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7 Hawaii opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Hawaii courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Snitkingreen2 sentences2020The State maintained that KPD was authorized to seize the truck pursuant to the automobile exception, and that exigent circumstances existed because “[i]f police had not seized the vehicle, there was an extremely high risk Ikimaka or Henderson would have moved, removed or destroyed the vehicle and/or evidence.” The State also asserted that a dog sniff “of the airspace around a closed container is not a Fourth Amendment or Article I, section 7 search,” citing State v. Snitkin, 67 Haw. 168, 171 , 681 P.2d 980, 983 (1984), and Groves, 65 Haw. 104 , 649 P.2d 366 . b. 2020The State maintained that KPD was authorized to seize the truck pursuant to the automobile exception, and that exigent circumstances existed because “[i]f police had not seized the vehicle, there was an extremely high risk Ikimaka or Henderson would have moved, removed or destroyed the vehicle and/or evidence.” The State also asserted that a dog sniff “of the airspace around a closed container is not a Fourth Amendment or Article I, section 7 search,” citing State v. Snitkin, 67 Haw. 168, 171 , 681 P.2d 980, 983 (1984), and Groves, 65 Haw. 104 , 649 P.2d 366 . b. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Johnsgreen2 sentences2010United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478, 484 , 105 S.Ct. 881 , 83 L.Ed.2d 890 (1985) (“There is no requirement [under the automobile exception] that the warrantless search of a vehicle occur contemporaneously with its lawful seizure.”) Accordingly, the full-scale search of Torres’s car by NCIS and FBI agents.was permissible pursuant to the automobile exception, and the evidence recovered from the car was lawfully seized. 2010United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478, 484 , 105 S.Ct. 881 , 83 L.Ed.2d 890 (1985) (“There is no requirement [under the automobile exception] that the warrantless search of a vehicle occur contemporaneously with its lawful seizure.”) Accordingly, the full-scale search of Torres’s car by NCIS and FBI agents.was permissible pursuant to the automobile exception, and the evidence recovered from the car was lawfully seized. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Brignoni-Poncegreen1 sentence1978“As with other categories of police action subject to Fourth Amendment constraints, the reasonableness of such seizures depends on a balance between the public interest and the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.” United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra at 878. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Hawaii. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Powell
green
2 sentences1980In two recent decisions, State v. Elliott, 61 Haw. 492 , 605 P.2d 930 (1980) and State v. Powell, 61 Haw. 316 , 603 P.2d 143 (1979), we discussed the automobile exception so we need not repeat such discussion here. 1980In two recent decisions, State v. Elliott, 61 Haw. 492 , 605 P.2d 930 (1980) and State v. Powell, 61 Haw. 316 , 603 P.2d 143 (1979), we discussed the automobile exception so we need not repeat such discussion here. | 2 | 1980–1980 |
State v. Groves
green
2 sentences2020The State maintained that KPD was authorized to seize the truck pursuant to the automobile exception, and that exigent circumstances existed because “[i]f police had not seized the vehicle, there was an extremely high risk Ikimaka or Henderson would have moved, removed or destroyed the vehicle and/or evidence.” The State also asserted that a dog sniff “of the airspace around a closed container is not a Fourth Amendment or Article I, section 7 search,” citing State v. Snitkin, 67 Haw. 168, 171 , 681 P.2d 980, 983 (1984), and Groves, 65 Haw. 104 , 649 P.2d 366 . b. 2020The State maintained that KPD was authorized to seize the truck pursuant to the automobile exception, and that exigent circumstances existed because “[i]f police had not seized the vehicle, there was an extremely high risk Ikimaka or Henderson would have moved, removed or destroyed the vehicle and/or evidence.” The State also asserted that a dog sniff “of the airspace around a closed container is not a Fourth Amendment or Article I, section 7 search,” citing State v. Snitkin, 67 Haw. 168, 171 , 681 P.2d 980, 983 (1984), and Groves, 65 Haw. 104 , 649 P.2d 366 . b. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
California v. Carney
green
2 sentences2010Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938 , 116 S.Ct. 2485 , 135 L.Ed.2d 1031 (1996); California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391-93 , 105 S.Ct. 2066 , 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985). 2010Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938 , 116 S.Ct. 2485 , 135 L.Ed.2d 1031 (1996); California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391-93 , 105 S.Ct. 2066 , 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Pennsylvania v. Labron
green
2 sentences2010Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938 , 116 S.Ct. 2485 , 135 L.Ed.2d 1031 (1996); California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391-93 , 105 S.Ct. 2066 , 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985). 2010Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938 , 116 S.Ct. 2485 , 135 L.Ed.2d 1031 (1996); California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391-93 , 105 S.Ct. 2066 , 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
United States v. Ross
green
2 sentences2010Ross, 456 U.S. at 823-25 , 102 S.Ct. 2157 . 2010Ross, 456 U.S. at 823-25 , 102 S.Ct. 2157 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Carroll v. United States
green
1 sentence1985The State would have us approve the search of the defendant’s car under the automobile exception established in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Coolidge v. New Hampshire
green
1 sentence1981In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, the Supreme Court held the automobile exception to be “simply irrelevant” to the facts before it, emphasizing (1) the suspect in the case knew beforehand that he was under investigation for a crime and had ample opportunity to destroy evidence; (2) during the arrest, the suspect had no access to the automobile; (3) the vehicle was not parked in such a place or manner as to attract undue attention; (4) the search did not involve contraband, stolen goods or weapons; and (5) there were no known confederates likely to remove the evidence. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
State v. Elliott
green
2 sentences1980In two recent decisions, State v. Elliott, 61 Haw. 492 , 605 P.2d 930 (1980) and State v. Powell, 61 Haw. 316 , 603 P.2d 143 (1979), we discussed the automobile exception so we need not repeat such discussion here. 1980In two recent decisions, State v. Elliott, 61 Haw. 492 , 605 P.2d 930 (1980) and State v. Powell, 61 Haw. 316 , 603 P.2d 143 (1979), we discussed the automobile exception so we need not repeat such discussion here. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Terry v. Ohio
green
1 sentence1978The standard which we announced in Barnes and apply in this case extends to an investigative stop of an automobile the rule of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), where the Supreme Court said that a police officer may place an individual under restraint and search him for weapons when he is able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion upon the individual’s privacy (“Terry facts”). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.