automobile exception in Vermont

2013See, e.g., State v. Girouard, 135 Vt. 123, 129 , 373 A.2d 836, 840 (1977) (“The well-delineated preconditions to [the automobile exception’s] reasonable invocation are 1) probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of crime and 2) exigent circumstances.” (quotation omitted, emphasis added)).

2013See, e.g., State v. Girouard, 135 Vt. 123, 129 , 373 A.2d 836, 840 (1977) (“The well-delineated preconditions to [the automobile exception’s] reasonable invocation are 1) probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of crime and 2) exigent circumstances.” (quotation omitted, emphasis added)).

2019See, e.g., People v. Waxler , 224 Cal. App. 4th 712 , 725, 168 Cal.Rptr.3d 822 (2014) (holding that "a law enforcement officer may search a vehicle pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement where the officer smells burnt marijuana and sees burnt marijuana in the defendant's car"); Brown v. State , 311 Ga.App. 405 , 715 S.E.2d 802 , 805 (2011) (concluding that smell of marijuana in car, in addition to flakes of marijuana on floorboards of car and suspect's visible agitation, gave officer probable cause to believe vehicle contained contraband); see also A. Ben-Yosef, Annota

2019See, e.g., People v. Waxler , 224 Cal. App. 4th 712 , 725, 168 Cal.Rptr.3d 822 (2014) (holding that "a law enforcement officer may search a vehicle pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement where the officer smells burnt marijuana and sees burnt marijuana in the defendant's car"); Brown v. State , 311 Ga.App. 405 , 715 S.E.2d 802 , 805 (2011) (concluding that smell of marijuana in car, in addition to flakes of marijuana on floorboards of car and suspect's visible agitation, gave officer probable cause to believe vehicle contained contraband); see also A. Ben-Yosef, Annota

2007See Savva, 159 Vt. at 89-90 , 616 A.2d at 782 (holding that warrantless search of bags found within car “was not supported by exigent circumstances because a less intrusive option was available” and therefore must be invalidated); State v. Girouard, 135 Vt. 123, 129 , 373 A.2d 836, 840 (1977) (describing the “well-delineated preconditions” to the automobile exception as “1) probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of crime and 2) exigent circumstances”). ¶ 33.

2007See Savva, 159 Vt. at 89-90 , 616 A.2d at 782 (holding that warrantless search of bags found within car “was not supported by exigent circumstances because a less intrusive option was available” and therefore must be invalidated); State v. Girouard, 135 Vt. 123, 129 , 373 A.2d 836, 840 (1977) (describing the “well-delineated preconditions” to the automobile exception as “1) probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of crime and 2) exigent circumstances”). ¶ 33.

2007With regard to the automobile exception, although we have not followed federal law in allowing warrantless searches of automobiles based on probable cause absent a particularized showing of exigent circumstances, Trudeau, 165 Vt. at 361 , 683 A.2d at 729 (rejecting notion that mobility of automobiles is per se exigent circumstance allowing warrantless search), we have acknowledged that automobiles often may present exigent circumstances, and that “people may have a lesser expectation of privacy in their vehicles, which are exposed at least in part to the public eye.” Savva, 159 Vt. at 83 , 616

2007With regard to the automobile exception, although we have not followed federal law in allowing warrantless searches of automobiles based on probable cause absent a particularized showing of exigent circumstances, Trudeau, 165 Vt. at 361 , 683 A.2d at 729 (rejecting notion that mobility of automobiles is per se exigent circumstance allowing warrantless search), we have acknowledged that automobiles often may present exigent circumstances, and that “people may have a lesser expectation of privacy in their vehicles, which are exposed at least in part to the public eye.” Savva, 159 Vt. at 83 , 616

2007See, e.g., State v. Holmgren, 282 N.J.Super. 212 , 659 A.2d 939, 940 (App.Div.1995) (holding that failure to produce registration allows search of vehicle for evidence of ownership "confined to the glove compartment or other area where a registration might normally be kept in a vehicle") (quotations omitted); State v. Barrett, 170 N.J.Super. 211 , 406 A.2d 198, 200 (Law Div.1979) (invalidating search of vehicle for registration where there was "no expectation that any indicia of title would be found in the rear of the vehicle").

2007See, e.g., State v. Holmgren, 659 A.2d 939, 940 (N.J.

2019See, e.g., People v. Waxler , 224 Cal. App. 4th 712 , 725, 168 Cal.Rptr.3d 822 (2014) (holding that "a law enforcement officer may search a vehicle pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement where the officer smells burnt marijuana and sees burnt marijuana in the defendant's car"); Brown v. State , 311 Ga.App. 405 , 715 S.E.2d 802 , 805 (2011) (concluding that smell of marijuana in car, in addition to flakes of marijuana on floorboards of car and suspect's visible agitation, gave officer probable cause to believe vehicle contained contraband); see also A. Ben-Yosef, Annota

2019See, e.g., People v. Waxler , 224 Cal. App. 4th 712 , 725, 168 Cal.Rptr.3d 822 (2014) (holding that "a law enforcement officer may search a vehicle pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement where the officer smells burnt marijuana and sees burnt marijuana in the defendant's car"); Brown v. State , 311 Ga.App. 405 , 715 S.E.2d 802 , 805 (2011) (concluding that smell of marijuana in car, in addition to flakes of marijuana on floorboards of car and suspect's visible agitation, gave officer probable cause to believe vehicle contained contraband); see also A. Ben-Yosef, Annota

2019While adjectives assessing the strength of an odor may be subjective and unhelpful at times in assessing whether probable cause exists, see Commissioner v. Overmyer, 11 N.E.3d 1054, 1059 (Mass. 2014) (stating that “characterizations of odors as strong or weak are inherently subjective”), the faint smell of burnt marijuana is far less probative as to whether a car contains marijuana than, say, an overpowering odor of fresh marijuana emanating from the trunk of a car. ¶ 82.

2007See, e.g., State v. Holmgren, 282 N.J.Super. 212 , 659 A.2d 939, 940 (App.Div.1995) (holding that failure to produce registration allows search of vehicle for evidence of ownership "confined to the glove compartment or other area where a registration might normally be kept in a vehicle") (quotations omitted); State v. Barrett, 170 N.J.Super. 211 , 406 A.2d 198, 200 (Law Div.1979) (invalidating search of vehicle for registration where there was "no expectation that any indicia of title would be found in the rear of the vehicle").

2007See, e.g., State v. Holmgren, 282 N.J.Super. 212 , 659 A.2d 939, 940 (App.Div.1995) (holding that failure to produce registration allows search of vehicle for evidence of ownership "confined to the glove compartment or other area where a registration might normally be kept in a vehicle") (quotations omitted); State v. Barrett, 170 N.J.Super. 211 , 406 A.2d 198, 200 (Law Div.1979) (invalidating search of vehicle for registration where there was "no expectation that any indicia of title would be found in the rear of the vehicle").

1992Originally created to address the impracticality of getting a warrant to search a mobile vehicle on the road, see Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925), the automobile exception over its sixty-six year history has been expanded beyond the initial rationale of exigent circumstances.

1992The automobile exception was first articulated in Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153 , a prohibition-era case, where the Court used it to justify a warrantless search for bootleg liquor in the upholstered seats of an automobile.

1992The Court’s conclusion is an ironic twist in fourth amendment jurisprudence; it has long been established that the “mere fact that law enforcement may be made more efficient can never by itself justify disregard of the Fourth Amendment.” Mincey v. Ari zona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978); see also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971) (warrant requirement “has .been a valued part of our constitutional law for decades ...

1992The Court's conclusion is an ironic twist in fourth amendment jurisprudence; it has long been established that the "mere fact that law enforcement may be made more efficient can never by itself justify disregard of the Fourth Amendment." *779 Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 , 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2414 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978); see also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 , 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2046 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) (warrant requirement "has been a valued part of our constitutional law for decades ...

1992The Court’s conclusion is an ironic twist in fourth amendment jurisprudence; it has long been established that the “mere fact that law enforcement may be made more efficient can never by itself justify disregard of the Fourth Amendment.” Mincey v. Ari zona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978); see also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971) (warrant requirement “has .been a valued part of our constitutional law for decades ...

1992The Court's conclusion is an ironic twist in fourth amendment jurisprudence; it has long been established that the "mere fact that law enforcement may be made more efficient can never by itself justify disregard of the Fourth Amendment." *779 Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 , 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2414 , 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978); see also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 , 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2046 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) (warrant requirement "has been a valued part of our constitutional law for decades ...

1990See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391-93 (1985) .