prima facie claim in Florida

2025Comm'n, 702 So. 2d 536, 536 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (“The charge, which was sworn to by Gibbons, stated that during the summer of 1995 Gibbons criticized the management staff in his office on several occasions and that he counseled colleagues regarding their union rights.”) (emphasis added) (citing § 447.503(1), Fla. Stat. (1995), requiring the charge be accompanied by “sworn statements and documentary evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie violation” of the pertinent unfair labor practice provision); Fla. Admin.

2012The only court to provide an explanation of the requirements to establish a prima facie charge alleging a violation of section 447.501(l)(a), (d) has been the Second District Court of Appeal in Gibbons v. State Public Employees Relations Commission, 702 So.2d 536, 537 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (“We have been unable to find an opinion from a Florida court setting forth the requirements necessary to establish a prima facie charge alleging a violation of section 447.501(a), (d) and section 447.301(3), (4).”).

2025We will not substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact.”); see also Viera v. State, 163 So. 3d 602, 604 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015).

2023See also Viera v. 7 State, 163 So. 3d 602, 604-05 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (“[T]he objective standard is to be applied by a trial court in evaluating the factual circumstances presented in a Stand Your Ground motion to dismiss.

2015Partners, LLC v. Palm Beach Pain Mgmt., Inc., 57 So.3d 966, 968 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (quoting Dream Closet, Inc. v. Palm Beach Mall, LLC, 991 So.2d 910, 911-12 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)).

2011Dream Closet, Inc. v. Palm Beach Mall, LLC, 991 So.2d 910, 911-12 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (quoting Boudreau v. M & H Food Corp., 895 So.2d 501, 503 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)).

2010See Brantley v. State, 912 So.2d 342, 342-43 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (remanding for an evidentiary hearing based on the affidavit of a code-fendant which stated the defendant was not present and was not involved in the shooting and based on the postconviction motion which alleged that defense counsel tried to obtain the codefendant’s cooperation but was refused); Roundtree v. State, 884 So.2d 322, 323 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (holding that the defendant’s allegations that his codefendant admitted that the defendant had no role in the robbery and that the codefendant had not testified on the defendant’s b

2010See Brantley v. State, 912 So.2d 342, 342-43 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (remanding for an evidentiary hearing based on the affidavit of a codefendant which stated the defendant was not present and was not involved in the shooting and based on the postconviction motion which alleged that defense counsel tried to obtain the codefendant's cooperation but was refused); Roundtree v. State, 884 So.2d 322, 323 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (holding that the defendant's allegations that his codefendant admitted that the defendant had no role in the robbery and that the codefendant had not testified on the defendant's be

2010See Brantley v. State, 912 So.2d 342, 342-43 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (remanding for an evidentiary hearing based on the affidavit of a code-fendant which stated the defendant was not present and was not involved in the shooting and based on the postconviction motion which alleged that defense counsel tried to obtain the codefendant’s cooperation but was refused); Roundtree v. State, 884 So.2d 322, 323 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (holding that the defendant’s allegations that his codefendant admitted that the defendant had no role in the robbery and that the codefendant had not testified on the defendant’s b

2010See Brantley v. State, 912 So.2d 342, 342-43 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (remanding for an evidentiary hearing based on the affidavit of a codefendant which stated the defendant was not present and was not involved in the shooting and based on the postconviction motion which alleged that defense counsel tried to obtain the codefendant's cooperation but was refused); Roundtree v. State, 884 So.2d 322, 323 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (holding that the defendant's allegations that his codefendant admitted that the defendant had no role in the robbery and that the codefendant had not testified on the defendant's be

2010See Brantley v. State, 912 So.2d 342, 342-43 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (remanding for an evidentiary hearing based on the affidavit of a code-fendant which stated the defendant was not present and was not involved in the shooting and based on the postconviction motion which alleged that defense counsel tried to obtain the codefendant’s cooperation but was refused); Roundtree v. State, 884 So.2d 322, 323 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (holding that the defendant’s allegations that his codefendant admitted that the defendant had no role in the robbery and that the codefendant had not testified on the defendant’s b

2010See Brantley v. State, 912 So.2d 342, 342-43 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (remanding for an evidentiary hearing based on the affidavit of a codefendant which stated the defendant was not present and was not involved in the shooting and based on the postconviction motion which alleged that defense counsel tried to obtain the codefendant's cooperation but was refused); Roundtree v. State, 884 So.2d 322, 323 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (holding that the defendant's allegations that his codefendant admitted that the defendant had no role in the robbery and that the codefendant had not testified on the defendant's be

2010See Brantley v. State, 912 So.2d 342, 342-43 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (remanding for an evidentiary hearing based on the affidavit of a code-fendant which stated the defendant was not present and was not involved in the shooting and based on the postconviction motion which alleged that defense counsel tried to obtain the codefendant’s cooperation but was refused); Roundtree v. State, 884 So.2d 322, 323 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (holding that the defendant’s allegations that his codefendant admitted that the defendant had no role in the robbery and that the codefendant had not testified on the defendant’s b

2010See Brantley v. State, 912 So.2d 342, 342-43 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (remanding for an evidentiary hearing based on the affidavit of a codefendant which stated the defendant was not present and was not involved in the shooting and based on the postconviction motion which alleged that defense counsel tried to obtain the codefendant's cooperation but was refused); Roundtree v. State, 884 So.2d 322, 323 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (holding that the defendant's allegations that his codefendant admitted that the defendant had no role in the robbery and that the codefendant had not testified on the defendant's be

2008See Kleppinger v. State, 884 So.2d 146, 148 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (concluded that allegation that counsel "fail[ed] to advise [defendant] of possible sentences he faced if he proceeded to trial" and that "he would have accepted the State's plea offer if he had been properly advised ... state[d] a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel"); Lewis v. State, 751 So.2d 715, 718 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (concluding that defendant was "entitled to relief because his trial counsel conceded that when the State's offer of one year was made, he failed to inform Lewis of a potential sentence of [th

2006See, e.g., Kleppinger v. State, 884 So.2d 146 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (holding that the allegation that trial counsel failed to advise defendant of possible sentences stated a prima facie claim for ineffective assistance of counsel); Parker v. State, 853 So.2d 602 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003).

2004See McLin v. State, 827 So.2d 948 (Fla.2002); Keen v. State, 855 So.2d 117 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003).

2003See McLin v. State, 827 So.2d 948 (Fla.2002); Padron v. State, 827 So.2d 393 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); Smith, 837 So.2d at 1186 .

2019This court held in Hight v. State, 253 So. 3d 1137, 1141 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018), that the amendment constituted a substantive change to the law that applies prospectively.

2018If the State cannot overcome an accused's claim of immunity by clear and convincing evidence at a pretrial immunity hearing, it is less likely it can prove beyond a reasonable doubt at trial that the same acts were not justifiable self-defense. 4In Langel v. State, 255 So. 3d 359, 362-363 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018), the Fourth District explained that raising a prima facie claim of self-defense immunity from criminal prosecution under section 776.032(4) ordinarily "require[s] the defendant to testify or to otherwise present or point to evidence from which the elements for justifiable use of force can

2018"To establish a prima facie claim for retaliation under Florida's Whistle-blower Act, *932 sections 112.3187 - 112.31895, Florida Statutes (2007), a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) he engaged in protected activity; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there is a causal relation between the two events." Fla. Dep't of Children & Families v. Shapiro , 68 So.3d 298 , 305-06 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (citing Rice-Lamar v. City of Fort Lauderdale , 853 So.2d 1125 , 1132-33 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) ).

2018"Once the prima facie case is established, the employer [has the burden to] proffer a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the adverse employment action." Rice-Lamar , 853 So.2d at 1133 .

2008Guess v. City of Miramar, 889 So.2d 840, 846 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (citing Harper v. Blockbuster Entn't Corp., 139 F.3d 1385 , 1388 (11th Cir.1998)).

2004Harper, 139 F.3d at 1385.

2006As set forth in PERC's final order, the applicable standard is found in Pasco County School Board v. Florida Public Employment Relations Commission, 353 So. 2d 108, 117 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), in which the court held: In order to determine whether the evidence sustains a charge alleging an unfair labor practice, when it is grounded upon an asserted violation of protected activity, the following general principles should be considered by the hearing officer and by PERC: (1) In any such proceeding the burden is upon the claimant to present proof by a preponderance of the evidence that (a) his condu

1997In F.U.S.A., FTP-NEA v. Hillsborough Community College, 440 So.2d 593 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), and Pasco County School Board v. Florida Public Employees Relations Commission, 353 So.2d 108 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), the First District Court of Appeal did not address the sufficiency of the charges.

2025Clear and convincing evidence means that “the sum total of the evidence must be of sufficient weight to convince the trier of fact without hesitancy.” Guida v. State, 356 So. 3d 310 , 311 (Fla. 5th DCA 2023) (quoting Edwards v. State, 257 So. 3d 586, 588 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018)).

2025Comm'n, 64 So. 3d 723, 727 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (“In order to establish a prima facie violation, the charge must include the names of the individuals involved in the alleged unfair labor practice, and the time and place of occurrence of the particular acts giving rise to the dispute.

2022See, e.g., Diehl v. Moore, 767 So. 2d 615 , 616–17 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (holding that a prima facie showing merely in the future, but not necessarily about to happen.” 795 So. 2d at 186 n.3 (citations omitted). 5 is not made by “conclusory allegation”); Drake v. Scharlau, 353 So. 2d 961, 965 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978) (holding that conclusory allegations were insufficient to carry an initial pleading burden).

2022See, e.g., Diehl v. Moore, 767 So. 2d 615 , 616–17 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (holding that a prima facie showing merely in the future, but not necessarily about to happen.” 795 So. 2d at 186 n.3 (citations omitted). 5 is not made by “conclusory allegation”); Drake v. Scharlau, 353 So. 2d 961, 965 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978) (holding that conclusory allegations were insufficient to carry an initial pleading burden).

2022See, e.g., Diehl v. Moore, 767 So. 2d 615 , 616–17 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (holding that a prima facie showing merely in the future, but not necessarily about to happen.” 795 So. 2d at 186 n.3 (citations omitted). 5 is not made by “conclusory allegation”); Drake v. Scharlau, 353 So. 2d 961, 965 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978) (holding that conclusory allegations were insufficient to carry an initial pleading burden).

2018If the State cannot overcome an accused's claim of immunity by clear and convincing evidence at a pretrial immunity hearing, it is less likely it can prove beyond a reasonable doubt at trial that the same acts were not justifiable self-defense. 4In Langel v. State, 255 So. 3d 359, 362-363 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018), the Fourth District explained that raising a prima facie claim of self-defense immunity from criminal prosecution under section 776.032(4) ordinarily "require[s] the defendant to testify or to otherwise present or point to evidence from which the elements for justifiable use of force can

2018See Lewis v. State, 34 So. 3d 183, 186 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) ("When a court makes a - 19 - Should our interpretation of the text of section 776.032(4) not reflect the legislature's intent, it is up to the legislature to clarify its intent by amending the statute.