automobile exception in Georgia

2019"Under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement imposed by the Fourth Amendment, a police officer may search a car without warrant if he has probable cause to believe the car contains contraband, even if there is no exigency preventing the officer from getting a search warrant." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) State v. Sarden , 305 Ga. App. 587 , 589, 699 S.E.2d 880 (2010).

2013“Under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement imposed by the Fourth Amendment, a police officer may search a car without a warrant if he has probable cause to believe the car contains contraband, even if there is no exigency preventing the officer from getting a search warrant.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) State v. Sarden, 305 Ga. App. 587, 589 ( 699 SE2d 880 ) (2010).

2010“The automobile exception provides that a police officer may search a car without a warrant if he has probable cause to believe the car contains contraband, even if there is no exigency preventing the officer from getting a search warrant.” (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Benton v. State, 240 Ga. App. 243 ( 522 SE2d 726 ) (1999).

2010“The automobile exception provides that a police officer may search a car without a warrant if he has probable cause to believe the car contains contraband, even if there is no exigency preventing the officer from getting a search warrant.” (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Benton v. State, 240 Ga. App. 243 ( 522 SE2d 726 ) (1999).

2015See California v. Carney, 471 U. S. 386, 394 (III) ( 105 SCt 2066 , 85 LE2d 406) (1985) (The validity of a warrantless search under the automobile exception is determined according to the same standard used by a magistrate in deciding to issue a search warrant, “only the prior approval of the magistrate is waived; the search otherwise must be such as the magistrate could authorize.”) (citation and punctuation omitted); United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798, 809 (II) ( 102 SCt 2157 , 72 LE2d 572) (1982) (A warrantless search under the automobile exception based on probable cause “is not unreason

2015See California v. Carney, 471 U. S. 386, 394 (III) ( 105 SCt 2066 , 85 LE2d 406) (1985) (The validity of a warrantless search under the automobile exception is determined according to the same standard used by a magistrate in deciding to issue a search warrant, “only the prior approval of the magistrate is waived; the search otherwise must be such as the magistrate could authorize.”) (citation and punctuation omitted); United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798, 809 (II) ( 102 SCt 2157 , 72 LE2d 572) (1982) (A warrantless search under the automobile exception based on probable cause “is not unreason

2013See Gant, supra, 556 U. S. at 347 (IV) (reaffirming the viability of the automobile exception).

2013See Gant, supra, 556 U. S. at 347 (IV) (reaffirming the viability of the automobile exception).

2013See Jones v. State, 319 Ga. App. 678 ( 738 SE2d 130 ) (2013) (smell of burnt and raw marijuana emitting from vehicle justified search of trunk once officers were unable to find marijuana in the passenger compartment); Brown, 311 Ga. App. at 408 (smell of marijuana, observation of suspected marijuana on floorboards of the car, and driver’s visible agitation justified warrantless search of vehicle, including trunk, under automobile exception to warrant requirement).

2013(Punctuation and footnotes omitted.) Brown v. State, 311 Ga. App. 405, 407 (2) ( 715 SE2d 802 ) (2011).

2015See California v. Carney, 471 U. S. 386, 394 (III) ( 105 SCt 2066 , 85 LE2d 406) (1985) (The validity of a warrantless search under the automobile exception is determined according to the same standard used by a magistrate in deciding to issue a search warrant, “only the prior approval of the magistrate is waived; the search otherwise must be such as the magistrate could authorize.”) (citation and punctuation omitted); United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798, 809 (II) ( 102 SCt 2157 , 72 LE2d 572) (1982) (A warrantless search under the automobile exception based on probable cause “is not unreason

2015See California v. Carney, 471 U. S. 386, 394 (III) ( 105 SCt 2066 , 85 LE2d 406) (1985) (The validity of a warrantless search under the automobile exception is determined according to the same standard used by a magistrate in deciding to issue a search warrant, “only the prior approval of the magistrate is waived; the search otherwise must be such as the magistrate could authorize.”) (citation and punctuation omitted); United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798, 809 (II) ( 102 SCt 2157 , 72 LE2d 572) (1982) (A warrantless search under the automobile exception based on probable cause “is not unreason

2012See generally State v. Lejeune, 276 Ga. 179, 182-183 (2) ( 576 SE2d 888 ) (2003) (re: the automobile exception).

2012See generally State v. Lejeune, 276 Ga. 179, 182-183 (2) ( 576 SE2d 888 ) (2003) (re: the automobile exception).

2019Hill first argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress, challenging the credibility of the officer who initiated the stop and contending that the officer unreasonably prolonged the stop. " 'Under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement imposed by the Fourth Amendment, a police officer may search a car without a warrant if he has probable cause to believe the car contains contraband, even if there is no exigency preventing the officer from getting a search warrant.' " (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Shell v. State , 315 Ga. App. 628 , 631 (2), 727 S.E.2d

2019Hill first argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress, challenging the credibility of the officer who initiated the stop and contending that the officer unreasonably prolonged the stop. " 'Under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement imposed by the Fourth Amendment, a police officer may search a car without a warrant if he has probable cause to believe the car contains contraband, even if there is no exigency preventing the officer from getting a search warrant.' " (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Shell v. State , 315 Ga. App. 628 , 631 (2), 727 S.E.2d

2022During Rawls’s motion for new trial hearing, his trial counsel was questioned about the officer’s discovery of the cocaine and why 8 (Punctuation omitted.) State v. Alford, 347 Ga. App. 208, 214 (3) ( 818 SE2d 668 ) (2018), quoting Shell v. State, 315 Ga. App. 628, 631 (2) ( 727 SE2d 243 ) (2012). 9 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) State v. Walden, 311 Ga. 389, 390 ( 858 SE2d 42 ) (2021). 10 The State asked the officer whether Rawls told him he was not allowed to search the vehicle, and the officer answered “no”; however, there is no indication that the officer actually requested permissio

2020Compare State v. Alford, 347 Ga. App. 208, 214 (3) ( 818 SE2d 668 ) (2018) (“Under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement 11 imposed by the Fourth Amendment, a police officer may search a car without [a] warrant if he has probable cause to believe the car contains contraband, even if there is no exigency preventing the officer from getting a search warrant.”) (Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) See also State v. Vickers, 339 Ga. App. 272, 273-277 ( 793 SE2d 167 ) (2016) (physical precedent only) (automobile exception did not apply to car parked in residential dr

2013See Jones v. State, 319 Ga. App. 678 ( 738 SE2d 130 ) (2013) (smell of burnt and raw marijuana emitting from vehicle justified search of trunk once officers were unable to find marijuana in the passenger compartment); Brown, 311 Ga. App. at 408 (smell of marijuana, observation of suspected marijuana on floorboards of the car, and driver’s visible agitation justified warrantless search of vehicle, including trunk, under automobile exception to warrant requirement).

2013See Jones v. State, 319 Ga. App. 678 ( 738 SE2d 130 ) (2013) (smell of burnt and raw marijuana emitting from vehicle justified search of trunk once officers were unable to find marijuana in the passenger compartment); Brown, 311 Ga. App. at 408 (smell of marijuana, observation of suspected marijuana on floorboards of the car, and driver’s visible agitation justified warrantless search of vehicle, including trunk, under automobile exception to warrant requirement).

2013See Warren, supra, 314 Ga. App. at 483 (3); Williams v. State, 273 Ga. App. 637, 638-639 (1) ( 615 SE2d 789 ) (2005); see also Durden v. State, 199 Ga. App. 397, 398-399 ( 405 SE2d 50 ) (1991) (applying the automobile exception and ruling that “[pjrobable cause authorized the agent to search every part of the vehicle which might have concealed [the drug contraband], including the trunk and closed containers”) (citations, punctuation and footnote omitted).

2013See Warren, supra, 314 Ga. App. at 483 (3); Williams v. State, 273 Ga. App. 637, 638-639 (1) ( 615 SE2d 789 ) (2005); see also Durden v. State, 199 Ga. App. 397, 398-399 ( 405 SE2d 50 ) (1991) (applying the automobile exception and ruling that “[pjrobable cause authorized the agent to search every part of the vehicle which might have concealed [the drug contraband], including the trunk and closed containers”) (citations, punctuation and footnote omitted).

2013See Warren, supra, 314 Ga. App. at 483 (3); Williams v. State, 273 Ga. App. 637, 638-639 (1) ( 615 SE2d 789 ) (2005); see also Durden v. State, 199 Ga. App. 397, 398-399 ( 405 SE2d 50 ) (1991) (applying the automobile exception and ruling that “[pjrobable cause authorized the agent to search every part of the vehicle which might have concealed [the drug contraband], including the trunk and closed containers”) (citations, punctuation and footnote omitted).

2013See Warren, supra, 314 Ga. App. at 483 (3); Williams v. State, 273 Ga. App. 637, 638-639 (1) ( 615 SE2d 789 ) (2005); see also Durden v. State, 199 Ga. App. 397, 398-399 ( 405 SE2d 50 ) (1991) (applying the automobile exception and ruling that “[pjrobable cause authorized the agent to search every part of the vehicle which might have concealed [the drug contraband], including the trunk and closed containers”) (citations, punctuation and footnote omitted).

2013See Warren, supra, 314 Ga. App. at 483 (3); Williams v. State, 273 Ga. App. 637, 638-639 (1) ( 615 SE2d 789 ) (2005); see also Durden v. State, 199 Ga. App. 397, 398-399 ( 405 SE2d 50 ) (1991) (applying the automobile exception and ruling that “[pjrobable cause authorized the agent to search every part of the vehicle which might have concealed [the drug contraband], including the trunk and closed containers”) (citations, punctuation and footnote omitted).

2013See Warren, supra, 314 Ga. App. at 483 (3); Williams v. State, 273 Ga. App. 637, 638-639 (1) ( 615 SE2d 789 ) (2005); see also Durden v. State, 199 Ga. App. 397, 398-399 ( 405 SE2d 50 ) (1991) (applying the automobile exception and ruling that “[pjrobable cause authorized the agent to search every part of the vehicle which might have concealed [the drug contraband], including the trunk and closed containers”) (citations, punctuation and footnote omitted).

2012Gant, supra, 556 U.S. at 347 (IV); Sarden, supra, 305 Ga. App. at 589, n. 1 . 13 and prudent person to believe that drug contraband was in the car.”) (citations and footnote omitted); Martinez v. State, 303 Ga. App. 166, 171 (2) (2010) (based upon their observations, the officers had probable cause to believe that drug contraband was in the truck and authorized the search of the truck under the automobile exception).

2010See Martinez, 303 Ga. App. at 170-171 (2) (upholding search under automobile exception where car was parked in parking lot across the street from a gasoline station to which the defendant had walked); Duncan, 253 Ga. App. at 831 (upholding search under automobile exception where car was parked at convenience store); State v. Folk, 238 Ga. App. 206, 209 ( 521 SE2d 194 ) (1999) (upholding search under automobile exception where car was in convenience store parking lot). 3 For these reasons, the search of Sarden’s car was authorized *591 under the automobile exception, and the trial court erred i

1968As pointed out in Moore v. Bryan, 52 Ga. App. 272, 282 ( 183 SE 117 ), “while simply operating an automobile in violation of the speed laws would not necessarily as a matter of law be gross negligence, still an automobile can be operated in such a manner and at such an excessive and dangerous rate of speed, say 70 miles an hour, as to be out of control of the driver, and, under the circumstances of the particular case, to present a jury question as to whether or not the driver was guilty of gross negligence.” See Hennon v. Hardin, 78 Ga. App. 81, 83 , supra; Atlantic C.

1968As pointed out in Moore v. Bryan, 52 Ga. App. 272, 282 ( 183 SE 117 ), “while simply operating an automobile in violation of the speed laws would not necessarily as a matter of law be gross negligence, still an automobile can be operated in such a manner and at such an excessive and dangerous rate of speed, say 70 miles an hour, as to be out of control of the driver, and, under the circumstances of the particular case, to present a jury question as to whether or not the driver was guilty of gross negligence.” See Hennon v. Hardin, 78 Ga. App. 81, 83 , supra; Atlantic C.

1935See Epps v. Parrish, 26 Ga. App. 399 ( 106 S. E. 297 ); Lee v. Lott, 50 Ga. App. 39 ( 177 S. E. 92 ); Frye v. Pyron, 51 Ga. App. 613 ( 181 S. E. 142 ).

1935See Epps v. Parrish, 26 Ga. App. 399 ( 106 S. E. 297 ); Lee v. Lott, 50 Ga. App. 39 ( 177 S. E. 92 ); Frye v. Pyron, 51 Ga. App. 613 ( 181 S. E. 142 ).

1935See Epps v. Parrish, 26 Ga. App. 399 ( 106 S. E. 297 ); Lee v. Lott, 50 Ga. App. 39 ( 177 S. E. 92 ); Frye v. Pyron, 51 Ga. App. 613 ( 181 S. E. 142 ).

1935See Epps v. Parrish, 26 Ga. App. 399 ( 106 S. E. 297 ); Lee v. Lott, 50 Ga. App. 39 ( 177 S. E. 92 ); Frye v. Pyron, 51 Ga. App. 613 ( 181 S. E. 142 ).

2022During Rawls’s motion for new trial hearing, his trial counsel was questioned about the officer’s discovery of the cocaine and why 8 (Punctuation omitted.) State v. Alford, 347 Ga. App. 208, 214 (3) ( 818 SE2d 668 ) (2018), quoting Shell v. State, 315 Ga. App. 628, 631 (2) ( 727 SE2d 243 ) (2012). 9 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) State v. Walden, 311 Ga. 389, 390 ( 858 SE2d 42 ) (2021). 10 The State asked the officer whether Rawls told him he was not allowed to search the vehicle, and the officer answered “no”; however, there is no indication that the officer actually requested permissio

2020Compare State v. Alford, 347 Ga. App. 208, 214 (3) ( 818 SE2d 668 ) (2018) (“Under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement 11 imposed by the Fourth Amendment, a police officer may search a car without [a] warrant if he has probable cause to believe the car contains contraband, even if there is no exigency preventing the officer from getting a search warrant.”) (Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) See also State v. Vickers, 339 Ga. App. 272, 273-277 ( 793 SE2d 167 ) (2016) (physical precedent only) (automobile exception did not apply to car parked in residential dr

2022If [the defendant] fails to show either prong of the Strickland[v. Washington] test, we need not examine the other prong.6 “The failure to file a motion to suppress does not constitute per se ineffective assistance of counsel; an appellant must make a strong showing that the evidence would have been suppressed had the motion been filed.”7 “Under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement imposed by the Fourth Amendment, a police officer may search a car without a warrant if he has probable cause to believe the car 6 (Punctuation and citations omitted.) Terrell v. State, 313 Ga. 120, 1

2022If [the defendant] fails to show either prong of the Strickland[v. Washington] test, we need not examine the other prong.6 “The failure to file a motion to suppress does not constitute per se ineffective assistance of counsel; an appellant must make a strong showing that the evidence would have been suppressed had the motion been filed.”7 “Under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement imposed by the Fourth Amendment, a police officer may search a car without a warrant if he has probable cause to believe the car 6 (Punctuation and citations omitted.) Terrell v. State, 313 Ga. 120, 1

2022If [the defendant] fails to show either prong of the Strickland[v. Washington] test, we need not examine the other prong.6 “The failure to file a motion to suppress does not constitute per se ineffective assistance of counsel; an appellant must make a strong showing that the evidence would have been suppressed had the motion been filed.”7 “Under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement imposed by the Fourth Amendment, a police officer may search a car without a warrant if he has probable cause to believe the car 6 (Punctuation and citations omitted.) Terrell v. State, 313 Ga. 120, 1

2022If [the defendant] fails to show either prong of the Strickland[v. Washington] test, we need not examine the other prong.6 “The failure to file a motion to suppress does not constitute per se ineffective assistance of counsel; an appellant must make a strong showing that the evidence would have been suppressed had the motion been filed.”7 “Under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement imposed by the Fourth Amendment, a police officer may search a car without a warrant if he has probable cause to believe the car 6 (Punctuation and citations omitted.) Terrell v. State, 313 Ga. 120, 1

2022If [the defendant] fails to show either prong of the Strickland[v. Washington] test, we need not examine the other prong.6 “The failure to file a motion to suppress does not constitute per se ineffective assistance of counsel; an appellant must make a strong showing that the evidence would have been suppressed had the motion been filed.”7 “Under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement imposed by the Fourth Amendment, a police officer may search a car without a warrant if he has probable cause to believe the car 6 (Punctuation and citations omitted.) Terrell v. State, 313 Ga. 120, 1

2022If [the defendant] fails to show either prong of the Strickland[v. Washington] test, we need not examine the other prong.6 “The failure to file a motion to suppress does not constitute per se ineffective assistance of counsel; an appellant must make a strong showing that the evidence would have been suppressed had the motion been filed.”7 “Under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement imposed by the Fourth Amendment, a police officer may search a car without a warrant if he has probable cause to believe the car 6 (Punctuation and citations omitted.) Terrell v. State, 313 Ga. 120, 1

2022If [the defendant] fails to show either prong of the Strickland[v. Washington] test, we need not examine the other prong.6 “The failure to file a motion to suppress does not constitute per se ineffective assistance of counsel; an appellant must make a strong showing that the evidence would have been suppressed had the motion been filed.”7 “Under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement imposed by the Fourth Amendment, a police officer may search a car without a warrant if he has probable cause to believe the car 6 (Punctuation and citations omitted.) Terrell v. State, 313 Ga. 120, 1

2022If [the defendant] fails to show either prong of the Strickland[v. Washington] test, we need not examine the other prong.6 “The failure to file a motion to suppress does not constitute per se ineffective assistance of counsel; an appellant must make a strong showing that the evidence would have been suppressed had the motion been filed.”7 “Under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement imposed by the Fourth Amendment, a police officer may search a car without a warrant if he has probable cause to believe the car 6 (Punctuation and citations omitted.) Terrell v. State, 313 Ga. 120, 1

2022If [the defendant] fails to show either prong of the Strickland[v. Washington] test, we need not examine the other prong.6 “The failure to file a motion to suppress does not constitute per se ineffective assistance of counsel; an appellant must make a strong showing that the evidence would have been suppressed had the motion been filed.”7 “Under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement imposed by the Fourth Amendment, a police officer may search a car without a warrant if he has probable cause to believe the car 6 (Punctuation and citations omitted.) Terrell v. State, 313 Ga. 120, 1

2022If [the defendant] fails to show either prong of the Strickland[v. Washington] test, we need not examine the other prong.6 “The failure to file a motion to suppress does not constitute per se ineffective assistance of counsel; an appellant must make a strong showing that the evidence would have been suppressed had the motion been filed.”7 “Under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement imposed by the Fourth Amendment, a police officer may search a car without a warrant if he has probable cause to believe the car 6 (Punctuation and citations omitted.) Terrell v. State, 313 Ga. 120, 1