).

2026Young was permitted to order both passengers out of the vehicle while the stop was pending. {¶28} During a valid traffic stop, “any questioning which occurs during the detention, even if unrelated to the scope of the detention, is valid so long as the questioning does not improperly extend the duration of the detention.” Id., citing State v. Chagaris, 107 Ohio App.3d 551, 556-557 (9th Dist.1995). {¶29} Moving to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, it “was created based on the ready mobility of automobiles and the lesser expectations of privacy surrounding an automobile.” State

2025The marijuana cigarette was in plain view. {¶51} Under a similar set of facts, the Ohio Supreme Court held, “Once a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that a vehicle contains contraband, he or she may search a validly stopped motor vehicle based upon the well- established automobile exception to the warrant requirement.” State v. Moore, 2000- Ohio-2010, ¶ 8, citing Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466 (1999); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 804 (1982); State v. Mills, 62 Ohio St.3d 357 (1992). {¶52} As previously stated, Trooper Guinther had probable cause to believe th

2022Generally, "[f]or a search or seizure to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, it must be based upon probable cause and executed pursuant to a warrant." State v. Moore, 90 Ohio St.3d 47 , 49 734 N.E.2d 804 (2000). {¶ 43} An exception to the warrant requirement is the automobile exception, which "allows police to conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle if there is probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband and exigent circumstances necessitate a search or seizure." State v. Mills, 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 367 , 582 N.E.2d 972 (1992), citing Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42,

2026Historically, in Ohio the law has been that “‘the smell of marijuana, alone, by a person qualified to recognize the odor, is sufficient to establish probable cause to search a motor vehicle, pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.’” State v. Vega, 2018-Ohio-4002, ¶ 15 , quoting State v. Moore, 2000- Ohio-10, ¶ 1.

2026Pursuant to the automobile exception, where “probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.” State v. Vega, 2018-Ohio-4002, ¶ 13 , quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982).

2024State v. Bostwick, 2011–Ohio–3671, ¶ 25 (4th Dist.); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). {¶42} The Fourth Amendment's automobile exception justifies “a warrantless search of a lawfully stopped vehicle if [officers] have probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband.” ADAMS, 23CA1178 26 State v. Mitchell, 2022-Ohio-2564, ¶ 13 (1st Dist.), citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982), and State v. Moore, 90 Ohio St.3d 47, 51 (2000).

2018"Probable cause sufficient to justify a search exists where, based on the totality of the circumstances, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." Id., citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). {¶ 27} In concluding the totality of the circumstances leading up to the opening of the box truck gave the officers probable cause to search the box truck under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, the trial court listed the factors that aided its decision, including: (1) the chaotic scene of broken and intact water

2022See also State v. Farris, 109 Ohio St.3d 519 , 2006-Ohio-3255 (reaffirming that the smell of marijuana in the passenger compartment of a vehicle establishes probable cause for a warrantless search of the passenger compartment, but not of the trunk). " 'When there is probable cause to search for contraband in a car, it is reasonable for police officers * * * to examine packages and containers without a showing of individualized probable cause for each one.' " State v. Vega, 154 Ohio St.3d 569 , 2018-Ohio-4002 116 N.E.3d 1262 ¶ 14 quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 302 , 119 S.Ct. 1297 ,

2019Godwin, 2006-Ohio-3563 . {¶ 22} With the Ohio Supreme Court's recognition of the automobile exception in State v. Moore, 90 Ohio St.3d 47, 51 (2000), Ohio courts were advised that a trunk "and a passenger compartment of an automobile are subject to different standards of probable cause to conduct searches." State v. Farris, 109 Ohio St.3d 519 , 2006-Ohio-3255 , ¶ 51.

2022“Once a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that a vehicle contains contraband, he or she may search a validly stopped motor vehicle based upon the well-established automobile exception to the warrant requirement.” State v. Moore, 90 Ohio St.3d 47, 51 , 734 N.E.2d 804 (2000), citing Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466 , 119 S.Ct. 2013 , 144 L.Ed.2d 442 (1999); Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 , 116 S.Ct. 2485 , 135 L.Ed.2d 1031 (1996) (“If a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment thus permits police to

2022“Once a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that a vehicle contains contraband, he or she may search a validly stopped motor vehicle based upon the well-established automobile exception to the warrant requirement.” State v. Moore, 90 Ohio St.3d 47, 51 , 734 N.E.2d 804 (2000), citing Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466 , 119 S.Ct. 2013 , 144 L.Ed.2d 442 (1999); Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 , 116 S.Ct. 2485 , 135 L.Ed.2d 1031 (1996) (“If a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment thus permits police to

2009But as the State points out, this is not the way the issue should be framed, because the facts here do not fall within the vehicle-exception line of cases. *Page 6 Rather, the facts resemble those in cases decided under the search incident-to-arrest exception, as State v. Murrell teaches. (2002) 94 Ohio St.3d 489, 493 , 764 N.E.2d 986 . {¶ 15} The Ohio Supreme Court in Murrell noted the U.S. Supreme Court case that established the rule for vehicle searches under the search incident-to-arrest exception, New York v. Belton (1981), 453 U.S. 454 , 101 S.Ct. 2860 , 69 L.Ed.2d 768 , "deliberately ch

2009But as the State points out, this is not the way the issue should be framed, because the facts here do not fall within the vehicle-exception line of cases. *Page 6 Rather, the facts resemble those in cases decided under the search incident-to-arrest exception, as State v. Murrell teaches. (2002) 94 Ohio St.3d 489, 493 , 764 N.E.2d 986 . {¶ 15} The Ohio Supreme Court in Murrell noted the U.S. Supreme Court case that established the rule for vehicle searches under the search incident-to-arrest exception, New York v. Belton (1981), 453 U.S. 454 , 101 S.Ct. 2860 , 69 L.Ed.2d 768 , "deliberately ch

2025This voluntary production of contraband provided Officer Beel with probable cause to search the vehicle. {¶ 28} "Once a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that a vehicle contains contraband, he or she may search a validly stopped motor vehicle based upon the well-established automobile exception to the warrant requirement." (Citations omitted.) State v. Moore, 90 Ohio St.3d 47, 51 , 2000-Ohio-10 .

2021See State v. Vega, 154 Ohio St.3d 569 , 2018-Ohio-4002 , 116 N.E.3d 1262 (2018) (“ ‘the smell of marijuana, alone, by a person qualified to recognize the odor, is sufficient to establish probable cause to search a motor vehicle, pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement’ ” quoting Moore, infra); State v. Moore, 90 Ohio St.3d 47 , 2000-Ohio-10 , 734 N.E.2d 804 (2000) (“we hold that the smell of marijuana, alone, by a person qualified to recognize the odor, is sufficient to establish probable cause to conduct a search”); State v. Maughmer, 4th Dist.

2026Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 302, 307 (1999). {¶46} Although Appellant cites Moore and Dyson, he insists the state must specifically demonstrate exigency to apply the automobile exception and points to the fact he was handcuffed and the owner of the vehicle was not present at the scene.

2026Id. at 52 ; see also State v. Green, 2023-Ohio-4503 , ¶ 18, 22-23 (7th Dist.), citing Moore, Dyson, and California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391-392 (1985) (the well-established automobile exception to the warrant requirement was created based on the ready mobility of automobiles, the lesser expectations of privacy surrounding an automobile, and also the pervasive regulation of vehicles capable of travel on public roads).

2018Battle at ¶ 34, citing Bowling Green v. Godwin, 110 Ohio St.3d 58 , 2006-Ohio-3563 , ¶ 14. {¶ 17} As noted by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 , 102 S.Ct. 2157 (1982), "[i]f probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search." Although not explicit, the Ohio Supreme Court held the same in State v. Moore, 90 Ohio St.3d 47, 51 (2000), stating that "[o]nce a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that a vehicle co

2013See Murrell at 493 (“[T]he United States Supreme Court in Belton deliberately chose not to analyze the situation before it under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, which is based on probable cause.”) (Emphasis omitted.).

2026Under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, officers “may conduct a warrantless search of a lawfully stopped vehicle if they have probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband.” State v. Mitchell, 2022-Ohio-2564, ¶ 13 (1st Dist.).

2024State v. Bostwick, 2011–Ohio–3671, ¶ 25 (4th Dist.); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). {¶42} The Fourth Amendment's automobile exception justifies “a warrantless search of a lawfully stopped vehicle if [officers] have probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband.” ADAMS, 23CA1178 26 State v. Mitchell, 2022-Ohio-2564, ¶ 13 (1st Dist.), citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982), and State v. Moore, 90 Ohio St.3d 47, 51 (2000).

2023Given our holding that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement applies, we need not consider these alternate bases for justifying the search. 6 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 , 96 S.Ct. 3092 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976).

2023Given our holding that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement applies, we need not consider these alternate bases for justifying the search. 6 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 , 96 S.Ct. 3092 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976).

2017Landis had probable cause to believe that Davenport's vehicle contained contraband, and he was, therefore, permitted under the automobile exception to search the vehicle. -10- {¶ 22} Conversely, Davenport relies upon State v. Farris, 109 Ohio St.3d 519 , 2006–Ohio–3255, 849 N.E.2d 985 , wherein the Ohio Supreme Court wrote that a trunk and a passenger compartment of an automobile are subject to different standards of probable cause to conduct searches under the automobile exception.

2013The assignment of error is overruled. 2 In State v. Farris, 109 Ohio St.3d 519 , 2006-Ohio-3255 , 849 N.E.2d 985 , the Ohio Supreme Court clarified that “[a] trunk and a passenger compartment of an automobile are subject to different standards of probable cause to conduct searches” under the automobile exception.

2018"Probable cause sufficient to justify a search exists where, based on the totality of the circumstances, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." Id., citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). {¶ 27} In concluding the totality of the circumstances leading up to the opening of the box truck gave the officers probable cause to search the box truck under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, the trial court listed the factors that aided its decision, including: (1) the chaotic scene of broken and intact water

2018"Probable cause sufficient to justify a search exists where, based on the totality of the circumstances, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." Id., citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). {¶ 27} In concluding the totality of the circumstances leading up to the opening of the box truck gave the officers probable cause to search the box truck under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, the trial court listed the factors that aided its decision, including: (1) the chaotic scene of broken and intact water

2025See Jones at ¶ 19 . {¶23} Because the automobile exception under Long, 463 U.S. 1032 , applies in this case, Thomas’s arguments challenging other potential justifications for the search are moot.

2024As such, the exception recognized in Michigan v. Long, supra, was not applicable. {¶ 28} The state argues that even if the exception in Long did not support the search, the search was nonetheless valid under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement as "the officers had probable cause to believe evidence of a crime would be found in the vehicle." Relying on the information provided by appellant's wife indicating that appellant had a loaded firearm in the vehicle, the state argues the deputies had probable cause to believe the vehicle contained evidence (i.e., a loaded gun) that appel

2020See Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259, 261 , 102 S.Ct. 3079 , 73 L.Ed.2d 750 (1982). {¶ 31} Under the automobile exception, Trooper Davis was justified in entering Warnick’s truck to seize the drug pipe and the white crystal substance from the vehicle.

2020See Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259, 261 , 102 S.Ct. 3079 , 73 L.Ed.2d 750 (1982). {¶ 31} Under the automobile exception, Trooper Davis was justified in entering Warnick’s truck to seize the drug pipe and the white crystal substance from the vehicle.