prima facie violation in Connecticut

1995To establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross section requirement under Duren , “the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection pro cess.” Id.

1991“In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community; (2) that the representa tion of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.” Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 , 99 S. Ct. 664 , 58 L.

1998Accordingly, the defendant has failed to state a prima facie violation of the sixth amendment. (5) Process Susceptible to Abuse In order to show a prima facie violation of the equal protection clause, the defendant must show that the selection procedure is "susceptible to abuse or not racially neutral." State v. Castonguay, 194 Conn. 416 , 421 , 481 , A.2d 56 (1984) "Although the equal protection test is similar to the cross section test, the critical difference is that in an equal protection claim the defendant must prove discriminatory purpose." Id.

1998Accordingly, the defendant has failed to state a prima facie violation of the sixth amendment. (5) Process Susceptible to Abuse In order to show a prima facie violation of the equal protection clause, the defendant must show that the selection procedure is "susceptible to abuse or not racially neutral." State v. Castonguay, 194 Conn. 416 , 421 , 481 , A.2d 56 (1984) "Although the equal protection test is similar to the cross section test, the critical difference is that in an equal protection claim the defendant must prove discriminatory purpose." Id.

2016The only remaining question is whether there is adequate justification for this infringement." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Gibbs , 254 Conn. 578 , 588, 758 A.2d 327 (2000). "[W]e review the [trial] court's factual determinations relevant to the defendant's Sixth Amendment ... challenge for clear error ... but we review de novo the court's legal determination whether a prima facie violation of the fair cross section requirement has occurred." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 592 , 758 A.2d 327 .

2016The only remaining question is whether there is adequate justification for this infringement." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Gibbs , 254 Conn. 578 , 588, 758 A.2d 327 (2000). "[W]e review the [trial] court's factual determinations relevant to the defendant's Sixth Amendment ... challenge for clear error ... but we review de novo the court's legal determination whether a prima facie violation of the fair cross section requirement has occurred." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 592 , 758 A.2d 327 .

2017To determine whether a plaintiff has established a prima facie claim for discrimination pursuant to § 46a-60 (a) (1), the court employs the burden shifting analysis set forth by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792 , 802-804, 93 S.Ct. 1817 , 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).

2017To determine whether a plaintiff has established a prima facie claim for discrimination pursuant to § 46a-60 (a) (1), the court employs the burden shifting analysis set forth by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792 , 802-804, 93 S.Ct. 1817 , 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).

2001The certified issue in this appeal is: “Whether an employee’s discharge lor not returning to work, while claiming she was unable to do so because of a compensable injury within two days of her discharge, constitutes a prima facie violation of General Statutes § 31-290a, requiring the employer to show a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge pursuant to Ford v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Connecticut, Inc., 216 Conn. 40 , 578 A.2d 1054 (1990)?” Diaz v. Housing Authority, 253 Conn. 917 , 755 A.2d 214 (2000).

2001The certified issue in this appeal is: “Whether an employee’s discharge lor not returning to work, while claiming she was unable to do so because of a compensable injury within two days of her discharge, constitutes a prima facie violation of General Statutes § 31-290a, requiring the employer to show a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge pursuant to Ford v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Connecticut, Inc., 216 Conn. 40 , 578 A.2d 1054 (1990)?” Diaz v. Housing Authority, 253 Conn. 917 , 755 A.2d 214 (2000).

1992Because the defendant failed to present evidence to support his claim that the jury array did not provide a fair and representative cross section of the community, the trial court acted properly in denying the defendant’s objection to the first jury panel. “ Tn order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a “distinctive” group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such pe

1992Because the defendant failed to present evidence to support his claim that the jury array did not provide a fair and representative cross section of the community, the trial court acted properly in denying the defendant’s objection to the first jury panel. “ Tn order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a “distinctive” group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such pe

1999See, e.g., State v. Webb, 238 Conn. 389, 450-52 , 680 A.2d 147 (1996); State v. Robinson, 227 Conn. 711, 717-18 , 631 A.2d 288 (1993); State v. Tillman, 220 Conn. 487, 492 , 600 A.2d 738 (1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1207 , 112 S. Ct. 3000 , 120 L.

1992Because the defendant failed to present evidence to support his claim that the jury array did not provide a fair and representative cross section of the community, the trial court acted properly in denying the defendant’s objection to the first jury panel. “ Tn order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a “distinctive” group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such pe

1999See, e.g., State v. Webb, 238 Conn. 389, 450-52 , 680 A.2d 147 (1996); State v. Robinson, 227 Conn. 711, 717-18 , 631 A.2d 288 (1993); State v. Tillman, 220 Conn. 487, 492 , 600 A.2d 738 (1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1207 , 112 S. Ct. 3000 , 120 L.

1992Because the defendant failed to present evidence to support his claim that the jury array did not provide a fair and representative cross section of the community, the trial court acted properly in denying the defendant’s objection to the first jury panel. “ Tn order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a “distinctive” group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such pe

1982Ed. 2d 579 (1979); State v. Frazier, 185 Conn. 211, 216-17 , 440 A.2d 916 (1981); State v. Machia, 38 Conn. Sup. 407, 412 , 449 A.2d 1043 (1979). *437 The defendant has failed to show that ten of the twelve groups claimed by him to have been excluded meet the first prong of the prima facie test: (1) naturalized citizens opposed to the present form of government in the United States; (2) voters with arrest records; (3) people living in apartments or not listed in the city directory; (4) people with insufficient formal education; (5) the elderly; (6) clergy; (7) teachers; (8) students; (9) low-i

1982Ed. 2d 579 (1979); State v. Frazier, 185 Conn. 211, 216-17 , 440 A.2d 916 (1981); State v. Machia, 38 Conn. Sup. 407, 412 , 449 A.2d 1043 (1979). *437 The defendant has failed to show that ten of the twelve groups claimed by him to have been excluded meet the first prong of the prima facie test: (1) naturalized citizens opposed to the present form of government in the United States; (2) voters with arrest records; (3) people living in apartments or not listed in the city directory; (4) people with insufficient formal education; (5) the elderly; (6) clergy; (7) teachers; (8) students; (9) low-i

1981You must determine from all the evidence, including the prima facie presumption, if *686 you find that it comes into operation, whether the defendant has been proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis added.) State v. Harrison, supra, stands for the proposition that “a jury instruction on the element of intent that is worded in terms of a ‘presumption’ and not of an ‘inference’ without a clear instruction on the legal effect of the presumption is unconstitutional .... [Further,] the impact upon the minds of a jury of such an instruction may be either to establish the defendant’s inte

1981You must determine from all the evidence, including the prima facie presumption, if *686 you find that it comes into operation, whether the defendant has been proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis added.) State v. Harrison, supra, stands for the proposition that “a jury instruction on the element of intent that is worded in terms of a ‘presumption’ and not of an ‘inference’ without a clear instruction on the legal effect of the presumption is unconstitutional .... [Further,] the impact upon the minds of a jury of such an instruction may be either to establish the defendant’s inte

1950"The rule of the common law, ... by which a prima facie presumption of payment arises after twenty years, presents the only limitation of time to the collection of a domestic judgment which is recognized in this State." Barber v. International Co., 74 Conn. 652 , 656 .

1913Barber v. International Co., 74 Conn. 652, 656 , 51 Atl. 857 .

2021The court found, on the basis of the record before it, that ‘‘that assump- tion [was] unwarranted and unproven.’’ Turning to the equal protection claim, the court applied the three part test set forth in State v. Gibbs, supra, 254 Conn. 578 , which requires, as proof of an equal protection violation in jury selection ‘‘(1) under- representation of a recognizable group; (2) substantial underrepresentation over a significant period of time; and (3) a selection procedure susceptible to abuse or not racially neutral.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Id., 594 , citing Castaneda v. Partida, 4

2021The court found, on the basis of the record before it, that ‘‘that assump- tion [was] unwarranted and unproven.’’ Turning to the equal protection claim, the court applied the three part test set forth in State v. Gibbs, supra, 254 Conn. 578 , which requires, as proof of an equal protection violation in jury selection ‘‘(1) under- representation of a recognizable group; (2) substantial underrepresentation over a significant period of time; and (3) a selection procedure susceptible to abuse or not racially neutral.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Id., 594 , citing Castaneda v. Partida, 4

2019Co. , 110 Conn. App. 736 , 739, 955 A.2d 1241 , cert. denied, 289 Conn. 955 , 961 A.2d 421 (2008) ; see 9 J.

2019Co. , 110 Conn. App. 736 , 739, 955 A.2d 1241 , cert. denied, 289 Conn. 955 , 961 A.2d 421 (2008) ; see 9 J.

2019Our Supreme Court repeatedly has cautioned trial courts not to make jurisdictional findings where there are disputed issues of fact until the court has held a full evidentiary hearing "because a court cannot make a critical factual [jurisdictional] finding [on the basis of] memoranda and documents submitted by the parties." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Angersola v. Radiologic Associates of Middletown, P.C. , supra, 330 Conn. at 275 , 193 A.3d 520 .

2019Our Supreme Court repeatedly has cautioned trial courts not to make jurisdictional findings where there are disputed issues of fact until the court has held a full evidentiary hearing "because a court cannot make a critical factual [jurisdictional] finding [on the basis of] memoranda and documents submitted by the parties." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Angersola v. Radiologic Associates of Middletown, P.C. , supra, 330 Conn. at 275 , 193 A.3d 520 .

2019Co. , 110 Conn. App. 736 , 739, 955 A.2d 1241 , cert. denied, 289 Conn. 955 , 961 A.2d 421 (2008) ; see 9 J.

2019Co. , 110 Conn. App. 736 , 739, 955 A.2d 1241 , cert. denied, 289 Conn. 955 , 961 A.2d 421 (2008) ; see 9 J.

2019Id., 85 .

2016He also claims that the court "abused its discretion when presented with a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel-by way of a [ State v. Fernando A., 294 Conn. 1 , 7-8, 981 A.2d 427 (2009) ] violation-by flatly denying the defendant an opportunity to be heard on his claim and preventing him from perfecting the record needed for him to present his claim either on direct appeal or through a petition for a writ of habeas corpus." 2 We agree with the *188 parties that the defendant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing regarding Riccio's alleged ineffective assistance.

2016He also claims that the court "abused its discretion when presented with a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel-by way of a [ State v. Fernando A., 294 Conn. 1 , 7-8, 981 A.2d 427 (2009) ] violation-by flatly denying the defendant an opportunity to be heard on his claim and preventing him from perfecting the record needed for him to present his claim either on direct appeal or through a petition for a writ of habeas corpus." 2 We agree with the *188 parties that the defendant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing regarding Riccio's alleged ineffective assistance.

2013Thus, we do not have reason to decide whether this claim, that employment termination pursuant to § 10-151 (d) violated § 46a-60, should have been brought under the mixed motive/Pnce Waterhouse framework; Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 246 , 109 S. Ct. 1775 , 104 L.

2013Thus, we do not have reason to decide whether this claim, that employment termination pursuant to § 10-151 (d) violated § 46a-60, should have been brought under the mixed motive/Pnce Waterhouse framework; Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 246 , 109 S. Ct. 1775 , 104 L.

2009“Exculpatory has been defined to mean [c]learing or tending to clear from alleged fault or guilt; excusing.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Falcon, 90 Conn. App. 111, 121 , 876 A.2d 547 , cert. denied, 275 Conn. 926 , *391 883 A.2d 1248 (2005).

2009“Exculpatory has been defined to mean [c]learing or tending to clear from alleged fault or guilt; excusing.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Falcon, 90 Conn. App. 111, 121 , 876 A.2d 547 , cert. denied, 275 Conn. 926 , *391 883 A.2d 1248 (2005).

2009“Exculpatory has been defined to mean [c]learing or tending to clear from alleged fault or guilt; excusing.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Falcon, 90 Conn. App. 111, 121 , 876 A.2d 547 , cert. denied, 275 Conn. 926 , *391 883 A.2d 1248 (2005).

2009“Exculpatory has been defined to mean [c]learing or tending to clear from alleged fault or guilt; excusing.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Falcon, 90 Conn. App. 111, 121 , 876 A.2d 547 , cert. denied, 275 Conn. 926 , *391 883 A.2d 1248 (2005).

2008It is an axiom of workers’ compensation law that the plaintiff must establish the predicates to compensation “by competent evidence.” Pereira v. State, supra, 544; Murchison v. Skinner Precision Industries, Inc., 162 Conn. 142, 151 , 291 A.2d 743 (1972).

2008It is an axiom of workers’ compensation law that the plaintiff must establish the predicates to compensation “by competent evidence.” Pereira v. State, supra, 544; Murchison v. Skinner Precision Industries, Inc., 162 Conn. 142, 151 , 291 A.2d 743 (1972).

2003Wendt v. Wendt , 59 Conn. App. 656 , 685 (2000).