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19 North Dakota opinions name it 1 courts 1907–2012 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Dakota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Duren v. Missourigreen2 sentences2011To establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show three elements: “(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this un-derrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.” Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 , 99 S.Ct. 664 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979); see also Robles, at 732. 2011To establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show three elements: “(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this un-derrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.” Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 , 99 S.Ct. 664 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979); see also Robles, at 732. | 2 | 3 |
State v. Zimmermangreen2 sentences2012See Zimmerman , 516 N.W.2d at 642 (explaining defendant must show evidence negates a presumed fact). [¶11] Although Thorsrud’s evidence is sufficient to rebut the prima facie presumption of fair administration, we decline Thorsrud’s invitation to conclude that the testing officer’s deviation from the approved method, alone, means the test was not fairly administered. 2012See Zimmerman, 516 N.W.2d at 642 (explaining defendant must show evidence negates a presumed fact). [¶ 11] Although Thorsrud’s evidence is sufficient to rebut the prima facie presumption of fair administration, we decline Thorsrud’s invitation to conclude that the testing officer’s deviation from the approved method, alone, means the test was not fairly administered. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Roblesgreen2 sentences2011To establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show three elements: “(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.” Duren v. Missouri , 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979); see also Robles , at 732. 2011If the defendant establishes a prima facie violation, the State has the burden to show “a significant state interest be manifestly and primarily advanced by those aspects of the jury-selection process ... that result in the disproportionate exclusion of a distinctive group.” Duren, at 367-68, 99 S.Ct. 664 (footnote omitted). [¶ 19] “A group of people is distinct when the members of the group have a shared attribute that defines or limits their membership and when they share a community of interests.” Robles, 535 N.W.2d at 732 . | 1 | 2 |
Shong v. Stinchfieldgreen2 sentences1923See Shong v. Stinchfield, 47 N. D. 495 , 183 N. W. 268 . 1923See Shong v. Stinchfield, 47 N. D. 495 , 183 N. W. 268 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Dakota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hedderich v. Hedderich
green
2 sentences1974In Schultz v. Schultz, supra , we alluded to the California case law relied on by the appellants when we said: "This statute [the pretermitted heir statute, now Sec. 56-04-17, NDCC] was involved in the case of Hedderich v. Hedderich, 123 N.W. 276 , recently decided by this court, and in disposing of the petition for rehearing we held that the fact that the lawful issue of a testator is omitted from his will merely raises a prima facie presumption that such issue was not intentionally omitted, and that such presumption is rebuttable by extrinsic proof. 1974In Schultz v. Schultz, supra, we alluded to the California case law relied on by the appellants when we said: “This statute [the pretermitted heir statute, now Sec. 56-04 — 17, NDCC] was involved in the case of Hedderich v. Hedderich, 123 N.W. 276 , recently decided by this court, and in disposing of the petition for rehearing we held that the fact that the lawful issue of a testator is omitted from his will merely raises a prima facie presumption that such issue was not intentionally omitted, and that such presumption is rebuttable by extrinsic proof. | 5 | 1910–1974 |
Estate of Baur v. West
green
2 sentences1974In Re Baur’s Estate, 79 N.D. 113 , 54 N.W.2d 891 (N.D.1952). 1974In Re Baur’s Estate, 79 N.D. 113 , 54 N.W.2d 891 (N.D.1952). | 2 | 1974–1974 |
In re Atwood's Estate
neutral
2 sentences1910In re Atwood’s Estate, 14 Utah, 1 45 Pac. 1036 , 60 Am. 1910In re Atwood’s Estate, 14 Utah, 1 45 Pac. 1036 , 60 Am. | 2 | 1909–1910 |
Larsen v. Zarrett
green
2 sentences2003Zarrett, 498 N.W.2d at 192 . 2003Zarrett, 498 N.W.2d at 192 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Fortier v. Traynor
green
1 sentence1993Fortier v. Traynor, supra; Morlan v. Harrington, 658 F.Supp. 24 (D.N.D.1986). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Morlan v. Harrington
green
1 sentence1993Fortier v. Traynor, supra; Morlan v. Harrington, 658 F.Supp. 24 (D.N.D.1986). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Schultz v. Schultz
neutral
1 sentence1952Schultz v. Schultz, 19 ND 688 , 125 NW 555 ; Hedderich v. Hedderich, 18 ND 488 , 123 NW 276 . | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Merchants' State Bank v. Sawyer Farmers' Co-operative Ass'n
neutral
2 sentences1926Asso. 47 N. D. 375 , 14 A.L.R. 1353 , 182 N. W. 263 , as follows: -“It is a well-settled principle of law that the ownership of realty carries with it as an incident thereto the prima facie presumption of the ownership of both the natural products of the land, such as grass and trees, and the emblements, or annually grown crops, but such presumption is not conclusive. 1926Asso. 47 N. D. 375 , 14 A.L.R. 1353 , 182 N. W. 263 , as follows: -“It is a well-settled principle of law that the ownership of realty carries with it as an incident thereto the prima facie presumption of the ownership of both the natural products of the land, such as grass and trees, and the emblements, or annually grown crops, but such presumption is not conclusive. | 1 | 1926–1926 |
Hess v. Oregon Baking Co.
green
2 sentences1922Hess v. Oregon Baking Co. 31 Or. 503 , 49 Pac. 803 ; 38 C. 1922Hess v. Oregon Baking Co. 31 Or. 503 , 49 Pac. 803 ; 38 C. | 1 | 1922–1922 |
Henderson v. . Henderson
neutral
1 sentence1920According to sounder doctrine while, where one signs as an agent of another, the prima facie presumption is that the words are merely descñptio persona?, and therefore that the one so signing is personally bound; yet it may be shown in an action between the original parties that it was not so intended, and that, in fact, the real intention was to bind- the principal whose name was disclosed in the signature of his agent, or who was well known by the payee to be the real party to be bound.” Megowan v. Peterson, 113 N. Y. 1 , 65 N. E. 738 . | 1 | 1920–1920 |
Megowan v. . Peterson
green
1 sentence1920According to sounder doctrine while, where one signs as an agent of another, the prima facie presumption is that the words are merely descñptio persona?, and therefore that the one so signing is personally bound; yet it may be shown in an action between the original parties that it was not so intended, and that, in fact, the real intention was to bind- the principal whose name was disclosed in the signature of his agent, or who was well known by the payee to be the real party to be bound.” Megowan v. Peterson, 113 N. Y. 1 , 65 N. E. 738 . | 1 | 1920–1920 |
Smith v. Steely
neutral
2 sentences1911That a promise to suppress such a criminal prosecution will not support a promise to pay money, see Smith v. Steely, 80 Iowa, 738 , 45 N. W. 912 ; Meech v. Lee, 82 Mich. 274 , 46 N. W. 383 ; 9 Cyc. 1911That a promise to suppress such a criminal prosecution will not support a promise to pay money, see Smith v. Steely, 80 Iowa, 738 , 45 N. W. 912 ; Meech v. Lee, 82 Mich. 274 , 46 N. W. 383 ; 9 Cyc. | 1 | 1911–1911 |
Meech v. Lee
green
2 sentences1911That a promise to suppress such a criminal prosecution will not support a promise to pay money, see Smith v. Steely, 80 Iowa, 738 , 45 N. W. 912 ; Meech v. Lee, 82 Mich. 274 , 46 N. W. 383 ; 9 Cyc. 1911That a promise to suppress such a criminal prosecution will not support a promise to pay money, see Smith v. Steely, 80 Iowa, 738 , 45 N. W. 912 ; Meech v. Lee, 82 Mich. 274 , 46 N. W. 383 ; 9 Cyc. | 1 | 1911–1911 |
Teutonia Loan & Building Co. v. Turrell
neutral
2 sentences1907Co. v. Turrell, 19 Ind. App. 469 , 49 N. E. 852 , 65 Am. 1907Co. v. Turrell, 19 Ind. App. 469 , 49 N. E. 852 , 65 Am. | 1 | 1907–1907 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.