prima facie claim in North Carolina

2026Dalton v. Camp, 353 N.C. 647, 656 , 548 S.E.2d 704, 710 (2001) (citing United Labs., 322 N.C. at 665, 370 S.E.2d at 389). “[T]o establish a prima facie claim for unfair trade practices, a plaintiff must show: (1) defendant committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) the action in question was in or affecting commerce, and (3) the act proximately caused injury to the plaintiff.” Dalton, 353 N.C. at 656 , 548 S.E.2d at 711 (citing Spartan Leasing, Inc. v. Pollard, 101 N.C.

2026Dalton v. Camp, 353 N.C. 647, 656 , 548 S.E.2d 704, 710 (2001) (citing United Labs., 322 N.C. at 665, 370 S.E.2d at 389). “[T]o establish a prima facie claim for unfair trade practices, a plaintiff must show: (1) defendant committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) the action in question was in or affecting commerce, and (3) the act proximately caused injury to the plaintiff.” Dalton, 353 N.C. at 656 , 548 S.E.2d at 711 (citing Spartan Leasing, Inc. v. Pollard, 101 N.C.

2026Dalton v. Camp, 353 N.C. 647, 656 , 548 S.E.2d 704, 710 (2001) (citing United Labs., 322 N.C. at 665, 370 S.E.2d at 389). “[T]o establish a prima facie claim for unfair trade practices, a plaintiff must show: (1) defendant committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) the action in question was in or affecting commerce, and (3) the act proximately caused injury to the plaintiff.” Dalton, 353 N.C. at 656 , 548 S.E.2d at 711 (citing Spartan Leasing, Inc. v. Pollard, 101 N.C.

2022Dalton v. Camp, 353 N.C. 647, 656 , 548 S.E.2d 704, 710 (2001) (citing United Labs., 322 N.C. at 665 , 370 S.E.2d at 389). “[T]o establish a prima facie claim for unfair trade practices, a plaintiff must show: (1) defendant committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) the action in question was in or affecting commerce, and (3) the act proximately caused injury to the plaintiff.” Dalton, 353 N.C. at 656 , 548 S.E.2d at 711 (citing Spartan Leasing, Inc. v. Pollard, 101 N.C.

2023To establish a prima facie claim for unfair and deceptive trade practices, “the plaintiff must show: (1) defendant committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) the action in question was in or affecting commerce, . . . and (3) the act proximately caused injury to the plaintiff.” Pleasant Valley Promenade v. Lechmere, Inc., 120 N.C.

2007In order to establish a prima facie claim under section 75-1.1, a plaintiff must show: “(1) defendant committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) the action in question was in or affecting commerce, and (3) the act proximately caused injury to the plaintiff.” Pleasant Valley Promenade v. Lechmere, Inc., 120 N.C.

2021Notably, however, “where the trial court has acted in a matter, every presumption not inconsistent with the record will be indulged in favor of jurisdiction . . . .” Nothing else appearing, we apply “the prima facie presumption of rightful jurisdiction which arises from the fact that a court of general jurisdiction has acted in the matter.” As a result, “[t]he burden is on the party asserting want of jurisdiction to show such want.” In re N.T., 368 N.C. 705, 707 , 782 S.E.2d 502 , 503–04 (2016) (first quoting Cheape v. Town of Chapel Hill, 320 N.C. 549, 557 , 359 S.E.2d 792, 797 (1987), then q

2021Notably, however, “where the trial court has acted in a matter, every presumption not inconsistent with the record will be indulged in favor of jurisdiction . . . .” Nothing else appearing, we apply “the prima facie presumption of rightful jurisdiction which arises from the fact that a court of general jurisdiction has acted in the matter.” As a result, “[t]he burden is on the party asserting want of jurisdiction to show such want.” In re N.T., 368 N.C. 705, 707 , 782 S.E.2d 502 , 503–04 (2016) (first quoting Cheape v. Town of Chapel Hill, 320 N.C. 549, 557 , 359 S.E.2d 792, 797 (1987), then q

2021To “establish a prima facie claim for unfair trade practices, a plaintiff must show: (1) [the] defendant committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) the action in question was in or affecting commerce, and (3) the act proximately caused injury to the plaintiff.” Bumpers v. Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 367 N.C. 81, 88 (2013) (quoting Dalton, 353 N.C. at 656 ). 49.

2020“In order to establish a prima facie claim for unfair trade practices, a plaintiff must show: (1) [the] defendant committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) the action in question was in or affecting commerce, and (3) the act proximately caused injury to the plaintiff.” Bumpers v. Cmty. Bank of N. Virginia, 367 N.C. 81, 88 , 747 S.E.2d 220, 226 (2013) (alterations in original) (quoting Dalton v. Camp, 353 N.C. 647, 656 , 548 S.E.2d 704, 711 (2001)).

1986The United States Supreme Court has held that in order to establish a prima facie violation of the sixth amendment fair cross-section requirement, a defendant must show: (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a “distinctive” group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process. *381 Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 , 58 L.Ed. 2d 579,

1986The United States Supreme Court has held that in order to establish a prima facie violation of the sixth amendment fair cross-section requirement, a defendant must show: (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a “distinctive” group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process. *381 Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 , 58 L.Ed. 2d 579,

2021Notably, however, “where the trial court has acted in a matter, every presumption not inconsistent with the record will be indulged in favor of jurisdiction . . . .” Nothing else appearing, we apply “the prima facie presumption of rightful jurisdiction which arises from the fact that a court of general jurisdiction has acted in the matter.” As a result, “[t]he burden is on the party asserting want of jurisdiction to show such want.” In re N.T., 368 N.C. 705, 707 , 782 S.E.2d 502 , 503–04 (2016) (first quoting Cheape v. Town of Chapel Hill, 320 N.C. 549, 557 , 359 S.E.2d 792, 797 (1987), then q

2021Notably, however, “where the trial court has acted in a matter, every presumption not inconsistent with the record will be indulged in favor of jurisdiction . . . .” Nothing else appearing, we apply “the prima facie presumption of rightful jurisdiction which arises from the fact that a court of general jurisdiction has acted in the matter.” As a result, “[t]he burden is on the party asserting want of jurisdiction to show such want.” In re N.T., 368 N.C. 705, 707 , 782 S.E.2d 502 , 503–04 (2016) (first quoting Cheape v. Town of Chapel Hill, 320 N.C. 549, 557 , 359 S.E.2d 792, 797 (1987), then q

2021Notably, however, “where the trial court has acted in a matter, every presumption not inconsistent with the record will be indulged in favor of jurisdiction . . . .” Nothing else appearing, we apply “the prima facie presumption of rightful jurisdiction which arises from the fact that a court of general jurisdiction has acted in the matter.” As a result, “[t]he burden is on the party asserting want of jurisdiction to show such want.” In re N.T., 368 N.C. 705, 707 , 782 S.E.2d 502 , 503–04 (2016) (first quoting Cheape v. Town of Chapel Hill, 320 N.C. 549, 557 , 359 S.E.2d 792, 797 (1987), then q

2021Notably, however, “where the trial court has acted in a matter, every presumption not inconsistent with the record will be indulged in favor of jurisdiction . . . .” Nothing else appearing, we apply “the prima facie presumption of rightful jurisdiction which arises from the fact that a court of general jurisdiction has acted in the matter.” As a result, “[t]he burden is on the party asserting want of jurisdiction to show such want.” In re N.T., 368 N.C. 705, 707 , 782 S.E.2d 502 , 503–04 (2016) (first quoting Cheape v. Town of Chapel Hill, 320 N.C. 549, 557 , 359 S.E.2d 792, 797 (1987), then q

2026“Whether a trade practice is unfair or deceptive usually depends upon the facts of each case and the impact the practice has in the marketplace.” Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 548 , 276 S.E.2d 397, 403 (1981).

2026“Whether a trade practice is unfair or deceptive usually depends upon the facts of each case and the impact the practice has in the marketplace.” Marshall v. Miller, 302 N.C. 539, 548 , 276 S.E.2d 397, 403 (1981).

2013UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES {81} “In order to establish a prima facie claim for unfair trade practices, a plaintiff must show: (1) defendant committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) the action in question was in or affecting commerce, and (3) the act proximately caused injury to the plaintiff.” Dalton v. Camp, 353 N.C. 647, 656 , 548 S.E.2d 704, 711 (2001). {82} “Plaintiff must first establish that defendants’ conduct was ‘in or affecting commerce’ before the question of unfairness or deception arises.” Hajmm Co. v. House of Raeford Farms, Inc., 328 N.C. 578, 592 , 403 S.

2013UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES {81} “In order to establish a prima facie claim for unfair trade practices, a plaintiff must show: (1) defendant committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) the action in question was in or affecting commerce, and (3) the act proximately caused injury to the plaintiff.” Dalton v. Camp, 353 N.C. 647, 656 , 548 S.E.2d 704, 711 (2001). {82} “Plaintiff must first establish that defendants’ conduct was ‘in or affecting commerce’ before the question of unfairness or deception arises.” Hajmm Co. v. House of Raeford Farms, Inc., 328 N.C. 578, 592 , 403 S.

2005See Atwood, 290 N.C. at 271 , 225 S.E.2d at 545 (holding that for purposes of a conviction for driving while license is revoked, mailing of the notice of suspension raises a prima facie presumption that defendant received the notice and thereby acquired knowledge of the suspension or revocation).

2005See Atwood, 290 N.C. at 271 , 225 S.E.2d at 545 (holding that for purposes of a conviction for driving while license is revoked, mailing of the notice of suspension raises a prima facie presumption that defendant received the notice and thereby acquired knowledge of the suspension or revocation).

2023As a result, Respondent-Mother did not carry her burden to rebut “the prima facie presumption of rightful jurisdiction[.]” N.T., 368 N.C. at 707 , 782 S.E.2d at 504 (citation omitted).

2023As a result, Respondent-Mother did not carry her burden to rebut “the prima facie presumption of rightful jurisdiction[.]” N.T., 368 N.C. at 707 , 782 S.E.2d at 504 (citation omitted).

1994Badame, 242 N.C. at 756 , 89 S.E.2d at 467 .

1994Badame, 242 N.C. at 756 , 89 S.E.2d at 467 .

2020CAMPBELL Opinion of the Court Defendant argued that the trial court erred by concluding that he failed to establish a prima facie claim of racial discrimination in jury selection, as set forth by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 90 L.

2020CAMPBELL Opinion of the Court Defendant argued that the trial court erred by concluding that he failed to establish a prima facie claim of racial discrimination in jury selection, as set forth by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 90 L.

2026Co. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 706 F.Supp.3d 535 , 542 (M.D.N.C. 2023) (quoting Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 792 (1938)); see also Renwick v. News & Observer Pub.

1971Badame v. Lampke, 242 N.C. 755 , 89 S.E. 2d 466 (1955); Kindley v. Privette, 241 N.C. 140 , 84 S.E. 2d 660 (1954); Roth v. News Co., 217 N.C. 13 , 6 S.E. 2d 882 (1940); Flake v. News Co., 212 N.C. 780 , 195 S.E. 55 (1938) ; Broadway v. Cope, 208 N.C. 85 , 179 S.E. 452 (1935).

2023DAVIS Opinion of the Court defendant must have consciously accepted the benefit.” JPMorgan Chase Bank, Nat’l Ass’n v. Browning, 230 N.C.

2020A prima facie claim for quantum meruit/unjust enrichment includes five elements: (1) “one party must confer a benefit upon the other party[;]” (2) “the benefit must not have been conferred officiously, that is it must not be conferred by an interference in the affairs of the other party in a manner that is not justified in the circumstances[;]” (3) “the benefit must not be gratuitous[;]” (4) “the benefit must be measurable[;]” and (5) “the defendant must have consciously accepted the benefit.” JPMorgan Chase Bank, Nat’l Ass’n v. Browning, 230 N.C.

2011Williams, 355 N.C. at 549 , 565 S.E.2d at 637 (quoting Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 , 99 S. Ct. 664, 668 , 58 L.

2011Williams, 355 N.C. at 549 , 565 S.E.2d at 637 (quoting Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 , 99 S. Ct. 664, 668 , 58 L.

1999See Donovan v. Fiumara, 114 N.C.

1995Donovan v. Fiumara, 114 N.C.

1997App. 211, 212 , 212 S.E.2d 552, 553 (1975). “[I]t is not necessary that a meritorious defense be proved, but only that a prima facie defense exists.” Wynnewood Corp. v. Soderquist, 27 N.C.

1975Carolina Bank, Inc. v. Finance Company, 25 N.C.

1997App. 211, 212 , 212 S.E.2d 552, 553 (1975). “[I]t is not necessary that a meritorious defense be proved, but only that a prima facie defense exists.” Wynnewood Corp. v. Soderquist, 27 N.C.

1997App. 611, 615 , 219 S.E.2d 787, 790-91 (1975).