automobile exception in Indiana

2024See Myers, 839 N.E.2d at 1152 (holding that the defendant’s car was readily mobile and thus eligible for the automobile exception regardless of the fact that it may have been temporarily confined by physical circumstances including the position of a police vehicle blocking it from the rear and, “[b]ecause the positive narcotics dog response provided probable cause to search the readily mobile vehicle, the warrantless search of it was justified under the automobile exception”). [25] As noted earlier, the trial court did not explicitly rule on whether the automobile exception applied.

2019Moreover, [i]f a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment thus permits police to search the vehicle without more." Pennsylvania v. Labron , 518 U.S. 938 , 940, 116 S.Ct. 2485 , 135 L.Ed.2d 1031 (1996). [17] In Myers v. State , 839 N.E.2d 1146 , 1152 (Ind. 2005), our supreme court concluded: In light of the Supreme Court's recent emphatic statement in Dyson that the automobile exception 'does not have a separate exigency requirement,' 527 U.S. at 467 [ 119 S.Ct. 2013 , 144 L.Ed.2d 442 (1999)], we conclude that this exception to the

2025The automobile exception is rooted in two justifications: “1) a vehicle is readily moved and therefore the evidence may disappear while a warrant is being obtained, and 2) citizens have lower expectations of privacy in their vehicles than in their homes.” Hobbs, 933 N.E.2d at 1285 .

2024In addressing Indiana law, the court discussed State v. Hobbs, 933 N.E.2d 1281 (Ind. 2010), observing that the Hobbs Court held that the search in that case “was subject to the automobile exception such that, under federal analysis, no warrant was required to search the vehicle if the officers had probable cause to believe it contained evidence of a crime.” Id. at 101.

2019Moreover, [i]f a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment thus permits police to search the vehicle without more." Pennsylvania v. Labron , 518 U.S. 938 , 940, 116 S.Ct. 2485 , 135 L.Ed.2d 1031 (1996). [17] In Myers v. State , 839 N.E.2d 1146 , 1152 (Ind. 2005), our supreme court concluded: In light of the Supreme Court's recent emphatic statement in Dyson that the automobile exception 'does not have a separate exigency requirement,' 527 U.S. at 467 [ 119 S.Ct. 2013 , 144 L.Ed.2d 442 (1999)], we conclude that this exception to the

2019But given what we just said above and that the United States Supreme Court clarified after Brown that the automobile exception “has no separate exigency requirement,” Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465 (1999), Brown does not support Payne’s claim.

2024M.O. v. State, 63 N.E.3d 329, 331 (Ind. 2016). [19] We note that a search falls within the automobile exception when a vehicle is readily mobile and there is probable cause to believe it contains contraband or evidence of a crime. 7 Meister v. State, 933 N.E.2d 875, 878-879 (Ind. 2010) 6 On appeal, Baker asserts that the State implies that the trial court granted his motion to suppress under both the United States Constitution and Indiana Constitution and that a reading of the trial court’s order reveals that the court granted the motion based on a violation of Article 1, Section 11 of the Ind

2018See id. at 1286 (“the automobile exception does not require that there be an imminent possibility the vehicle may be driven away”); see also Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466 (1999) (“the ‘automobile exception’ has no separate exigency requirement”); Meister v. State, 933 N.E.2d 875, 880 (Ind. 2010) (applying automobile exception despite “the dearth of exigent circumstances” given defendant’s arrest).

2024Meister, 933 N.E.2d at 879 (citing California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 569 , 111 S. Ct. 1982 (1991)); see also Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 , 116 S. Ct. 2485, 2487 (1996) (“If a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment thus permits police to search the vehicle without more.” (citing Carney, 471 U.S. at 393 , 105 S. Ct. 2066 )). [20] “Most cases addressing the automobile exception arise in the context of an arrest or an investigatory stop of a motorist that gives rise to probable cause, but the exception is grounded in

2024Meister, 933 N.E.2d at 879 (citing California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 569 , 111 S. Ct. 1982 (1991)); see also Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 , 116 S. Ct. 2485, 2487 (1996) (“If a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment thus permits police to search the vehicle without more.” (citing Carney, 471 U.S. at 393 , 105 S. Ct. 2066 )). [20] “Most cases addressing the automobile exception arise in the context of an arrest or an investigatory stop of a motorist that gives rise to probable cause, but the exception is grounded in

2024Meister, 933 N.E.2d at 879 (citing California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 569 , 111 S. Ct. 1982 (1991)); see also Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 , 116 S. Ct. 2485, 2487 (1996) (“If a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment thus permits police to search the vehicle without more.” (citing Carney, 471 U.S. at 393 , 105 S. Ct. 2066 )). [20] “Most cases addressing the automobile exception arise in the context of an arrest or an investigatory stop of a motorist that gives rise to probable cause, but the exception is grounded in

2024Meister, 933 N.E.2d at 879 (citing California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 569 , 111 S. Ct. 1982 (1991)); see also Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 , 116 S. Ct. 2485, 2487 (1996) (“If a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment thus permits police to search the vehicle without more.” (citing Carney, 471 U.S. at 393 , 105 S. Ct. 2066 )). [20] “Most cases addressing the automobile exception arise in the context of an arrest or an investigatory stop of a motorist that gives rise to probable cause, but the exception is grounded in

2019See Wilkinson v. State , 70 N.E.3d 392 , 404 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (holding that under the automobile exception, once probable cause is established, officers are permitted to search any items in the vehicle that might conceal controlled substances); see also United States v. Ross , 456 U.S. 798 , 825, 102 S.Ct. 2157 , 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982) (establishing that "if probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search[ ]"). [13] Here, it does not matter that Cleveland left t

2019Wilkinson v. State, 70 N.E.3d 392, 404 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (holding that under the automobile exception, once probable cause is established, officers are permitted to search any items in the vehicle that might conceal controlled substances); see also United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982) (establishing Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2759 | July 10, 2019 Page 9 of 15 that “if probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search[]”).

2025But “[w]ith few exceptions, the courts have not hesitated to apply the vehicle exception to vehicles other than automobiles.” Carney, 471 U.S. at 393 n.2. 11 To determine whether the automobile exception applies under these circumstances, we revisit its justifications, both of which “come into play” here.

2024The automobile exception is grounded in two notions: “1) a vehicle is readily moved and therefore the evidence may disappear while a warrant is being obtained, and 2) citizens have lower expectations of privacy in their vehicles than in their homes.” State v. Hobbs, 933 N.E.2d 1281, 1285 (Ind. 2010) (citing California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391 , 105 S. Ct. 2066 (1985)).

2005E.g., compare, v. State, T5 N.E.2d 1207, 1211 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (legally parked automobile surrounded by police officers held not inherently mobile to qualify for automobile exeeption), transfer denied, and Edwards v. State, 768 N.E.2d 506, 508-09 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (impounded vehicle no longer "inherently mobile"), trams. not sought, with Johnson v. State, 766 N.E2d 426, 483 (Ind.Ct.App. 2002) (holding that ready mobility existed when a car was capable of being driven, even after the driver was arrested and despite the absence of other potential drivers), trans. demied, and Justice v. State, 7

2004See Edwards v. State, 762 N.E.2d 128 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) affd on rehearing, 768 N.E.2d 506 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), trans. denied; Scott v. State, 775 N.E.2d 1207 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), trans. denied (2003); Shepherd v. State, 690 N.E.2d 318 (Ind.Ct.App.1997), trans. denied; Green v. State, 647 N.E.2d 694 (Ind.Ct.App.1995).

2025Collins, 584 U.S. at 592 . [23] To refresh, the automobile exception is based on a vehicle’s ready mobility and its occupants’ lesser expectations of privacy.

2020The trial court entered an order again denying Combs’ motion to suppress and found as follows: This Court finds that in this case under consideration, the State did not rely on the automobile exception to enter onto Defendant’s property and seize evidence as was prohibited in Collins v. Virginia[, __ U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1663 (2018)].

2017Id. at 996 ; see Johnson v. State, 766 N.E.2d 426, 432 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that Fourth Amendment does not require a separate exigency requirement for the automobile exception). [10] We initially note that sufficient probable cause existed for the police to believe that evidence of a crime—namely, the unidentified driver’s involvement in a hit and run as well as the driver’s vehicle registration—would be found in Burton’s vehicle.

2004One exception to the warrant requirement is the automobile exception." Johnson, 766 N.E.2d at 432 (citations omitted).

2003In Edwards, we noted that the original justification for the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement was "the exigent circumstances arising out of the likely disappearance of the vehicle." [2] 762 N.E.2d at 134 (citing California *1064 v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 569 , 111 S.Ct. 1982 , 114 L.Ed.2d 619 (1991)).

2003In Edwards, we noted that the original justification for the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement was "the exigent cireumstances arising out of the likely disappearance of the vehicle. 2 762 N.E.2d at 134 (citing Califor nia v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 569 , 111 S.Ct. 1982 , 114 L.Ed.2d 619 (1991)).

2024M.O. v. State, 63 N.E.3d 329, 331 (Ind. 2016). [19] We note that a search falls within the automobile exception when a vehicle is readily mobile and there is probable cause to believe it contains contraband or evidence of a crime. 7 Meister v. State, 933 N.E.2d 875, 878-879 (Ind. 2010) 6 On appeal, Baker asserts that the State implies that the trial court granted his motion to suppress under both the United States Constitution and Indiana Constitution and that a reading of the trial court’s order reveals that the court granted the motion based on a violation of Article 1, Section 11 of the Ind

2019For a search to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, a warrant is required, id., and if a search is conducted without a warrant, the State bears the burden to show that one of the “well-delineated exceptions” to the warrant requirement applies, M.O. v. State, 63 N.E.3d 329, 331 (Ind. 2016). [11] The State contends that the automobile exception applies to the facts of this case.

2013Masterson v. State, 843 N.E.2d 1001, 1004 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied; see also Myers v. State, 839 N.E.2d 1146, 1152 (Ind. 2005).

2010"Facts necessary to demonstrate the existence of probable cause for a war-rantless search are not materially different from those which would authorize the issuance of a warrant if presented to a magistrate." Masterson v. State, 843 N.E.2d 1001, 1004 (Ind.Ct.App.2006) (citation omitted), trans. denied, 855 N.E.2d 1007 (Ind.2006).

2001Thus, the automobile exception to the search warrant rule requires more than probable cause, because "[olnly in exigent circumstances will the judgment of the police as to probable cause serve as a sufficient authorization for a search." Chambers, 399 U.S. at 51 , 90 S.Ct. at 1981 .

2001Thus, the automobile exception to the search warrant rule requires more than probable cause, because "[olnly in exigent circumstances will the judgment of the police as to probable cause serve as a sufficient authorization for a search." Chambers, 399 U.S. at 51 , 90 S.Ct. at 1981 .

2019Cheatham v. State , 819 N.E.2d 71 , 75-76 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).

2019Cheatham v. State, 819 N.E.2d 71, 75-76 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).

2017Id. at 996 ; see Johnson v. State, 766 N.E.2d 426, 432 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that Fourth Amendment does not require a separate exigency requirement for the automobile exception). [10] We initially note that sufficient probable cause existed for the police to believe that evidence of a crime—namely, the unidentified driver’s involvement in a hit and run as well as the driver’s vehicle registration—would be found in Burton’s vehicle.

2003See also Justice v. State, 767 N.E.2d 995, 996 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) ("[Tlhe Fourth Amendment does not require a separate exigency requirement for the automobile exception."); Cody v. State, 702 N.E.2d 364, 366 (Ind.Ct.App.1998) ("An automobile may be searched without a warrant where there is probable cause to believe that the automobile contains articles that the officers are entitled to seize.").

2025Said another way, “[w]hen there is probable cause to search for contraband in a car, it is reasonable for police officers . . . to examine packages and containers without a showing of individualized probable cause for each one.” Houghton, 526 U.S. at 302 (“[N]either Ross itself nor the historical evidence it relied upon admits of a distinction among packages or containers based on ownership.”). 8 No separate exigent circumstances are required for the automobile exception to apply.

2018We begin with the automobile exception as discussed in Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 297 (1999).

2019See Wilkinson v. State , 70 N.E.3d 392 , 404 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (holding that under the automobile exception, once probable cause is established, officers are permitted to search any items in the vehicle that might conceal controlled substances); see also United States v. Ross , 456 U.S. 798 , 825, 102 S.Ct. 2157 , 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982) (establishing that "if probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search[ ]"). [13] Here, it does not matter that Cleveland left t

2019Wilkinson v. State, 70 N.E.3d 392, 404 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (holding that under the automobile exception, once probable cause is established, officers are permitted to search any items in the vehicle that might conceal controlled substances); see also United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982) (establishing Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2759 | July 10, 2019 Page 9 of 15 that “if probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search[]”).

2018See Carroll v. U.S., 267 U.S. 132, 159 (1925) (holding a warrantless search of a vehicle is permissible under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment where police possess probable cause).

2013The automobile exception was first applied in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925).

2019"Facts necessary to demonstrate the existence of probable cause for a warrantless search are not materially different from those which would authorize the issuance of a warrant if presented to a magistrate." Gibson v. State , 733 N.E.2d 945 , 952 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).

2004Gibson v. State, 733 N.E.2d 945, 951 (Ind.Ct.App.2000).

2015See Johnson v. State, 766 N.E.2d 426, 431-433 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that the police had probable cause to search under the hood of a vehicle where police responded to a report of shots fired and an officer was informed by witnesses of a description of one of the shooters, the vehicle, and that a handgun had been stashed under the hood of the car, and police subsequently stopped a vehicle and driver matching the description given by the witnesses), trans. denied; Thurman v. State, 602 N.E.2d 548, 554 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that the marijuana was in open view, that there was no se

2015See Johnson v. State, 766 N.E.2d 426, 431-433 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that the police had probable cause to search under the hood of a vehicle where police responded to a report of shots fired and an officer was informed by witnesses of a description of one of the shooters, the vehicle, and that a handgun had been stashed under the hood of the car, and police subsequently stopped a vehicle and driver matching the description given by the witnesses), trans. denied; Thurman v. State, 602 N.E.2d 548, 554 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that the marijuana was in open view, that there was no se

2015Principles underlying the automobile exception include a vehicle’s mobility and subjection to government regulation, California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390-93 , 105 S.Ct. 2066 , 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985), and the inability to avoid public scrutiny due to its exposure to “public thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in plain view,” South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 , 96 S.Ct. 3092 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976) (citation omitted). ■ [13] The automobile exception allows law enforcement to search not Only the vehicle itself but also any containers inside it that may contain

2015Principles underlying the automobile exception include a vehicle’s mobility and subjection to government regulation, California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390-93 , 105 S.Ct. 2066 , 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985), and the inability to avoid public scrutiny due to its exposure to “public thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in plain view,” South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 , 96 S.Ct. 3092 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976) (citation omitted). ■ [13] The automobile exception allows law enforcement to search not Only the vehicle itself but also any containers inside it that may contain

2012One such exception is the search incident to arrest.1 This exception to the warrant requirement was articulated in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 , 89 S. Ct. 2034, 2040 (1969), where the Court held that a search incident to arrest may include “the 1 The State also argues that the search was proper under the automobile exception because Officer Shockey had probable cause to believe the vehicle contained evidence of a crime.

2012One such exception is the search incident to arrest.1 This exception to the warrant requirement was articulated in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 , 89 S. Ct. 2034, 2040 (1969), where the Court held that a search incident to arrest may include “the 1 The State also argues that the search was proper under the automobile exception because Officer Shockey had probable cause to believe the vehicle contained evidence of a crime.

2003See also Scott v. State, 775 N.E.2d 1207, 1210 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), trans. denied (2003) ("If a vehicle is no longer `inherently mobile' and obtaining a search warrant is reasonably practicable, then the automobile exception does not apply."); Shepherd v. State, 690 N.E.2d 318, 323 (Ind.Ct.App. 1997), trans. denied ("Where it is practicable to obtain a search warrant, it is unreasonable to conduct a warrantless search of an automobile."); Green v. State, 647 N.E.2d 694, 696 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) ("[B]ecause it was practicable ... to obtain a search warrant, it was unreasonable ... to conduct a warra

2003See also Scott v. State, 775 N.E.2d 1207, 1210 (Ind.Ct,App.2002), trans. denied (2003) ("If a vehicle is no longer 'inherently mobile' and obtaining a search warrant is reasonably practicable, then the automobile exception does not apply."); Shepherd v. State, 690 N.E.2d 318, 323 (Ind.Ct.App.1997), trans. denied ("Where it is practicable to obtain a search warrant, it is unreasonable to conduct a warrantless search of an automobile."); Green v. State, 647 N.E.2d 694, 696 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) ("[Ble-cause it was practicable ... to obtain a search warrant, it was unreasonable ... to conduct a warra

2003See also Scott v. State, 775 N.E.2d 1207, 1210 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), trans. denied (2003) ("If a vehicle is no longer `inherently mobile' and obtaining a search warrant is reasonably practicable, then the automobile exception does not apply."); Shepherd v. State, 690 N.E.2d 318, 323 (Ind.Ct.App. 1997), trans. denied ("Where it is practicable to obtain a search warrant, it is unreasonable to conduct a warrantless search of an automobile."); Green v. State, 647 N.E.2d 694, 696 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) ("[B]ecause it was practicable ... to obtain a search warrant, it was unreasonable ... to conduct a warra

2003See also Scott v. State, 775 N.E.2d 1207, 1210 (Ind.Ct,App.2002), trans. denied (2003) ("If a vehicle is no longer 'inherently mobile' and obtaining a search warrant is reasonably practicable, then the automobile exception does not apply."); Shepherd v. State, 690 N.E.2d 318, 323 (Ind.Ct.App.1997), trans. denied ("Where it is practicable to obtain a search warrant, it is unreasonable to conduct a warrantless search of an automobile."); Green v. State, 647 N.E.2d 694, 696 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) ("[Ble-cause it was practicable ... to obtain a search warrant, it was unreasonable ... to conduct a warra

2003See also Scott v. State, 775 N.E.2d 1207, 1210 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), trans. denied (2003) ("If a vehicle is no longer `inherently mobile' and obtaining a search warrant is reasonably practicable, then the automobile exception does not apply."); Shepherd v. State, 690 N.E.2d 318, 323 (Ind.Ct.App. 1997), trans. denied ("Where it is practicable to obtain a search warrant, it is unreasonable to conduct a warrantless search of an automobile."); Green v. State, 647 N.E.2d 694, 696 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) ("[B]ecause it was practicable ... to obtain a search warrant, it was unreasonable ... to conduct a warra

2003See also Scott v. State, 775 N.E.2d 1207, 1210 (Ind.Ct,App.2002), trans. denied (2003) ("If a vehicle is no longer 'inherently mobile' and obtaining a search warrant is reasonably practicable, then the automobile exception does not apply."); Shepherd v. State, 690 N.E.2d 318, 323 (Ind.Ct.App.1997), trans. denied ("Where it is practicable to obtain a search warrant, it is unreasonable to conduct a warrantless search of an automobile."); Green v. State, 647 N.E.2d 694, 696 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) ("[Ble-cause it was practicable ... to obtain a search warrant, it was unreasonable ... to conduct a warra

2025See, e.g., United States v. Tartaglia, 864 F.2d 837 (D.C.