automobile exception in Maryland

2022As such, the case dealt with the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, also known as the “Carroll doctrine,” which allows an officer to “search an automobile, without a warrant, if he or she has 5 The General Assembly has provided exceptions to this enforcement regime for those who have obtained marijuana “directly or by prescription or order from an authorized provider acting in the course of professional practice.” CR § 5-601(a)(1). 12 probable cause to believe it contains evidence of a crime or contraband goods.” Id. at 468 (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); W

2022As such, the case dealt with the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, also known as the “Carroll doctrine,” which allows an officer to “search an automobile, without a warrant, if he or she has 5 The General Assembly has provided exceptions to this enforcement regime for those who have obtained marijuana “directly or by prescription or order from an authorized provider acting in the course of professional practice.” CR § 5-601(a)(1). 12 probable cause to believe it contains evidence of a crime or contraband goods.” Id. at 468 (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); W

2005See Berry v. State, supra ("It is clear from [the cited cases] that 'the automobile exception does not have a separate exigency requirement: “If a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment ... permits police to search the automobile without *177 more.” ’ ''). 155 Md.App. at 176 , 843 A.2d 93 (citing Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467 , 119 S.Ct. 2013 , 144 L.Ed.2d 442 (1999)). [9] 9.

2005See Berry v. State, supra ("It is clear from [the cited cases] that 'the automobile exception does not have a separate exigency requirement: “If a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment ... permits police to search the automobile without *177 more.” ’ ''). 155 Md.App. at 176 , 843 A.2d 93 (citing Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467 , 119 S.Ct. 2013 , 144 L.Ed.2d 442 (1999)). [9] 9.

2003Therefore, the search of the vehicle was valid as a search incident to an arrest, Ford, 37 Md.App. at 380 , 377 A.2d 577 (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 , 89 S.Ct. 2034 , 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969)), or under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment.

2003Therefore, the search of the vehicle was valid as a search incident to an arrest, Ford, 37 Md.App. at 380 , 377 A.2d 577 (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 , 89 S.Ct. 2034 , 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969)), or under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment.

2017Id. at 151 , 45 S.Ct. 280 ; see also Berry v. State, 155 Md.App. 144, 178 , 843 A.2d 93 (2004) (explaining that the automobile exception has no separate exigency requirement).

2017Id. at 151 , 45 S.Ct. 280 ; see also Berry v. State, 155 Md.App. 144, 178 , 843 A.2d 93 (2004) (explaining that the automobile exception has no separate exigency requirement).

2017See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 , 70 S.Ct. 430 , 94 L.Ed. 653 (1950), overruled in part by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 , 89 S.Ct. 2034 , 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969)).

2017See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 , 70 S.Ct. 430 , 94 L.Ed. 653 (1950), overruled in part by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 , 89 S.Ct. 2034 , 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969)).

2026The automobile exception originates from the case of Carroll [v. United States], 267 U.S. 132 [(1925)], and has been referred to the as “the Carroll doctrine.” (Citations omitted). -7- [OFFICER HUFF:] While we were behind it going west on West North Ave, we observed the operator begin to manipulate the cellphone that was mounted to the dash or windshield, and it appeared like he was typing a message or placing a phone call while he was driving the vehicle. [PROSECUTOR:] Okay, why did you think that? . . .

2022But “the scope of the automobile exception extends no further than the automobile itself,” Collins, 138 S. Ct. at 1671 , and probable cause to search a vehicle does not automatically provide probable cause to search an occupant of the vehicle, State v. Wallace, 372 Md. 137, 144 (2002). 18 “Although typically described as the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, the Carroll exception also applies to searches of other vehicles.” Lewis v. State, 470 Md. 1 , 20 n.6 (2020); see also Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153 (characterizing “ship[s], motor boat[s], wagon[s], [and] automo

2022But “the scope of the automobile exception extends no further than the automobile itself,” Collins, 138 S. Ct. at 1671 , and probable cause to search a vehicle does not automatically provide probable cause to search an occupant of the vehicle, State v. Wallace, 372 Md. 137, 144 (2002). 18 “Although typically described as the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, the Carroll exception also applies to searches of other vehicles.” Lewis v. State, 470 Md. 1 , 20 n.6 (2020); see also Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153 (characterizing “ship[s], motor boat[s], wagon[s], [and] automo

2019The distinction between the two exceptions is at least in part due to the diminished expectation of privacy that justifies the automobile exception, Carney, 471 U.S. at 390-92 , as compared to the “unique, significantly heightened” constitutional protections afforded a 10 person to be secure in his or her body, Houghton, 526 U.S. at 303 .

2023The automobile exception “authorize[s] the warrantless search of a vehicle if, at the time of the search, the police have developed ‘probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime.’” Pacheco v. State, 465 Md. 311, 321 (2019) (quoting Johnson v. State, 458 Md. 519, 533 (2018)). -9- the arrest before police could conduct a warrantless search of the individual.

2020Under the automobile exception, “Carroll [v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925),] and its progeny authorize the warrantless search of a vehicle if, at the time of the search, the police have developed ‘probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime.’” Id. at 321 (quoting State v. Johnson, 458 Md. 519, 533 (2018)).

2017The Court of Special Appeals also examined case law from the Supreme Court and other jurisdictions and concluded that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement is not limited to where there is probable cause to believe there is evidence of a crime in a vehicle; rather, the Court of Special Appeals determined that “a search is permitted when there is probable cause to believe that the car contains evidence of a crime or contraband.” W. at 472, 134 A.3d at 396 (emphasis in original).

2017The Court of Special Appeals also examined case law from the Supreme Court and other jurisdictions and concluded that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement is not limited to where there is probable cause to believe there is evidence of a crime in a vehicle; rather, the Court of Special Appeals determined that “a search is permitted when there is probable cause to believe that the car contains evidence of a crime or contraband.” Id. at 472 , 134 A.3d at 396 (emphasis in original).

2022But “the scope of the automobile exception extends no further than the automobile itself,” Collins, 138 S. Ct. at 1671 , and probable cause to search a vehicle does not automatically provide probable cause to search an occupant of the vehicle, State v. Wallace, 372 Md. 137, 144 (2002). 18 “Although typically described as the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, the Carroll exception also applies to searches of other vehicles.” Lewis v. State, 470 Md. 1 , 20 n.6 (2020); see also Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153 (characterizing “ship[s], motor boat[s], wagon[s], [and] automo

2019“Expanding the scope of the automo- bile exception [beyond the vehicle] would both undervalue the core Fourth Amendment protection afforded to the home and its curtilage and ‘untether’ the automobile exception 6 ‘from the justifications underlying’ it.” Id. (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 , 386 (2014)).

2019However, before a person can be lawfully arrested and searched incident thereto the focus must be on the likelihood of the “guilt of the arrestee,” LaFave at 9, and asks whether “there is probable cause to believe that the individual has committed either a felony or a misde- meanor in an officer’s presence.” Donaldson, 416 Md. at 480 ; see also United States v. Humphries, 372 F.3d 653, 659 (4th Cir. 2004) (“In the search context, the question is whether the totality of circumstances is sufficient to warrant a reasonable person to believe that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in

2019However, before a person can be lawfully arrested and searched incident thereto the focus must be on the likelihood of the “guilt of the arrestee,” LaFave at 9, and asks whether “there is probable cause to believe that the individual has committed either a felony or a misde- meanor in an officer’s presence.” Donaldson, 416 Md. at 480 ; see also United States v. Humphries, 372 F.3d 653, 659 (4th Cir. 2004) (“In the search context, the question is whether the totality of circumstances is sufficient to warrant a reasonable person to believe that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in

2019The Search Incident to Arrest Exception The exception that authorizes a search incident to the (lawful) arrest of a person “has an ancient pedigree” and was recognized “[w]ell before the Nation’s founding.” Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2174 (2016).

2019The Search Incident to Arrest Exception The exception that authorizes a search incident to the (lawful) arrest of a person “has an ancient pedigree” and was recognized “[w]ell before the Nation’s founding.” Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2174 (2016).

2011See Nair v. State, 51 Md.App. 234, 237 , 442 A.2d 196 (1982) (A warrantless search of an automobile was proper where police were informed that the vehicle contained illegal firearms that were to be sold that day.); United States v. Newbourn, 600 F.2d 452, 454 (4th Cir.1979) (Upholding the warrantless search of the trunk of a vehicle loaded with stolen firearms under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement); Jarrell v. State, 36 Md.App. 371, 374 , 373 A.2d 975 (1977) (Upholding the warrantless search of a vehicle for marijuana upon receiving information that a sale was to occur with

1982See also United States v. Neubourn, 600 F. 2d 452 (4th Cir. 1979) where the Fourth Circuit under a similar factual situation held that the warrantless search of the trunk of a vehicle loaded with stolen firearms was within the automobile exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.

2006United States v. Klinginsmith, 25 F.3d 1507, 1510 (10th Cir.1994), had no difficulty reaching this conclusion: [WJken the canine “alerted” to the vehicle, the district court held that the officers had probable cause to arrest the defendants and effect an immediate search under the automobile exception to the search warrant requirement.

2001United States v. Klinginsmith, 25 F.3d 1507, 1510 (10th Cir.1994), had no difficulty reaching this conclusion: *723 [W]hen the canine “alerted” to the vehicle, the district court held that the officers had probable cause to arrest the defendants and effect an immediate search under the automobile exception to the search warrant requirement.

2023The automobile exception “authorize[s] the warrantless search of a vehicle if, at the time of the search, the police have developed ‘probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime.’” Pacheco v. State, 465 Md. 311, 321 (2019) (quoting Johnson v. State, 458 Md. 519, 533 (2018)). -9- the arrest before police could conduct a warrantless search of the individual.

2022The automobile exception “requires the same ‘quantum of evidence’”—probable cause—as the search incident to arrest exception, but each exception “requires a showing of probabilities as to somewhat different facts and circumstances.” Pacheco, 465 Md. at 324 -25 (quoting 2 Wayne R.

2022Although the Court acknowledged that “it is effectively impossible for law enforcement officers to identify a quantity of [cannabis] based on odor alone,” id. at 130 , the Court noted that possession of less than 10 grams of cannabis, while no longer criminal, is still illegal, and, thus, “any amount” of cannabis “remains contraband,” id. at 99 .24 The odor of cannabis, then, “gives rise to probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband,” id., and the automobile exception authorizes a police officer to search a vehicle based on probable cause that it contains contraband, id. at

2022Although the Court acknowledged that “it is effectively impossible for law enforcement officers to identify a quantity of [cannabis] based on odor alone,” id. at 130 , the Court noted that possession of less than 10 grams of cannabis, while no longer criminal, is still illegal, and, thus, “any amount” of cannabis “remains contraband,” id. at 99 .24 The odor of cannabis, then, “gives rise to probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband,” id., and the automobile exception authorizes a police officer to search a vehicle based on probable cause that it contains contraband, id. at

2023Whereas the Carroll Doctrine places no limits on the character of the suspected evidence, the Arizona v. Gant exception limits the predicate for the search to “evidence of the offense of arrest.” The Gant Court noted that the search incident to arrest exception is narrower than the automobile exception, which “authorizes a search of any area of the vehicle in which the evidence might be found.” See Gant, 556 U.S. at 347 (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 , 820–21 (1982)).

2023We also emphasize that “the scope of the search authorized [under the automobile exception] is broader” than under the search incident to arrest exception, and that both are limited to “any area of the vehicle in which the evidence [sought] might be found.” Gant, 556 U.S. at 347 .

2017The automobile exception originates from the case of Carroll, 267 U.S. 132 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 543 , and has been referred to as “the Carroll doctrine.” See Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 569-70 , 111 S.Ct. 1982 .

2017The automobile exception originates from the case of Carroll, 267 U.S. 132 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 543 , and has been referred to as “the Carroll doctrine.” See Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 569-70 , 111 S.Ct. 1982 .

2022Search Incident to Arrest Exception Under the search incident to arrest exception, police may lawfully search a person pursuant to a warrantless arrest if the police have probable cause to believe that the person “has committed a felony or is committing a felony or misdemeanor in the presence of the police.” Pacheco v. State, 465 Md. 311 , 321- 22 (2019) (citing Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 369-70 (2003)).

2005Instead, relying on Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 , 124 S.Ct. 795 , 157 L.Ed.2d 769 (2003), the State asserts that a “warrantless arrest of an individual in a public place for a felony or a misdemeanor [9] committed in the officer’s presence! ] is consistent with the Fourth Amendment if the arrest is supported by probable cause.” See also Miller v. State, 380 Md. 1, 50 , 843 A.2d 803 (2004), and Johnson v. State, 142 Md.App. 172, 187 , 788 A.2d 678 (2002).

2022But “the scope of the automobile exception extends no further than the automobile itself,” Collins, 138 S. Ct. at 1671 , and probable cause to search a vehicle does not automatically provide probable cause to search an occupant of the vehicle, State v. Wallace, 372 Md. 137, 144 (2002). 18 “Although typically described as the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, the Carroll exception also applies to searches of other vehicles.” Lewis v. State, 470 Md. 1 , 20 n.6 (2020); see also Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153 (characterizing “ship[s], motor boat[s], wagon[s], [and] automo

2017The automobile exception, or Carroll doctrine, “allows vehicles to be searched without a warrant provided that the officer has probable cause to believe that a crime-connected item is within the car.” State v. Wallace, 372 Md. 137, 146 , 812 A.2d 291 (2002).

2015“Rather, the ‘reasonable to believe’ standard probably is akin to the ‘reasonable suspicion’ standard required to justify a Terry search.” Vinton, 594 F.3d at 25 (citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 , 92 S.Ct. 1921 , 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972)) (noting that a Terry search is permissible if the officer has reason to believe that the suspect is armed and dangerous).

2015“Rather, the ‘reasonable to believe’ standard probably is akin to the “reasonable suspicion” standard required to justify a Terry search.” Vinton, 594 F.3d at 25 (citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972)) (noting that a Terry search is permissible if the officer has reason to believe that the suspect is armed and dangerous).