prima facie violation in Iowa

2023Under controlling precedents, a defendant establishes a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section right by proving the following: (1) a group alleged to have been excluded from the jury pool is a distinctive group in the community; (2) the distinctive group’s representation in the jury pool is not “fair and reasonable” when compared to the group’s percentage in the community; and (3) the distinctive group’s underrepresentation in the jury pool “is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.” Plain, 898 N.W.2d at 822 (quoting Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 36

2022A defendant establishes a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement by showing that (1) a group alleged to have been excluded is a “distinctive” group in the community, (2) the group’s representation in jury pools is not “fair and reasonable” when considered against the group’s percentage in the community, and (3) the group’s underrepresentation “is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.” Id. at 822 (quoting Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979)).

2023Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979); State v. Plain (Plain II), 969 N.W.2d 293 , 296 (Iowa 2022); State v. Lilly (Lilly I), 930 N.W.2d 293, 299 (Iowa 2019).

2021As our supreme court explained in State v. Plain: [A] defendant can establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross- section requirement by showing (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘‘distinctive’’ group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process. 898 N.W.2d 801 , 821–22 (Iowa 2017) (quoting Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357,

2020The United States Supreme Court articulated a three-part test for establishing a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement in Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979), and our supreme court adopted the test in State v. Watkins, 463 N.W.2d 411, 414 (Iowa 1990).

1992“A defendant challenging the composition of a jury panel must first establish a prima facie violation of the sixth amendment’s fair cross-section requirement.” State v. Watkins, 463 N.W.2d 411, 414 (1990) (citing Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 , 99 S.Ct. 664, 668 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579, 586-87 (1979)).

2015To establish a prima facie claim of legal malpractice, the plaintiff must produce evidence showing the attorney’s breach of duty caused “actual injury, loss, or damage.” Ruden v. Jenk, 543 N.W.2d 605, 610 (Iowa 1996).

2015To establish a prima facie claim of legal malpractice, the plaintiff must produce 10 evidence showing the attorney’s breach of duty caused “actual injury, loss, or damage.” Ruden v. Jenk, 543 N.W.2d 605, 610 (Iowa 1996).

2025But to establish a prima facie claim for legal malpractice, a plaintiff must show—among other elements—that the attorney failed “to use such skill, prudence and diligence as lawyers of ordinary skill and capacity commonly possess and exercise.” 2 We review the court’s summary judgment ruling for correction of errors at law, examining whether the movant demonstrated “that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Vossoughi v. Polaschek, 859 N.W.2d 643, 649 (Iowa 2015). 4 Stender v. Blessum, 897 N.W.2d 491, 505 (Iowa 2017).

2016“To establish a prima facie claim of legal malpractice, the plaintiff must produce evidence showing the attorney’s breach of duty caused ‘actual injury, loss, or damage.’” Vossoughi v. Polaschek, 859 N.W.2d 643, 649 (Iowa 2015) (citation omitted).

1997Dessel v. Dessel, 431 N.W.2d 359, 361 (Iowa 1988).

1995Dessel v. Dessel, 431 N.W.2d 359, 361 (Iowa 1988).

2025“The United States Supreme Court and [the Iowa Supreme Court] have held the constitutional right to ‘an impartial jury’ includes the right to a jury ‘drawn from a fair cross-section of the community.’” Id. (citing Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975); Plain, 898 N.W.2d at 821 ). [A] defendant establishes a prima facie violation of the fair-cross- section right by proving the following: (1) a group alleged to have been excluded from the jury pool is a distinctive group in the community; (2) the distinctive group’s representation in the jury pool is not “fair and reasonable” when compar

2025“The United States Supreme Court and [the Iowa Supreme Court] have held the constitutional right to ‘an impartial jury’ includes the right to a jury ‘drawn from a fair cross-section of the community.’” Id. (citing Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975); Plain, 898 N.W.2d at 821 ). [A] defendant establishes a prima facie violation of the fair-cross- section right by proving the following: (1) a group alleged to have been excluded from the jury pool is a distinctive group in the community; (2) the distinctive group’s representation in the jury pool is not “fair and reasonable” when compar

2025But to establish a prima facie claim for legal malpractice, a plaintiff must show—among other elements—that the attorney failed “to use such skill, prudence and diligence as lawyers of ordinary skill and capacity commonly possess and exercise.” 2 We review the court’s summary judgment ruling for correction of errors at law, examining whether the movant demonstrated “that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Vossoughi v. Polaschek, 859 N.W.2d 643, 649 (Iowa 2015). 4 Stender v. Blessum, 897 N.W.2d 491, 505 (Iowa 2017).

2024Stender v. Blessum, 897 N.W.2d 491, 502 (Iowa 2017).

2016“An attorney breaches the duty of care owed to the client when the attorney fails to use ‘such skill, prudence and diligence as lawyers of ordinary skill and capacity commonly possess and exercise in the performance of the task which [is undertaken].’” Schmitz v. Crotty, 528 N.W.2d 112, 115 (Iowa 1995) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).

1995Schmitz v. Crotty, 528 N.W.2d 112, 115 (Iowa 1995) (citing Dessel v. Dessel, 431 N.W.2d 359, 361 (Iowa 1988)).

1991Fogel, 446 N.W.2d at 454 ; Prior v. Rathjen, 199 N.W.2d 327, 330 (Iowa 1972).

1989Prior v. Rathjen, 199 N.W.2d 327, 330 (Iowa 1972).

1988In Gruener v. City of Cedar Falls, 189 N.W.2d 577, 580 (Iowa 1971) the court said: By proper motion, a party can compel his adversary to come forth with specific facts which constitute competent evidence showing a prima facie claim or defense.

1972Because of instant applicability we do, however, interpose these statements from Gruener v. City of Cedar Falls, 189 N.W.2d 577, 580 (Iowa); "Involved here is the basic purpose of summary judgment procedure. * * * By proper motion, a party can compel his adversary to come forth with specific facts which constitute competent evidence showing a prima facie claim or defense.

2006See Hoefer, 470 N.W.2d at 338-39 (“While intentional torts ... are generally poor candidates for summary judgment because of the subjective nature of motive and intent the rule is not absolute and, ... ‘there is no genuine issue of fact if there is no evidence.’ Put another way, the party resisting summary judgment ‘may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading.’ The resistance must set forth specific facts constituting competent evidence to support a prima facie claim.” (Citations omitted.)).

1994The party resisting summary judgment “must set forth specific facts constituting competent evidence to support a prima facie claim.” Id. at 339 ; see also Jones v. Palmer Communications, Inc., 440 N.W.2d 884, 889 (Iowa 1989); Iowa R.Civ.P. 237(e).

2026Although the movant holds the burden to show the district court a lack of genuine issue of material fact, the resistance to summary judgment “must set forth specific facts which constitute competent evidence showing a prima facie claim.” Id. (citation omitted).

2023By requiring the resister to go beyond generalities, the basic purpose of summary judgment procedure is achieved: to weed out “[p]aper cases and defenses” in order “to make way for litigation which does have something to it.” Slaughter, 925 N.W.2d at 808 (alteration in original) (quoting Thompson v. City of Des Moines, 564 N.W.2d 839, 841 (Iowa 1997)).

2023Bar Ass’n, 142 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 1998) (“In conducting the requisite analysis under the prima facie standard, we take specific facts affirmatively alleged by the plaintiff as true (whether or not disputed) and construe them in the light most congenial to the plaintiff’s jurisdictional claim.

2023Bar Ass’n, 142 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 1998) (“In conducting the requisite analysis under the prima facie standard, we take specific facts affirmatively alleged by the plaintiff as true (whether or not disputed) and construe them in the light most congenial to the plaintiff’s jurisdictional claim.

2023By requiring the resister to go beyond generalities, the basic purpose of summary judgment procedure is achieved: to weed out “[p]aper cases and defenses” in order “to make way for litigation which does have something to it.” Slaughter, 925 N.W.2d at 808 (alteration in original) (quoting Thompson v. City of Des Moines, 564 N.W.2d 839, 841 (Iowa 1997)).

2019By requiring the resister to go beyond generalities, the basic purpose of summary judgment procedure is achieved: to weed out "[p]aper cases and defenses" in order "to make way for litigation which does have something to it." Thompson v. City of Des Moines , 564 N.W.2d 839 , 841 (Iowa 1997) (alteration in original) (quoting Fogel v. Trs. of Iowa Coll. , 446 N.W.2d 451 , 454 (Iowa 1989) ).

2017See State v. Knutson, 220 N.W.2d 575, 577 (Iowa 1974).

2017See State v. Knutson, 220 N.W.2d 575, 577 (Iowa 1974).

2015Until the attorney’s act or omission that breached the applicable duty “produces injury to claimant’s inter *650 est by way of loss or damage, no cause of action accrues.” Wolfswinkel v. Gesink, 180 N.W.2d 452, 456 (Iowa 1970).

2015Until the attorney’s act or omission that breached the applicable duty “produces injury to claimant’s interest by way of loss or damage, no cause of action accrues.” Wolfswinkel v. Gesink, 180 N.W.2d 452, 456 (Iowa 1970).

2018Analysis “A party seeking to establish a prima facie claim of legal malpractice must show the following: (1) a duty arising from the established existence of an attorney- client relationship; (2) the attorney breached that duty; (3) the attorney’s breach was the proximate cause of injury to the client; and (4) the client suffered actual damage, injury, or loss.” Barker v. Capotosto, 875 N.W.2d 157, 161 (Iowa 2016).

2018A party seeking to establish a prima facie claim of legal malpractice must establish “(1) a duty arising from the established existence of an attorney-client relationship; (2) the attorney breached that duty; (3) the attorney’s breach was the proximate cause of injury to the client; and (4) the client suffered actual damage, injury, or loss.” Barker, 875 N.W.2d at 161 . 6 A legal-malpractice action is subject to a five-year statute of limitations.

2017It appears [the court] was unaware the term of 5 To establish a prima facie claim of legal malpractice, Kraklio “must ‘achieve relief from a conviction before advancing a legal malpractice action against his former attorney.’” Barker, 875 N.W.2d at 161 (quoting Trobaugh v. Sondag, 668 N.W.2d 577, 583 (Iowa 2003) (“[T]he approach [requiring] a defendant to achieve relief . . . before advancing a legal malpractice action against his former attorney . . . best preserves key principles of judicial economy and comity, including the avoidance of multiple proceedings related to the same factual and p

2017Trobaugh v. Sondag, 668 N.W.2d 577 , 580 n.1 (Iowa 2005).

2025“The United States Supreme Court and [the Iowa Supreme Court] have held the constitutional right to ‘an impartial jury’ includes the right to a jury ‘drawn from a fair cross-section of the community.’” Id. (citing Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975); Plain, 898 N.W.2d at 821 ). [A] defendant establishes a prima facie violation of the fair-cross- section right by proving the following: (1) a group alleged to have been excluded from the jury pool is a distinctive group in the community; (2) the distinctive group’s representation in the jury pool is not “fair and reasonable” when compar

1990Id. at 368 , 99 S.Ct. at 670-71 , 58 L.Ed.2d at 589-90 ; Taylor, 419 U.S. at 533-35 , 95 S.Ct. at 699-700 , 42 L.Ed.2d at 700-01 .

2019By requiring the resister to go beyond generalities, the basic purpose of summary judgment procedure is achieved: to weed out “[p]aper cases and defenses” in order “to make way for litigation which does have something to it.” Thompson v. City of Des Moines, 564 N.W.2d 839, 841 (Iowa 1997) (alteration in original) (quoting Fogel v. Trs. of Iowa Coll., 446 N.W.2d 451, 454 (Iowa 1989)).

2019By requiring the resister to go beyond generalities, the basic purpose of summary judgment procedure is achieved: to weed out "[p]aper cases and defenses" in order "to make way for litigation which does have something to it." Thompson v. City of Des Moines , 564 N.W.2d 839 , 841 (Iowa 1997) (alteration in original) (quoting Fogel v. Trs. of Iowa Coll. , 446 N.W.2d 451 , 454 (Iowa 1989) ).

2025See id.; see also Humphries v. Trs. of the Methodist Episcopal Church of Cresco, Iowa, 566 N.W.2d 869 , 872–73 (Iowa 1997) (to properly resist a motion for summary judgment “[the party] must set forth specific facts constituting competent evidence to support a prima facie claim.” (citation omitted)).

2025“A genuine issue of material fact exists when reasonable minds can differ as to how a factual question should be resolved.” Andersen v. Khanna, 913 N.W.2d 526, 535 (Iowa 2018) (citation omitted).

2025Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) (“[I]ssues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we will decide them on appeal.”). 5 not complete a hair stat test, the mother had opportunities to test through both urine and sweat patches.

2024When a plaintiff is a public official, the First Amendment adds two elements to the tort that must be established by clear and convincing evidence—the statement must be false and it must be made with actual malice.[2] Bertrand v. Mullin, 846 N.W.2d 884, 892 (Iowa 2014) (internal citations and footnote omitted).