automobile exception in Idaho

2021The automobile exception also extends to containers in the vehicle: “If probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.” United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982).

2021The automobile exception to the warrant requirement authorizes a warrantless search of a vehicle when there is probable cause to believe 12 the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of criminal activity.” Id., citing Ross, 456 U.S. at 824 .

2021The scope of a search pursuant to the automobile exception is limited to “where [officers] have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained.” State v. Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894, 898 , 821 P.2d 949, 953 (1991) (quoting California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991)).

2021The scope of a search pursuant to the automobile exception is limited to “where [officers] have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained.” State v. Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894, 898 , 821 P.2d 949, 953 (1991) (quoting California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991)).

2022United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982); State v. Smith, 152 Idaho 115, 120 , 266 P.3d 1220, 1225 (Ct. App. 2011).

2021The automobile exception to the warrant requirement authorizes a warrantless search of a vehicle when there is probable cause to believe 12 the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of criminal activity.” Id., citing Ross, 456 U.S. at 824 .

2026Contrary to Smith’s argument that applying the destruction of evidence exigency to the facts in this case would be tantamount to creating a per se exception for cellphones that would resemble the automobile exception, see Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925), our holding does not create a per se exigency.

2014The automobile exception was first recognized in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925).

2014Gosch’s argument that, in order for the automobile exception to apply to the sedan, the state was required to prove that the sedan was readily mobile, largely relies upon language in which the United States Supreme Court explained that, “when a vehicle is being used on the highways, or if it is readily capable of such use and is found stationary in a place not regularly used for residential purposes — temporary or otherwise — the two justifications for the vehicle exception come into play.” Carney, 471 U.S. at 392-93 , 105 S.Ct. at 2070 , 85 L.Ed.2d at 414 .

2014“The automobile exception is based both upon the automobile’s ready mobility, which is deemed an exigency sufficient to excuse the warrant requirement once probable cause for the search is clear, and upon the lesser expectation of privacy in an automobile as compared to the privacy interest in a home.” Id. at 281-82 , 108 P.3d at 428-29 ; see also California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390-92 (1985); State v. Bottelson, 102 Idaho 90, 93 , 625 P.2d 1093, 1096 (1981).

2026A warrantless search of a vehicle is reasonable under the automobile exception “when there is probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime.” State v. Anderson, 154 Idaho 703, 706 , 302 P.3d 328, 331 (2012).

2026A warrantless search of a vehicle is reasonable under the automobile exception “when there is probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime.” State v. Anderson, 154 Idaho 703, 706 , 302 P.3d 328, 331 (2012).

2014“The automobile exception is based both upon the automobile’s ready mobility, which is deemed an exigency sufficient to excuse the warrant requirement once probable cause for the search is clear, and upon the lesser expectation of privacy in an automobile as compared to the privacy interest in a home.” Id. at 281-82 , 108 P.3d at 428-29 ; see also California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390-92 (1985); State v. Bottelson, 102 Idaho 90, 93 , 625 P.2d 1093, 1096 (1981).

2014“The automobile exception is based both upon the automobile’s ready mobility, which is deemed an exigency sufficient to excuse the warrant requirement once probable cause for the search is clear, and upon the lesser expectation of privacy in an automobile as compared to the privacy interest in a home.” Id. at 281-82 , 108 P.3d at 428-29 ; see also California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390-92 (1985); State v. Bottelson, 102 Idaho 90, 93 , 625 P.2d 1093, 1096 (1981).

2015United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 586-87 , 68 S.Ct. 222, 224-25 , 92 L.Ed. 210 , 216 (1948); Gibson, 141 Idaho at 282 , 108 P.3d at 429 . *176 This case presents a very refined question: whether Easterday’s purse was a part of her person, and therefore, not subject to search under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.

2015United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 586-87 , 68 S.Ct. 222, 224-25 , 92 L.Ed. 210 , 216 (1948); Gibson, 141 Idaho at 282 , 108 P.3d at 429 . *176 This case presents a very refined question: whether Easterday’s purse was a part of her person, and therefore, not subject to search under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.

2016State v. Braendle, 134 Idaho 173, 176 , 997 P.2d 634, 637 (Ct.App.2000) (holding the reaction of a drug detection dog provides probable cause for a search under the automobile exception).

2016State v. Braendle, 134 Idaho 173, 176 , 997 P.2d 634, 637 (Ct.App.2000) (holding the reaction of a drug detection dog provides probable cause for a search under the automobile exception).

2021The scope of a search pursuant to the automobile exception is limited to “where [officers] have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained.” State v. Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894, 898 , 821 P.2d 949, 953 (1991) (quoting California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991)).

1997Under the automobile exception, the police are permitted to "search an automobile and the containers within it where they have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained." State v. Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894, 898 , 821 P.2d 949, 953 (1991), quoting Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 580 , 111 S.Ct. at 1991 .

2021Central to several of these decisions was the U.S. Supreme Court holding in Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 307 (1999), that “police officers with probable cause to search a car may inspect passengers’ belongings found in the car that are capable of concealing the object of the search.” 7 (Italics added.) See also Sossamon, 576 S.W.3d at 529 (collecting U.S. Supreme Court cases with language focusing on whether the automobile exception applies to containers inside the vehicle).

2021See, e.g., Houghton, 526 U.S. at 307 ; Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 572 ; United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478, 479 (1985) (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982)) (“[I]f police officers have probable cause to search a lawfully stopped vehicle, they may conduct a warrantless search of any containers found inside that may conceal the object of the search.”).

2021United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 807-08 (1982); State v. Yeoumans, 144 Idaho 871, 873 , 172 P.3d 1146, 1148 (Ct. App. 2007). 4 Probable cause is the possession of information that would lead a person of ordinary care and prudence to believe or entertain an honest and strong presumption that a person placed under arrest is guilty of a crime.

2021United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 807-08 (1982); State v. Yeoumans, 144 Idaho 871, 873 , 172 P.3d 1146, 1148 (Ct. App. 2007). 4 Probable cause is the possession of information that would lead a person of ordinary care and prudence to believe or entertain an honest and strong presumption that a person placed under arrest is guilty of a crime.

2018State v. Wigginton, 142 Idaho 180, 182 , 125 P.3d 536, 538 (Ct. App. 2005).

2018State v. Wigginton, 142 Idaho 180, 182 , 125 P.3d 536, 538 (Ct. App. 2005).

2014It is true that the automobile exception was, at least originally, founded in part upon the rationale that “the opportunity to search is fleeting since a car is readily movable.” Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970).

1992In State v. Bottelson, 102 Idaho 90, 93 , 625 P.2d 1093, 1096 (1981), we recognized that: The rule of the automobile exception is that "the constitution does not require a search warrant ... when the police stop an automobile on the street or highway *953 because they have probable cause to believe it contains contraband or evidence of a crime." Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 760 , 99 S.Ct. at 2591 ; Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 , 90 S.Ct. 1975, 1981 , 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970).

2015United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 586-87 , 68 S.Ct. 222, 224-25 , 92 L.Ed. 210 , 216 (1948); Gibson, 141 Idaho at 282 , 108 P.3d at 429 . *176 This case presents a very refined question: whether Easterday’s purse was a part of her person, and therefore, not subject to search under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.

2015United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 586-87 , 68 S.Ct. 222, 224-25 , 92 L.Ed. 210 , 216 (1948); Gibson, 141 Idaho at 282 , 108 P.3d at 429 . *176 This case presents a very refined question: whether Easterday’s purse was a part of her person, and therefore, not subject to search under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.

2025See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-31 (1983) (holding that the “totality-of-the-circumstances approach is far more consistent with our prior treatment of probable cause than is any rigid demand that specific ‘tests’ be satisfied” (footnote and internal citation omitted)).

2000The district court did, however, make a finding that “there was sufficient evidence that if presented to a magistrate, a search warrant would have been issued.” Because a showing of probable cause is the prerequisite to issuance of a search warrant, Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 , 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983); State v. Lang, 105 Idaho 683 , 672 P.2d 561 (1983), this finding of the district court is implicitly a finding that probable cause existed.

2023State v. Maloney, 168 Idaho 936, 941 , 489 P.3d 847, 852 (2021).

2021As such, the Court held “unless probable cause to search a vehicle has developed before a container is removed from the vehicle, an officer may not rely on the automobile exception to search that container.” Id.

2014We noted that, “The permissible scope of a warrantless automobile search ‘is defined by the object of the search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe it will be found,’” Id. at 598 , 38 P.3d at 636 (quoting Ross, 456 U.S. at 824 ), and that “[t]he existence of probable cause to search the interior of a car is not necessarily sufficient to justify a search of the car’s trunk.” Schmadeka, 136 Idaho at 599 , 38 P.3d at 637 .

2014We noted that, “The permissible scope of a warrantless automobile search ‘is defined by the object of the search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe it will be found,’” Id. at 598 , 38 P.3d at 636 (quoting Ross, 456 U.S. at 824 ), and that “[t]he existence of probable cause to search the interior of a car is not necessarily sufficient to justify a search of the car’s trunk.” Schmadeka, 136 Idaho at 599 , 38 P.3d at 637 .

2010Id., 138 Idaho at 930 , 71 P.3d at 1077 .

2010Id., 138 Idaho at 930 , 71 P.3d at 1077 .

1981In the plurality decision of Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971), four justices in the lead opinion severely attacked the mobility rationale, and construing Chambers narrowly, implied that an automobile should be secured and a warrant obtained if possible before undertaking a search. 403 U.S. at 460-63 , 91 S.Ct. at 2034-36 ; see 403 U.S. at 504 , 91 S.Ct. at 2057 (J.

1981In the plurality decision of Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971), four justices in the lead opinion severely attacked the mobility rationale, and construing Chambers narrowly, implied that an automobile should be secured and a warrant obtained if possible before undertaking a search. 403 U.S. at 460-63 , 91 S.Ct. at 2034-36 ; see 403 U.S. at 504 , 91 S.Ct. at 2057 (J.

2026State v. Williams, 120 Idaho 386, 389 , 816 P.2d 342, 345 (1991).

2026State v. Williams, 120 Idaho 386, 389 , 816 P.2d 342, 345 (1991).

2026Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466-67 (1999).

2025In State v. Storm, the Iowa Supreme Court declined to limit the automobile exception under the Iowa Constitution in the same manner that Fletcher proposes here. 898 N.W.2d 140 (Iowa 2017).

2025The court further clarified that the automobile exception is “rooted in good policy that balances private interests with the collective good, even as it provides law enforcement with clear and unequivocal guidelines for doing their jobs.” Id. at 150 (quoting State v. Lloyd, 312 P.3d 467, 474 (Nev. 2013)).