prima facie violation in Nevada

2021Williams v. State, 121 Nev. 934, 940 , 125 P.3d 627, 631 (2005) (emphases and internal quotation marks omitted). "[A]n evidentiary hearing is warranted on a fair-cross-section challenge when a defendant makes specific allegations that, if true, would be sufficient to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement." Valentine, 135 Nev. at 466, 454 P.3d at 714.

2021Williams v. State, 121 Nev. 934, 940 , 125 P.3d 627, 631 (2005) (emphases and internal quotation marks omitted). "[A]n evidentiary hearing is warranted on a fair-cross-section challenge when a defendant makes specific allegations that, if true, would be sufficient to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement." Valentine, 135 Nev. at 466, 454 P.3d at 714.

2022See Evans v. State, 112 Nev. 1172, 1186 , 926 P.2d 265, 275 (1996) ("The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement.").

2022See Evans v. State, 112 Nev. 1172, 1186 , 926 P.2d 265, 275 (1996) ("The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement.").

2022To establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, a defendant must demonstrate that (1) the group he alleges was "excluded is a distinctive group in the community;" (2) the group's representation "in jury venires is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community;" and (3) the underrepresentation is due to "systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process." Rippo v. State, 122 Nev. 1086, 1097 , 146 P.3d 279, 286 (2006) (citing Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979)).

2021To make such a prima facie challenge, the defendant must show three things, one of which is that the underrepresentation of a distinctive group in the community "is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection process." Evans v. State, 112 Nev. 1172, 1186 , 926 P.2d 265, 275 (1996) (quoting Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979)).

2024To be sure, in Taylor v. Colon, we SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 10 (0) 1947A previously upheld the second prong of Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes as constitutional, partly because the prima facie standard does not interfere with a jury's fact-finding abilities. 136 Nev. 434 , 439, 482 P.3d 1212, 1216 (2020).7 But importantly, "whether the evidence in the record in a defamation case is sufficient to support a finding of actual malice is a question of law." Harte-Hanks Commc'ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 685 (1989).

2024To be sure, in Taylor v. Colon, we previously upheld the second prong of Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes as constitutional, partly because the prima facie standard does not interfere with a jury's fact-finding abilities. 136 Nev. 434 , 439, 482 P.3d 1212 , 1216 SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA (0) 1 ,14 A 10 (2020).6 But importantly, "whether the evidence in the record in a defamation case is sufficient to support a finding of actual malice is a question of law." Harte-Hank.s Commc'ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 685 (1989).

2024And even outside of the anti-SLAPP context, "Nile question of actual malice goes to the jury only if there is sufficient evidence for the jury, by clear and convincing evidence, to reasonably infer that the publication was made with actual malice." Pegasus, 118 Nev. at 721-22 , 57 P.3d at 92 (emphases added).

2024And even outside of the anti-SLAPP context, "Nile question of actual malice goes to the jury only if there is sufficient evidence for the jury, by clear and convincing evidence, to reasonably infer that the publication was made with actual malice." Pegasus, 118 Nev. at 721-22 , 57 P.3d at 92 (emphases added).

2024To be sure, in Taylor v. Colon, we SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 10 (0) 1947A previously upheld the second prong of Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes as constitutional, partly because the prima facie standard does not interfere with a jury's fact-finding abilities. 136 Nev. 434 , 439, 482 P.3d 1212, 1216 (2020).7 But importantly, "whether the evidence in the record in a defamation case is sufficient to support a finding of actual malice is a question of law." Harte-Hanks Commc'ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 685 (1989).

2024To be sure, in Taylor v. Colon, we previously upheld the second prong of Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes as constitutional, partly because the prima facie standard does not interfere with a jury's fact-finding abilities. 136 Nev. 434 , 439, 482 P.3d 1212 , 1216 SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA (0) 1 ,14 A 10 (2020).6 But importantly, "whether the evidence in the record in a defamation case is sufficient to support a finding of actual malice is a question of law." Harte-Hank.s Commc'ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 685 (1989).

1996NRCP 12(d) provides that a pretrial motion for dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction “shall be heard and determined before trial on application of any party, unless the court orders that the hearing and determination thereof be deferred until the trial.” When the district court applies the prima facie standard of review — as it presumably did in this case as there was never an evidentiary hearing — and denies the motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the district court is implicitly, if not explicitly, ordering “that hearing and determination [of the motion to dismiss] be

1993However, the prima facie standard, under which personal jurisdiction is not finally resolved until trial, may be undesirable where the defendant will incur “significant expense and burden of trial on the merits in the foreign forum that is unfair in the circumstances.” Boit, 967 F.2d at 677 . 3 “An agency relationship is formed when one who hires another retains a contractual right to control the other’s manner of performance.” Grand Hotel Gift Shop v. Granite St.

2022To establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, a defendant must demonstrate that (1) the group he alleges was "excluded is a distinctive group in the community;" (2) the group's representation "in jury venires is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community;" and (3) the underrepresentation is due to "systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process." Rippo v. State, 122 Nev. 1086, 1097 , 146 P.3d 279, 286 (2006) (citing Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979)).

2022To establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, a defendant must demonstrate that (1) the group he alleges was "excluded is a distinctive group in the community;" (2) the group's representation "in jury venires is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community;" and (3) the underrepresentation is due to "systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process." Rippo v. State, 122 Nev. 1086, 1097 , 146 P.3d 279, 286 (2006) (citing Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979)).

2021Brooks Tr., 113 Nev. 747, 755, 942 P.2d 182, 187 (1997) (emphasis added).

2021Brooks Tr., 113 Nev. 747, 755, 942 P.2d 182, 187 (1997) (emphasis added).

2021Thus, Brian's own allegations in this Board complaint demonstrate that he had enough information to allege a prima facie claim for professional negligence—that in treating Rebecca, her health care providers failed "to use the reasonable care, skill or knowledge ordinarily used under similar circumstances by similarly trained and experienced providers of health care." NRS 41A.015 (defining professional negligence); 1Vinn, 128 Nev. at 252-53 ; 277 P.3d at 462 (explaining that a "plaintiff s general belief that someone's negligence may have caused his or her injury" triggers inquiry notice).3 Tha

2021Thus, Brian's own allegations in this Board complaint demonstrate that he had enough information to allege a prima facie claim for professional negligence—that in treating Rebecca, her health care providers failed "to use the reasonable care, skill or knowledge ordinarily used under similar circumstances by similarly trained and experienced providers of health care." NRS 41A.015 (defining professional negligence); 1Vinn, 128 Nev. at 252-53 ; 277 P.3d at 462 (explaining that a "plaintiff s general belief that someone's negligence may have caused his or her injury" triggers inquiry notice).3 Tha

2020See Grey v. State, 124 Nev. 110, 117 , 178 3 P.3d 154, 159 (2008) (providing for de novo review of constitutional challenges).3 Third, appellant claims his right to a fair and impartial jury was violated when the district court denied his challenge for cause to prospective juror 26.

2020See Grey v. State, 124 Nev. 110, 117 , 178 3 P.3d 154, 159 (2008) (providing for de novo review of constitutional challenges).3 Third, appellant claims his right to a fair and impartial jury was violated when the district court denied his challenge for cause to prospective juror 26.

2019See Terry, 60 F.3d at 1544 n.2 (explaining that no evidentiary hearing is warranted on a fair-cross-section challenge if no set of facts could be developed that "would be significant legally").

2019See Terry, 60 F.3d at 1544 n.2 (explaining that no evidentiary hearing is warranted on a fair-cross-section challenge if no set of facts could be developed that "would be significant legally").

2014See Berg huis v. Smith, 559 U.S. 314, 329-30 (2010).

2013United States v. Gay, 567 F.2d 916, 919 (9th Cir. 1978); see also NRS 173.135.

2000See Hospital Corp., 112 Nev. at 1161 n.2, 924 P.2d at 726 n.2; Trump, 109 Nev. at 692-93 , 857 P.2d at 743-45 .

2000See Hospital Corp., 112 Nev. at 1161 n.2, 924 P.2d at 726 n.2; Trump, 109 Nev. at 692-93 , 857 P.2d at 743-45 .

1993Ins., 108 Nev. 811, 815 , 839 P.2d 599, 602 (1992).

1993Ins., 108 Nev. 811, 815 , 839 P.2d 599, 602 (1992).