14 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1934–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Portergreen2 sentences2003See e.g., State v. Porter, 102 Wash.App. 327, 333-34 , 6 P.3d 1245 (2000) (search of vehicle unlawful when suspect arrested 300 feet from vehicle while walking his dog and directed to return to his vehicle). 2002See, e.g., State v. Porter, 102 Wn. | 2 | 2 |
Chambers v. Maroneygreen2 sentences1981Therefore, they should have been able to search the vehicle and its contents thoroughly without a warrant as part of the automobile exception set forth in Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 , 26 L.Ed.2d 419 , 90 S.Ct. 1975 (1970) and Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 , 69 L.Ed. 543 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 39 A.L.R. 790 (1925). 1981Therefore, they should have been able to search the vehicle and its contents thoroughly without a warrant as part of the automobile exception set forth in Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 , 26 L.Ed.2d 419 , 90 S.Ct. 1975 (1970) and Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 , 69 L.Ed. 543 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 39 A.L.R. 790 (1925). | 1 | 3 |
State v. Valdezgreen2 sentences2016State v. Ringer, 100 Wn.2d 686, 700 , 674 P.2d 1240 (1983), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Stroud, 106 Wn.2d 144 , 720 P.2d 436 (1986), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Valdez, 167 Wn.2d 761 , 224 P.3d 751 , (2009). 2012Thornton, 541 U.S. at 631 , 124 S.Ct. 2127 (Scalia, J., concurring); see Buelna Valdez, 167 Wash.2d at 771, 224 P.3d 751 (explaining that the Thornton "search is justified under the Fourth Amendment because there is a reduced expectation of privacy in an automobile and that expectation is outweighed by law enforcement needs heightened by the difficulties arising from an automobile's mobility" (citing Thornton, 541 U.S. at 631 , 124 S.Ct. 2127 (Scalia, J., concurring))); see also United States v. Arriaza, 641 F.Supp.2d 526, 535 (E.D.Va.2009) (explaining that same considerations as underpin the | 1 | 2 |
State v. Valdezgreen2 sentences2016State v. Ringer, 100 Wn.2d 686, 700 , 674 P.2d 1240 (1983), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Stroud, 106 Wn.2d 144 , 720 P.2d 436 (1986), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Valdez, 167 Wn.2d 761 , 224 P.3d 751 , (2009). 2012Thornton, 541 U.S. at 631 , 124 S.Ct. 2127 (Scalia, J., concurring); see Buelna Valdez, 167 Wash.2d at 771, 224 P.3d 751 (explaining that the Thornton "search is justified under the Fourth Amendment because there is a reduced expectation of privacy in an automobile and that expectation is outweighed by law enforcement needs heightened by the difficulties arising from an automobile's mobility" (citing Thornton, 541 U.S. at 631 , 124 S.Ct. 2127 (Scalia, J., concurring))); see also United States v. Arriaza, 641 F.Supp.2d 526, 535 (E.D.Va.2009) (explaining that same considerations as underpin the | 1 | 2 |
Thornton v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2012Thornton, 541 U.S. at 631 , 124 S.Ct. 2127 (Scalia, J., concurring); see Buelna Valdez, 167 Wash.2d at 771, 224 P.3d 751 (explaining that the Thornton "search is justified under the Fourth Amendment because there is a reduced expectation of privacy in an automobile and that expectation is outweighed by law enforcement needs heightened by the difficulties arising from an automobile's mobility" (citing Thornton, 541 U.S. at 631 , 124 S.Ct. 2127 (Scalia, J., concurring))); see also United States v. Arriaza, 641 F.Supp.2d 526, 535 (E.D.Va.2009) (explaining that same considerations as underpin the 2012Thornton, 541 U.S. at 631 , 124 S.Ct. 2127 (Scalia, J., concurring); see Buelna Valdez, 167 Wash.2d at 771, 224 P.3d 751 (explaining that the Thornton "search is justified under the Fourth Amendment because there is a reduced expectation of privacy in an automobile and that expectation is outweighed by law enforcement needs heightened by the difficulties arising from an automobile's mobility" (citing Thornton, 541 U.S. at 631 , 124 S.Ct. 2127 (Scalia, J., concurring))); see also United States v. Arriaza, 641 F.Supp.2d 526, 535 (E.D.Va.2009) (explaining that same considerations as underpin the | 1 | 1 |
State v. Pattongreen2 sentences2012See Patton, 167 Wn.2d at 386 n.4; Tibbies, 169 Wn.2d at 369 (in context of automobile search where suspect was not arrested; probable cause to search did not justify search of vehicle — “the existence of probable cause, standing alone, does not justify a warrantless search”); Ringer, 100 Wn.2d at 700-01 . 2012See Patton, 167 Wash.2d at 386 n. 4, 219 P.3d 651 ; State v. Tibbles, 169 Wash.2d 364, 369 , 236 P.3d 885 (2010) (in context of automobile search where suspect was not arrested; probable cause to search did not justify search of vehicle"the existence of probable cause, standing alone, does not justify a warrantless search"); Ringer, 100 Wash.2d at 700-01 , 674 P.2d 1240 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Pattongreen1 sentence2012See Patton, 167 Wash.2d at 386 n. 4, 219 P.3d 651 ; State v. Tibbles, 169 Wash.2d 364, 369 , 236 P.3d 885 (2010) (in context of automobile search where suspect was not arrested; probable cause to search did not justify search of vehicle"the existence of probable cause, standing alone, does not justify a warrantless search"); Ringer, 100 Wash.2d at 700-01 , 674 P.2d 1240 . | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Arriazagreen1 sentence2012Thornton, 541 U.S. at 631 , 124 S.Ct. 2127 (Scalia, J., concurring); see Buelna Valdez, 167 Wash.2d at 771, 224 P.3d 751 (explaining that the Thornton "search is justified under the Fourth Amendment because there is a reduced expectation of privacy in an automobile and that expectation is outweighed by law enforcement needs heightened by the difficulties arising from an automobile's mobility" (citing Thornton, 541 U.S. at 631 , 124 S.Ct. 2127 (Scalia, J., concurring))); see also United States v. Arriaza, 641 F.Supp.2d 526, 535 (E.D.Va.2009) (explaining that same considerations as underpin the | 1 | 1 |
California v. Carneygreen2 sentences2012The automobile exception allows for a warrantless search of a mobile vehicle when "there is probable cause to believe [the] vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity." Gant, 129 S.Ct. at 1721 (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-21 , 102 S.Ct. 2157 , 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982)); see California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 , 105 S.Ct. 2066 , 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985) (automobile exception justified based on lower expectation of privacy in a vehicle); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925) (warrantless automobile search supported by probable cause 2012The automobile exception allows for a warrantless search of a mobile vehicle when "there is probable cause to believe [the] vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity." Gant, 129 S.Ct. at 1721 (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-21 , 102 S.Ct. 2157 , 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982)); see California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 , 105 S.Ct. 2066 , 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985) (automobile exception justified based on lower expectation of privacy in a vehicle); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925) (warrantless automobile search supported by probable cause | 1 | 1 |
State v. Portergreen1 sentence2003See e.g., State v. Porter, 102 Wash.App. 327, 333-34 , 6 P.3d 1245 (2000) (search of vehicle unlawful when suspect arrested 300 feet from vehicle while walking his dog and directed to return to his vehicle). | 1 | 1 |
Michigan v. Thomasgreen2 sentences1989See Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259, 73 L. 1989See Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259, 73 L. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Svendrowskigreen1 sentence1986E.g., State v. Svendrowski, 692 S.W.2d 348, 349 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Department of Pub. | 1 | 1 |
Chimel v. Californiared2 sentences1982See Arkansas v. Sanders, supra. However, in Belton the court concluded a search incident to an arrest eliminates any privacy interest the arrestee might have in the area immediately around him and allows the police to search any open or closed container within the "passenger compartment." Justice Stewart reasoned that an automobile interior "generally . . . [is] within 'the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary item.'" Belton, 453 U.S. at 460 , 101 S. Ct. at 2864 , citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 , 23 L. 1982See Arkansas v. Sanders, supra. However, in Belton the court concluded a search incident to an arrest eliminates any privacy interest the arrestee might have in the area immediately around him and allows the police to search any open or closed container within the "passenger compartment." Justice Stewart reasoned that an automobile interior "generally . . . [is] within 'the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary item.'" Belton, 453 U.S. at 460 , 101 S. Ct. at 2864 , citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 , 23 L. | 1 | 1 |
South Dakota v. Oppermangreen2 sentences1982See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367-68 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1000, 1004 , 96 S.Ct. 3092 (1976). 1982See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367-68 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1000, 1004 , 96 S.Ct. 3092 (1976). | 1 | 1 |
New York v. Beltonred2 sentences1982See Arkansas v. Sanders, supra. However, in Belton the court concluded a search incident to an arrest eliminates any privacy interest the arrestee might have in the area immediately around him and allows the police to search any open or closed container within the "passenger compartment." Justice Stewart reasoned that an automobile interior "generally . . . [is] within 'the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary item.'" Belton, 453 U.S. at 460 , 101 S. Ct. at 2864 , citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 , 23 L. 1982See Arkansas v. Sanders, supra. However, in Belton the court concluded a search incident to an arrest eliminates any privacy interest the arrestee might have in the area immediately around him and allows the police to search any open or closed container within the "passenger compartment." Justice Stewart reasoned that an automobile interior "generally . . . [is] within 'the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary item.'" Belton, 453 U.S. at 460 , 101 S. Ct. at 2864 , citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 , 23 L. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Stroud
red
2 sentences1993The State contends that Sergeant Radder's warrantless search of the cab of the pickup was permissible under the automobile exception as defined in State v. Stroud, 106 Wn.2d 144 , 720 P.2d 436 (1986). *269 Mr. Lopez argues that Stroud is factually distinguishable from the instant case 4 and requires that the actual exigencies present in this case be balanced against his constitutional privacy interests to determine whether the automobile exception applies. 1993The State contends that Sergeant Radder's warrantless search of the cab of the pickup was permissible under the automobile exception as defined in State v. Stroud, 106 Wn.2d 144 , 720 P.2d 436 (1986). *269 Mr. Lopez argues that Stroud is factually distinguishable from the instant case 4 and requires that the actual exigencies present in this case be balanced against his constitutional privacy interests to determine whether the automobile exception applies. | 4 | 1993–2016 |
State v. Ringer
red
2 sentences2016State v. Ringer, 100 Wn.2d 686, 700 , 674 P.2d 1240 (1983), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Stroud, 106 Wn.2d 144 , 720 P.2d 436 (1986), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Valdez, 167 Wn.2d 761 , 224 P.3d 751 , (2009). 2016State v. Ringer, 100 Wn.2d 686, 700 , 674 P.2d 1240 (1983), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Stroud, 106 Wn.2d 144 , 720 P.2d 436 (1986), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Valdez, 167 Wn.2d 761 , 224 P.3d 751 , (2009). | 3 | 1989–2016 |
Carroll v. United States
green
2 sentences2012The automobile exception allows for a warrantless search of a mobile vehicle when "there is probable cause to believe [the] vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity." Gant, 129 S.Ct. at 1721 (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-21 , 102 S.Ct. 2157 , 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982)); see California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 , 105 S.Ct. 2066 , 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985) (automobile exception justified based on lower expectation of privacy in a vehicle); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925) (warrantless automobile search supported by probable cause 2012The automobile exception allows for a warrantless search of a mobile vehicle when "there is probable cause to believe [the] vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity." Gant, 129 S.Ct. at 1721 (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-21 , 102 S.Ct. 2157 , 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982)); see California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 , 105 S.Ct. 2066 , 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985) (automobile exception justified based on lower expectation of privacy in a vehicle); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925) (warrantless automobile search supported by probable cause | 3 | 1981–2012 |
United States v. Ross
green
2 sentences2012The automobile exception allows for a warrantless search of a mobile vehicle when "there is probable cause to believe [the] vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity." Gant, 129 S.Ct. at 1721 (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-21 , 102 S.Ct. 2157 , 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982)); see California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 , 105 S.Ct. 2066 , 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985) (automobile exception justified based on lower expectation of privacy in a vehicle); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925) (warrantless automobile search supported by probable cause 2012The automobile exception allows for a warrantless search of a mobile vehicle when "there is probable cause to believe [the] vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity." Gant, 129 S.Ct. at 1721 (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-21 , 102 S.Ct. 2157 , 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982)); see California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 , 105 S.Ct. 2066 , 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985) (automobile exception justified based on lower expectation of privacy in a vehicle); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925) (warrantless automobile search supported by probable cause | 3 | 1985–2012 |
State v. Fladebo
green
2 sentences2003State v. Fladebo, 113 Wash.2d 388, 397 , 779 P.2d 707 (1989). 2003State v. Fladebo, 113 Wash.2d 388, 397 , 779 P.2d 707 (1989). | 2 | 2002–2003 |
State v. Johnston
green
2 sentences2003State v. Johnston, 107 Wash.App. 280, 288 , 28 P.3d 775 (2001), review denied, 145 Wash.2d 1021 , 41 P.3d 483 (2002). 2002State v. Johnston, 107 Wn. | 2 | 2002–2003 |
Arizona v. Gant
green
2 sentences2012The automobile exception allows for a warrantless search of a mobile vehicle when “there is probable cause to believe [the] vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity.” Gant, 556 U.S. at 347 (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-21 , 102 S. Ct. 2157 , 72 L. 2012The automobile exception allows for a warrantless search of a mobile vehicle when "there is probable cause to believe [the] vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity." Gant, 129 S.Ct. at 1721 (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-21 , 102 S.Ct. 2157 , 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982)); see California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 , 105 S.Ct. 2066 , 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985) (automobile exception justified based on lower expectation of privacy in a vehicle); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925) (warrantless automobile search supported by probable cause | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Tibbles
green
1 sentence2012See Patton, 167 Wash.2d at 386 n. 4, 219 P.3d 651 ; State v. Tibbles, 169 Wash.2d 364, 369 , 236 P.3d 885 (2010) (in context of automobile search where suspect was not arrested; probable cause to search did not justify search of vehicle"the existence of probable cause, standing alone, does not justify a warrantless search"); Ringer, 100 Wash.2d at 700-01 , 674 P.2d 1240 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Tibbles
green
1 sentence2012See Patton, 167 Wash.2d at 386 n. 4, 219 P.3d 651 ; State v. Tibbles, 169 Wash.2d 364, 369 , 236 P.3d 885 (2010) (in context of automobile search where suspect was not arrested; probable cause to search did not justify search of vehicle"the existence of probable cause, standing alone, does not justify a warrantless search"); Ringer, 100 Wash.2d at 700-01 , 674 P.2d 1240 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Johnston
green
1 sentence2003State v. Johnston, 107 Wash.App. 280, 288 , 28 P.3d 775 (2001), review denied, 145 Wash.2d 1021 , 41 P.3d 483 (2002). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
State v. Smith
green
2 sentences1989We have recognized . . . that where police have probable cause to conduct a search, they may do so without a warrant when "they are confronted by emergencies and exigencies which do not permit reasonable time and delay for a judicial officer to evaluate and act upon probable cause applications for warrants by police officers." State v. Smith, 88 Wn.2d 127, 135 , 559 P.2d 970 (1977). 100 Wn.2d at 701 . 1989We have recognized . . . that where police have probable cause to conduct a search, they may do so without a warrant when "they are confronted by emergencies and exigencies which do not permit reasonable time and delay for a judicial officer to evaluate and act upon probable cause applications for warrants by police officers." State v. Smith, 88 Wn.2d 127, 135 , 559 P.2d 970 (1977). 100 Wn.2d at 701 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Stovall v. Denno
green
2 sentences1986In making that analysis, we have considered the following factors set forth in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 , 18 L. 1986In making that analysis, we have considered the following factors set forth in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 , 18 L. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
State v. Jordan
green
1 sentence1986In Jordan, 39 Wn. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Cady v. Dombrowski
green
1 sentence1982Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. at 441 . | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States
green
2 sentences1981Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 269 , 37 L. 1981Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 269 , 37 L. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| United States v. Chadwick red | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| State v. Fink neutral | 1 | 1934–1934 |
| State v. Wasinger green | 1 | 1934–1934 |
| State v. Le Masters neutral | 1 | 1934–1934 |
| Eastway v. State neutral | 1 | 1934–1934 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.