prima facie claim in Montana

2009TAG must present “a prima facie defense.” Blume, 242 Mont. at 470 , 791 P.2d at 787 .

2009TAG must present “a prima facie defense.” Blume, 242 Mont. at 470 , 791 P.2d at 787 .

1991LeVasseur v. Roullman (1933), 93 Mont. 552 , 20 P.2d 250 .

1949But though the general rule is as above stated, still as stated in the Le Vasseur case [ 93 Mont. 552 , 20 Pac. (2d) 252 ], ‘! one tenant in common' may oust his cotenant and make his possession adverse.' But, as prima facie the possession of every co-tenant is presumed to be by virtue of his title, and not in hostility to the rights of his cotenants, whoever asserts the remedy, to the granting of which the fact of ouster is a prerequisite, must first remove this prima facie presumption. * * * In order to sustain the claim that he has obtained title by adverse possession, the claimant must sho

2022See Porter, 192 Mont. at 181 , 627 P.2d at 839 (citing Atkinson, 66 Mont. at 421 , 214 P. at 76-77 ; Parsons, 59 Mont. at 340 , 196 P. at 529 ; Rea Bros.

2022See Porter, 192 Mont. at 181 , 627 P.2d at 839 (citing Atkinson, 66 Mont. at 421 , 214 P. at 76-77 ; Parsons, 59 Mont. at 340 , 196 P. at 529 ; Rea Bros.

2017Hughes v. Lynch, 2007 MT 177, ¶ 25 , 338 Mont. 214 , 164 P.3d 913 .

2017Hughes v. Lynch, 2007 MT 177, ¶ 25 , 338 Mont. 214 , 164 P.3d 913 .

2016Bolz, 200 Mont. at 295 , 651 P.2d at 611 ; Emmerson v. Walker, 2010 MT 167, ¶ 23 , 357 Mont. 166 , 236 P.3d 598 . ¶20 In this case the contract or relationship at issue is Wagner’s buy-sell agreement with the Foundation for purchase of the sixty acres of land.

2016Bolz, 200 Mont. at 295 , 651 P.2d at 611 ; Emmerson v. Walker, 2010 MT 167, ¶ 23 , 357 Mont. 166 , 236 P.3d 598 . ¶20 In this case the contract or relationship at issue is Wagner’s buy-sell agreement with the Foundation for purchase of the sixty acres of land.

2016Bolz, 200 Mont. at 295 , 651 P.2d at 611 ; Emmerson v. Walker, 2010 MT 167, ¶ 23 , 357 Mont. 166 , 236 P.3d 598 . ¶20 In this case the contract or relationship at issue is Wagner’s buy-sell agreement with the Foundation for purchase of the sixty acres of land.

2016Bolz, 200 Mont. at 295 , 651 P.2d at 611 ; Emmerson v. Walker, 2010 MT 167, ¶ 23 , 357 Mont. 166 , 236 P.3d 598 . ¶20 In this case the contract or relationship at issue is Wagner’s buy-sell agreement with the Foundation for purchase of the sixty acres of land.

2012Instead, we apply the established multi-factor tests for promissory estoppel and equitable estoppel and hold that the District Court correctly concluded that the John Turners failed to establish a prima facie case for either promissory or equitable estoppel. ¶24 To establish a prima facie claim, the party asserting promissory estoppel must establish the following four elements: “(1) a promise clear and unambiguous in its terms; (2) reliance on the promise by the party to whom the promise is made; (3) reasonableness and foreseeability of the reliance; [and] (4) the party asserting the reliance

2012Instead, we apply the established multi-factor tests for promissory estoppel and equitable estoppel and hold that the District Court correctly concluded that the John Turners failed to establish a prima facie case for either promissory or equitable estoppel. ¶24 To establish a prima facie claim, the party asserting promissory estoppel must establish the following four elements: “(1) a promise clear and unambiguous in its terms; (2) reliance on the promise by the party to whom the promise is made; (3) reasonableness and foreseeability of the reliance; [and] (4) the party asserting the reliance

2004“The effect of [the marital] presumption, of course, is to place the burden on the other party to overcome the presumption.” Murnion, 212 Mont. at 113 , 686 P.2d at 897 . ¶128 Thus, the language of the Affidavit and the law’s presumption in favor of marriage clearly establish a prima facie claim of common-law marriage because the presumption is “itself sufficient to establish the marriage.” Spradlin, 262 F.Supp. at 505 .

2004“The effect of [the marital] presumption, of course, is to place the burden on the other party to overcome the presumption.” Murnion, 212 Mont. at 113 , 686 P.2d at 897 . ¶128 Thus, the language of the Affidavit and the law’s presumption in favor of marriage clearly establish a prima facie claim of common-law marriage because the presumption is “itself sufficient to establish the marriage.” Spradlin, 262 F.Supp. at 505 .

2004Waldher, 282 Mont. at 63 , 935 P.2d at 1104 .

2004Waldher, 282 Mont. at 63 , 935 P.2d at 1104 .

2004“The effect of [the marital] presumption, of course, is to place the burden on the other party to overcome the presumption.” Murnion, 212 Mont. at 113 , 686 P.2d at 897 . ¶128 Thus, the language of the Affidavit and the law’s presumption in favor of marriage clearly establish a prima facie claim of common-law marriage because the presumption is “itself sufficient to establish the marriage.” Spradlin, 262 F.Supp. at 505 .

2004“The effect of [the marital] presumption, of course, is to place the burden on the other party to overcome the presumption.” Murnion, 212 Mont. at 113 , 686 P.2d at 897 . ¶128 Thus, the language of the Affidavit and the law’s presumption in favor of marriage clearly establish a prima facie claim of common-law marriage because the presumption is 59 “itself sufficient to establish the marriage.” Spradlin, 262 F.Supp. at 505 .

2000See Duren v. Missouri (1979), 439 U.S. 357 , 99 S.Ct. 664 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579 ; Taylor v. Louisiana (1975), 419 U.S. 522 , 95 S.Ct. 692 , 42 L.Ed.2d 690 ; see also United States v. Esquivel (9th Cir. 1996), 88 F.3d 722 ; Kills on Top v. State (1995), 273 Mont. 32 , 901 P.2d 1368 ; State v. Bradley (1993), 262 Mont. 194 , 864 P.2d 787 .

2000See Duren v. Missouri (1979), 439 U.S. 357 , 99 S.Ct. 664 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579 ; Taylor v. Louisiana (1975), 419 U.S. 522 , 95 S.Ct. 692 , 42 L.Ed.2d 690 ; see also United States v. Esquivel (9th Cir. 1996), 88 F.3d 722 ; Kills on Top v. State (1995), 273 Mont. 32 , 901 P.2d 1368 ; State v. Bradley (1993), 262 Mont. 194 , 864 P.2d 787 .

2000See Duren v. Missouri (1979), 439 U.S. 357 , 99 S.Ct. 664 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579 ; Taylor v. Louisiana (1975), 419 U.S. 522 , 95 S.Ct. 692 , 42 L.Ed.2d 690 ; see also United States v. Esquivel (9th Cir. 1996), 88 F.3d 722 ; Kills on Top v. State (1995), 273 Mont. 32 , 901 P.2d 1368 ; State v. Bradley (1993), 262 Mont. 194 , 864 P.2d 787 .

2000See Duren v. Missouri (1979), 439 U.S. 357 , 99 S.Ct. 664 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579 ; Taylor v. Louisiana (1975), 419 U.S. 522 , 95 S.Ct. 692 , 42 L.Ed.2d 690 ; see also United States v. Esquivel (9th Cir. 1996), 88 F.3d 722 ; Kills on Top v. State (1995), 273 Mont. 32 , 901 P.2d 1368 ; State v. Bradley (1993), 262 Mont. 194 , 864 P.2d 787 .

2000See Duren v. Missouri (1979), 439 U.S. 357 , 99 S.Ct. 664 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579 ; Taylor v. Louisiana (1975), 419 U.S. 522 , 95 S.Ct. 692 , 42 L.Ed.2d 690 ; see also United States v. Esquivel (9th Cir. 1996), 88 F.3d 722 ; Kills on Top v. State (1995), 273 Mont. 32 , 901 P.2d 1368 ; State v. Bradley (1993), 262 Mont. 194 , 864 P.2d 787 .

2000See Duren v. Missouri (1979), 439 U.S. 357 , 99 S.Ct. 664 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579 ; Taylor v. Louisiana (1975), 419 U.S. 522 , 95 S.Ct. 692 , 42 L.Ed.2d 690 ; see also United States v. Esquivel (9th Cir. 1996), 88 F.3d 722 ; Kills on Top v. State (1995), 273 Mont. 32 , 901 P.2d 1368 ; State v. Bradley (1993), 262 Mont. 194 , 864 P.2d 787 .

1993Zosel, 185 P. at 1113 .

1991Cook v. Rigney (1942), 113 Mont. 198 , 126 P.2d 325 .

1991Cook v. Rigney (1942), 113 Mont. 198 , 126 P.2d 325 .

1990Eder v. Bereolos (1922), 63 Mont. 363, 368 , 207 P. 471, 472 ; Worstell v. Devine (1959), 135 Mont. 1, 6 , 335 P.2d 305, 308 .

1990Eder v. Bereolos (1922), 63 Mont. 363, 368 , 207 P. 471, 472 ; Worstell v. Devine (1959), 135 Mont. 1, 6 , 335 P.2d 305, 308 .

1990Eder v. Bereolos (1922), 63 Mont. 363, 368 , 207 P. 471, 472 ; Worstell v. Devine (1959), 135 Mont. 1, 6 , 335 P.2d 305, 308 .

1990Eder v. Bereolos (1922), 63 Mont. 363, 368 , 207 P. 471, 472 ; Worstell v. Devine (1959), 135 Mont. 1, 6 , 335 P.2d 305, 308 .

1983The District Court found that the presumption provided for by section 20-184(a), M.M.C. was unconstitutional in that it resulted in an impermissible shifting of the burden of persuasion under the holding in Sandstrom v. State of Montana (1979), 442 U.S. 510 , 99 S.Ct. 2450 , 61 L.Ed.2d 39 .

1983The District Court found that the presumption provided for by section 20-184(a), M.M.C. was unconstitutional in that it resulted in an impermissible shifting of the burden of persuasion under the holding in Sandstrom v. State of Montana (1979), 442 U.S. 510 , 99 S.Ct. 2450 , 61 L.Ed.2d 39 .

1983Presumption in reference to illegal parking, (a) In any prosecution charging a violation of any law or regulation governing the standing or parking of a vehicle, proof that the particular vehicle described in the complaint was parked in violation of any such law or regulation, together with proof that the defendant named in the complaint was at the time of such parking the registered owner of the vehicle, shall constitute in evidence a prima facie presumption that the registered owner of such vehicle was the person who parked or placed such vehicle where, and for the time during which, such vi

1983Presumption in reference to illegal parking, (a) In any prosecution charging a violation of any law or regulation governing the standing or parking of a vehicle, proof that the particular vehicle described in the complaint was parked in violation of any such law or regulation, together with proof that the defendant named in the complaint was at the time of such parking the registered owner of the vehicle, shall constitute in evidence a prima facie presumption that the registered owner of such vehicle was the person who parked or placed such vehicle where, and for the time during which, such vi

1957In Smith v. Collis, 42 Mont. 350, 364 , 112 Pac. 1070, 1073 , Ann.

1957In Smith v. Collis, 42 Mont. 350, 364 , 112 Pac. 1070, 1073 , Ann.

1952Riggsby and the burden of proof * * * is upon him to show that he was without negligence in the collision." The appellate court held the instruction to be erroneous and said, quoting from Desmarchier v. Frost, 91 Vt. 138 , 99 A. 782, 783 ; "The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not affect the burden of proof, or transform the general issue into an affirmative defense." See: Anderson v. Sisson, 170 Va. 178 , 196 S.E. 688, 690 ; McDowell v. Norfolk Southern R.

1952Riggsby and the burden of proof * * * is upon him to show that he was without negligence in the collision." The appellate court held the instruction to be erroneous and said, quoting from Desmarchier v. Frost, 91 Vt. 138 , 99 A. 782, 783 ; "The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not affect the burden of proof, or transform the general issue into an affirmative defense." See: Anderson v. Sisson, 170 Va. 178 , 196 S.E. 688, 690 ; McDowell v. Norfolk Southern R.

1952Riggsby and the burden of proof * * * is upon him to show that he was without negligence in the collision." The appellate court held the instruction to be erroneous and said, quoting from Desmarchier v. Frost, 91 Vt. 138 , 99 A. 782, 783 ; "The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not affect the burden of proof, or transform the general issue into an affirmative defense." See: Anderson v. Sisson, 170 Va. 178 , 196 S.E. 688, 690 ; McDowell v. Norfolk Southern R.

1952Riggsby and the burden of proof * * * is upon him to show that he was without negligence in the collision." The appellate court held the instruction to be erroneous and said, quoting from Desmarchier v. Frost, 91 Vt. 138 , 99 A. 782, 783 ; "The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not affect the burden of proof, or transform the general issue into an affirmative defense." See: Anderson v. Sisson, 170 Va. 178 , 196 S.E. 688, 690 ; McDowell v. Norfolk Southern R.

1949The prima facie presumption is that a fund deposited in a bank belongs to the person in whose name it has been deposited and the burden of proof is upon another claiming such fund. 5 Michie, Banks and Banking, see. 368b, p. 710; Egbert v. Payne, 99 Pa. 239, 244 ; O’Brien v. Radford, 113 Pa. Super. 88, 91 , 171 A. 296 ; Johnson v. Commercial National Bank, La.

1949The prima facie presumption is that a fund deposited in a bank belongs to the person in whose name it has been deposited and the burden of proof is upon another claiming such fund. 5 Michie, Banks and Banking, see. 368b, p. 710; Egbert v. Payne, 99 Pa. 239, 244 ; O’Brien v. Radford, 113 Pa. Super. 88, 91 , 171 A. 296 ; Johnson v. Commercial National Bank, La.