automobile exception in Utah

2019This exception allows officers to conduct a warrantless search of a car "so long as there [is] probable cause for the search." State v. Rigby , 2016 UT App 42 , ¶ 12, 369 P.3d 127 ; see also Pennsylvania v. Labron , 518 U.S. 938 , 940, 116 S.Ct. 2485 , 135 L.Ed.2d 1031 (1996) (per curiam) ("If a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment thus permits police to search the vehicle without more."). ¶29 In this case, once the drug dog alerted to the scent of narcotics in the truck, the officers had probable cause to conduct a warrantless

2019This exception allows officers to conduct a warrantless search of a car "so long as there [is] probable cause for the search." State v. Rigby , 2016 UT App 42 , ¶ 12, 369 P.3d 127 ; see also Pennsylvania v. Labron , 518 U.S. 938 , 940, 116 S.Ct. 2485 , 135 L.Ed.2d 1031 (1996) (per curiam) ("If a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment thus permits police to search the vehicle without more."). ¶29 In this case, once the drug dog alerted to the scent of narcotics in the truck, the officers had probable cause to conduct a warrantless

2021See State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408, 412 (Utah 1984) (explaining that in the face of a warrantless search, the district court must determine whether there was “evidence showing an exception to the warrant requirement” when ruling on a motion to suppress evidence of that search). ¶36 We conclude that the automobile exception applies here.

2021The automobile exception permits a warrantless search of a vehicle when law enforcement officers have probable cause to believe the vehicle contains “evidence of a crime.” Christensen, 676 P.2d at 411 .

2022And “because warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, police officers generally need a warrant to search a place in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy.” Rigby, 2016 UT App 42, ¶ 8 (quotation simplified). ¶19 “There are, of course, exceptions to the general rule, one of which is the so-called automobile exception.” Id. (quotation simplified).

2022And “because warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, police officers generally need a warrant to search a place in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy.” Rigby, 2016 UT App 42, ¶ 8 (quotation simplified). ¶19 “There are, of course, exceptions to the general rule, one of which is the so-called automobile exception.” Id. (quotation simplified).

2016Nee State v. Despain, 2007 UT App 367 , 4 14, 16, 178 P.8d 218 (recognizing that the requirements to justify a search under the automobile exception have "fluctuated in the past," but ultimately relying on both Dyson and Labron to conclude that "federal law hald] been clarified" and therefore "[the officers' search ... was justified under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment[ ] ... because the officers had probable cause"); State v. Griffith, 2006 UT App 291 , 11 6-8, 141 P.8d 602 (relying on Dyson and Labron to conclude that because the defendant's vehicle was mobile the officer n

2011Under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, a war-rantless search is allowed "'if a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband.'" 5 Despain, *469 2007 UT App 367, ¶ 13 , 173 P.3d 213 (alteration in original) (quoting Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467 , 119 S.Ct. 2013 , 144 L.Ed.2d 442 (1999) (per curiam)).

2016Rigby primarily draws support for his argument that Utah ought to depart from the federal path with regard to the automobile exception from three opinions, which seem to 'be the Utah Supreme Court's last ventures into the realm of the Utah Constitution's relationship to the automobile exception prior to Labron: State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1988), State v. Laroceco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990) (plurality opinion), and State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229 .

2016The plurality reasoned that although both federal and Utah courts had historically interpreted the automobile exception to require both probable cause and exigent cirenmstances, id. at 470 , exigency had become essentially a given based on a too-simplistie notion about the ready mobility of automobiles, id. at 469 .

2019There is no argument that the State had sufficient individualized suspicion of criminal wrongdoing to conduct a Terry stop, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); cf. State v. Malloy, 2019 UT App 55 , ¶¶ 6 & n.2, 11–12, or a warrantless search of Smith’s car under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, see Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999). ¶24 Next, I agree with the majority that a welfare check of some kind was warranted.

2019There is no argument that the State had sufficient individualized suspicion of criminal wrongdoing to conduct a Terry stop, see Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1 , 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) ; cf. State v. Malloy , 2019 UT App 55 , ¶¶ 6 & n.2, 11-12, or a warrantless search of Smith's car under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, see Wyoming v. Houghton , 526 U.S. 295 , 300, 119 S.Ct. 1297 , 143 L.Ed.2d 408 (1999). ¶24 Next, I agree with the majority that a welfare check of some kind was warranted.

2016Our case law has also echoe? federal case law in recognizing that "[tlhere are ... several exceptions to the warrant requirement ... in-clud[ing] ... [the] search of an automobile based on probable cause." State v. Hygh, 714 P.2d 264, 267 (Utah 1985) (citing Chambers, 399 U.S. 42 , 90 S.Ct. 1975 ); see also State v. Limb, 581 P.2d 142, 144-45 (Utah 1978) (discussing the automobile exception to the warrant requirement and quoting Chambers, 899 U.S.; at 51; 90 S.Ct. 1975 , with approval). 6 no C *132 {14 Our cases have also described the rationale for the automobile exception much like federal c

1994Although Naisbitt did not discuss exigent circumstances, prior case law clearly establishes that under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, exigent circumstances exist where “ ‘the car is movable, the occupants are alerted, and the car’s contents may never be found again if a warrant must be obtained.’ ” Larocco, 794 P.2d at 470 (quoting State v. Limb, 581 P.2d 142 (Utah 1978)).

2016In Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465 , 119 S.Ct. 2013 , 144 L.Ed.2d 442 (1999) (per curiam), the Supreme Court stated that it had been "clear" since United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 , 102 S.Ct. 2157 , 72 L,Ed.2d 572 (1982), that the automobile exception had no exigency requirement and characterized Labron as simply reiterating that principle: The Fourth Amendment generally requires police to secure a warrant before conducting a search.

2016In Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465 , 119 S.Ct. 2013 , 144 L.Ed.2d 442 (1999) (per curiam), the Supreme Court stated that it had been "clear" since United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 , 102 S.Ct. 2157 , 72 L,Ed.2d 572 (1982), that the automobile exception had no exigency requirement and characterized Labron as simply reiterating that principle: The Fourth Amendment generally requires police to secure a warrant before conducting a search.

2016The Court noted that the first cases underlying the automobile exception "were based on the automobile's 'ready mobility'" because "'ready mobility[ I [is] an exigency sufficient to excuse failure to obtain a search warrant once probable cause to conduct the search is clear." Id.

2016T9 In 1925, the United States Supreme Court decided Curroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 182 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed., 548 (1925), the seminal case addressing the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.

2019James , 2000 UT 80 , ¶ 10, 13 P.3d 576 .

2019James , 2000 UT 80 , ¶ 10, 13 P.3d 576 .

2016But the Court explained that "[Imjore recent cases provide a further justification [for the automobile exception}" based on an "individual's reduced expectation of privacy in an automobile[ ] [because of] ... its pervasive regulation." Id. (citing Carney, 471 U.S. at 891-92 , 105 S.Ct. 2066 ).

2016But the Court explained that "[Imjore recent cases provide a further justification [for the automobile exception}" based on an "individual's reduced expectation of privacy in an automobile[ ] [because of] ... its pervasive regulation." Id. (citing Carney, 471 U.S. at 891-92 , 105 S.Ct. 2066 ).

2016The Automobile Exeeption Under Utah Case Law > ~ {13 Historically, Utah case law has mirrored federal case law with respect to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, Utah cases, like their federal counterparts, have recognized that "[wlarrantless searches are per se unreasonable unless undertaken pursuant to a recognized exception to the warrant requirement." State, v, Brown, 858 P.2d 851 , 855 (Utah 1992) {citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 847 , 857, 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L,EdA2d 576 (1967))..

1990The Court applied the warrant approach in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 , 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), and held that "searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment" and that this requirement is "subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Id. at 357 , 88 S.Ct. at 514 (including the automobile exception to be discussed below).

2016Our case law has also echoe? federal case law in recognizing that "[tlhere are ... several exceptions to the warrant requirement ... in-clud[ing] ... [the] search of an automobile based on probable cause." State v. Hygh, 714 P.2d 264, 267 (Utah 1985) (citing Chambers, 399 U.S. 42 , 90 S.Ct. 1975 ); see also State v. Limb, 581 P.2d 142, 144-45 (Utah 1978) (discussing the automobile exception to the warrant requirement and quoting Chambers, 899 U.S.; at 51; 90 S.Ct. 1975 , with approval). 6 no C *132 {14 Our cases have also described the rationale for the automobile exception much like federal c

2016Our case law has also echoe? federal case law in recognizing that "[tlhere are ... several exceptions to the warrant requirement ... in-clud[ing] ... [the] search of an automobile based on probable cause." State v. Hygh, 714 P.2d 264, 267 (Utah 1985) (citing Chambers, 399 U.S. 42 , 90 S.Ct. 1975 ); see also State v. Limb, 581 P.2d 142, 144-45 (Utah 1978) (discussing the automobile exception to the warrant requirement and quoting Chambers, 899 U.S.; at 51; 90 S.Ct. 1975 , with approval). 6 no C *132 {14 Our cases have also described the rationale for the automobile exception much like federal c

2019There is no argument that the State had sufficient individualized suspicion of criminal wrongdoing to conduct a Terry stop, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); cf. State v. Malloy, 2019 UT App 55 , ¶¶ 6 & n.2, 11–12, or a warrantless search of Smith’s car under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, see Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999). ¶24 Next, I agree with the majority that a welfare check of some kind was warranted.

2019There is no argument that the State had sufficient individualized suspicion of criminal wrongdoing to conduct a Terry stop, see Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1 , 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) ; cf. State v. Malloy , 2019 UT App 55 , ¶¶ 6 & n.2, 11-12, or a warrantless search of Smith's car under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, see Wyoming v. Houghton , 526 U.S. 295 , 300, 119 S.Ct. 1297 , 143 L.Ed.2d 408 (1999). ¶24 Next, I agree with the majority that a welfare check of some kind was warranted.

2016Cf. 'State v. Rodriguez, 2007 UT 15, 60 , 156 P.3d 771 ("[PJractical considerations associated with warrant acquisition remain central to inquiries into whether exigent circumstances justify a warrant-less search."); State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 470 (Utah 1990) (plurality opinion) (recognizing "[the amount of time necessary to obtain a war"rant" is a factor used to "determin{el whether circumstances are exigent."); City of Orem v. Henrie, 868 P.2d 1384, 1391-92 (Utah Ct.App. 1994) (identifying "the availability of a telephonic warrant" as one consideration when determining whether exigency

2016See, e.g., State v. Baker, 2010 UT 18 , T11, 2290 P.3d 650 ; State v. James, 2000 UT 80 , €10, 18 PBd 576; State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229, 1284-87 (Utah 1996) (plurality opinion); Limb, 581 P.2d at 144-45 ; State v. Farnsworth, 30 Utah 2d 485 , 519 P.2d 244, 247 (1974); State v. Shields, 28 Utah 2d 405 , 503 P.2d 848, 849 (1972).

2016I, The Automobile Exception to the Warrant Requirement 18 Because warrantless searches are "per se unreasonable," Katz v. United States, 889 U.S. 347 , 357, 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L,Ed.2d 576 (1967), "[plolice officers generally need a warrant to search a place in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy," State v. Boyles, 2015 UT App 185 , 1 10, 356 P.3d 687 (citing Franks v. Delaware, 488 U.S. 154 , 164, 98 S.Ct. 2674 , 57 LEd.2d 687 (1978)); see also id. (citing F'romks, 488 U.S. at 164, 98 S.Ct. 2674 ) (noting that "[blefore issuing a search warrant, a magistrate must determine th

2016I, The Automobile Exception to the Warrant Requirement 18 Because warrantless searches are "per se unreasonable," Katz v. United States, 889 U.S. 347 , 357, 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L,Ed.2d 576 (1967), "[plolice officers generally need a warrant to search a place in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy," State v. Boyles, 2015 UT App 185 , 1 10, 356 P.3d 687 (citing Franks v. Delaware, 488 U.S. 154 , 164, 98 S.Ct. 2674 , 57 LEd.2d 687 (1978)); see also id. (citing F'romks, 488 U.S. at 164, 98 S.Ct. 2674 ) (noting that "[blefore issuing a search warrant, a magistrate must determine th

2016For instance, in State v. Baker, the Utah Supreme Court noted that the "automobile exception to the warrant rule arises because occupants of a vehicle have a lesser expectation of privacy due to the mobile nature of vehicles and their highly regulated status." 2010 UT 18 , T 11, 229 P.3d 650 (alteration, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted); accord James, 2000 UT 80 , €10, 18 P.8d 576 ("Due to the mobile nature of vehicles and their highly-regulated status,. persons traveling in vehicles have a lesser expectation of privacy than they would have within a private dwelling."); see also

2016For example, in the 1948 case City of Price v. Jaynes, while discussing the validity of a city ordinance modeled after the Fourth Amendment, our supreme court recognized that under federal law an individual has a lessened degree of protection in some instances based on whether the place to be searched is mobile, 113 Utah 89 , 191 P.2d 606, 608 (1948).

2016For example, in the 1948 case City of Price v. Jaynes, while discussing the validity of a city ordinance modeled after the Fourth Amendment, our supreme court recognized that under federal law an individual has a lessened degree of protection in some instances based on whether the place to be searched is mobile, 113 Utah 89 , 191 P.2d 606, 608 (1948).

2016Our case law has also echoe? federal case law in recognizing that "[tlhere are ... several exceptions to the warrant requirement ... in-clud[ing] ... [the] search of an automobile based on probable cause." State v. Hygh, 714 P.2d 264, 267 (Utah 1985) (citing Chambers, 399 U.S. 42 , 90 S.Ct. 1975 ); see also State v. Limb, 581 P.2d 142, 144-45 (Utah 1978) (discussing the automobile exception to the warrant requirement and quoting Chambers, 899 U.S.; at 51; 90 S.Ct. 1975 , with approval). 6 no C *132 {14 Our cases have also described the rationale for the automobile exception much like federal c

2016Our case law has also echoe? federal case law in recognizing that "[tlhere are ... several exceptions to the warrant requirement ... in-clud[ing] ... [the] search of an automobile based on probable cause." State v. Hygh, 714 P.2d 264, 267 (Utah 1985) (citing Chambers, 399 U.S. 42 , 90 S.Ct. 1975 ); see also State v. Limb, 581 P.2d 142, 144-45 (Utah 1978) (discussing the automobile exception to the warrant requirement and quoting Chambers, 899 U.S.; at 51; 90 S.Ct. 1975 , with approval). 6 no C *132 {14 Our cases have also described the rationale for the automobile exception much like federal c