automobile exception in Pennsylvania

2025“Exceptions to the warrant requirement include the consent exception, the plain view exception, the inventory search exception, the exigent circumstances exception, the automobile exception …, the stop and frisk exception, and the search incident to arrest exception.” Commonwealth v. Simonson, 148 A.3d 792, 797 (Pa. Super. 2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2024The "well well delineated exceptions" to exceptions" to the the warrant requirement include warrant requirement include `the the consent consent exception, exception, the the plain view exception, plain view exception, the the inventory search exception, inventory search exception, the exigent circumstances the exigent circumstances exception, exception, the automobile exception the automobile exception ... ... the stop and the stop and frisk exception, and frisk exception, and the search incident the search to arrest incident to arrest exception."" exception."' Commonwealth y v. McMahon, 280

2024Initially, we note that, although Appellant’s argument relies on Alexander, he filed his motion to suppress before our Supreme Court decided Alexander.5 Prior to Alexander, the automobile exception to the warrant requirement permitted police to conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle with probable cause and did not require exigency beyond a vehicle’s “inherent mobility.” Commonwealth v. Gary, 91 A.3d 102, 138 (Pa. 2014), overruled by Alexander, 243 A.3d 177 .

2023We repeatedly have determined that Alexander “does not address the plain view exception or any alterations to its requirements.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 285 A.3d 328, 332 (Pa. Super. 2022); see also Commonwealth v. McMahon, 280 A.3d 1069, 1073 (Pa. Super. 2022) (noting that Alexander pertains only to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement); ____________________________________________ 4 In Alexander, the Court concluded that Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution “affords greater protection to our citizens than the Fourth Amendment,” reaffirming pre-Commonwealth v. G

2026See Commonwealth v. Alexander, 243 A.3d 177 , 207 (Pa. 2020) (stating that, to establish the automobile exception permitting a warrantless search of a vehicle, the Commonwealth must demonstrate “both probable cause and exigent circumstances[, as] one without the other is insufficient” (citation and original quotation marks omitted)).

2026Specifically, “Pennsylvania recognized an automobile exception, but unlike its federal counterpart, ours was ‘limited’ in application.” Id. at 187-88.

2026This Court has explained that “[s]uch exceptions include the consent exception, the plain view exception, the inventory search exception, the exigent circumstances exception, the automobile exception[,] the stop and frisk exception, and the search incident to arrest exception.” Commonwealth v. McMahon, 280 A.3d 1069, 1072 (Pa.Super. 2022) (cleaned up).

2024Simply put, Alexander is not applicable here because the police did not seize the handgun “upon the analytical underpinnings of the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, but rather upon an application of the plain view exception.” McMahon, 280 A.3d at 1073 (quotation and quotation marks omitted).

2025The Saunders Court explained: “Put simply, under [Commonwealth v.] McCree, [ 924 A.2d 621 (Pa. 2007) (plurality),] lawful access to seize an item from a car under the third prong of the plain view doctrine requires the unexpected development of probable cause, whereas, pursuant to Alexander, the automobile exception requires probable cause and exigent circumstances.” Id.

2025The Saunders Court explained: “Put simply, under [Commonwealth v.] McCree, [ 924 A.2d 621 (Pa. 2007) (plurality),] lawful access to seize an item from a car under the third prong of the plain view doctrine requires the unexpected development of probable cause, whereas, pursuant to Alexander, the automobile exception requires probable cause and exigent circumstances.” Id.

2017The Court concluded that “[ajpplying the vehicle exception in these circumstances allows the essential purposes .served by the exception to be fulfilled, while assuring that the exception will acknowledge legitimate privácy interests.” Id. at 394 , 105 S.Ct. 2066 ; see also Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 593 , 94 S.Ct. 2464 , 41 L.Ed.2d 325 (1974) (plurality) (finding thé seizure of a vehicle from a public place lawful under the automobile exception, differentiating Coolidge based on the vehicle’s location); Ross, 456 U.S. at 807 n.9, 102 S.Ct. 2157 (explaining the holding in Chambers as per

2017The Court concluded that “[ajpplying the vehicle exception in these circumstances allows the essential purposes .served by the exception to be fulfilled, while assuring that the exception will acknowledge legitimate privácy interests.” Id. at 394 , 105 S.Ct. 2066 ; see also Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 593 , 94 S.Ct. 2464 , 41 L.Ed.2d 325 (1974) (plurality) (finding thé seizure of a vehicle from a public place lawful under the automobile exception, differentiating Coolidge based on the vehicle’s location); Ross, 456 U.S. at 807 n.9, 102 S.Ct. 2157 (explaining the holding in Chambers as per

2024Smith, 285 A.3d at 332 ; see also McMahon, 280 A.3d at 1073 (explaining that “Alexander addresses the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, not the plain view exception”); Lutz, 270 A.3d at 576 (holding -7- that “Alexander did not impact [the trial court’s] ruling because its decision did not ‘rest upon the analytical underpinnings of the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, but rather upon an application of the plain view’” exception); Commonwealth v. Davis, 287 A.3d 467, 473 (Pa. Super. 2022) (rejecting the appellant’s claim that “Alexander requires the Commonwealth to

2023These exceptions include “the consent exception, the plain view exception, the inventory search exception, the exigent circumstances exception, the automobile exception, ... the stop and frisk exception, and the search incident to arrest exception.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 285 A.3d 328, 332 (Pa.Super. 2022) (citation omitted).

2024Smith, 285 A.3d at 332 ; see also McMahon, 280 A.3d at 1073 (explaining that “Alexander addresses the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, not the plain view exception”); Lutz, 270 A.3d at 576 (holding -7- that “Alexander did not impact [the trial court’s] ruling because its decision did not ‘rest upon the analytical underpinnings of the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, but rather upon an application of the plain view’” exception); Commonwealth v. Davis, 287 A.3d 467, 473 (Pa. Super. 2022) (rejecting the appellant’s claim that “Alexander requires the Commonwealth to

2023See Commonwealth v. McMahon, 280 A.3d 1069, 1073 (Pa. Super. 2022) (“[The a]ppellant points to nothing in Alexander which modified the plain view exception, and we decline to apply Alexander.”); Commonwealth v. Lutz, 270 A.3d 571, 576 (Pa. Super. 2022) (“Alexander did not impact its ruling because its decision did not rest upon the analytical underpinnings of the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, but rather upon an application of the plain view and search incident to arrest exceptions to the warrant requirement.”) (internal quotation marks and citation to trial court opinion omi

2015As the high Court stated in [Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465 , 466–67 (1999)], since 1982, the only requirement for application of the automobile exception, permitting warrantless search of a motor vehicle under federal law, is a finding of probable cause.[7] 7 We are mindful that litigants and our sister courts continue to refer to Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), to suggest a search of a vehicle is held to differing standards when the vehicle is found on public versus private property.

2014Similarly, in Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465 , 119 S.Ct. 2013 , 144 L.Ed.2d 442 (1999), the high Court reversed the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, which had held that application of the automobile exception required not only probable cause but also exigent circumstances that prevented the police from obtaining a warrant.

2017See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S, 443, 479, 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) (plurality) (concluding that if the Court were to hold the automobile exception applies to a vehicle parked in a residential driveway “where there was no stopping and the vehicle was unoccupied ... it is but a short step to the .position that it is never necessary for the police to obtain a warrant before searching and seizing an automobile, provided that ■they have probable cause.”).

2017See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S, 443, 479, 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) (plurality) (concluding that if the Court were to hold the automobile exception applies to a vehicle parked in a residential driveway “where there was no stopping and the vehicle was unoccupied ... it is but a short step to the .position that it is never necessary for the police to obtain a warrant before searching and seizing an automobile, provided that ■they have probable cause.”).

2024Id. at 95 (Castille, J., concurring); see also White, 669 A.2d at 909 (Castille, J., dissenting) (stating “that the automobile exception to the warrant requirements of this Commonwealth should be a per se rule regardless of how much time police may have to obtain a warrant”).

2021Our Supreme Court held in Commonwealth v. White, 669 A.2d 896 (Pa. 1995), that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement did not apply in Pennsylvania due to the heightened privacy protection provided by Section 8, and relied on that decision in deciding Commonwealth v. Labron, 669 A.2d 917 (Pa. 1995).

2024Id. at 95 (Castille, J., concurring); see also White, 669 A.2d at 909 (Castille, J., dissenting) (stating “that the automobile exception to the warrant requirements of this Commonwealth should be a per se rule regardless of how much time police may have to obtain a warrant”).

2002That probable cause arose unexpectedly is all the exigency I would require under Article I, Section 8 — since that is all that is required by the actual holdings of this Court’s cases explicating the automobile exception, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Luv, 557 Pa. 570 , 735 A.2d 87 (1999); Commonwealth v. White, 543 Pa. 45 , 669 A.2d 896 (1995); Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 526 Pa. 268 , 585 A.2d 988 (1991); Commonwealth v. Baker, 518 Pa. 145 , 541 A.2d 1381 (1988), and since any other rule is unjustifiably hostile to perfectly reasonable police conduct.

2024In addition, the court noted “[t]he plain view doctrine ‘permits the warrantless seizure of an object when: (1) an officer views the object from a lawful vantage point; (2) it is immediately apparent to him that the object is incriminating; and (3) the officer has a lawful right of access to the object.’” Id. at 14, quoting Commonwealth v. Heidelberg, 267 A.3d 492, 504 (Pa. Super. 2021).2 Here, the court opined, there was probable cause and exigent circumstances satisfying the automobile exception to the warrant requirement: Under the totality of the circumstances, . . .

2024See Commonwealth v. Heidelberg, 267 A.3d 492, 503 (Pa. Super. 2021) (en banc) (holding that an appellant must “preserve a challenge to the application of the automobile exception” pursuant to Alexander “at ‘all stages of adjudication up to and including the direct appeal’” for Alexander to have retroactive effect) (citation omitted).

2017United States v. McCormick, 502 F.2d 281, 287 (9th Cir. 1974).

2017United States v. McCormick, 502 F.2d 281, 287 (9th Cir. 1974).

2017See, e.g., United States v. Sinisterra, 77 F.3d 101, 105 (5th Cir. 1996) (recognizing, pursuant to Carney, that the automobile exception operates to permit warrantless searches/seizures of stationary vehicles only if parked in a place not regularly used for residential purposes, but finding that the automobile exception applied to a vehicle parked in a mall parking lot because it “was not related to anyone’s residence, it was open to the public and available for public use”); United States v. Beene, 818 F.3d 157, 164 (5th Cir. 2016) (same), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 113 , 196 L.Ed.2d 9

2017See, e.g., United States v. Sinisterra, 77 F.3d 101, 105 (5th Cir. 1996) (recognizing, pursuant to Carney, that the automobile exception operates to permit warrantless searches/seizures of stationary vehicles only if parked in a place not regularly used for residential purposes, but finding that the automobile exception applied to a vehicle parked in a mall parking lot because it “was not related to anyone’s residence, it was open to the public and available for public use”); United States v. Beene, 818 F.3d 157, 164 (5th Cir. 2016) (same), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 113 , 196 L.Ed.2d 9

2021Our Supreme Court held in Commonwealth v. White, 669 A.2d 896 (Pa. 1995), that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement did not apply in Pennsylvania due to the heightened privacy protection provided by Section 8, and relied on that decision in deciding Commonwealth v. Labron, 669 A.2d 917 (Pa. 1995).

2014As will be discussed in more detail, infra, the high Court in Labron corrected a misconception of this Court that, under the Fourth Amendment, the automobile exception was limited to cases in which “unforeseen circumstances involving the search of an automobile are coupled with the presence of probable cause.” Labron, 518 U.S. at 940 , 116 S.Ct. 2485 (quoting Commonwealth v. Labron, 543 Pa. 86 , 669 A.2d 917, 924 (1995)).

2021Probable cause is a practical, nontechnical conception: it is a fluid concept - turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 4As we explain infra, the automobile exception to the warrant requirement no longer exists in Pennsylvania. [J-70-2021] - 8 Next, the Superior Court provided an overview of the Commonwealth’s various arguments, namely that: (1) it is well-settled that the odor of marijuana is sufficient to create probable cause to conduc

2021In summarizing the various principles of law that govern review of this claim, the Superior Court explained the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, which, according to the court, “permits the search and/or seizure of a motor vehicle if supported by probable cause—no separate finding of exigent circumstances is required.”4 Id. at 1274 (quoting Commonwealth v. Loughnane, 173 A.3d 733, 741 (Pa. 2017)).

2021Concerning the law as it pertains to marijuana, it is indisputable that, prior to the enactment of the MMA, the CSA rendered marijuana per se illegal, inter alia, to possess. 12 At the time of the vehicular search at issue in this case, this Court’s plurality decision in Gary, supra, which adopted the automobile exception for purposes of the Pennsylvania Constitution, was considered to control the law in this area.

2017See Gary, 91 A.3d at 110 (“[W]hile a vehicle’s ready mobility was the original justification for the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, the U.S. Supreme Court subsequently broadened this justification to encompass those situations where the vehicle was in police custody and thus was immobilized.”); see also Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259, 261 (1982) (“In Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 , . . . (1970), we held that when police officers have probable cause to believe there is contraband inside an automobile that has been stopped on the road, the officers may conduct a warrantles

2014See Commonwealth v. Perry, 568 Pa. 499 , 798 A.2d 697, 708-11 (2002) (Castille, J., concurring) (characterizing Commonwealth v. White, 543 Pa. 45 , 669 A.2d 896 (1995), as having “decided the automobile exception question by employing the same - coterminous, Fourth Amendment-based construct this Court had developed and followed for years”).

2014See Commonwealth v. Perry, 568 Pa. 499 , 798 A.2d 697, 708-11 (2002) (Castille, J., concurring) (characterizing Commonwealth v. White, 543 Pa. 45 , 669 A.2d 896 (1995), as having “decided the automobile exception question by employing the same - coterminous, Fourth Amendment-based construct this Court had developed and followed for years”).