automobile exception in Tennessee

2018See State v. Leveye, 796 S.W.2d 948, 949 (Tenn. 1990) (upholding the search of a defendant’s car after his arrest pursuant to the automobile exception where the car was parked in a truck stop lot approximately seventy-five yards from the place where the defendant was arrested); Ronewicz, 2012 WL 6719646 , at *20 (concluding that the victim’s identification of stolen items in the van gave probable cause to search); State v. Jason Paul Sherwood, No. M2005-01883-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 189376 , at *9 (Tenn. 4 In Drinkard, our supreme court set forth guidelines to determine the validity of an inventory

2016In differentiating between the particular circumstances of this case and other cases where the automobile exception has been applied, the Defendant directs us to State v. Leveye, wherein our supreme court drew a distinction between “fluid” and “stable” situations involving vehicles. 796 S.W.2d 948, 951 (Tenn. 1990).

2019The supreme court also held that “the automobile exception does not require a separate finding of exigency under the Tennessee Constitution.” Id.

2019The automobile exception “permits an officer to search an automobile if the officer has probable cause to believe that the automobile contains contraband.” See State v. Saine, 297 S.W.3d 199, 207 (Tenn. 2009) (holding that the automobile exception requires probable cause but does not require a separate finding of exigency).

2009See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 576 , 111 S.Ct. 1982 , 114 L.Ed.2d 619 (1991); see also State v. Leveye, 796 S.W.2d 948, 953 (Tenn.1990) (acknowledging that this Court has consistently followed United States Supreme Court decisions involving the automobile exception and deeming it "appropriate to continue to do so”).

2009See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 576 , 111 S.Ct. 1982 , 114 L.Ed.2d 619 (1991); see also State v. Leveye, 796 S.W.2d 948, 953 (Tenn.1990) (acknowledging that this Court has consistently followed United States Supreme Court decisions involving the automobile exception and deeming it "appropriate to continue to do so”).

1976Moreover, even if he could have gained access to his car, he could not have driven it away, because a police car was blocking the driveway. . . . ‘[N]o amount of probable cause can justify a warrantless search or seizure, absent “exigent circumstances.” ’ Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, 403 U.S. at 468 , 91 S.Ct. at 2039 , and so the seizure here does not fall within the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.” 502 F.2d 287 . *68 In our view, the Coolidge, Young and McCormick decisions are controlling in determining the validity of the seizure without a warrant of the automobile in

1976Moreover, even if he could have gained access to his car, he could not have driven it away, because a police car was blocking the driveway. . . . ‘[N]o amount of probable cause can justify a warrantless search or seizure, absent “exigent circumstances.” ’ Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, 403 U.S. at 468 , 91 S.Ct. at 2039 , and so the seizure here does not fall within the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.” 502 F.2d 287 . *68 In our view, the Coolidge, Young and McCormick decisions are controlling in determining the validity of the seizure without a warrant of the automobile in

2016See Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466-67 (1999) (“[U]nder our established precedent, the „automobile exception‟ has no separate exigency requirement.”).

2011Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466-67 (1999); State v. Saine, 297 S.W.3d 199, 207 (Tenn. 2009).

2016Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925).

2013See Chambers, 299 U.S. at 49 (citing Carroll, 267 U.S. at 158-59 ) (noting that the search of an automobile based upon probable cause “proceeds on a theory wholly different from that justifying the search incident to an arrest.”); see also, -25- Leveye, 796 S.W.2d at 949 (upholding the search of a defendant’s car after his arrest pursuant to the automobile exception where the car was parked in a truck stop lot approximately 75 yards from the place where the defendant was arrested).

2019See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); see also California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991).

2016Only the prior approval of the magistrate is waived; the search otherwise is as the magistrate could authorize.” United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823 (1982). -9- Det.

2024California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 393 (1985).

2019See State v. Leveye, 796 S.W.2d 948, 953 (Tenn. 1990) (adopting California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985)).

2020See State v. Nicholson, 188 S.W.3d 649, 656 (Tenn. 2006).

2019See State v. Shrum, 643 S.W.2d 891, 893 (Tenn. 1982); State v. Blakely, 677 S.W.2d 12, 16 (Tenn. Crim.

2019State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996).

2019This court has previously held that “[t]he detection of the odor of marijuana [i]s sufficient to allow the subsequent warrantless search of the automobile[.]” Hicks v. State, 534 S.W.2d 872, 874 (Tenn. Crim.

2019See State v. Watkins, 827 S.W.2d 293, 295 (Tenn. 1992).

2019See State v. Shrum, 643 S.W.2d 891, 893 (Tenn. 1982); State v. Blakely, 677 S.W.2d 12, 16 (Tenn. Crim.

2019Fuqua, 543 S.W.2d at 68 ; see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), U.S. v. Young, 489 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1974).

2015Consequently, A[i]f the officer has probable cause to believe that the automobile contains contraband, the officer may either seize the automobile and then obtain a warrant or search the automobile immediately.@ Id. (citing Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970).

2013The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution protect against unreasonable searches and seizures. “[U]nder both the federal and state constitutions, a warrantless search or seizure is presumed unreasonable, and evidence discovered as a result thereof is subject to suppression unless the State demonstrates that the search or seizure was conducted pursuant to one of the narrowly defined exceptions to the warrant requirement.” Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d at 629 (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); State v. Bartram,

2013Whether officers searched it at the Gregory house or searched it later at the police department is of no moment because “the justification to conduct a warrantless search does not vanish once the car has been immobilized.” Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259, 261 (1982); see also, Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67, 68 (1975) (emphasizing that Chambers held “that police officers with probable cause to search an automobile at the scene where it was stopped could constitutionally do so later at the station house without first obtaining a warrant.”); Carrie Lynn Ronewicks, 2012 WL 6719646 , at *20 (conclud

2013Whether officers searched it at the Gregory house or searched it later at the police department is of no moment because “the justification to conduct a warrantless search does not vanish once the car has been immobilized.” Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259, 261 (1982); see also, Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67, 68 (1975) (emphasizing that Chambers held “that police officers with probable cause to search an automobile at the scene where it was stopped could constitutionally do so later at the station house without first obtaining a warrant.”); Carrie Lynn Ronewicks, 2012 WL 6719646 , at *20 (conclud

2012For analytical purposes, we divide the numerous items of evidence seized by police into four categories: (1) items that were seen by Detective Howell, other officers, and the victim while they were still located on the public roadway (i.e. during their initial drive-by of the defendant’s home), which by his testimony were seized prior to the issuance of a search warrant; (2) items that were seen by Detective Howell while he was located on the defendant’s property as he approached the defendant’s residence in an attempt to perform a consensual “knock and talk,” which by his testimony were also

2012Pursuant to the automobile exception, the officer was free to search the van immediately or have it towed and searched later pursuant to either a search warrant or, as the trial court held, pursuant to the inventory search exception, see South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 371 (U.S. 1976) (sustaining vehicle inventory procedures as reasonable police intrusions not prohibited by the Fourth Amendment).