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14 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1965–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ohio v. Robinettegreen2 sentences2001Moreover, as a second justification for departure, we recognized that the United States Supreme Court's blanket adoption of a bright-line rule, such as the automobile exception, caused tension in the Supreme Court's pronouncements which disavowed bright-line rules in favor of "`emphasizing the fact-specific nature of the reasonableness inquiry.'" Id. ¶ 45 (quoting Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 34 , 117 S.Ct. 417 , 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996)). 2001Moreover, as a second justification for departure, we recognized that the United States Supreme Court's blanket adoption of a bright-line rule, such as the automobile exception, caused tension in the Supreme Court's pronouncements which disavowed bright-line rules in favor of "`emphasizing the fact-specific nature of the reasonableness inquiry.'" Id. ¶ 45 (quoting Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 34 , 117 S.Ct. 417 , 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996)). | 1 | 2 |
Cooper v. Californiagreen1 sentence2009See, e.g., Cooper v. 7 1 California, 386 U.S. 58, 59 (1967); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 , 366-67 2 (1964). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Randy Grahamgreen1 sentence2009See 18 id.; South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 376 (1976) (concluding that the 19 warrantless inventory search of an impounded vehicle was reasonable); United States 20 v. Graham, 275 F.3d 490, 509 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that, since Carney, “the 21 necessity of a special exigency has waned”); United States v. Mercado, 307 F.3d 8 1 1226, 1231 (10th Cir. 2002) (“[W]hen probable cause exists, the agents’ time and 2 opportunity to obtain a warrant are irrelevant.”) (internal citation and quotation marks 3 omitted). | 1 | 1 |
South Dakota v. Oppermangreen1 sentence2009See 18 id.; South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 376 (1976) (concluding that the 19 warrantless inventory search of an impounded vehicle was reasonable); United States 20 v. Graham, 275 F.3d 490, 509 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that, since Carney, “the 21 necessity of a special exigency has waned”); United States v. Mercado, 307 F.3d 8 1 1226, 1231 (10th Cir. 2002) (“[W]hen probable cause exists, the agents’ time and 2 opportunity to obtain a warrant are irrelevant.”) (internal citation and quotation marks 3 omitted). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Gomezgreen2 sentences2009See State v. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006 , 2 ¶ 19, 122 N.M. 777 , 932 P.2d 1 . 3 1. 2009See State v. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006 , 2 ¶ 19, 122 N.M. 777 , 932 P.2d 1 . 3 1. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Bomboygreen1 sentence2009See Bomboy, 2008-NMSC-029, ¶ 6 . | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Charles N. Matthewsgreen2 sentences1989United States v. Matthews, 615 F.2d 1279, 1287 (10th Cir.1980), sets forth the following regarding the finding of probable cause for a warrantless search under the automobile exception: The probable cause requirement is satisfied when the officers conducting the search have "reasonable or probable cause" to believe that they will find the instrumentality of a crime or evidence pertaining to a crime before they begin their warrantless search. 1989United States v. Matthews, 615 F.2d 1279, 1287 (10th Cir.1980), sets forth the following regarding the finding of probable cause for a warrantless search under the automobile exception: The probable cause requirement is satisfied when the officers conducting the search have “reasonable or probable cause” to believe that they will find the instrumentality of a crime or evidence pertaining to a crime before they begin their warrantless search. | 1 | 1 |
Union Central Life Insurance v. Cofergreen1 sentence1965See Union Central Life Insurance Co. v. Cofer, 1961, 103 Ga.App. 355 , 119 S.E.2d 281 , in which the court stated: “Nor does the fact that the speed of the automobile was in violation of law affect the coverage of the policy, in the absence of an exception to that effect. * * * ” (Emphasis added.) In our opinion, the use of the term “accidental means” in the policy here involved was synonymous with “accident.” This leaves only the question of whether or not the trial court should have left to the jury a determination as to whether the death of the decedent was effected by accident. | 1 | 1 |
Roberts v. Stategreen1 sentence1965See Union Central Life Insurance Co. v. Cofer, 1961, 103 Ga.App. 355 , 119 S.E.2d 281 , in which the court stated: “Nor does the fact that the speed of the automobile was in violation of law affect the coverage of the policy, in the absence of an exception to that effect. * * * ” (Emphasis added.) In our opinion, the use of the term “accidental means” in the policy here involved was synonymous with “accident.” This leaves only the question of whether or not the trial court should have left to the jury a determination as to whether the death of the decedent was effected by accident. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Cardenas-Alvarez
green
2 sentences2022In Gomez, our Supreme Court recognized that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, like the inventory search exception at issue here, “was based, in part, on the notion that a motorist has a lesser expectation of privacy in an automobile.” Cardenas-Alvarez, 2001-NMSC-017, ¶ 15 . 2022In Gomez, our Supreme Court recognized that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, like the inventory search exception at issue here, “was based, in part, on the notion that a motorist has a lesser expectation of privacy in an automobile.” Cardenas-Alvarez, 2001-NMSC-017, ¶ 15 . | 2 | 2022–2022 |
Wyoming v. Houghton
green
2 sentences2013The automobile exception is justified in part by the recognition that passengers, as well as drivers, “possess a reduced expectation of privacy with regard to the property that they transport in cars.” Houghton, 526 U.S. at 303 . {45} We do not believe that the principles underlying Ross and Houghton apply in this matter because neither case involves the search of the personal property of a person who is not subject to the search warrant and who has stored his or her property on premises that are open to the public. 2013The automobile exception is justified in part by the recognition that passengers, as well as drivers, “possess a reduced expectation of privacy with regard to the property that they transport in cars.” Houghton, 526 U.S. at 303 . {45} We do not believe that the principles underlying Ross and Houghton apply in this matter because neither case involves the search of the personal property of a person who is not subject to the search warrant and who has stored his or her property on premises that are open to the public. | 2 | 2013–2013 |
Preston v. United States
green
1 sentence2009See, e.g., Cooper v. 7 1 California, 386 U.S. 58, 59 (1967); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 , 366-67 2 (1964). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Capps
green
2 sentences1991In State v. Capps, 97 N.M. 453, 455 , 641 P.2d 484, 486 , cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1107 , 102 S.Ct. 3486 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1368 (1982), our supreme court set forth two requirements of the automobile exception: "(1)[t]here must be probable cause that the automobile contains evidence of a crime, and (2) there must be an exigency to search the automobile at that moment, because of the automobile's mobility and fear that evidence could be destroyed." Included in the second requirement is the premise that the automobile, as opposed to a particular container within the automobile, is the target of the offi 1991In State v. Capps, 97 N.M. 453, 455 , 641 P.2d 484, 486 , cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1107 , 102 S.Ct. 3486 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1368 (1982), our supreme court set forth two requirements of the automobile exception: "(1)[t]here must be probable cause that the automobile contains evidence of a crime, and (2) there must be an exigency to search the automobile at that moment, because of the automobile's mobility and fear that evidence could be destroyed." Included in the second requirement is the premise that the automobile, as opposed to a particular container within the automobile, is the target of the offi | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Arthur Treacher's Fish & Chips, Inc. v. Horstmyer
green
2 sentences1991In State v. Capps, 97 N.M. 453, 455 , 641 P.2d 484, 486 , cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1107 , 102 S.Ct. 3486 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1368 (1982), our supreme court set forth two requirements of the automobile exception: "(1)[t]here must be probable cause that the automobile contains evidence of a crime, and (2) there must be an exigency to search the automobile at that moment, because of the automobile's mobility and fear that evidence could be destroyed." Included in the second requirement is the premise that the automobile, as opposed to a particular container within the automobile, is the target of the offi 1991In State v. Capps, 97 N.M. 453, 455 , 641 P.2d 484, 486 , cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1107 , 102 S.Ct. 3486 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1368 (1982), our supreme court set forth two requirements of the automobile exception: “(1) [tjhere must be probable cause that the automobile contains evidence of a crime, and (2) there must be an exigency to search the automobile at that moment, because of the automobile’s mobility and fear that evidence could be destroyed.” Included in the second requirement is the premise that the automobile, as opposed to a particular container within the automobile, is the target of the off | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Wilson v. Wilson
green
2 sentences1991In State v. Capps, 97 N.M. 453, 455 , 641 P.2d 484, 486 , cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1107 , 102 S.Ct. 3486 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1368 (1982), our supreme court set forth two requirements of the automobile exception: "(1)[t]here must be probable cause that the automobile contains evidence of a crime, and (2) there must be an exigency to search the automobile at that moment, because of the automobile's mobility and fear that evidence could be destroyed." Included in the second requirement is the premise that the automobile, as opposed to a particular container within the automobile, is the target of the offi 1991In State v. Capps, 97 N.M. 453, 455 , 641 P.2d 484, 486 , cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1107 , 102 S.Ct. 3486 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1368 (1982), our supreme court set forth two requirements of the automobile exception: “(1) [tjhere must be probable cause that the automobile contains evidence of a crime, and (2) there must be an exigency to search the automobile at that moment, because of the automobile’s mobility and fear that evidence could be destroyed.” Included in the second requirement is the premise that the automobile, as opposed to a particular container within the automobile, is the target of the off | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Wilder v. Gilman Paper Co.
green
2 sentences1991In State v. Capps, 97 N.M. 453, 455 , 641 P.2d 484, 486 , cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1107 , 102 S.Ct. 3486 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1368 (1982), our supreme court set forth two requirements of the automobile exception: "(1)[t]here must be probable cause that the automobile contains evidence of a crime, and (2) there must be an exigency to search the automobile at that moment, because of the automobile's mobility and fear that evidence could be destroyed." Included in the second requirement is the premise that the automobile, as opposed to a particular container within the automobile, is the target of the offi 1991In State v. Capps, 97 N.M. 453, 455 , 641 P.2d 484, 486 , cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1107 , 102 S.Ct. 3486 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1368 (1982), our supreme court set forth two requirements of the automobile exception: “(1) [tjhere must be probable cause that the automobile contains evidence of a crime, and (2) there must be an exigency to search the automobile at that moment, because of the automobile’s mobility and fear that evidence could be destroyed.” Included in the second requirement is the premise that the automobile, as opposed to a particular container within the automobile, is the target of the off | 1 | 1991–1991 |
United States v. Joseph Charles Milhollan, A/K/A Alec Leroy Foltz
green
2 sentences1982The majority, however, citing Milhollan, supra, persist in arguing that, since the automobile was mobile and the discovery of the bags was unexpected, there were exigent circumstances to justify application of the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. 1982The majority, however, citing Milhollan, supra, persist in arguing that, since the automobile was mobile and the discovery of the bags was unexpected, there were exigent circumstances to justify application of the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
State v. Ellis
green
2 sentences1981Thus, in State v. Ellis, 88 N.M. 90 , 537 P.2d 698 (Ct.App.1975), we said: The constitutional prohibition against an unreasonable search is a personal right enforceable by one whose own protection was infringed by the search. 1981Thus, in State v. Ellis, 88 N.M. 90 , 537 P.2d 698 (Ct.App.1975), we said: The constitutional prohibition against an unreasonable search is a personal right enforceable by one whose own protection was infringed by the search. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
State v. Barton
green
2 sentences1978State v. Luna, 91 N.M. 560 , 577 P.2d 458 (Ct.App.1978); State v. Barton, 92 N.M. 118 , 584 P.2d 165 (Ct.App.1978). 1978State v. Luna, 91 N.M. 560 , 577 P.2d 458 (Ct.App.1978); State v. Barton, 92 N.M. 118 , 584 P.2d 165 (Ct.App.1978). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
State v. Luna
green
2 sentences1978State v. Luna, 91 N.M. 560 , 577 P.2d 458 (Ct.App.1978); State v. Barton, 92 N.M. 118 , 584 P.2d 165 (Ct.App.1978). 1978State v. Luna, 91 N.M. 560 , 577 P.2d 458 (Ct.App.1978); State v. Barton, 92 N.M. 118 , 584 P.2d 165 (Ct.App.1978). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
United States v. Chadwick
red
2 sentences1978United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 , 97 S.Ct. 2476 , 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 , 90 S.Ct. 1975 , 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970). 1978United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 , 97 S.Ct. 2476 , 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 , 90 S.Ct. 1975 , 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Chambers v. Maroney
green
2 sentences1978United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 , 97 S.Ct. 2476 , 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 , 90 S.Ct. 1975 , 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970). 1978United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 , 97 S.Ct. 2476 , 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 , 90 S.Ct. 1975 , 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.