prima facie violation in Rhode Island

2019C Intentional Interference with Prospective Contractual Relations "To establish a prima facie claim for intentional interference with contractual relations, the aggrieved party must demonstrate '(1) the existence of a contract; (2) the alleged wrongdoer's knowledge of the contract; (3) his [or her] intentional interference; and (4) damages resulting therefrom.' " Lomastro v. Iacovelli , 126 A.3d 470 , 474 (R.I. 2015) (italics deleted) (quoting Belliveau Building Corp. v. O'Coin , 763 A.2d 622 , 627 (R.I. 2000) ).

2015To establish a prima facie claim for intentional interference with contractual relations, the aggrieved party must demonstrate “(1) the existence of a contract; (2) the alleged wrongdoer’s knowledge of the contract; (3) his [or her] intentional interference; and (4) damages resulting therefrom.” Belliveau Building Corp. v. O’Coin, 763 A.2d 622, 627 (R.I. 2000) (quoting Smith Development Corp. v. Bilow Enterprises, Inc., 112 R.I. 203, 211 , 308 A.2d 477, 482 (1973)).

2021“To establish a prima facie claim for intentional interference with contractual relations, the aggrieved party must demonstrate (1) the existence of a contract; (2) the alleged wrongdoer’s knowledge of the contract; (3) his or her intentional - 14 - interference; and (4) damages resulting therefrom.” John Rocchio Corporation v. Pare Engineering Corporation, 201 A.3d 316, 324 (R.I. 2019) (brackets omitted) (quoting Lomastro v. Iacovelli, 126 A.3d 470 , 474 (R.I. 2015)).

2018See Marchetti v. Parsons , 638 A.2d 1047 , 1049 (R.I. 1994).

2015As to the requirement that the interference must be intentional, we have not required that actual malice be shown; rather, “legal malice—an intent to do harm without justification—will suffice.” Id. (quoting Jolicoeur Furniture Co. v. Baldelli, 653 A.2d 740, 753 (R.I. 1995)).

2015To establish a prima facie claim for intentional interference with contractual relations, the aggrieved party must demonstrate “(1) the existence of a contract; (2) the alleged wrongdoer’s knowledge of the contract; (3) his [or her] intentional interference; and (4) damages resulting therefrom.” Belliveau Building Corp. v. O’Coin, 763 A.2d 622, 627 (R.I. 2000) (quoting Smith Development Corp. v. Bilow Enterprises, Inc., 112 R.I. 203, 211 , 308 A.2d 477, 482 (1973)).

2015To establish a prima facie claim for intentional interference with contractual relations, the aggrieved party must demonstrate “(1) the existence of a contract; (2) the alleged wrongdoer’s knowledge of the contract; (3) his [or her] intentional interference; and (4) damages resulting therefrom.” Belliveau Building Corp. v. O’Coin, 763 A.2d 622, 627 (R.I. 2000) (quoting Smith Development Corp. v. Bilow Enterprises, Inc., 112 R.I. 203, 211 , 308 A.2d 477, 482 (1973)).

2014See Thomas v. Denny’s, Inc., 111 F.3d 1506, 1510 (10th Cir. 1997); Davenport v. Riverview Gardens School District, 30 F.3d 940, 944 (8th Cir. 1994); Siegel v. Alpha Wire Corp., 894 F.2d 50, 54 (3d Cir. 1990).

2014See Thomas v. Denny's, Inc., 111 F.3d 1506, 1510 (10th Cir.1997); Davenport v. Riverview Gardens School District, 30 F.3d 940, 944 (8th Cir.1994); Siegel v. Alpha Wire Corp., 894 F.2d 50, 54 (3d Cir.1990).

2014See Thomas v. Denny’s, Inc., 111 F.3d 1506, 1510 (10th Cir. 1997); Davenport v. Riverview Gardens School District, 30 F.3d 940, 944 (8th Cir. 1994); Siegel v. Alpha Wire Corp., 894 F.2d 50, 54 (3d Cir. 1990).

2014See Thomas v. Denny's, Inc., 111 F.3d 1506, 1510 (10th Cir.1997); Davenport v. Riverview Gardens School District, 30 F.3d 940, 944 (8th Cir.1994); Siegel v. Alpha Wire Corp., 894 F.2d 50, 54 (3d Cir.1990).

2014See Thomas v. Denny’s, Inc., 111 F.3d 1506, 1510 (10th Cir. 1997); Davenport v. Riverview Gardens School District, 30 F.3d 940, 944 (8th Cir. 1994); Siegel v. Alpha Wire Corp., 894 F.2d 50, 54 (3d Cir. 1990).

2014See Thomas v. Denny's, Inc., 111 F.3d 1506, 1510 (10th Cir.1997); Davenport v. Riverview Gardens School District, 30 F.3d 940, 944 (8th Cir.1994); Siegel v. Alpha Wire Corp., 894 F.2d 50, 54 (3d Cir.1990).

2007See Andreoni v. Ainsworth, 898 A.2d 1240, 1244 (R.I.2006) (holding that a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding consent when the defendant testified that her son did not have permission to use her automobile); Hill v. Cabral, 62 R.I. 11, 13, 19 , 2 A.2d 482, 483, 485 (1938) (characterizing the issue of consent as a question of fact for the jury where the defendant testified that she had refused to let her son operate the automobile).

2007See Andreoni v. Ainsworth, 898 A.2d 1240, 1244 (R.I.2006) (holding that a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding consent when the defendant testified that her son did not have permission to use her automobile); Hill v. Cabral, 62 R.I. 11, 13, 19 , 2 A.2d 482, 483, 485 (1938) (characterizing the issue of consent as a question of fact for the jury where the defendant testified that she had refused to let her son operate the automobile).

2007See Andreoni v. Ainsworth, 898 A.2d 1240, 1244 (R.I.2006) (holding that a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding consent when the defendant testified that her son did not have permission to use her automobile); Hill v. Cabral, 62 R.I. 11, 13, 19 , 2 A.2d 482, 483, 485 (1938) (characterizing the issue of consent as a question of fact for the jury where the defendant testified that she had refused to let her son operate the automobile).

2005Schindler v. Sckiavo, 358 F.Supp.2d 1161, 1165 (M.D.Fla.), aff'd, 403 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir.2005).

2005Schindler v. Schiavo, 358 F.Supp.2d 1161, 1165 (M.D.Fla.), affd, 403 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir.2005).

2005In order to establish a prima facie claim of discrimination pursuant to Title III of the ADA, it is well settled that the plaintiff bears the burden of proving: “1) that he or she is an individual with a disability; 2) that defendant is a place of public accommodation; and 3) that defendant denied him or her full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities or privileges offered by defendant on the basis of his or her disability.” Larsen v. Carnival Corp., 242 F.Supp.2d 1333, 1342 (S.D.Fla.2003); see also Schiavo ex. rel.

2005In order to establish a prima facie claim of discrimination pursuant to Title III of the ADA, it is well settled that the plaintiff bears the burden of proving: "1) that he or she is an individual with a disability; 2) that defendant is a place of public accommodation; and 3) that defendant denied him or her full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities or privileges offered by defendant on the basis of his or her disability." Larsen v. Carnival Corp., 242 F.Supp.2d 1333, 1342 (S.D.Fla.2003); see also Schiavo ex. rel .

2003To demonstrate a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must establish: “(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this under representation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.” Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 , 99 S.Ct. 664 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979); see also State v. Johnson, 116 R.I. 449, 45

2003To demonstrate a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must establish: “(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this under representation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.” Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 , 99 S.Ct. 664 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979); see also State v. Johnson, 116 R.I. 449, 45

2003App. 60 , 64, 497 S.E.2d 303 , 306 (1998) ("[S]tatistical evidence indicating a disparity between the number of minorities serving on a jury in relation to the number of minorities in the community, standing alone, is insufficient to prove that the underrepresentation is a product of systematic exclusion of the minority group"); accord People v. Bell, 49 Cal.3d 502 , 529, 778 P.2d 129 , 143 (1989) (recognizing that "[w]ere statistical evidence of recurring disparity alone adequate to establish a prima facie violation of the cross-section guaranty, the third prong of the Duren test would be sur

2003App. 60 , 64, 497 S.E.2d 303 , 306 (1998) ("[S]tatistical evidence indicating a disparity between the number of minorities serving on a jury in relation to the number of minorities in the community, standing alone, is insufficient to prove that the underrepresentation is a product of systematic exclusion of the minority group"); accord People v. Bell, 49 Cal.3d 502 , 529, 778 P.2d 129 , 143 (1989) (recognizing that "[w]ere statistical evidence of recurring disparity alone adequate to establish a prima facie violation of the cross-section guaranty, the third prong of the Duren test would be sur

2002The trial justice's "from the hip” statements appear to fall far short of meeting the prima facie standard enunciated in Iggy’s Doughboys, Inc. v. Giroux, 729 A.2d 701, 705 (R.I.1999) (per curiam). 6 .