automobile exception in Pennsylvania

2024Initially, we note that, although Appellant’s argument relies on Alexander, he filed his motion to suppress before our Supreme Court decided Alexander.5 Prior to Alexander, the automobile exception to the warrant requirement permitted police to conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle with probable cause and did not require exigency beyond a vehicle’s “inherent mobility.” Commonwealth v. Gary, 91 A.3d 102, 138 (Pa. 2014), overruled by Alexander, 243 A.3d 177 .

2023At the time of the car stop in this case, the automobile exception was valid in Pennsylvania pursuant to Commonwealth v. Gary, 91 A.3d 102, 138 (Pa. 2014) (plurality opinion).

2025“Exceptions to the warrant requirement include the consent exception, the plain view exception, the inventory search exception, the exigent circumstances exception, the automobile exception …, the stop and frisk exception, and the search incident to arrest exception.” Commonwealth v. Simonson, 148 A.3d 792, 797 (Pa. Super. 2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2024These exceptions include “the consent exception, the plain view exception, the inventory search exception, the exigent circumstances exception, the automobile exception, . . . the stop and frisk exception, and the search incident to arrest exception.” Commonwealth v. Simonson, 148 A.3d 792, 797 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted).

2026This Court has explained that “[s]uch exceptions include the consent exception, the plain view exception, the inventory search exception, the exigent circumstances exception, the automobile exception[,] the stop and frisk exception, and the search incident to arrest exception.” Commonwealth v. McMahon, 280 A.3d 1069, 1072 (Pa.Super. 2022) (cleaned up).

2024Smith, 285 A.3d at 332 ; see also McMahon, 280 A.3d at 1073 (explaining that “Alexander addresses the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, not the plain view exception”); Lutz, 270 A.3d at 576 (holding -7- J-S44028-23 that “Alexander did not impact [the trial court’s] ruling because its decision did not ‘rest upon the analytical underpinnings of the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, but rather upon an application of the plain view’” exception); Commonwealth v. Davis, 287 A.3d 467, 473 (Pa. Super. 2022) (rejecting the appellant’s claim that “Alexander requires the Com

2025The Saunders Court explained: “Put simply, under [Commonwealth v.] McCree, [ 924 A.2d 621 (Pa. 2007) (plurality),] lawful access to seize an item from a car under the third prong of the plain view doctrine requires the unexpected development of probable cause, whereas, pursuant to Alexander, the automobile exception requires probable cause and exigent circumstances.” Id.

2025The Saunders Court explained: “Put simply, under [Commonwealth v.] McCree, [ 924 A.2d 621 (Pa. 2007) (plurality),] lawful access to seize an item from a car under the third prong of the plain view doctrine requires the unexpected development of probable cause, whereas, pursuant to Alexander, the automobile exception requires probable cause and exigent circumstances.” Id.

2024Smith, 285 A.3d at 332 ; see also McMahon, 280 A.3d at 1073 (explaining that “Alexander addresses the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, not the plain view exception”); Lutz, 270 A.3d at 576 (holding -7- J-S44028-23 that “Alexander did not impact [the trial court’s] ruling because its decision did not ‘rest upon the analytical underpinnings of the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, but rather upon an application of the plain view’” exception); Commonwealth v. Davis, 287 A.3d 467, 473 (Pa. Super. 2022) (rejecting the appellant’s claim that “Alexander requires the Com

2023These exceptions include “the consent exception, the plain view exception, the inventory search exception, the exigent circumstances exception, the automobile exception, ... the stop and frisk exception, and the search incident to arrest exception.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 285 A.3d 328, 332 (Pa.Super. 2022) (citation omitted).

2024Smith, 285 A.3d at 332 ; see also McMahon, 280 A.3d at 1073 (explaining that “Alexander addresses the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, not the plain view exception”); Lutz, 270 A.3d at 576 (holding -7- J-S44028-23 that “Alexander did not impact [the trial court’s] ruling because its decision did not ‘rest upon the analytical underpinnings of the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, but rather upon an application of the plain view’” exception); Commonwealth v. Davis, 287 A.3d 467, 473 (Pa. Super. 2022) (rejecting the appellant’s claim that “Alexander requires the Com

2023See Commonwealth v. McMahon, 280 A.3d 1069 , 1073 (Pa. Super. 2022) (“[The a]ppellant points to nothing in Alexander which modified the plain view exception, and we decline to apply Alexander.”); Commonwealth v. Lutz, 270 A.3d 571 , 576 (Pa. Super. 2022) (“Alexander did not impact its ruling because its decision did not rest upon the analytical underpinnings of the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, but rather upon an application of the plain view and search incident to arrest exceptions to the warrant requirement.”) (internal quotation marks and citation to trial court opinion o

2015As the high Court stated in [Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465 , 466–67 (1999)], since 1982, the only requirement for application of the automobile exception, permitting warrantless search of a motor vehicle under federal law, is a finding of probable cause.[7] 7 We are mindful that litigants and our sister courts continue to refer to Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), to suggest a search of a vehicle is held to differing standards when the vehicle is found on public versus private property.

2014Similarly, in Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465 , 119 S.Ct. 2013 , 144 L.Ed.2d 442 (1999), the high Court reversed the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, which had held that application of the automobile exception required not only probable cause but also exigent circumstances that prevented the police from obtaining a warrant.

2017In so doing, the court differentiated the facts of the case from those present in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971), wherein the United States Supreme Court held that the automobile exception did not apply to permit the warrantless seizure of a vehicle.from the. defendant’s residential driveway (discussed at length later in this Opinion).

2017In so doing, the court differentiated the facts of the case from those present in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971), wherein the United States Supreme Court held that the automobile exception did not apply to permit the warrantless seizure of a vehicle.from the. defendant’s residential driveway (discussed at length later in this Opinion).

2024Id. at 95 (Castille, J., concurring); see also White, 669 A.2d at 909 (Castille, J., dissenting) (stating “that the automobile exception to the warrant requirements of this Commonwealth should be a per se rule regardless of how much time police may have to obtain a warrant”).

2021Our Supreme Court held in Commonwealth v. White, 669 A.2d 896 (Pa. 1995), that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement did not apply in Pennsylvania due to the heightened privacy protection provided by Section 8, and relied on that decision in deciding Commonwealth v. Labron, 669 A.2d 917 (Pa. 1995).

2024Id. at 95 (Castille, J., concurring); see also White, 669 A.2d at 909 (Castille, J., dissenting) (stating “that the automobile exception to the warrant requirements of this Commonwealth should be a per se rule regardless of how much time police may have to obtain a warrant”).

2002That probable cause arose unexpectedly is all the exigency I would require under Article I, Section 8 — since that is all that is required by the actual holdings of this Court’s cases explicating the automobile exception, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Luv, 557 Pa. 570 , 735 A.2d 87 (1999); Commonwealth v. White, 543 Pa. 45 , 669 A.2d 896 (1995); Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 526 Pa. 268 , 585 A.2d 988 (1991); Commonwealth v. Baker, 518 Pa. 145 , 541 A.2d 1381 (1988), and since any other rule is unjustifiably hostile to perfectly reasonable police conduct.

2024In addition, the court noted “[t]he plain view doctrine ‘permits the warrantless seizure of an object when: (1) an officer views the object from a lawful vantage point; (2) it is immediately apparent to him that the object is incriminating; and (3) the officer has a lawful right of access to the object.’” Id. at 14, quoting Commonwealth v. Heidelberg, 267 A.3d 492, 504 (Pa. Super. 2021).2 Here, the court opined, there was probable cause and exigent circumstances satisfying the automobile exception to the warrant requirement: Under the totality of the circumstances, . . .

2024See Commonwealth v. Heidelberg, 267 A.3d 492, 503 (Pa. Super. 2021) (en banc) (holding that an appellant must “preserve a challenge to the application of the automobile exception” pursuant to Alexander “at ‘all stages of adjudication up to and including the direct appeal’” for Alexander to have retroactive effect) (citation omitted).

2017“Curtilage” is an area adjacent to one’s home that is nonetheless afforded the same constitutional protections as one’s home because it is "associated with the sanctity of a man's home and privacies of life.” Commonwealth v. Oglialoro, 525 Pa. 250 , 579 A.2d 1288, 1292 (1990); Commonwealth v. Lee, 972 A.2d 1 , 3 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2009).

2017“Curtilage” is an area adjacent to one’s home that is nonetheless afforded the same constitutional protections as one’s home because it is "associated with the sanctity of a man's home and privacies of life.” Commonwealth v. Oglialoro, 525 Pa. 250 , 579 A.2d 1288, 1292 (1990); Commonwealth v. Lee, 972 A.2d 1 , 3 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2009).

2017United States v. Hines, 449 F.3d 808, 814 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Fladten, 230 F.3d 1083, 1086 (8th Cir. 2000); United States v. Blaylock, 535 F.3d 922, 926-27 (8th Cir. 2008). .

2017United States v. Hines, 449 F.3d 808, 814 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Fladten, 230 F.3d 1083, 1086 (8th Cir. 2000); United States v. Blaylock, 535 F.3d 922, 926-27 (8th Cir. 2008). .

2017See State v. Rocha, 295 Neb. 716 , 890 N.W.2d 178, 207 (2017) ("the requirement of ready mobility for the automobile exception is met whenever a vehicle that is not located on private property is capable or apparently capable of being driven on the roads or highways”); State v. Hobbs, 933 N.E.2d 1281, 1285-86 (Ind. 2010) (“an operable vehicle found in a residential area may not be searched under [the automobile] exception, but one located in a non-residential area, whether by reason of a police stop or not, is subject to the exception”); State v. LeJeune, 276 Ga. 179 , 576 S.E.2d 888, 892-93 (

2017See State v. Rocha, 295 Neb. 716 , 890 N.W.2d 178, 207 (2017) ("the requirement of ready mobility for the automobile exception is met whenever a vehicle that is not located on private property is capable or apparently capable of being driven on the roads or highways”); State v. Hobbs, 933 N.E.2d 1281, 1285-86 (Ind. 2010) (“an operable vehicle found in a residential area may not be searched under [the automobile] exception, but one located in a non-residential area, whether by reason of a police stop or not, is subject to the exception”); State v. LeJeune, 276 Ga. 179 , 576 S.E.2d 888, 892-93 (

2017See, e.g., United States v. Sinisterra, 77 F.3d 101, 105 (5th Cir. 1996) (recognizing, pursuant to Carney, that the automobile exception operates to permit warrantless searches/seizures of stationary vehicles only if parked in a place not regularly used for residential purposes, but finding that the automobile exception applied to a vehicle parked in a mall parking lot because it “was not related to anyone’s residence, it was open to the public and available for public use”); United States v. Beene, 818 F.3d 157, 164 (5th Cir. 2016) (same), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 113 , 196 L.Ed.2d 9

2017See, e.g., United States v. Sinisterra, 77 F.3d 101, 105 (5th Cir. 1996) (recognizing, pursuant to Carney, that the automobile exception operates to permit warrantless searches/seizures of stationary vehicles only if parked in a place not regularly used for residential purposes, but finding that the automobile exception applied to a vehicle parked in a mall parking lot because it “was not related to anyone’s residence, it was open to the public and available for public use”); United States v. Beene, 818 F.3d 157, 164 (5th Cir. 2016) (same), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 113 , 196 L.Ed.2d 9

2021Our Supreme Court held in Commonwealth v. White, 669 A.2d 896 (Pa. 1995), that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement did not apply in Pennsylvania due to the heightened privacy protection provided by Section 8, and relied on that decision in deciding Commonwealth v. Labron, 669 A.2d 917 (Pa. 1995).

2014As will be discussed in more detail, infra, the high Court in Labron corrected a misconception of this Court that, under the Fourth Amendment, the automobile exception was limited to cases in which “unforeseen circumstances involving the search of an automobile are coupled with the presence of probable cause.” Labron, 518 U.S. at 940 , 116 S.Ct. 2485 (quoting Commonwealth v. Labron, 543 Pa. 86 , 669 A.2d 917, 924 (1995)).

2021In summarizing the various principles of law that govern review of this claim, the Superior Court explained the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, which, according to the court, “permits the search and/or seizure of a motor vehicle if supported by probable cause—no separate finding of exigent circumstances is required.”4 Id. at 1274 (quoting Commonwealth v. Loughnane, 173 A.3d 733, 741 (Pa. 2017)).

2021Probable cause is a practical, nontechnical conception: it is a fluid concept - turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 4As we explain infra, the automobile exception to the warrant requirement no longer exists in Pennsylvania. [J-70-2021] - 8 Next, the Superior Court provided an overview of the Commonwealth’s various arguments, namely that: (1) it is well-settled that the odor of marijuana is sufficient to create probable cause to conduc

2014See Commonwealth v. Perry, 568 Pa. 499 , 798 A.2d 697, 708-11 (2002) (Castille, J., concurring) (characterizing Commonwealth v. White, 543 Pa. 45 , 669 A.2d 896 (1995), as having “decided the automobile exception question by employing the same - coterminous, Fourth Amendment-based construct this Court had developed and followed for years”).

2014See Commonwealth v. Perry, 568 Pa. 499 , 798 A.2d 697, 708-11 (2002) (Castille, J., concurring) (characterizing Commonwealth v. White, 543 Pa. 45 , 669 A.2d 896 (1995), as having “decided the automobile exception question by employing the same - coterminous, Fourth Amendment-based construct this Court had developed and followed for years”).

2014As will be discussed in more detail, infra, the high Court in Labron corrected a misconception of this Court that, under the Fourth Amendment, the automobile exception was limited to cases in which “unforeseen circumstances involving the search of an automobile are coupled with the presence of probable cause.” Labron, 518 U.S. at 940 , 116 S.Ct. 2485 (quoting Commonwealth v. Labron, 543 Pa. 86 , 669 A.2d 917, 924 (1995)).

2014As will be discussed in more detail, infra, the high Court in Labron corrected a misconception of this Court that, under the Fourth Amendment, the automobile exception was limited to cases in which “unforeseen circumstances involving the search of an automobile are coupled with the presence of probable cause.” Labron, 518 U.S. at 940 , 116 S.Ct. 2485 (quoting Commonwealth v. Labron, 543 Pa. 86 , 669 A.2d 917, 924 (1995)).

2017The Court concluded that “[ajpplying the vehicle exception in these circumstances allows the essential purposes .served by the exception to be fulfilled, while assuring that the exception will acknowledge legitimate privácy interests.” Id. at 394 , 105 S.Ct. 2066 ; see also Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 593 , 94 S.Ct. 2464 , 41 L.Ed.2d 325 (1974) (plurality) (finding thé seizure of a vehicle from a public place lawful under the automobile exception, differentiating Coolidge based on the vehicle’s location); Ross, 456 U.S. at 807 n.9, 102 S.Ct. 2157 (explaining the holding in Chambers as per

2017The Court concluded that “[ajpplying the vehicle exception in these circumstances allows the essential purposes .served by the exception to be fulfilled, while assuring that the exception will acknowledge legitimate privácy interests.” Id. at 394 , 105 S.Ct. 2066 ; see also Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 593 , 94 S.Ct. 2464 , 41 L.Ed.2d 325 (1974) (plurality) (finding thé seizure of a vehicle from a public place lawful under the automobile exception, differentiating Coolidge based on the vehicle’s location); Ross, 456 U.S. at 807 n.9, 102 S.Ct. 2157 (explaining the holding in Chambers as per