prima facie presumption in Illinois

2002See, e.g., Partlow v. State, 453 N.E.2d 259 (Ind. 1983); State v. Green, 275 So. 2d 184 (La. 1973); Fischer v. Ball, 212 Md. 517 , 129 A.2d 822 (1957).

2002See, e.g., Partlow v. State, 453 N.E.2d 259 (Ind. 1983); State v. Green, 275 So. 2d 184 (La. 1973); Fischer v. Ball, 212 Md. 517 , 129 A.2d 822 (1957).

2002See, e.g., Partlow v. State, 453 N.E.2d 259 (Ind. 1983); State v. Green, 275 So. 2d 184 (La. 1973); Fischer v. Ball, 212 Md. 517 , 129 A.2d 822 (1957).

2002See, e.g. , Partlow v. State , 453 N.E.2d 259 (Ind. 1983); State v. Green , 275 So. 2d 184 (La. 1973); Fischer v. Ball , 212 Md. 517 , 129 A.2d 822 (1957).

1992(Murgic v. Granite City Trust & Savings Bank (1964), 31 Ill. 2d 587, 590 , 202 N.E.2d 470 ("a prima facie presumption of donative intent exists where the proof shows that the making of the deposit and the execution of the contract is in conformity with the statute”); Franklin v. Anna National Bank (1986), 140 Ill.

1992(Murgic v. Granite City Trust & Savings Bank (1964), 31 Ill. 2d 587, 590 , 202 N.E.2d 470 ("a prima facie presumption of donative intent exists where the proof shows that the making of the deposit and the execution of the contract is in conformity with the statute”); Franklin v. Anna National Bank (1986), 140 Ill.

1986App. 3d 388 , 291 N.E.2d 27 .) A failure to present a prima facie defense on the merits defeats a defendant’s right to have the judgment opened.

1978App. 3d 388 , 291 N.E.2d 27 .) In Turner the court stated: “While we do not insist that a defendant in a case such as this must comply strictly with the procedural aspects of Rule 276, a failure to present a prima facie defense on the merits defeats defendant’s right to have the judgment opened.

1994Ed. 2d at 696 , 95 S. Ct. at 696 .) In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show: (1) the group alleged to be excluded is a "distinctive” group in the community; (2) the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) the under-representation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection process.

1990Ed. 2d 690, 697 , 95 S. Ct. 692, 697 .) In order to show a prima facie violation of this fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group allegedly excluded is a distinctive group in the community; (2) that the underrepresentation of that group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that the underrepresentation is due to the systematic exclusion of that distinctive group in the jury-selection process.

1982Such facts raised a prima facie presumption in favor of a resulting trust and imposed the burden upon the defendant to show that she was to have some beneficial interest in the property.” 6 Ill. 2d 167, 175 , 128 N.E.2d 734, 738 .

1982Such facts raised a prima facie presumption in favor of a resulting trust and imposed the burden upon the defendant to show that she was to have some beneficial interest in the property.” 6 Ill. 2d 167, 175 , 128 N.E.2d 734, 738 .

1982This presumption may be rebutted by parol proof of an intention on the part of the payor that the grantee shall take the beneficial interest and not merely the legal title.” (Emphasis added.) 410 Ill. 519, 524 , 102 N.E.2d 787, 790 .

1962(Bowman v. Pettersen, 410 Ill. 519, 524 .) The payment of the consideration raises a prima facie presumption in favor of a resulting trust.

2024Hamilton, 2019 IL App (5th) 170295, ¶ 80 . ¶ 101 It is clear from the testimony of the parties throughout the trial, that while Teresa was generally aware that John was borrowing money from his family, John incurred the vast majority of the marital and institutional loans without informing or consulting Teresa.

2024Hamilton, 2019 IL App (5th) 170295, ¶ 80 . ¶ 100 It is clear from the testimony of the parties throughout the trial, that while Teresa was generally aware that John was borrowing money from his family, John incurred the vast majority of the marital and institutional loans without informing or consulting Teresa.

2023Id.

1995(In re Estate of Wilson (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 349, 355-56 , 410 N.E.2d 23, 27 .) Where a husband purchases property and title is taken in his and his wife’s names, as joint tenants, there is a presumption of gift and not a presumption of resulting trust.

2022To establish a prima facie violation of the cross-section requirement, defendants must show that: “(1) the group allegedly excluded is a distinctive group in the community; (2) the underrepresentation of that group in venires, from which juries are selected, is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) the underrepresentation is due to the systematic exclusion of that distinctive group in the jury selection process.” Id. (citing Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979)).

1995Ed. 2d 579 , 99 S. Ct. 664 ; People v. Peeples (1993), 155 Ill. 2d 422, 450 .) Defendant has failed to state a prima facie challenge because he is unable to fulfill the second and third elements, African-Americans are a distinctive group but they comprised no more than 2% of the population of Du Page County.

2022Id. ¶ 23 The burden of persuasion rests with the petitioner throughout the proceedings (id.), and the failure to present substantial evidence of a prima facie claim of unlawful discrimination or to disprove a respondent’s articulated reason for its actions warrants dismissal of the charge.

2022Id. ¶ 33 The burden of persuasion rests with the petitioner throughout the proceedings (id.), and the failure to present substantial evidence of a prima facie claim of unlawful discrimination or to disprove a respondent’s articulated reason for its actions warrants dismissal of the charge.

2021Consequently, the majority’s conclusion in the next paragraph that “we may affirm the circuit court’s ruling based on the equities alone” (supra ¶ 61) finds no support in the law and runs afoul of the supreme court’s contrary directive in Mohanty (Mohanty, 225 Ill. 2d at 62 ). ¶ 86 Additional aspects of the majority’s paragraph 61 are worth noting.

2021Consequently, the majority’s conclusion in the next paragraph that “we may affirm the circuit court’s ruling based on the equities alone” (supra ¶ 61) finds no support in the law and runs afoul of the supreme court’s contrary directive in Mohanty (Mohanty, 225 Ill. 2d at 62 ). ¶ 86 Additional aspects of the majority’s paragraph 61 are worth noting.

2021Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 39 . ¶ 60 A. Cause and Prejudice ¶ 61 On appeal, the petitioner argues that the circuit court erred in denying him leave to file his successive postconviction petition because he established a prima facie claim of cause and prejudice based on new scientific evidence demonstrating the invalidity and unreliability of the bite mark evidence used by the State to obtain his conviction.

2021Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 39 . ¶ 60 A. Cause and Prejudice ¶ 61 On appeal, the petitioner argues that the circuit court erred in denying him leave to file his successive postconviction petition because he established a prima facie claim of cause and prejudice based on new scientific evidence demonstrating the invalidity and unreliability of the bite mark evidence used by the State to obtain his conviction.

2019Specifically, the Court stated that the second amendment protects only the sorts of weapons that are in common use and “typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.” Id. at 625 . ¶ 13 Any attempt by the State to rebut the prima facie presumption of second amendment protection afforded stun guns and tasers on the grounds that the weapons are uncommon or not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes would be futile.

2019Specifically, the Court stated that the second amendment protects only the sorts of weapons that are in common use and “typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.” Id. at 625 . ¶ 13 Any attempt by the State to rebut the prima facie presumption of second amendment protection afforded stun guns and tasers on the grounds that the weapons are uncommon or not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes would be futile.

2019See Caetano, 577 U.S. at ___, 136 S. Ct. at 1027 (rejecting the contention that stun guns and tasers are dangerous and unusual because they were not in common use at the time the second amendment was enacted); Ramirez v. Commonwealth, 94 N.E.3d 809 (Mass. 2018) (holding that stun guns and tasers are arms within the protection of the second amendment); Yanna, 824 N.W.2d at 144 (holding that stun guns and tasers are protected by the second amendment and noting that “[h]undreds of thousands of Tasers and stun guns have been sold to private citizens”); Caetano, 577 U.S. at ___, 136 S. Ct. at 1033

2019See Caetano, 577 U.S. at ___, 136 S. Ct. at 1027 (rejecting the contention that stun guns and tasers are dangerous and unusual because they were not in common use at the time the second amendment was enacted); Ramirez v. Commonwealth, 94 N.E.3d 809 (Mass. 2018) (holding that stun guns and tasers are arms within the protection of the second amendment); Yanna, 824 N.W.2d at 144 (holding that stun guns and tasers are protected by the second amendment and noting that “[h]undreds of thousands of Tasers and stun guns have been sold to private citizens”); Caetano, 577 U.S. at ___, 136 S. Ct. at 1033