automobile exception in Florida

2025The automobile exception arises from a century-old case, Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 160 (1925), which Florida has expressly adopted.

2011Id. at 149 , 45 S.Ct. 280 ; see also Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467 , 119 S.Ct. 2013 , 144 L.Ed.2d 442 (1999) (stating that the automobile exception permits police to search a vehicle if probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband).

2025See, e.g., United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478, 482 (1985) (“After the officers came closer and detected the distinct odor of [fresh] marihuana, they had probable cause to believe that the vehicles contained contraband.” (citing Carroll, 267 U.S. at 149 )); Betz, 815 So. 2d at 633 (“As the odor of previously burnt marijuana certainly warranted a belief that an offense had been committed, this unquestionably provided the police officers on the scene probable cause to search the passenger compartment 9 of the respondent’s vehicle.” (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982) (applyi

2025See Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 569 ; Betz, 815 So. 2d at 631–32.

1989The interior of the vehicle was properly searched pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requirements," citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 , 102 S.Ct. 2157 , 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982).

1989The interior of the vehicle was properly searched pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requirements," citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 , 102 S.Ct. 2157 , 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982).

1998See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 , 90 S.Ct. 1975 , 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970) (outlining the automobile exception to the warrant requirement); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 146 , 45 S.Ct. 280, 282 , 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925) (noting rationale of automobile exception).

1998See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 , 90 S.Ct. 1975 , 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970) (outlining the automobile exception to the warrant requirement); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 146 , 45 S.Ct. 280, 282 , 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925) (noting rationale of automobile exception).

1988See Ensor v. State, 403 So.2d 349 (Fla. 1981).

1985Ensor v. State, 403 So.2d 349 (Fla.1981).

2020See Gant, 556 U.S. at 346-47 (“Other established exceptions to the warrant requirement authorize a vehicle search . . . when . . . evidentiary concerns demand.

2009The Court acknowledged that this second scenario "does not follow from Chimel.” Gant, 129 S.Ct. at 1719. 3 .

2019The warrantless search of the car was thus authorized by the automobile exception." (footnote omitted) (citing State v. Green, 934 So. 2d 1004 , 1006- 07 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006); State v. Gardner, 72 So. 3d 218, 220-21 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011); State v. Fischer, 987 So. 2d 708, 711-13 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008))).

2016Green, 943 So.2d at 1006-07 ; see also State v. Gardner, 72 So.3d 218, 220-21 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (reversing order suppressing evidence and finding probable cause to conduct warrantless search of a parked automobile for evidence of a shooting where police had lawfully arrested the vehicle’s owner for the shooting two hours earlier); State v. Fischer, 987 So.2d 708, 711-13 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) (holding that warrantless search of car was authorized where police observed white powder *610 that appeared to be cocaine in open view therein).

2019The warrantless search of the car was thus authorized by the automobile exception." (footnote omitted) (citing State v. Green, 934 So. 2d 1004 , 1006- 07 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006); State v. Gardner, 72 So. 3d 218, 220-21 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011); State v. Fischer, 987 So. 2d 708, 711-13 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008))).

2016Green, 943 So.2d at 1006-07 ; see also State v. Gardner, 72 So.3d 218, 220-21 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (reversing order suppressing evidence and finding probable cause to conduct warrantless search of a parked automobile for evidence of a shooting where police had lawfully arrested the vehicle’s owner for the shooting two hours earlier); State v. Fischer, 987 So.2d 708, 711-13 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) (holding that warrantless search of car was authorized where police observed white powder *610 that appeared to be cocaine in open view therein).

1983See, further, opinion of the Fourth District, State v. Melendez, 392 So.2d 587, 589 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), noting, in footnote 2, the question as to the continued viability of the exigent circumstances requirement as applied to vehicle searches.

1983See, further, opinion of the Fourth District, State v. Melendez, 392 So.2d 587, 589 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), noting, in footnote 2, the question as to the continued viability of the exigent circumstances requirement as applied to vehicle searches.

1996Although privacy interests in a motor vehicle are protected under the Fourth Amendment, under the automobile exception those interests have a lesser degree of protection because "the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought," id., 471 U.S. at 390 , 105 S.Ct. at 2069 , and "because the expectation of privacy with respect to one's automobile is significantly less than that relating to one's home or office." Id., 471 U.S. at 391 , 105 S.Ct. at 2069 .

1996Although privacy interests in a motor vehicle are protected under the Fourth Amendment, under the automobile exception those interests have a lesser degree of protection because "the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought," id., 471 U.S. at 390 , 105 S.Ct. at 2069 , and "because the expectation of privacy with respect to one's automobile is significantly less than that relating to one's home or office." Id., 471 U.S. at 391 , 105 S.Ct. at 2069 .

2025Under the automobile exception, probable cause exists where, based on the available facts, a person of reasonable caution would believe “that contraband or evidence of a crime is present.” Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 243 (2013) (citing Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983) (plurality opinion)).

2013Furthermore, the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, irrespective of an arrest, permits a warrant-less search supported by probable cause “based on the inherent mobility of vehicles, as well as the reduced expectation of privacy in a vehicle.” Harris v. State, 71 So.3d 756, 765 (Fla.2011) (citing Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 990 , 116 S.Ct. 2485 , 135 L.Ed.2d 1031 (1996)), rev’d on other grounds, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1050 , 185 L.Ed.2d 61 (2013).

2013Furthermore, the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, irrespective of an arrest, permits a warrant-less search supported by probable cause “based on the inherent mobility of vehicles, as well as the reduced expectation of privacy in a vehicle.” Harris v. State, 71 So.3d 756, 765 (Fla.2011) (citing Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 990 , 116 S.Ct. 2485 , 135 L.Ed.2d 1031 (1996)), rev’d on other grounds, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1050 , 185 L.Ed.2d 61 (2013).

2011We agree with the trial court that the K-9 alert did not provide probable *221 cause to search, because the State did not meet the requirements outlined in Harris v. State, 71 So.3d 756 (Fla.2011).

2025See, e.g., United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478, 482 (1985) (“After the officers came closer and detected the distinct odor of [fresh] marihuana, they had probable cause to believe that the vehicles contained contraband.” (citing Carroll, 267 U.S. at 149 )); Betz, 815 So. 2d at 633 (“As the odor of previously burnt marijuana certainly warranted a belief that an offense had been committed, this unquestionably provided the police officers on the scene probable cause to search the passenger compartment 9 of the respondent’s vehicle.” (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982) (applyi

2025See Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 569 ; Betz, 815 So. 2d at 631–32.

2025Both the United States Supreme Court and the Florida Supreme Court have stated that law enforcement officers “may draw inferences based on [their] own experience[s] in deciding whether probable cause exists.’” State v. Hankerson, 65 So. 3d 502, 506 (Fla. 2011) (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 700 (1996)).

2025See, e.g., United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478, 482 (1985) (“After the officers came closer and detected the distinct odor of [fresh] marihuana, they had probable cause to believe that the vehicles contained contraband.” (citing Carroll, 267 U.S. at 149 )); Betz, 815 So. 2d at 633 (“As the odor of previously burnt marijuana certainly warranted a belief that an offense had been committed, this unquestionably provided the police officers on the scene probable cause to search the passenger compartment 9 of the respondent’s vehicle.” (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982) (applyi

2025Under the automobile exception, probable cause exists where, based on the available facts, a person of reasonable caution would believe “that contraband or evidence of a crime is present.” Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 243 (2013) (citing Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983) (plurality opinion)).

2025Both the United States Supreme Court and the Florida Supreme Court have stated that law enforcement officers “may draw inferences based on [their] own experience[s] in deciding whether probable cause exists.’” State v. Hankerson, 65 So. 3d 502, 506 (Fla. 2011) (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 700 (1996)).

2019Because the parties did not develop the standing issue below, we are reluctant to assess the issue in the first instance.3 See McCauley, 842 So. 2d at 900 ("Because McCauley was not given an opportunity to prove his interest in the premises below due to the State's tacit concession of standing, we conclude that he is entitled to a hearing on the matter."); see also State v. Fernandez, 36 So. 3d 120, 123 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) ("[W]e reverse the order suppressing the evidence and remand for further proceedings.

2019See Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1668 (2018) (holding that the automobile exception does not permit "a police officer, uninvited and without a warrant, to enter the curtilage of a home in order to search a vehicle parked therein").

2019Because the parties did not develop the standing issue below, we are reluctant to assess the issue in the first instance.3 See McCauley, 842 So. 2d at 900 ("Because McCauley was not given an opportunity to prove his interest in the premises below due to the State's tacit concession of standing, we conclude that he is entitled to a hearing on the matter."); see also State v. Fernandez, 36 So. 3d 120, 123 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) ("[W]e reverse the order suppressing the evidence and remand for further proceedings.

2011Id. at 149 , 45 S.Ct. 280 ; see also Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467 , 119 S.Ct. 2013 , 144 L.Ed.2d 442 (1999) (stating that the automobile exception permits police to search a vehicle if probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband).

2011Id. at 149 , 45 S.Ct. 280 ; see also Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467 , 119 S.Ct. 2013 , 144 L.Ed.2d 442 (1999) (stating that the automobile exception permits police to search a vehicle if probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband).